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
THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF
COLONEL HOUSE



FROM NEUTRALITY TO WAR
1915-1917

'If the story of President Wilson's actions through this crisis is ever told, not the least of the things to his credit will be the departure from all diplomatic precedents in availing himself of the services of this wise and far-seeing political observer and adviser. . . .'

SIR HORACE PLUNKETT



Wm. H. H. H. H.

THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

Arranged as a Narrative

BY

CHARLES SEYMOUR

Sterling Professor of History, Yale University



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CONTENTS

I. THE PATIENCE OF WOODROW WILSON

Wilson's Note of Protest — House Returns to United States — Bryan's Resignation — His Successor — Conversations with British and German Ambassadors — House Urges Preparedness — German Evasions of the *Lusitania* Issue — Atmosphere in Berlin — The Forebodings of Gerard.

II. THE ARABIC CRISIS

29

The Sinking of the *Arabic* — Wilson's Appeal for Advice — House opposed to Further Notes — House's Negotiations with Bernstorff — Germany Promises not to Sink Liners without Warning — Wilson's Distrust of Germany — Dismissal of Dumba — American Demand for Formal Disavowal of Sinking of *Arabic* — Letters of Gerard — Bernstorff Secures the Disavowal from Berlin — Lull in the Crisis with Germany.

III. AMERICA AND THE ALLIES

49

Basis of the Wilsonian Policy of Neutrality — Attitude of Allied Leaders — Letters from Sir Edward Grey — Continued Trade Dispute with the British — House Explains the American Situation to Page — Opinions of Bryce and Plunkett — Tension in Official Circles — The Irritation of Spring-Rice — The Discouragement of Grey.

IV. A PLAN TO COMPEL PEACE

82

Alternative Policies Open to Wilson — House Urges Definite Action — His Suggestion of a Plan to Assist Allies to a 'Peace of Justice' — Wilson's Tentative Approval — House's Letter to Grey — Attacks upon Wilson — Pressure from the Pacifists — A Disappointing Response from Grey — President Dissatisfied with Relations with Allies — Plan for Sending House Abroad — Difficulties with the British Ambassador — House Leaves for Europe.

V. A SECOND QUEST

112

Public Opinion on the New House Mission — Conference with Grey and Balfour — Wilson Cables, promising that United States will Coöperate to Maintain Permanent

Peace — The Personal Contacts of Colonel House — Interviews with the King and British Leaders — Conferences with Lloyd George, Balfour, and Grey — British Trade Restrictions.

VI. DEADLOCK IN EUROPE 135

Grey and Bryce Approve House's Trip to Germany — In Berlin — Talks with the Chancellor, von Jagow, Zimmermann — Origin of Phrase, 'Scrap of Paper' — Germany will not make Peace except on Victor's Terms — Struggle between German Civil Government and Navalists — Conditions in Austria and Italy as Told by American Ambassadors — Conferences with French Leaders — House Discusses American Intervention with Briand and Cambon — 'The Way Out seems Clear to Me.'

VII. AMERICA OFFERS TO HELP 166

House Visits the King of the Belgians — Back in London — Discussions with Asquith, Grey, Balfour, Lloyd George, Reading — The Conference of February 14 — House Prophesies a German Attack on Verdun — His Offer of American Conditional Assistance — War Gossip — Opinion on House's Mission — His Return to Washington — Wilson Approves House's Offer to the Allies — Grey's Memorandum and Cable Endorsing It — The Opportunity of the Allies.

VIII. THE SUSSEX AND AFTER 205

Tension in Relations with Germany — The *Lusitania* and Armed Merchantmen Issue — Wilson Stands Firm for American Rights — His Victory in Congress — Conditions in Germany as Reported by Gerard — The Sinking of the *Sussex* (March 24) — House Advises a Rupture — Wilson Hesitates — House's Negotiations with Bernstorff — Wilson's Ultimatum of April 18 — Imminence of War — Germany Yields.

IX. THE ALLIES REFUSE HELP 248

Deadlock in Military Situation — German Fear of American Intervention — Allied Determination — Unpopularity of Wilson in Allied Circles — Misunderstanding through Diplomatic Incompetency — Allies Fail to Take American Offer of Intervention and Assistance Seriously — House Urges the Plan upon Grey — Latter Unable to Act — House's Disappointment — Jusserand Unfavorable to Acceptance of the Offer — A Lost Opportunity.

X. WAR NERVES

293

Wilson Plans with House Announcement that United States will Coöperate with Europe to Maintain Permanent Peace — The Drafting of the Speech — The Speech of May 27, 1916 — Indifference of Allies — Continued Disputes with British — Irritation of Both Sides — The Blacklist — House's Efforts to Compose the Crisis — British Complaints of the U-53 — Germans on Good Behavior during the Summer — German Nerves Frazzled according to Gerard — Threat of Renewal of Submarine Warfare, October, 1918.

XI. THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

339

Domestic Problems — The Shadow of the Election — The Republicans Nominate Hughes — Problem of Democratic Campaign Manager — Elimination of McCombs — 'Sifting the Country' — Choice of McCormick — House's Plan of Campaign.

XII. WILSON REELECTED

364

House's Advice upon Campaign Issues — The Weakness of Hughes — His Failure to Win the Progressives — Bernstorff on German-American Opposition to Wilson — Democratic Strategy — Danger of New York Situation — Wilson's Visit to New York, November 2 — House's Prognostications — Advice to Wilson in Case of Defeat — Confidence at Last Moment — The Returns Come In — Emotions of the Democrats.

XIII. FUTILE PEACE PROPOSITIONS

387

Danger of New Submarine Crisis — House Opposed to Offer of American Mediation — Wilson Disturbed by Danger of War with Germany, Anxious to Mediate — Wilson Drafts his Note — House's Criticism and Objections — The Fall of the Asquith Cabinet — The German Peace Note — Wilson Issues his Note — Lack of Effect.

XIV. LAST HOPES OF PEACE

411

Wilson's Determination to Avoid War — House Objects to a Drifting Policy — Suggests a Speech to Define Diplomatic Aims of the United States — Wilson's Address to the Senate, January 22, 1917 — Echoes of the Speech — Bernstorff's Efforts to Secure American Mediation — Negotiations with House — Bernstorff Informed of German Plan to Renew Submarine Warfare — House's Suspicions — Germany Throws Off the Mask.

XV. THE END OF NEUTRALITY

436

Germany Announces Resumption of Submarine Warfare, February 1, 1917 — House called to Washington — Wilson Determined to Dismiss Bernstorff — The Activities of the Colonel — Wilson Hopes to Avoid War — Departure of Bernstorff — The Zimmermann Note and its Publication — The Policy of Armed Neutrality — The Senate Filibuster — Wilson Refuses to Reveal his Policy — The Cabinet Disturbed — House Confident of Final Decision — His Conferences with Wilson — Drafting the War Message — The United States Enters the War, April 2, 1917 — 'The Right is More Precious than Peace.'

INDEX

473

ILLUSTRATIONS

EDWARD M. HOUSE	<i>Photogravure frontispiece</i>
SIR CECIL SPRING-RICE	76
JAMES W. GERARD	138
Photograph with inscription	
CARDINAL MERCIER	166
Photograph with inscription	
THE PRESIDENT, MRS. WILSON, AND COLONEL HOUSE	200
COLONEL HOUSE'S STUDY AT NO. 115 EAST 53D STREET	234
WALTER HINES PAGE	270
Photograph with inscription	
VANCE McCORMICK	352
Photograph with inscription	
MAP SHOWING STATES GUARANTEED BY HOUSE TO WILSON IN THE ELECTION OF 1916 AND THE OTHER STATES FINALLY CARRIED BY WILSON	386
SIR HORACE PLUNKETT	406
Photograph with inscription	

THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

1915-1917

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CHAPTER I

THE PATIENCE OF WOODROW WILSON

If war comes with Germany, it will be because of our unpreparedness and her belief that we are more or less impotent to do her harm.

House to Wilson, July 19, 1915

— I —

PRESIDENT WILSON had refused to permit the United States to be drawn into the European War by the sinking of the *Lusitania*. The historian may approve or disapprove the wisdom of his course, viewed in the light of after events; but he may not question the President's motives. His decision was not based upon timidity, for to stand out against the outburst of popular emotion in the Eastern States demanded far more courage than to yield to it. Wilson was sometimes cautious, but he was always brave, and his willingness to negotiate resulted from an unshakable conviction that he owed it to America and the world to keep out of war unless the Germans definitely forced it upon us.

It would not have been difficult for him to stimulate a general war spirit had he wished to use the submarine's attack upon American citizens as a text. It would have been simple to create for himself the glory that surrounds the chief of a belligerent Power. Instead, he chose a harder road, and one that compelled him to travel through months of anxiety and personal humiliation, but always in the hope that he might save the United States from the horrors of war and, as chief of the one great neutral state, might end the

agony in which Europe was caught. Upon him fell the abuse of Entente sympathizers in America and the ill-concealed gibes of the British and French. Most difficult of all for him to meet, however, were the evasive tactics of the Germans, who for more than three months dragged out the negotiations over the submarine warfare, until even the President's patience was stretched to a gossamer tenuity.

To Wilson's note of May 15, demanding that the German Government disavow the act of the submarine commander who sank the *Lusitania* and give assurances that such acts would not be repeated, they retorted a fortnight later, May 28, that the *Lusitania* was an armed cruiser and transport and, as such, a vessel of war. The President, in his reply of June 9, did not permit the issue to become confused. While he denied the truth of the German allegations, he declared them irrelevant; he placed his protest on higher and less technical ground:

'The sinking of passenger ships [he wrote] involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the cases, principles which lift it, as the Imperial German Government will no doubt be quick to recognize and acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or of international controversy. . . . The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every Government honors itself in respecting and which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority. . . .

'The Government of the United States cannot admit that the proclamation of a war zone from which neutral ships have been warned to keep away may be made to operate as in

any degree an abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It understands it also to accept as established beyond question the principle that the lives of non-combatants cannot lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unresisting merchantman, and to recognize the obligation to take sufficient precaution to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag. The Government of the United States therefore deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial German Government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles into practice in respect of the safeguarding of American lives and American ships, and asks for assurances that this will be done.'

It was this note, sent on June 9, that led to the resignation of Mr. Bryan. His difference with Wilson was basic, for he was willing to submit the dispute with Germany to arbitration and to limit the rights of American citizens by warning them not to travel on merchant ships of the belligerent Powers or on those carrying munitions. Wilson, while he was willing to give to Germany ample opportunity to alter the policy she had proclaimed, was determined not to sacrifice nor even to debate any American rights. In all his notes he merely announced them.

II

Colonel House was on the Atlantic at the moment when Mr. Wilson sent his second note to Germany. The voyage was without incident except for the convoy which Mr. Balfour had not forgotten and which indicated in some degree the position of international importance which

4 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

Colonel House had attained. The American press made much of it.

‘Mystery [stated the New York *American*¹] surrounds the nature of the important despatches which Colonel House brought back to America yesterday. It was the first time since the start of the war that foreign warships had escorted an American ship through the war zone. The unprecedented step was made the more significant by the fact that the British steamer *Orduna*, which left Liverpool three hours ahead of the *St. Paul*, was unconvoyed as was also the *Adriatic* which arrived in Liverpool at about the same time carrying munitions of war. . . .

“Two destroyers were sent by the British Admiralty to convoy us through the war zone,” said Captain F. M. Passow. “. . . There is no doubt the destroyers were sent to protect the despatches carried by Colonel E. M. House.”

Colonel House, as one might guess, was more disturbed than flattered by the public expression which the British Admiralty thus gave to the high value which it placed upon his safety, since the effectiveness of the Colonel’s missions depended largely upon their strictly unofficial character.

‘June 6, 1915: Much as I appreciate this attention [he wrote on shipboard], if I had known it was to be done in such a noticeable way, I should have prevented it. I thought the destroyers would be at a distance and not be noticed, and that we would have the protection without the excitement which has been caused by it. I have many misgivings as to what the American press may say, and also as to whether I might not lessen my influence as an intermediary of the President. . . .

‘June 13, 1915: It was a restful and pleasant voyage.

¹ June 14, 1915.

Dudley Malone came down to Ambrose Light in a revenue cutter to meet me. . . . He boarded the *St. Paul*, and I the revenue cutter. Dudley had all the news. . . . I received a wireless from Sir Horace Plunkett while at sea, telling me of Mr. Bryan's resignation. Dudley said it was generally conceded that I could have the appointment if I desired it. I dismissed the idea at once, stating that under no circumstances would I take it, even if the President desired me to do so. Dudley asked me not to make a final decision, because he thought the President had a right to insist upon my acceptance. I replied that the President would not consider tying me down to departmental details when I was doing the work I had in hand, for I could be far more useful to him and to the country by carrying on as I had been doing. . . .

'June 20, 1915: Attorney-General Gregory arrived on the ten o'clock train this morning. He told me practically everything of importance that has happened in the Cabinet since I have been away, more especially concerning the two notes to Germany and Mr. Bryan's resignation.

'He said the President read my cable of May 9 to the Cabinet on Tuesday, May 11. He opened his remarks by stating that he wished them to hear my views as to the answer which should be made to Germany, and they knew the confidence he had in my judgment and ability to see a situation clearly. The cable was then read and favorably commented on.

'Mr. Bryan told Gregory later that the only objection he had was that the cable was read to the Cabinet before he, Bryan, had seen it. He thought the President should have read it to him first and given him an opportunity of discussing it before it was submitted to the Cabinet.

'After reading my cable, the President read them a memorandum he had made and which embodied the note as it was finally sent to Germany. While the discussion was going on, Bryan showed some heat and said there were some members

of the Cabinet who were not neutral. The President turned to him and said, with a steely glitter in his eyes, "Mr. Bryan, you are not warranted in making such an assertion. We all doubtless have our opinions in this matter, but there are none of us who can justly be accused of being unfair." Mr. Bryan apologized and the incident passed.

"Gregory said this was the second time since he had been in the Cabinet that the President had set his jaw so firmly. The other time was when X had in some way transgressed the proprieties.

"Bryan did not plan to attend the Cabinet meeting the day he offered his resignation, but the President suggested that he be invited, and all the Cabinet welcomed the suggestion. Mr. Bryan told Gregory after he had resigned that there had been inserted in the note a sentence which he, Bryan, had written, and which had been eliminated. After the resignation and before the note was published, Bryan said the sentence was reincorporated in it. Gregory said, however, Mr. Bryan was mistaken, and the sentence was discussed at the Cabinet meeting when his resignation was offered and at which Mr. Bryan was present. They had been discussing the note for some minutes before Mr. Bryan appeared, and whether that sentence had been covered before or after Mr. Bryan came in, is not of importance for the reason that the entire message was upon the table and was handed Mr. Bryan to read. This is also the President's recollection. Mr. Bryan evidently wishes it to appear that he resigned because the President refused to include a certain sentence modifying the note, and, after he resigned, the sentence was used.

"Another interesting incident Gregory told, which I was able to corroborate by a despatch sent me by Gerard, was that Mr. Bryan prepared a letter after the first note was sent to the German Government, to the effect that they should not consider the note seriously, that it was meant in a "Pickwickian sense." The President refused to sign this letter.

Gregory enlarged upon the stupidity of such a suggestion. I agree that it would have ruined the President. It would have been saying to the American public, "We are standing firm in demanding our rights," and behind their backs it would be saying to the German Government, "We merely send this note to deceive the American people, and do not mean what we say." It occurred to both of us that, if the President had consented to do this, it would have been akin to treachery.

'I told Gregory that Gerard cabled me at London that Mr. Bryan had said to the Austrian Ambassador that the note was not to be taken seriously.

'*June 21, 1915* [conference with the British Ambassador]: We had two hours together. We went over the ground carefully, I telling him of the European situation and he giving me the happenings here since I left. I called his attention to the fact that he was being quoted as saying the President was pro-German. He admitted this and said he had done it for the President's protection. I replied that the result of it had been that there was a general feeling throughout England and France that the President was pro-German, and it had taken me a long while in both countries to combat the work which he and Jusserand were innocently doing over here. I advised him in the future to say nothing upon the subject, or to maintain that the President was observing strict neutrality. . . .

'*June 22, 1915*: The German Ambassador came this afternoon at five, and we had a very satisfactory talk. I told of my reception in Germany and of how gratified I was at its cordiality. We discussed the prospects of peace, and I explained conditions in Germany somewhat better perhaps than he knows them at present. He gets his information directly from the Foreign Office, and I happen to know they are at cross-purposes with the military authorities. Bernstorff knows something of this, but not the full extent.

'He still clings to the idea that Germany would be willing to make peace on the basis of evacuation of Belgium and France. I told him the civil Government would be willing to do it and the military Government was divided, but the people would not consent to any such terms, largely because they have been misled by exaggerated accounts of victory. . . . He talked sensibly and rather as a neutral than as a belligerent. I am told he has the habit of doing this in order to draw one out and get one's true opinions. I think better of Bernstorff than most people who know him, and if he is not sincere, he is the most consummate actor I have ever met.'

The passing of Mr. Bryan eliminated at least one factor that blurred Wilson's determination to compel from Germany a relaxation of the submarine campaign, and henceforth the President could be sure of a Cabinet ready to support unanimously any measures that might be necessary to carry through this policy. The Secretary of State was beloved by those who came in close contact with him, but the predominant emotion evoked by his resignation, at least in diplomatic circles, seems to have been one of relief.

Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House

LONDON, June 10, 1915

DEAR HOUSE:

. . . I inspired the leader in to-day's *Times*, wh. says that Bryan's going will make little or no difference. But some of the other papers make a sensation of it; and it has attracted much attention. But they all sum him up pretty accurately.

My own comment to you is simply this: 'My son, beware of cranks. They are sure at some time to turn the wrong way and to break your arm or to hit you in the belly or to do some other improper caper — always, too, at an inopportune time. I tell you, beware of cranks.'

But Mr. Bryan would not feel complimented if he knew that for these two days we've all gone about our work in the Embassy without more than some slight passing allusion to his resignation, as one might speak of the weather. It hasn't occurred to any of the men that it is an event of any importance.

But one American wrote me a letter saying he now wanted another passport; he had never cared for the one he has because it bore the signature of W. J. B., and now he *knows* that that passport's no good.

The Wilderness is becoming populated. There are others who ought to join him — for their country's good — in the Bad Lands of dead men who don't know they are dead. They talked themselves into greatness and, not knowing when to stop, also talked themselves out of it. . . .

Heartily yours

W. H. P.

Mr. Lansing, hitherto Counsellor of the State Department, was ultimately chosen as Secretary of State, and the question of his successor arose. House regarded the position as of the first importance, for upon the tact, the firmness, the legal ability of the Counsellor would largely depend the tone of official relations with the belligerents in these days of irritating crises.

Colonel House to the President

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
July 7, 1915

DEAR GOVERNOR:

When Phillips was here Sunday he said that Lansing was anxious to get a Counsellor for the State Department as soon as possible, for the reason they were very short-handed. . . .

I suggested Solicitor-General Davis as being a desirable

10 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

man for Counsellor, and, after conferring with Lansing, Phillips wires me in code: 'Davis the ideal man. We hope it can succeed.'

McReynolds was here Sunday, and he told me that Davis ranked as one of the greatest Solicitor-Generals the Department had ever had. This opinion seems general, for Gregory shares it and so does almost every member of the Supreme Court.

Davis would probably hesitate to leave the Department of Justice for the State Department, but, if you approve, I think it might be arranged. The State Department needs some such man, and a good Solicitor-General can be found more easily than a good Counsellor.

There is another feature about Davis that appeals to me, and that is, his appointment would be warmly received by members of Congress and Democrats generally. The Department needs some strengthening in that direction, and this would do it.

If you think this suggestion a good one, please let me know so I may confer further with Lansing as to the best means of procedure. The matter will have to be handled with some tact, otherwise he may not accept. Then, too, Gregory should be consulted before any tender is made.

I am hoping when you go to Washington you will motor down to Manchester and stay the night with us. You would lose but little time by doing this. If your car was sent to Manchester, you could leave here, I think, at five o'clock and reach Washington at the same time that you would be leaving Cornish earlier in the day, and I know you would enjoy the trip down.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

President Wilson replied to House's suggestion of Davis that, although he would be admirable wherever he might be

placed, he was the best Solicitor-General of the last twenty years. It seemed unwise to transfer him from the Department of Justice.

The appointment to the Counsellorship was delayed for a month, while all available material was sifted with care and a determined opposition maintained against the pressure exerted for using the office as a reward for purely political services. Ultimately, and with House's warm approval, Mr. Frank L. Polk, Corporation Counsel of New York, was selected. He was one of the few who possessed the three qualifications that House had laid down as essential, — firmness, tact, legal ability.

Colonel House to Secretary Lansing

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
August 14, 1915

DEAR MR. LANSING:

... He [Polk] has an attractive personality and he will be loyal to you to the core.

He comes as nearly being without ambition except to serve, as any man I know. He tried hard to help Mayor Mitchel select another man for Corporation Counsel, but took it himself as a matter of duty and loyalty to Mitchel.

I think you will find him most helpful as a sort of Assistant Secretary of State. He has a good deal of political instinct and can speak the language of the members of Congress. At the same time, he is such a cultured gentleman that he will be of great value to you in dealing with the Diplomatic Corps. . . .

Sincerely yours

E. M. HOUSE

'August 15, 1915: Frank Polk arrived from Bar Harbor to see me before going to Washington. He was gratified over the thought that he had been selected for Counsellor of the

12 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

State Department. I told him we had gone at the task of choosing with the thought that any man in America would accept the post during this critical time in the country's history, and he should therefore feel doubly complimented. . . .

'I outlined something of his duties as I imagined Lansing would want them to be, and I took away the lingering doubt in his mind as to his qualifications for the place. . . .'

III

To Colonel House, the difficulties of the course chosen by President Wilson in the crisis with Germany were perfectly clear, although he was willing to assist him to carry it through if possible. War could not be avoided, he felt, unless Germany changed her policy. This would depend upon the outcome of the struggle, which then and always continued in Berlin, between the Chancellor and von Tirpitz.

Colonel House to Sir Edward Grey

NEW YORK, June 17, 1915

DEAR SIR EDWARD:

. . . It is too early to give a final opinion as to the sentiment in America, but I think that it is fairly accurate to say that the vast majority of our people desire the President to be very firm in his attitude towards Germany and yet avoid war.

The two things are rather inconsistent. It is the general belief that war will be avoided, although I have not changed my opinion that it is inevitable unless Germany changes her policy in regard to submarine warfare.

Mr. Bryan's resignation simplifies the situation somewhat. . . .

With warm regards and good wishes, I am

Faithfully yours

E. M. HOUSE

*Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House*¹

BERLIN, June 16, 1915

MY DEAR COLONEL:

... I think that the firm tone in the President's note will make the Germans climb down. There seems to be a general disposition to be pleased with the note and an expectation that matters can be arranged. The great danger is that the Germans may again get the idea that we do not dare to declare war. In such case they will again become difficult to handle. Von Gwinner said yesterday that if the *Mauretania* sailed it would be treated like the *Lusitania*. Zimmermann and von Jagow are both quite pleased with the tone of the note. They both talk now of keeping Belgium, the excuse being that the Belgians hate the Germans so much that if Belgium again became independent it would only be an English outpost....

I am sorry to report that while authorities here think the idea of freedom of the seas good, they think the idea of freedom of land too vague. They want to know exactly what it means and say the seas should be free because they belong to no one, but land is private property of various nations, and compare the situation to a city street where every one is interested in keeping the streets free, but would resent a proposal that their houses should also be made common meeting-ground if not property. Unfortunately for Germany and the world, the German armies are winning and this will be considered a complete vindication of the military and caste system and everything that now exists. As Cleveland said, we are confronted by a condition and not a theory. *Germany will never agree directly or indirectly to any freedom of land or disarmament proposal.*

I think everything will work out all right on the *Lusitania*

¹ Excerpts from this and succeeding letters from Ambassador Gerard have been published in the form of diary notes in his *Face to Face with Kaiserism*.

14 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

note and that Bryan will regret leaving and losing part of the credit for a success.

The Emperor will probably see me soon. He has been rabid on the delivery of arms from the U.S.A. question, but like all Germans, when they see we cannot be scared into a change of policy, he is making a nice recovery.

Yours ever

JAMES W. GERARD

BERLIN, June 22, 1915

MY DEAR COLONEL:

The Government yesterday suppressed the *Tageszeitung*, a newspaper for which Reventlow has been writing. . . . Reventlow, an ex-navy officer, is a follower of von Tirpitz and is bitterly opposed to America in the present crisis. It is said that he once lived in America and lost a small fortune in orange-growing. I shall have this verified. At any rate, this suppression means that the Chancellor has at last exhibited some backbone and will fight von Tirpitz. The answer of Germany depends on the outcome of this fight. It is possible that von Falkenhayn and the army party may sustain the Chancellor as against von Tirpitz. It is quite likely that a sort of safe-conduct will be offered, in the note, for ships especially engaged in the passenger trade. Much stress will be laid on English orders to merchant ships to ram submarines. . . .

Many commercial magnates have arrived in town to impress the Government against war with America; but some are in favor of the continuance of bitter submarine war, notably your friend von Gwinner who sees his Bagdad railway menaced by possible English success in the Dardanelles.

There is, as usual, great expectation of a separate peace with Russia. . . .

Yours ever

JAMES W. GERARD

The contest between the Chancellor and the navy went in favor of the latter, at least for the moment; so much was apparent when the German reply to Wilson's note was received on July 8. Beginning with a formal approval of the rights of humanity, which in the circumstances seemed to many Americans an ill-chosen stroke of irony, the body of the note was made up of complaints of British restriction of trade and anti-submarine methods. It maintained the principle that neutral citizens travelling in the 'barred zone' on the high seas, did so at their own risk. It concluded with the suggestion which Gerard had prophesied, that Americans might cross the seas upon neutral vessels which, if they raised the American flag, would be assured special protection, or upon 'four enemy passenger-steamers for passenger traffic,' for the 'free and safe passage' of which the German Government would give guaranties. Of Wilson's demand for a promise that acts like the sinking of the *Lusitania* should not be repeated, there was no hint.

Germany thus avoided the issue and proposed that the United States should keep out of trouble by yielding their sovereign rights. 'The Foreign Office, I am sure,' wrote Ambassador Gerard, 'wanted to make some decent settlement, but were overruled by the navy.'

Colonel House was in no doubt as to the character of the reply that Wilson should send. He also exposed the distortion of facts upon which rested the argument that the submarine campaign was merely an answer to the British food blockade.

Colonel House to the President

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
July 10, 1915

DEAR GOVERNOR:

In thinking of your reply to the German note, the following has occurred to me:

16 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

The Government of the United States is unwilling to consent to any suggestion looking to the abridgment of the rights of American citizens upon the high seas. If this Government were willing to bargain with the German Government for less than our inalienable rights, then any belligerent nation might transgress the rights of our citizens in other directions and would confidently count upon our trafficking with them for concessions.

This war has already caused incalculable loss to the neutrals of the world, and this Government cannot lend its consent to any abridgment of those rights which civilized nations have conceded for a century or more.¹

The soul of humanity cries out against the destruction of the lives of innocent non-combatants, it matters not to what country they belong; and the Government of the United States can never consent to become a party to an agreement which sanctions such pitiless warfare.

Since your first note, the German Government has not committed any act against either the letter or the spirit of it; and it may be, even though they protest that they are unable to meet your demands, they may continue to observe them.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

P.S. In answer to their contention that Great Britain is trying to starve their people, it is well to remember that Germany refused to modify her submarine policy even though Great Britain would agree to permit foodstuffs to enter neutral ports without question.

¹ It is interesting to compare this sentence with Mr. Wilson's letter to Senator Stone in the spring of 1916, refusing to approve the Gore-McLemore resolution which warned Americans not to travel on armed merchant vessels. See pp. 216, 217.

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

July 12, 1915

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Here is a copy of a letter which comes from Bernstorff this morning.

I have told him that there should be some way out, and if I found he could be of service I would let him know. Do you think there would be any profit in seeing him? Perhaps I might tell him something of the tremendous effort this country would make in the event of war, in order to convince the world that we were not as impotent as was thought and in order to deter any nation in the future from provoking us into hostilities.

Your affectionate

E. M. HOUSE

The President replied expressing entire agreement with the suggestion of House for standing firm against compromise with Germany and every restriction of American rights to travel freely on the high seas. He intimated that it was not the business of the United States Government to arrange passenger traffic, but to define neutral and human rights. He agreed that House should see Bernstorff and impress upon him that some way out must be found, and that they must continue to abstain from submarine attacks without warning, unless they deliberately wished to prove that they were unfriendly and desired war.

The essential weakness of Wilson's position, as House perceived, was that any protests he might send to Germany rested purely upon moral influence, since the country was in no way prepared to support its diplomatic arguments by force. The situation had arisen which the Colonel had foreseen nine months before, when he vainly urged upon the President the need of an immediate naval and military reorganization. Convinced that the evasions of Germany

would continue so long as she could count upon American unpreparedness, he again took up the argument in favor of preparation for war; it was, he insisted, the best insurance against war with Germany in the existing crisis, and the only means of securing a relaxation of the submarine campaign. The strength of his conviction was not lessened by the news that Mr. Bryan planned a trip to Europe as Apostle of Peace, where, House feared, the impression of American pacifism would be intensified by the Commoner's speeches.

'*July 10, 1915*: The truth of the matter, I feel [recorded House], is that the President has never realized the gravity of our unprepared position. I have urged him from the beginning that this country prepare for eventualities. I urged him early in the autumn to start in with some such programme, and, in my opinion, it should have been started the day war was declared in Europe. If we had gone actively to work with all our resources to build up a war machine commensurate with our standing among nations, we would be in a position to-day to enforce peace.

'If war comes with Germany because of this submarine controversy, it will be because we are totally unprepared and Germany feels that we are impotent. The trouble with the President is that he does not move, at times, with sufficient celerity.¹ Take, for instance, the covenant we desire with South America. Nothing has been done with it since I laid it down in January. He places the blame upon Mr. Bryan's shoulders, and that, of course, is true as far as Mr. Bryan is concerned; but, nevertheless, he should have pressed the matter himself or through some one else competent to handle

¹ Comment by Colonel House, October 29, 1925: 'I did not mean to suggest that the President was a slow thinker or afraid of action; upon occasion he made up his mind like a flash and assumed a decisive policy. In the problems of Mexico and Preparedness, however, there was so much to be said on both sides that he delayed a decision, balancing the arguments, awaiting what would seem to him a clear-cut issue.'

it. Even since I have been back, I have been unable to get him to move, and a month or more has been wasted. I am afraid it will drag along until it is too late to put it through. I see the same propensity for lagging in the Mexican situation. There is something which needs the most vigorous treatment, and yet it drags its weary length from day to day. There is no more reason why this should not have been settled in January, when I urged him to act, than now.'

Colonel House to the President

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

July 14, 1915

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... Ever since I was in Germany last year and saw the preparation that she had made for war, I have wondered at the complacency of her neighbors. I feel that we are taking a terrible gamble ourselves in permitting our safety to rest almost wholly upon the success of the Allies, and I wonder whether the time has not come for us to put our country in a position of security.

I wonder, too, whether we did not make a mistake in not preparing actively when this war first broke loose. If we had, by now we would have been in a position almost to enforce peace.

If war comes with Germany, it will be because of our unpreparedness and her belief that we are more or less impotent to do her harm.

Your affectionate

E. M. HOUSE

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

August 8, 1915

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... I was sure Bryan contemplated a trip to Europe in behalf of peace. If he goes, he will return a sadder, if not wiser, man.

I believe I know the temper of the American people at this time well enough to be certain that, upon the question of preparedness, you will be able to lessen his ever-diminishing influence.

General Wood was here yesterday. He gave some interesting information. He said the camp at Plattsburgh was turning out far better than any one could anticipate, that the material that came to them was of such a high order of intelligence that it took but little time to teach them the rudiments.

He is very anxious for you to fill the gaps in the regiments. He considers that the main thing to be done at present. He said this could be done by merely giving the order. . . .

If I were in your place, I would give this order at once. It will have a good effect. . . .

He recommends strongly, of course, a modified Swiss system. He thinks if our young men from eighteen to twenty-two had two months a year for four years, we would soon have a citizen soldiery that would practically make it unnecessary for us to have a standing army.

Wood is anxious to go to Europe and see something of the war as it is conducted to-day, and I agree with him there — for there is not an American soldier of great ability who has the remotest idea of how war is carried on now. One cannot get it from reports; one must see it. He said he could go over without any publicity and he could get to the front without its being known.

While our people do not want war, I am satisfied that eighty per cent of them see for the first time the danger of our position. New conditions have arisen that seem to me to make it the part of wisdom to heed. . . .

Your affectionate

E. M. HOUSE

The President, however, at this time spent more thought

upon means of keeping the country at peace than he did upon the need of preparedness. He pondered carefully his reply to German evasions, and to the suggestion that American citizens refrain from travelling upon belligerent ships except as designated by the Germans. At times he was bombarded by pacifist arguments delivered by those ready to surrender every right for the sake of peace. When he sent these to House, the latter refused to be impressed. He was himself, perhaps, the most sincere pacifist in America; but he was convinced that any yielding to Germany would merely strengthen von Tirpitz and make Berlin more uncompromising. If a strong reply were delivered to Germany, she might yield; any hint of weakness would encourage her to proceed upon the course she had undertaken. Nor did he put any confidence in the peace feelers sent out from Berlin, for he had seen Germany too recently and at too close range.

Colonel House to the President

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
July 15, 1915

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... I have talked with a great many people and mostly those from a distance, and, without exception, they have expressed a wish that a firm answer be sent. When pressed further, they have told me that in their opinion the country was willing to accept the consequences.

I shall try and get hold of Bernstorff in a few days.

I have a feeling that Germany will not commit what we would consider an overt act, unless, indeed, such talk as Mr. Bryan is indulging himself in should influence them to do so. . . .

Your affectionate

E. M. HOUSE

22 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
July 17, 1915

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . Jane Addams comes on Monday. Hapgood and Crane thought I should see her. She has accumulated a wonderful lot of misinformation in Europe. She saw von Jagow, Grey, and many others, and, for one reason or another, they were not quite candid with her, so she has a totally wrong impression.

It is believed that Germany is willing to make peace now upon the basis of evacuation of Belgium, France, and Russian Poland; and this impression gains force by Bernstorff's constant iteration that this is true, and his further statement that if England would agree to let foodstuffs enter Germany, they would cease their submarine policy.

These tactics have a tendency to make people believe that we should treat Germany in the same spirit of compromise as she seems herself to evidence. It also has a tendency to create the feeling that we are favoring England at the expense of Germany.

Sight is lost of the fact that England will be called to an accounting for any infringement of our property rights at sea, as soon as Germany has been reckoned with for the more serious offence of killing Americans and other non-combatants.

Sometime I believe you should give out a statement which will clear up these points. If Germany is willing to evacuate Belgium, France, and Russian Poland, and is willing to give up her submarine warfare if the embargo on foodstuffs is lifted, she should have a chance to say so officially; for immediately she reaches this decision, peace parleys may begin. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

According to Mr. Gerard's messages, evacuation of conquered territory was the last thing the Germans had in mind. Their victories over Russia gave tremendous impetus of confidence, while the refusal of Wilson to place an embargo upon munitions and his protests against submarine warfare intensified their animus against the United States.

Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House

BERLIN, July 20, 1915

MY DEAR COLONEL:

... Perhaps it is worth a war to have it decided that the United States of America is not to be run from Berlin. The people here are firmly convinced that we can be slapped, insulted, and murdered with absolute impunity, and refer to our notes as things worse than waste paper. I hear this is said by persons in very exalted station. They feel that our 'New Freedom' is against their ideas and ideals, and they hate President Wilson because he embodies peace and learning rather than caste and war.

Politically it will be an asset to have the German-Americans against him. . . .

I hear this last week for the first time of growing dissatisfaction among the plain people; especially at the great rise in food prices. Germany is getting everything she wants, however, through Sweden, including copper, lard, etc. Von Tirpitz and his press bureau were too much for the Chancellor — the latter is not a good fighter. Zimmermann, if left to himself, would of course have stopped this submarine murder.

I hope the President never gives in on the arms [export] question; if he ever gives in on that, we might as well hoist the German Eagle on the Capitol.

In a war way Germany is winning, but after all this is only the beginning; another winter campaign will find much dissatisfaction here. . . .

Ever yours

J. W. GERARD

IV

Although determined to give Germany every opportunity to change her naval methods, President Wilson was at least not deceived by the casuistry of the German arguments justifying the submarine campaign. His reply was conceived with skill. Avoiding all dialectic, he refused to admit their defence of the submarine attack as a retaliatory measure consequent upon British methods of restraining trade or attacking submarines:

‘Illegal and inhuman acts, however justifiable they may be thought to be against an enemy who is believed to have acted in contravention of law and humanity, are manifestly indefensible when they deprive neutrals of their acknowledged rights, particularly when they violate the right to life itself. . . .’

The President then went on to show that the experience of two months, illustrated by the case of the *Armenian*, where warning was given by the submarine, showed that it was possible to lift the practice of submarine attack above the criticism of inhumanity and illegality it had aroused. In a tone of rather friendly irony, he refused to abate any jot or tittle of American rights, renewed his demand for a disavowal of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and in more serious tones emphasized his warning that repetition of ‘acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly.’ The final sentence had the tone, if not the form, of an ultimatum.

Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House

BERLIN, July 27, 1915

MY DEAR COLONEL:

I think the Note marvellous, a veritable masterpiece. I sent a cable advocating some concession and so my conscience is clear. I was afraid that the hate against America here had warped my judgment and now I am glad that the President has taken the strong course. . . .

The Note is received with hostility by press and Government. Of course, as you have seen, the party of frightfulness has conquered those of milder views, largely owing to the aggressive press campaign made by von Tirpitz, Reventlow and company. The Germans generally are at present in rather a waiting attitude, perhaps wishing to see what our attitude toward England is, but this will not affect their submarine policy. The Foreign Office now claims, I hear, that I am hostile to Germany, but that claim was to be expected. Of course I had no more to do with the Note than a baby, but it is impossible to convince them of that, so I shall not try. . . .

Germany has the Balkan situation well in hand. Roumania can do nothing in the face of recent Russian defeats and has just consented to allow grain to be exported to Austria and Germany, but has, I think, not yet consented to allow the passage of ammunition to Turkey. The pressure, however, is great. If not successful, perhaps German troops will invade Serbia so as to get a passage through to Turkey.¹

A minister from one of the Balkan States told me the situation of Roumania, Greece, and Bulgaria was about the same, each state can last in war only three months. So all are trying to gauge three months before the end and come in on the winning side.

The Bulgarian Minister of the Public Debt got in here by mistake the other day, insisting he had an appointment; he

¹ The attack upon Serbia was launched two months later.

had an appointment with the Treasurer, Helfferich, whose office is near by. This shows, perhaps, that Bulgaria is getting money here.¹

The Germans are sending back to Russia, Russians of revolutionary tendencies, who were prisoners here, with money and passports in order that they may stir up trouble at home. . . .

It is not pleasant to be the object of the hate of so many millions, as the Germans naturally find in poor me a present object for concentrated hate. Enclosed is a specimen anonymous letter in which the kindly writer rejoices that so many Americans were drowned in the Chicago disaster. This shows the state of mind.

The Emperor is at the front, 'somewhere in Galicia.' They keep him very much in the background, I think with the idea of disabusing the popular mind of the idea that this is 'his war.' . . .

I am afraid the late Secretary of State mixed matters considerably — certainly he told Dumba and Bernstorff things which were reported here — were told to me — and put me and the authorities here a little 'off' as to the President's intentions. If we have trouble with Germany, he will be responsible. He gave the idea of weakness here. . . .

Yours ever

J. W. G.

Affairs had approached a crisis. The 'overt act,' which Colonel House feared, was still uncommitted, but this was apparently more the result of circumstance than of intention. In Berlin the extremists were largely in control, and so far as their attitude toward the United States was concerned, it was clear that the warnings of Wilson, speaking for an unarmed nation, produced the maximum of irritation and the

¹ Bulgaria was in fact receiving loans from Germany, preparatory to entering the war.

minimum of effect. Wilson, not unnaturally, refused to trust the candor of Bernstorff. On July 29 he wrote House that he believed the German Ambassador was not dealing frankly with us, and suggesting that the Colonel again try to make him impress upon Berlin the danger of the course they were pursuing. Bernstorff complained that the President unfairly concentrated his protests upon Germany while he shut his eyes to the infractions of international law by the British. Ambassador Gerard seemed to regard a break between the United States and Germany as merely a matter of time.

Ambassador von Bernstorff to Colonel House

WASHINGTON, D.C., July 27, 1915

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

... The present situation is not pleasant. In the last American note such strong language was used that I am afraid I will not be able to do much in the matter. Nevertheless I am doing my best, but my efforts will certainly fail if the expected American note to England does not use just as strong a language as that employed toward us.

At present nobody in Germany believes in the impartiality of the American Government. That is the great difficulty of the situation. Very much ill feeling has been created on both sides of the ocean and any — not 'deliberately unfriendly,' but — unintended, unfortunate, incident may bring about war any moment. . . .

We must *certainly* stop publishing sharp and unsatisfactory notes. I do not think that public opinion in either country can stand that much longer. If I cannot persuade my country to give an answer, we will have to trust to our good luck and hope that no incident will occur which brings about war.

Very sincerely yours

J. BERNSTORFF

Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House

BERLIN, August 3, 1915

MY DEAR COLONEL:

... The Chancellor is still wrong in his head; says it was necessary to invade Belgium, break all international laws, etc. I think, however, that he was personally against the fierce Dernburg propaganda in America. I judge that von Tirpitz has, through his press bureau, so egged on the people that this submarine war will keep on and the Germans will be utterly astonished and hurt when the war is on.¹ After all it is necessary. Von Jagow confessed to me that they had tried to get England to interfere with them in Mexico, and the Germans 'Gott strafe' the Monroe Doctrine in their daily prayers of Hate.

Warsaw, as I predicted officially long ago, will soon fall. This keeps the Balkan States out.²

No great news — we are simply waiting for the inevitable accident. . . .

Yours ever

J. W. G.

¹ With the United States.

² That is, Rumania and Bulgaria will not join the Entente.

CHAPTER II

THE ARABIC CRISIS

Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance.

Bernstorff to Lansing, September 1, 1915

I

GERARD'S forebodings of the 'inevitable accident' were tragically justified on August 19, when the British liner *Arabic* was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine off Fastnet. She was outward bound, headed for New York, a neutral port, and thus could carry no contraband. The attack was delivered without warning. Two Americans were lost.

It is interesting to note that even under such provocation President Wilson was in no way affected by the personal emotions which such a flagrant disregard of his warnings must have aroused — and he was far from meek-tempered; but solely by the responsibility which he felt had been laid upon him. He turned to House for help.

On August 21 he wrote him demanding his advice. What should he do? On two points his mind was clear. In the first place, the people of the United States counted upon him to keep them out of war; in the second, it would be a calamity to the world at large if we were drawn actively into the conflict and so deprived of all disinterested influence over the settlement. He concluded by saying that he was well but desperately lonely; the letters of House came, he said, like the visits of a friend.

Colonel House's reply to the President's appeal for advice placed before Wilson three alternatives, and excluded the possibility of despatching another diplomatic note of protest, which he believed would be tantamount to a confession of

political anæmia. Wilson might immediately break diplomatic relations by dismissing Ambassador Bernstorff; he might call Congress and place upon its shoulders the responsibility for war or peace; he might privately inform Bernstorff that a disavowal and complete surrender by Germany on the submarine issue could alone prevent a rupture. House favored the first alternative, although he believed that it meant war. But he refused to press it upon the President: 'He knows full well my views,' recorded the Colonel. The decision which might throw into war a nation of a hundred million must be taken by those upon whom the official responsibility would rest.

Colonel House to the President

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
August 22, 1915

DEAR GOVERNOR:

My heart has been heavy since the *Arabic* disaster, and my thoughts and sympathy have been constantly with you.

I have hoped against hope that no such madness would seize Germany. If war comes, it is clearly of their making and not yours. You have been calm, patient, and just. From the beginning they have taken an impossible attitude which has led them to the brink of war with all nations.

Our people do not want war, but even less do they want to recede from the position you have taken. Neither do they want to shirk the responsibility which should be ours. Your first note to Germany after the sinking of the *Lusitania* made you not only the first citizen of America, but the first citizen of the world. If by any word or act you should hurt our pride of nationality, you would lose your commanding position overnight.

Further notes would disappoint our own people and would cause something of derision abroad. . . .

To send Bernstorff home and to recall Gerard would be the first act of war, for we would be without means of communication with one another and it would not be long before some act was committed that would force the issue.

If you do not send Bernstorff home and if you do not recall Gerard, then Congress should be called to meet the emergency and assume the responsibility. This would be a dangerous move because there is no telling what Congress would do in the circumstances. . . .

For the first time in the history of the world, a great nation has run amuck, and it is not certain that it is not a part of our duty to put forth a restraining hand. Unless Germany disavows the act and promises not to repeat it, some decisive action upon our part is inevitable; otherwise we will have no influence when peace is made or afterwards. . . .

I am, with deep affection

Your devoted

E. M. HOUSE

‘If I were in his place [the Colonel noted on August 21], I would send Bernstorff home and recall Gerard. I would let the matter rest there for the moment, with the intimation that the next offence would bring us actively in on the side of the Allies. In the meantime, I would begin preparations for defence and for war, just as vigorously as if war had been declared. I would put the entire matter of defence and the manufacture of munitions in the hands of a non-partisan commission composed mostly of business men — men like John Hays Hammond, Guy Tripp, and others of that sort. I would issue an address to the American people and I would measurably exonerate the Germans as a whole, but I would blister the militant party in Germany who are responsible for this world-wide tragedy. I would ask the German-Americans to help in redeeming their fatherland from such blood-thirsty monsters.’

32 INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE

And on the following day, commenting upon Wilson's sense of responsibility to the world to keep the United States at peace:

'I am surprised at the attitude he takes. He evidently will go to great lengths to avoid war. He should have determined his policy when he wrote his notes of February, May, June, and July. No citizen of the United States realizes better than I the horrors of this war, and no one would go further to avoid it; but there is a limit to all things and, in the long run, I feel the nation would suffer more in being supine than in taking a decided stand. If we were fully prepared, I am sure Germany would not continue to provoke us.'

From Gerard, House received the impression that popular confidence in Berlin was such that no adequate reply would be given to the President's last *Lusitania* note, and that, as regards the sinking of the *Arabic*, the Government would simply await another protest from Wilson and file it for reference. German optimism ran high.

Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House

BERLIN, August 24, 1915

MY DEAR COLONEL:

Successes in Russia have made people very cocky. Hence, probably, the torpedoing of the *Arabic*. Also great hope of Bulgaria coming in with Germany; there is no more dissatisfaction with the war heard. . . .

It is more and more apparent that the Emperor is only a figurehead in the war. He seems to have but little power, and is kept away and surrounded. . . . The Reichstag session has developed no opposition. . . .

If Bulgaria comes in, Germany will undoubtedly take a strip in Serbia and keep a road to Constantinople and the

East. The new Turkish Ambassador has just arrived. The old one was not friendly to Enver Bey and so was bounced; he remains here, however, as he fears if he went to Turkey he would get some 'special' coffee. The hate of Americans grows daily. . . .

Yours ever

JAMES W. GERARD

Before Wilson had decided which of the three alternatives he would follow, for he was clearly determined not to waste ink and paper upon another note, Ambassador von Bernstorff suddenly awoke to the gravity of the crisis. He promised that, given time, he would obtain from Berlin concessions sufficient to prevent the rupture that threatened. What was necessary was the assurance that Germany would cease to torpedo merchant ships without warning and without protection for the lives of the passengers; what was also necessary was a disavowal of the attack upon the *Arabic*. This was the least that could be considered, and there seemed no chance of securing so much. He begged that the United States take no immediate action, in order that he might have the opportunity to bring pressure upon Berlin. President Wilson's patience at last showed signs of weakening.

On August 25 he wrote to Colonel House asking his opinion of Bernstorff's request for a suspension of judgment, and admitted his suspicion that they were merely sparring for time in order that any action we might take would not affect the unstable equilibrium in the Balkans. Did House regard the suspicion as too far-fetched? And how long should he wait? When the United States Government asked for the German version of the *Orduna* sinking, they simply pigeon-holed the demand and nothing had yet been heard from them.

Wilson wrote also that he had thought with solicitude of

a possible outbreak of German-Americans in the United States, in case of a break with Germany, but where and how should the Government prepare? Every clue had been followed up, even the most vague, but nothing had been discovered sufficient to form a basis even for guessing. What had House in mind, in what direction should any concentration of force be directed or precautionary vigilance be exercised?

Colonel House to the President

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
August 26, 1915

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . I am *always* suspicious of German diplomacy. What they say is not dependable, and one has to arrive at their intentions by inverse methods. I do not think your suspicions are far-fetched and it is quite possible they are playing for time. I have a feeling, however, that they may weaken and come to your way.

As to being prepared for a possible outbreak, I have this in mind: Attempts will likely be made to blow up waterworks, electric light and gas plants, subways and bridges in cities like New York. This could be prevented by some caution being used by local authorities under the direction of the Government.

For instance, Police Commissioner Woods tells me he has definitely located a building in New York in which two shipments of arms have been stored by Germans. They were shipped from Philadelphia. He is trying to trace the point of shipment and other details. No one knows of this excepting myself. . . .

I am told there are only two hundred men at Governor's Island. I think there should be at least a regiment. What trouble we have will be in large cities, and it is there where precautions should be taken. I do not look for any organized

rebellion or outbreak, but merely some degree of frightfulness in order to intimidate the country. . . .

Your devoted

E. M. HOUSE

One advantage of the apparent proximity of war was that it compelled the Government at last to grasp the need of preparing the armed forces of the United States. The crisis gave a practical example of the futility of the *laissez-faire* policy, which had obviously failed to prevent diplomatic quarrels and had merely encouraged the Germans to proceed without regard to American protests. So much Wilson and Daniels confessed, as they took the first steps toward an increase of the navy. Colonel House followed the change of policy, which he had so strongly urged, with interest and enthusiasm. He kept in touch equally with the preparations for meeting the local disturbances which seemed possible in case the rupture with Germany were not averted.

'August 26, 1915: Police Commissioner Arthur Woods came at ten-thirty . . . to advise with me concerning the coördination of the Secret Service organizations in the Department of Justice and the Treasury Department with that of New York City. He told of what was being done about the Germans. . . . I promised to put him in touch with both McAdoo and Gregory, and later in the day I did this when I met Gregory in Boston.

'Upon my return to Manchester, I found a telephone call from Secretary Daniels. He is in Gloucester, on the *Dolphin*, and wanted to see me. I got in touch with him later and we had a conference of an hour. He told of his activities in the navy and of his conference with the President concerning naval estimates. Daniels wishes the President to indicate the sum he is willing to recommend Congress to appropriate, and then he, Daniels, wants to partition this sum out in the way most fruitful to the navy's needs.

'The President wished him to make a statement of what he thought the navy should have, rather than the other way about. I approved the President's method rather than his. I urged him to ask for all that was necessary to make the navy second only to that of Great Britain, and easily superior to any other Power.

'Daniels said this would take \$200,000,000 or more, just for construction purposes. I told him it did not matter if it took \$300,000,000 or \$400,000,000, for the country demanded it and it should be done. He promised he would go at it in that spirit. . . .'

II

In the meantime, von Bernstorff worked feverishly to secure from Berlin some concession sufficient to tide over the crisis. The German civil Government hesitated, fearing the navy officials and public opinion and therefore not daring to settle the matter by a frank disavowal, but finally conceding enough to prevent a break.

On August 29, Bernstorff wrote to House, suggesting that Germany was ready to yield to the demand of Wilson and to promise that the submarine warfare on passenger liners should cease. House sent the letter to the President. Wilson answered that he trusted neither the accuracy nor the sincerity of Bernstorff, but that he would consider any offer of conciliation.

Warned that he must be explicit, the German Ambassador on September 1 wrote formally to Mr. Lansing:

Ambassador von Bernstorff to Secretary Lansing

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1915

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

With reference to our conversation of this morning, I beg to inform you that my instructions concerning our answer to your last *Lusitania* note contain the following passage:

‘Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance. . . .’

I remain, my dear Mr. Lansing, very sincerely yours

J. BERNSTORFF

Germany thus yielded on the main issue, and it may fairly be said that Mr. Wilson had won a great diplomatic victory. The President had been working to safeguard a principle by compelling from Germany a written acknowledgment of its validity: the principle that if submarines were used, they must observe the established rules of warning, visit, and search, and also provide for the safety of non-combatants. Henceforth attacks such as those upon the *Lusitania* and *Arabic* could not be made except in violation of the promise given by the Germans. So much had the President won, and without the exercise of force.

But the victory was not clean-cut. No formal disavowal was made of the sinking of the *Lusitania* or the *Arabic*. Furthermore, the German promise was implied rather than explicit. They had given orders to the submarine commanders to abide by Wilson’s demands, but they evidently reserved the right to change those orders whenever conditions suited them.¹ Three days after Bernstorff gave his pledge, a submarine sank the Allan liner *Hesperian*. And a letter from Mr. Gerard indicated that, whatever promises the German Government made, the Navy would act as it pleased.

Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House

BERLIN, September 7, 1915

MY DEAR COLONEL:

. . . The navy people frankly announce that they *will not stop submarining*, no matter what concessions are made by

¹ At least, so they stated in the spring of 1916.

the Chancellor and Foreign Office. We have outlined this in cables and now the torpedoing of the *Hesperian* proves it.

The Chancellor still seems very much afraid of von Tiritz and his press bureau.

Zimmermann told me it was all a great diplomatic victory for the United States.

A friend told me the change in policy here was at the request of the *Pope* and that in return the Pope was to work for peace which Germany now desires. This friend's 'dope' is usually correct. . . .

As a result of recent breakdown and fundamental causes, I hear the Kaiser is very bitter against the President, but I don't think that this is novel or will make the President lose much sleep. . . .

I am much bothered now by presence of alleged Americans — correspondents, accelerators of public opinion, etc., in German pay. They make it difficult stepping and are dangerous spies. . . .

Yours ever

J. W. G.

III

Although Germany's promise that liners would not be sunk without warning was sufficient to prevent an immediate break in relations, few believed that the issue was definitely settled. Neither the American Government nor public opinion could be satisfied unless a complete disavowal of the sinking of the *Arabic* followed. Neither Gerard nor the German Ambassador believed that Berlin would make it.

Von Bernstorff's efforts, however, were intensified by a decisive step taken by President Wilson early in September, which indicated to Germany that even Wilson's patience was not infinite. The Austrian Ambassador, Dr. Dumba, had been so indiscreet as to entrust to an American correspondent, James F. J. Archibald, important despatches

destined for the Vienna Government. The correspondent was arrested by the British, the despatches published. They proved the intent of the Austrian Embassy to assist in the crippling of munitions plants, and the coöperation of the German military attaché, von Papen, in an effort to disorganize American industries exporting to the Allies. A letter of von Papen to his wife was also published, in which he wrote: 'I always say to these idiotic Yankees that they had better hold their tongues.' Its publication did not serve to allay the warmth of American feeling.

Wilson at once requested the recall of Ambassador Dumba, and Bernstorff became uneasy. He redoubled his efforts to win concessions from Berlin.

Colonel House to the President

ROSLYN, LONG ISLAND
September 17, 1915

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Bernstorff was here yesterday. He said his main trouble was in getting his people to believe that this Government was in earnest. He told me in confidence that he thought the sending of Dumba home had done more to make Berlin realize the gravity of the situation than anything else.

They consider him [Bernstorff] pro-American in his views and are inclined to discount what he says, believing that it is done for the purpose of getting more favorable action.

He thought there would be no more objectionable acts and that, if we could get over the question of disavowal for the *Arabic*, there would be smooth sailing. He did not know how far Berlin would go in disavowing the *Arabic*, but he thought he could get them to say that from the evidence presented they believed the submarine commander was mistaken in thinking the *Arabic* tried to ram him.

I told him to get his Government to go as far as they would and then let me find unofficially from you whether it was

acceptable. If it was acceptable, he could present it to the State Department officially.

We conversed at some length concerning the sentiment in this country. I told him that while our people west of the Atlantic seaboard were averse to war, they were willing to trust your judgment and would sustain you to any length which you thought proper to go. I told him I had arrived at this conclusion after very exhaustive inquiries. He admitted it was true. . . .

Your devoted

E. M. HOUSE

The President replied on September 20, expressing his perplexity over Bernstorff's attitude. In his letters to House the Ambassador seemed to be one person, in his interviews with the newspapermen he was quite another. Wilson was at a loss to know which, if either, was the genuine Bernstorff. The Ambassador, he felt, was anxious to save the Berlin Government from any formal disavowal of the sinking of the *Arabic*, but Wilson did not see any possibility of yielding; the country would regard him as too easy, any general promise of better intentions on Germany's part as utterly untrustworthy. The President expressed definitely his conviction that the Germans were moving with intentional and exasperating slowness, but he felt himself under bonds to the people of the United States to show patience to the utmost.

Throughout the month of September, House worked with Bernstorff to secure the formal disavowal of the sinking of the *Arabic*, without which, as Wilson perceived, no trust whatever could be put in German promises. The Colonel was not optimistic. On September 12, after a conversation with Mr. Polk, the new Counsellor for the State Department, he recorded: 'Polk understands for the first time our true relations with Germany, and he feels it will be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid a rupture.'

‘September 16, 1915: The German Ambassador telephoned and asked for an interview, which I gave him at half-past five o’clock. He remained for nearly an hour and was not in a hopeful mood. I encouraged him as much as possible in the work he was doing for peace. I let him know that the President was determined about certain things and it would be well if his Government would heed his, Bernstorff’s, advice as to the seriousness of the situation. . . .

‘I had overwhelming evidence that the President would be sustained in any action he might take. The fact that he has been so patient and has tried so hard to avoid war, gives the people confidence in his judgment as to what is necessary in the premises.

‘It was arranged that when it came to the wording of the disavowal regarding the *Arabic*, it should be given to me first unofficially, in order that there might be no mistake made by a premature publication of something entirely unsatisfactory. . . .

‘September 28, 1915: The German Ambassador called this morning. . . . I took occasion to tell Bernstorff what a mistake it was to have undertaken German propaganda in this country. I laid it at the door of Dr. Dernburg and he permitted it to remain there. I said if Germany won, they would not need us; but if she failed, I could see much service which this country might render them. It therefore seemed to me the part of wisdom to keep on friendly relations with us and not antagonize us. He spoke inadvertently of the German vote. I replied that the President was wholly unconcerned about his own political fortunes, and, even so, the Democratic Party was unconcerned as to the German vote for the reason it was always given to the Republican Party. I think this came as something of a surprise to him. I wish to make it clear, however, that he did not speak of the German vote in an offensive way, but merely as a matter of public concern.

‘When he left, he apologized for taking so much of my time and thanked me for my many acts of courtesy to him.’

The situation would have been easier for Bernstorff to deal with if there had been any one in supreme control in Germany. The letters of Ambassador Gerard gave an extraordinary picture of the political confusion there, which contrasted forcibly with the efficiency of German military organization. Of victory they seemed confident, but there was no agreement as to how they would use it. Councils were equally divided on the problem of how to answer Wilson’s demands for a disavowal of the *Arabic* sinking. And through the story ran a thread of petty espionage and propaganda which seemed more suitable for a cinema than for the successors of Bismarck.

Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House

BERLIN, *September 20, 1915*

MY DEAR COLONEL:

As usual waiting. Lansing does not let me know what is going on and von Jagow says he is also in the dark. Lansing very kindly sent me a copy of the note von Bernstorff wrote him, *five days after* it had appeared in the *London Times*. I really think the Ambassador on the job should be kept informed.

As I predicted to you, the invasion of Serbia by German and Austrian troops has commenced. This is to cut a road to Bulgaria, and then it is expected Bulgaria will join Germany and the road to Constantinople and Egypt will be open to German troops.

There is great expectation that Hindenburg’s present operation will catch a great Russian army.

A newspaper writer was prosecuted for writing against the annexation of Belgium. The *Bund Neues Vaterland* got out a

circular about that event, but their rooms were 'pulled' by the police and the circulars confiscated. . . .

X
Yours ever

J. W. G.

BERLIN, *September 27, 1915*

MY DEAR COLONEL:

. . . Pamphlets on the idiocy of 'Annexation,' etc., have been seized by the police and the printers and authors jailed. It is hard to know *where* the Government stands on this question. I think they don't know themselves. Now the idea is to annex the Baltic Provinces of Russia and Courland, give Poland to Austria and give up Belgium and Northern France for a great indemnity. . . .

I hear more and more people say that President Wilson must be the peace mediator. You see people here rather suspect that the Pope has too many axes to grind in Europe, while the President has no interest one way or the other. You are liked and trusted here and if there is any chance of immediate peace (which I doubt) you will be called on to represent the President.

Of course I have been doing what I could in the *Arabic*, etc., situation and hope it will come out all right. I have heard nothing lately, but Admiral Holtzendorff, the new head of the naval staff, will not stand bossing from any one. He is a fine old seaman.

The Chancellor, of course, and the Foreign Office are against 'frightfulness' and see how ridiculous it would be to bring us in the war; but if we are dragged in — in spite of their efforts — they will as usual be most unfairly blamed. And German 'diplomacy' will again be ridiculed — without reason. . . .

Yours ever

J. W. G.

P.S. An American girl named —— who lived in Berlin

and was a friend of a prominent member of the Reichstag and also sang in the 'Black Cat' Cabaret, was paid \$3000 by Bernstorff to lecture in America. What a ridiculous propaganda!

BERLIN, October 1 (?), 1915

MY DEAR COLONEL:

... Have had several talks with Chancellor lately — also von Jagow, and pumped them about peace — there is no prospect now. If Bulgaria and the Balkans move it means new stakes on the table and continuance of the gambling. Lately they talk here of keeping Bulgaria. *The trouble is no one knows what they want.* The Chancellor and the K. merely try to follow, while seeming to lead, public opinion. ...

Correspondents back to-day from West say Germans are still calm and confident. English broke through first lines of trenches, but then did not know what to do. Germans claim losses of French and British were very great. Instructions found on English prisoners were good, but stopped short of telling them what to do when they broke through first line. ...

A telegram addressed to us here came in the other day with a stamp on it as follows:

ABDRUCK FUER A. A.

ORIGINAL IST BEFUERDERT.

A. A. means Auswaertiges Amt (Foreign Of.) so translation is: 'Copy for Foreign Office. Original has been forwarded.'

This proves that all our telegrams are sent to Foreign Office to be read; by mistake they sent us the copy for the Foreign Office. ...

Query: Why should Bernstorff be cabling to one Cormorar or similar name on the island of Guam unless there was a plot to cut our cable or steal news or despatches?...

Yours ever

J. W. G.

IV

From this chaos, Bernstorff, who, whatever his interest in German propaganda, was sincerely desirous of staying in Washington, finally extracted a disavowal for the sinking of the *Arabic*. Few persons realized how near to a complete rupture the two nations had come. On September 13, House wrote to Gerard: 'Things seem to be going from bad to worse and I cannot tell you how critical they are at this moment.' On the following day, to Grey: 'The situation shifts so quickly from day to day that it is hard to forecast anything. A few weeks ago it looked as if our troubles with Germany might be over. But now the situation is more tense than it has ever been, and a break may come before this letter reaches you.'

The Colonel gave full credit to Bernstorff's anxiety for peace.

On October 6, he wrote Gerard: 'I have seen much of Bernstorff during this *Arabic* crisis and I want to say again that, in my opinion, there is no German of to-day who deserves better of his country than Bernstorff. I hope you will impress this upon his Government. If it had not been for his patience, good sense, and untiring effort, we would now be at war with Germany.' And some weeks later: 'We all feel that Bernstorff deserves great credit — just how much may never be known until after this terrible war is over.'

On October 2, Bernstorff telephoned House that he had received sufficient authority from Berlin to satisfy Wilson's demands, and three days later he sent to Lansing the necessary formal letter. At the last moment the German Ambassador was compelled to act upon his own initiative, eliminating Berlin's demand for arbitration of conflicting evidence regarding the *Arabic's* intention to ram the submarine. He explained to Colonel House how he had himself made the change, after the President and the Secretary of State insisted upon it.

‘The orders issued by His Majesty the Emperor [he informed the United States Government] to the commanders of the German submarines — of which I notified you on a previous occasion — have been made so stringent that the recurrence of incidents similar to the *Arabic* case is considered out of the question. According to the report of Commander Schneider of the submarine that sank the *Arabic*, and his affidavit as well as those of his men, Commander Schneider was convinced that the *Arabic* intended to ram the submarine. On the other hand, the Imperial Government does not doubt the good faith of the affidavits of the British officers of the *Arabic*, according to which the *Arabic* did not intend to ram the submarine. The attack of the submarine, therefore, was undertaken against the instructions issued to the commander. The Imperial Government regrets and disavows this act, and has notified Commander Schneider accordingly. Under these circumstances my Government is prepared to pay an indemnity for the American lives which to its deep regret have been lost on the *Arabic*.’

‘It is a diplomatic victory for the United States,’ remarked von Bernstorff to a friend; and as such the historian must regard it. But it produced, not a settlement of American problems of neutrality, but merely another breathing space. Barely a month later, the *Ancona* was torpedoed by an Austrian submarine. It looked like beginning at the beginning with Austria, as Wilson wrote to House. The President caught himself wondering if they had noticed at Vienna what was going on in the rest of the world. It seemed clear, at all events, that the Central Empires were playing for time and that their promises could not be trusted. Furthermore, the connection of the German military and naval attachés with plots against munitions factories, as well as the attacks of both pro-German and pro-Entente elements upon the President, combined to produce a confusion that robbed

German concessions on the submarine issue of all significance. Colonel House asked the President for vigorous action.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, November 21, 1915

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Would it be possible immediately to let some of the obnoxious underlings of the offending Embassies go? And would it not be possible to sever diplomatic relations with Austria because of the *Ancona*?

I do not believe it would be well to go through the same process as was done with the *Lusitania* and *Arabic*. When you laid down the law, and Germany agreed to comply, you were laying down the law to all belligerents, and her disavowal and renunciation of her submarine policy should have bound her allies as much as it bound her.

I believe you will find that the Central Powers will now do almost anything to keep from an open rupture.

I hope you will ask Congress to give the Government more power to deal with the crimes committed by the hyphenates. It seems to me that power is needed to deport undesirables just as it is given the immigration authorities. The country is ready and waiting for action, and I believe it would be a mistake to send further notes. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Wilson did not approve the suggestion of an immediate diplomatic rupture with Austria. Instead he sent a sharp note to Vienna, drafted by Mr. Lansing and untouched by the President; 'it lacks nothing in vigor — *Lansingesque*,' wrote House, who saw the note before it was sent. It was successful in eliciting a rather churlish disavowal and a promise of reparation. The two German attachés, von Papen and Boy-Ed, Wilson sent home. However, neither

Berlin nor Vienna seemed in a chastened mood, for the former complained of Bernstorff's concessions and the latter soothed Dumba with titles.

Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House

BERLIN, October 19, 1915

MY DEAR COLONEL:

... Von Jagow told me that Bernstorff, while not exactly exceeding his instructions in his *Arabic* note, had put the matter in a manner they did not approve. . . .

Dumba has been made a *noble* — 'von und zu.'

Best wishes to Mrs. House.

Yours ever

J. W. G.

For a time the tempest in relations with Germany sank into a lull. The President's patience, which excited thinly veneered contempt in Allied countries, was nevertheless commended by the press of the United States, with the notable exception of certain Republican newspapers. West of the Mississippi and south of the Ohio, in three fourths of the country, neither the war nor our quarrel with Germany aroused much feeling. People were making money. Even in the East, closer to the conflict and more hostile to Germany, there was some truth in House's observation: 'I notice that the old men, and sometimes the women, are the most bellicose people we have.' Probably it would be possible to scrape along until the next crisis, which might or might not be worse than the last.

CHAPTER III

AMERICA AND THE ALLIES

There was one mistake that, if made, would have been fatal to the cause of the Allies . . . a breach with the United States.

Viscount Grey of Fallodon, '*Twenty-Five Years*'

I

'MY chief puzzle,' said Wilson to House, in late September, 1915, 'is to determine where patience ceases to be a virtue.' It was indeed a puzzle, for the President felt himself responsible to opinion as a whole — as he expressed it, 'under bonds' — and at this period there was no crystallized opinion in the United States. Along the Atlantic seaboard, in many circles, Wilson's patience had long ceased to evoke respect and threatened to become a perennial source of ribaldry. But in the Middle and Far West the President's strength lay chiefly in his refusal to enter a war which few persons cared about and fewer still understood.

Certain critics have interpreted the President's policy in terms which, for the sake of historical accuracy, deserve refutation. They have asserted especially that his insistence upon neutrality, in the face of continued provocation, resulted from a lingering tenderness toward Germany. There is much evidence that tends to invalidate the supposition. The records of Colonel House show that Wilson was appalled by the German disregard of the Belgian Treaty and that, despite the irritations caused by Allied control of neutral trade, he looked upon the Allies as the defenders of civilization. Mr. T. W. Gregory, Attorney-General, tells of the pressure brought to bear upon Wilson to institute retaliatory measures against the Entente for interference with American trade. Some of the members of the Cabinet were willing to consider an embargo upon munitions. President Wilson re-

plied to their arguments: 'Gentlemen, the Allies are standing with their backs to the wall, fighting wild beasts. I will permit nothing to be done by our country to hinder or embarrass them in the prosecution of the war unless admitted rights are grossly violated.'

Some months later, Mr. Brand Whitlock saw the President in Washington. It was December, 1915. The Ambassador to Belgium thus reports his conversation:

'I said: "Mr. President, I am officially representing the interests of Germany as well as of the United States and I can say honestly that I am officially neutral in all things; but I ought to tell you that in my heart there is no such thing as neutrality. I am heart and soul for the Allies." Wilson responded at once: "So am I. No decent man, knowing the situation and Germany, could be anything else. But that is only my own personal opinion and there are many others in this country who do not hold that opinion. In the West and Middle West frequently there is no opinion at all. I am not justified in forcing my opinion upon the people of the United States and bringing them into a war which they do not understand."'¹

This sense of responsibility to public opinion in America, which Wilson felt so keenly, was reënforced by a sense of responsibility to mankind, which he expressed to House when he said: 'It would be a calamity to the world at large if we should be drawn actively into the conflict.' Later, in his message to Congress, December 7, 1915, he said:

'It was necessary, if a universal catastrophe was to be avoided, that a limit should be set to the sweep of destructive war and that some part of the great family of nations should keep the processes of peace alive. . . . It was mani-

¹ Conversation with the author, December 10, 1924.

festly the duty of the self-governed nations of this hemisphere to redress, if possible, the balance of economic loss and confusion in the other, if they could do nothing more. In the day of readjustment and recuperation we earnestly hope and believe that they can be of infinite service.'

Curiously enough, it was to be this same sense of responsibility to the world at large that brought him later to insist upon the full coöperation of the United States with Europe in forming a reorganized international system.

Let us also add that Mr. Wilson was attracted to a policy of neutrality because of a constitutional tendency to postpone a decision upon a matter in which he saw a balance of opposing arguments. Like most of us, he disliked facing an unpleasant situation and he hoped that something might 'turn up' to improve it and obviate the need of positive action. It is the vice of the scholarly temperament, which balances good against evil so carefully that it is impossible to discover a clear course.

The patience which Wilson displayed in the face of German diplomatic evasions and his obvious determination to keep the United States out of the war, produced, inevitably, an unfortunate impression upon Allied peoples. The British and French were in no mood to analyze his policy objectively nor to make allowance for conditions in the United States which they did not understand. They regarded themselves as the defenders of civilization and they believed that they were fighting the battles of America, which either from cowardice or greed remained aloof and gathered a golden harvest from its sale of munitions. Their irritation increased, unreasonably but by no means unnaturally, after the German victories of 1915, the conquest of Russian Poland, the advance of the Austro-German armies in the East, the continued failure of the Allies at Gallipoli, and the futility of Allied attacks in France. Had they been triumphant in the

summer of 1915, the sympathy of America and the benevolence of its neutrality would perhaps have satisfied them; but smarting from the losses and setbacks of the campaign, they looked upon the one great neutral as a slacker.

Allied leaders, while they doubtless shared popular regret at the aloofness of the United States, realized that they must take the situation as they found it. They appreciated better than the ordinary citizen the negative value of American neutrality, and they never forgot that Wilson had it in his power, by a stroke of the pen, to hamper seriously the Allied war effort.

‘There was one mistake in diplomacy [writes Grey in his memoirs] that, if it had been made, would have been fatal to the cause of the Allies. It was carefully avoided. This cardinal mistake would have been a breach with the United States, not necessarily a rupture, but a state of things that would have provoked American interference with the blockade, or led to an embargo on exports of munitions from the United States. Germany, on the other hand, did make this cardinal mistake.’¹

The more far-seeing leaders, especially in Great Britain, realized also that if the victory they hoped for were not to be wasted, American aid would be necessary to assure the peace. They wished not merely to meet the present danger of German domination by complete military triumph, but to lay the ground for a future international organization that might prevent a repetition of the catastrophe, and in this task the moral and material influence of the United States would be invaluable. It was all the more vital that if Wilson refused to enter the war against Germany, he should at least become sympathetic with the ultimate war aims of the Allies and that relations between them and the United States should remain cordial.

¹ Grey, *Twenty-Five Years* (Frederick A. Stokes Company), II, 160.

Of all the Allied statesmen no one was more anxious to preserve American friendship than the British Foreign Secretary, and no one appreciated more clearly its value to the Allies both during and after the war. The difficulties which Sir Edward Grey faced, however, were numerous and complex. He must contend with the rising tide of anti-American opinion in Great Britain, and with the demands of the public and all the war-making agencies for a tightening of the blockade, regardless of American protests. He must meet also the equally strong anti-British opinion of American shippers whose interests were infringed by British restrictions. It was fortunate that in the closest friend of President Wilson he had an active sympathizer.

Colonel House realized acutely the delicacy of Grey's position and he did all in his power to assist him. Like Grey he was anxious to bring about the close understanding with the British which he believed was demanded by the interests of America and the world. He explained to his British friends the factors that lay behind Wilson's policy of neutrality and impressed upon them the danger inherent in the blockade that interfered with American trade. He urged Wilson, on the other hand, not to press our protests over-hard, and he worked with the British Ambassador to discover a *modus vivendi*. However sharp might be the interchange of official notes, he hoped to maintain through personal contact the underlying bases of Anglo-American friendship.

That the British Foreign Secretary appreciated both the spirit and effect of House's efforts is apparent from what he says of the Colonel in his memoirs:

'His mind was always practical [writes Grey]. He was not less studious of the means by which an end was to be accomplished than he was of the end itself. . . . House followed public affairs with the close attention and informed himself about them with the industry and zeal of a man who lives

for a public career. Yet a public career was what House desired to avoid for himself; his mind therefore worked with all the keenness of one who feels the spur of ambition, but with the free impartiality of one whose ambition is quite impersonal. He longed to get good accomplished and was content that others should have the credit.' ¹

II

Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House

FALLODON, NORTHUMBERLAND
June 6, 1915

DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

I am very glad to hear from Drummond, my private secretary at the Foreign Office, that a cypher has been arranged which you can use with me direct. This is a most satisfactory arrangement.

If, as you think, the United States drifts into war with Germany, the influence of the United States in the general aspects of the peace will be predominant and perhaps decisive, for it is the one country that can neither be beaten nor exhausted. (I mean by the general aspects of peace, those which are concerned with preserving peace in the future, as distinct from local and particular conditions such as the destiny of Alsace and Lorraine, which are purely European.)

But the dilemma I foresee is that the desire of the people of the United States to keep out of war with Germany may lead to burying the *Lusitania* issue inconclusively, in which case Germany will disregard and the other belligerents will hope for little from American influence in the future and the tendency will be to discount it.

Yours sincerely

E. GREY

¹ Grey, *Twenty-Five Years* (Frederick A. Stokes Company), II, 125.

33 ECCLESTON SQUARE, LONDON, W.
July 14, 1915

DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

. . . I have now returned to London, and take up work to-morrow. . . .¹

I see that it will naturally take very great provocation to force your people into war. If they do go to war, I believe it is certain that the influence of the United States on the larger aspects of the final conditions of peace will prevail, and I am very doubtful whether anything short of being actually involved in the war will stir your people sufficiently to make them exercise, or enable the President to exercise, on the terms of peace all the influence that is possible. Personally, I feel that the influence of the President would be used to secure objects essential to future peace that we all desire.

The more I have meditated on past events, the more continually I have come to the point that the refusal of a Conference in July last year was the fatal moment that decided the question of peace or war. Austria had presented a tremendous ultimatum to Serbia. Serbia had accepted nine tenths of that ultimatum. Russia was prepared to leave the outstanding points to a Conference of Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves. France, Italy, and ourselves were ready: Germany refused. After that came reports that Germany was mobilizing, the announcement that Russia had mobilized, the ultimatum from Germany to Russia, and all the rest.

The invasion of Belgium, I believe, decided the opinion of people in England, who were not thinking much of foreign policy or at all of war, to enter the war at the beginning; but the great question of peace or war for Europe was decided, and the death warrant of millions of men was signed, when the Conference was refused.

¹ Because of imminent danger to his eyesight, Grey had been compelled to give up active work for a month.

If neutral nations and the opinion of the world generally had been sufficiently alert to say that they would side against the party that refused a Conference, war might have been avoided. Peace in future years, after this war is over, seems to me to depend greatly upon whether the world takes this lesson to heart sufficiently to decide promptly if ever such a crisis occurs again.

I spent nearly the whole of June at my home in Northumberland, wearing dark glasses and not reading at all, but fishing a little and moving about constantly amongst flowers and trees, seeing for the first time shrubs and trees in flower, many of which I had planted with my own hands twenty-five or twenty-six years ago; for I had not been at home in June for nineteen years. There was really something reassuring in the indifference of Nature to the war, and its unconsciousness of it when one was in the country away from the actual theatre of the war. Now, I am feeling something of what I hear that wounded or invalided soldiers feel when the time comes for them to return to the trenches.

I greatly miss your presence in London, and should be much refreshed by a talk with you.

The immediate danger to my sight is removed for the present and I am to try whether I can do my work, with a minimum of actual reading with my own eyes, without reviving the trouble.

Yours sincerely

E. GREY

Colonel House to Sir Edward Grey

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
July 8, 1915

DEAR SIR EDWARD:

... Your letters are of much value, and they give me a good opportunity of bringing your views directly to the President in a way which is more effective than if stated by me.

We are still waiting for Germany's reply to our last note, and on it will depend our course of action. The sentiment of the country continues to be clearly against war, and I have serious doubts whether the President would be strongly sustained by Congress in the event he decided upon drastic action, unless, indeed, Germany goes beyond the limit of endurance.

In the event our immediate differences with Germany are composed, there will at once arise a demand for an adjustment of our shipping troubles with England. There is an influential element here that persists in pressing this issue to a conclusion, and it is something of which the President must take cognizance.

Is there not a way by which some of the responsibility England bears may be transferred to France? You will remember the *Dacia* incident was immediately forgotten when France seized her.

Would it not be possible for Jusserand to be given a hint to come more to the fore in this controversy? There is a feeling in the State Department that he is the most forceful representative that the Allies have here. The Russian Ambassador seems to be a negative quantity, and Sir Cecil's nervous temperament sometimes does not lend itself well to the needs of the present moment.

You will understand, of course, how confidential this is and that it is merely my personal view and for your information alone. . . .

Sincerely yours

E. M. HOUSE

Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House

LONDON, July 21, 1915

DEAR HOUSE:

. . . We are in deep water with this Government. They made the mistake of putting themselves legally wrong by the

Order in Council of March 11, and the cotton men and the meat men are being stirred up (being already angry) to keep our State Department active. I fear this Government will have to put cotton on the contraband list. The agitation for it has become almost irresistible. And the Government has bungled so many things that it has lost its courage and is generally under fire. Sir Edward is very despondent about the American situation. The best thing they could do would be to rescind the Order in Council (which would be humiliating to them); then put cotton on the contraband list, but buy and pay for as much as would go to Germany; and let other (minor, non-contraband) things come and go (they are of little value).

It is a curious thing to say. But the only solution that I see is another *Lusitania* outrage, which would force war.

‘Graveyard.’

W. H. P.

Colonel House to the President

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
July 22, 1915

DEAR GOVERNOR:

In regard to our shipping troubles with Great Britain, I believe that if we press hard enough they will go to almost any limit rather than come to the breaking point. But, in so doing, we would gain their eternal resentment for having taken advantage of their position, and our action would arise to haunt us — not only at the peace conference, but for a century to follow. . . .

If it came to the last analysis and we placed an embargo upon munitions of war and foodstuffs to please the cotton men, our whole industrial and agricultural machinery would cry out against it. . . .

I am glad Lansing is coming for the week-end. I always

understand your motives.¹ You do not know what a comfort it is that there is such a perfect understanding between us and to feel that our friendship is beyond the reach of mischief-makers.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

'June 27, 1915: I reached Manchester this morning [wrote House in his journal] and am having a delightful and quiet time. The British Ambassador, whose summer place is at Pride's, had already telephoned, and I called on him in the late afternoon and discussed with him the question of embargo and their long-delayed reply to our note upon that question.

'August 2, 1915: The British Ambassador came this afternoon. We discussed the cotton situation and his Government's attitude regarding neutral trade. He confirmed the opinion which I expressed to the President and Secretary Lansing, that the British Government would go any length rather than have a serious break with us. He also confirmed my opinion that they would never forgive us if we pressed them to a point beyond what they considered fair, and took advantage of their unfortunate position.

'I advised him to cable Sir Edward Grey to bring the French, Italian, Belgian, and Russian Governments to the fore so that this country might see that it was not Great Britain alone that was holding up our trade, but that it was done at the earnest insistence of all the Allies. That England, herself, could not do otherwise even if she wished to, because the other nations demanded such a policy.

'I explained that this would help us in dealing with the question as much as it would them. He spoke in the kindest

¹ An answer to a note of Wilson in which the latter said he did not wish to make a special visit to House, lest people might think that he was not satisfied with Lansing, who was newly appointed.

terms of the cotton farmers and thought they were being misled by demagogues and speculators who were acting under German direction. He said there was a certain Senator who could be diverted from his antagonism, but that his Government refused to use such means to sustain their side. He thought the matter could be worked out satisfactorily to all by the Allies agreeing to buy so much cotton at a price which would net the farmer ten cents f.o.b. ship. That is, the Allies would agree to maintain the price at that figure.

'I made him understand how necessary it was that England should not bear the entire burden, and I shall look with interest at future developments in this direction. This is along the line of my recent advice to Sir Edward Grey. . . .

'August 6, 1915: I arranged to meet the British Ambassador at the home of our mutual friend, Hetty Higginson. We meet at Hetty's because we believe we can do so without notice. We discussed cotton and the relations between Great Britain and the United States. I showed Sir Cecil the letter I wrote Page. . . . I wished him to know that I felt strongly the injustice the Allies are doing the President and our people. He is to give me a memorandum of his arguments in the neutral shipping controversy, in order that I may forward it directly to the President. . . .'

Colonel House to Ambassador W. H. Page

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
August 4, 1915

DEAR PAGE:

Your letters of the 20th and 21st came this morning and add something to the depression of the day.

Sir Edward and you cannot know the true situation here. I did not know it myself until I returned and began to plumb it. Ninety per cent of our people do not want the President to involve us in war. They desire him to be firm in his treat-

ment of Germany, but they do not wish him to go to such lengths that war will follow. He went to the very limit in his last note to Germany. . . .

If the President had followed any course other than the one he has, his influence would have been broken and he would not be able to steer the nation, as he now is, in the way which in the end will be best for all. He sees the situation just as you see it and as I do, but he must necessarily heed the rocks.

His judgment and mine was that last autumn was the time to discuss peace parleys and we both foresaw present possibilities. War is a great gamble at best, and there was too much at stake in this one to take chances. I believe if we could have started peace parleys in November, we could have forced the evacuation of both France and Belgium and finally forced a peace which would eliminate militarism both on land and sea. The wishes of the Allies were heeded, with the result that the war has now fastened itself upon the vitals of Europe, and what the end may be is beyond the knowledge of man.

I am sorry there is any one in England who thinks so ill of the President as to write 'A Merry Ballad of Woodrow Wilson.' It is the same sort of unjust criticism which is being levelled at England for not doing her share in this war. She has really done more than her share and is to-day the only obstacle between Germany and complete success. No one a year ago would have thought that England's part was more than to clear the seas and hold them free for the commerce of the Allies. But to-day she is criticized for not being able to cope with Germany on land.

And so it is with America. A year ago the Allies would have been content beyond measure if they could have been assured that munitions of war would go to them from here in such unrestricted volume and if they had known that the President would demand of Germany a cessation of her submarine

policy in regard to the sinking of merchantmen without warning, to the extent of a threat of war.

What neutral nation has done so much? The shipping of Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Spain has been sunk without warning and innumerable lives lost. Each of those nations, I take it, had passengers upon the *Lusitania*, and yet not one has raised a voice in protest and no criticism has come from the Allies. . . .

It is not altogether clear to Americans that we could not well take care of ourselves if needs be. Our hopes, our aspirations, and our sympathies are closely woven with the democracies of France and England, and it is this that causes our hearts and powerful economic help to go out to them, and not the fear of what may follow for us in their defeat.

Your friend always

E. M. HOUSE

Colonel House to the President

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
August 4, 1915

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Page is in a blue funk. So also is Sir Edward. To read Page's letters, one would think the Germans were just outside London and moving rapidly westward upon New York.

As soon as our affairs with Great Britain become less acute, I think it would be well to send for Page and let him have thirty or forty days in this country. The war has gotten on his nerves and he has no idea what the sentiment of the people in this country is in regard to it.

Now that the fortunes of war are for the moment going against the Allies, the feeling among them becomes more prevalent that we are not doing our share, and that which I feared might happen seems nearer to-day than ever, that we will soon be without friends anywhere.

They do not realize the diversity of races here, our isola-

tion and consequent inability to see the bogies they set up. Nor do they altogether understand or appreciate the potential help we are giving them from an economic standpoint.

It is a difficult situation and gives me no little concern.

Your affectionate

E. M. HOUSE

Colonel House to Ambassador W. H. Page

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

August 19, 1915

DEAR PAGE:

Your letter of August 4 came yesterday. No one knows better than I the difficulties under which you are laboring. I can understand quite well the inadvisability of what you term 'a nagging policy' and the futility of it.

I think the view here is that something of the kind is demanded and that if it were not done, it would arouse a suspicion of favoritism. I doubt whether anything that we could do, short of intervention, would satisfy the Allies now that the fortune of war seems to be going against them; and even should they win, the loss of men and treasure will be laid at our door. . . .

Faithfully yours

E. M. HOUSE

Colonel House to Lord Bryce

MANCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

August 12, 1915

DEAR LORD BRYCE:

. . . If the President had done as many of his French and English friends desired, he would not to-day be able to guide the nation so sanely and safely along the lines of right and justice. The firmness of his notes to Germany made only a part of his popularity; the other part comes to him from the fact that he has not involved this country in war. If war

finally is our fate, then the people will be ready for it and they will give him unstinted support, because they will recognize he has done all that was humanly possible, with honor, to avoid it.

I wish your people understood this better. I wish they understood the difficulties under which the President has labored. I wish they knew with what courage he has resisted all efforts to force him to change our policy in regard to the shipment of munitions of war, and in regard to his treatment of the question of neutral shipping.

I wish, too, they might remember that this nation is one of many nationalities, and that he has to recognize many diverse elements in our make-up. They should stop for a moment and consider whether their criticism of us for not entering the conflict is just. . . . Other neutral countries, with far more involved than ourselves and who might give at this time far greater momentary help, have remained silent and have given the Central Powers as much aid as was possible by permitting their countries to be the mediums of shipments of foodstuffs and raw materials. . . .

I am writing you these things, dear Lord Bryce, because of all men in Great Britain you know our difficulties. You know our sympathies and our ideals, and it is through you that I hope some measure of our troubles and perplexities may reach your people. . . .

Sincerely yours

E. M. HOUSE

Lord Bryce replied to Colonel House on August 26, and in sympathetic vein. He went so far as to say that House's report of the confidence of the American people in President Wilson confirmed what he himself had been thinking and saying: that no President since Abraham Lincoln had had the same hold upon the nation. The United States seemed to him to have placed its policy and its fortunes in the hands of

Wilson, saying, 'You know better than we what is fit to be done. Go on; we will support you.' There was hardly a precedent for this in all American history.

Bryce's estimate of British opinion was that the utterances of some of the dailies and at least one of the weeklies were far from representing the sentiments of the thoughtful sections in England. It was natural that 'the man in the cars,' hearing that the vast bulk of Americans sympathized with the Allies and feeling that the British were fighting a Power whose unscrupulous ambition threatened the world and who would be a disagreeable neighbor to America if the British fleet were out of the war, should jump to the conclusion that America ought to join in the conflict. But he insisted that those who understood American history and the genuinely pacific mind of the American people, knew how strong was the tradition against intermixture in European complications and how many facts and sentiments had to be considered by those who guided American policy. He added that he had tried, once or twice publicly and often privately, to enforce this view and he knew that it was widely held by those who understood something of American conditions.

In answer to House's question as to his own view, he wrote that in the early days of the war American interests seemed to him only slightly affected. Now, however, it had become plain that a victorious Germany would threaten America and every maritime nation. If she dominated the seas, she would be dangerous in the West Indies and probably in South America. He insisted, furthermore, that the methods by which Germany carried on war against non-combatants on land and sea were a step back toward savagery and a challenge to civilized mankind. For her to emerge triumphant after the free use of such methods, would be a great misfortune for human progress, to which America, 'the most humane of nations' as he called her, could not be indifferent.

These two phases of the war, Bryce believed, had changed its aspect for neutral nations. They went far beyond the original causes and merits of the struggle. Far more than the fortunes of Great Britain was now involved.

He closed with an expression of hope that House would write him, and promised that whenever good could be done he would convey House's opinion to quarters in which it would be useful.

Sir Horace Plunkett to Colonel House

DUBLIN, August 23, 1915

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

... It is a little difficult to gauge the feeling over here in regard to the President's handling of the crisis which first demanded your return to the United States in June.¹ Among the people whose opinions count most, with me at any rate, the feeling towards him is one of profound respect for the dignified position he has taken up, as you pointed out in that fine letter to Page of August 4th, between the two extremes, Bryan and Roosevelt. The pronouncement of the latter in to-day's papers, calling for deeds not words, etc., is more than usually platitudinous, and, if I might import an Americanism, will cut no ice over here. But going outside thinking people and talking to minor officials and the ordinary man of business, there has been a strong growing impression which can be best summed up in the words, America ought to come in but won't. Now, since this last outrage² seems like a direct negative to the President's proposals for the avoidance of a serious breach, people are beginning to read his past utterances with care and seem to me to be enormously impressed with the high principles he has stood for, and his refusal to be drawn aside from his great resolve by diplomatic casuistry. If you are forced to come in I feel that those

¹ The *Lusitania* crisis.

² Sinking of the *Arabic*.

of us who will get to work at a proper presentation of Wilson's attitude, will have a splendid text in his own words. . . .

Yours ever sincerely

HORACE PLUNKETT

Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House

LONDON, August 26, 1915

DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

. . . I get out of London to my cottage for a day at the end of the week. The work comes to me there, and waking or asleep the war is always present inside one. But the indifference of natural things, the beauty of them unaffected by our troubles, the seasons progressing as they did before the war, give a certain assurance that there are elemental and eternal things which human catastrophes, such as this war, cannot shake.

I have said nothing about the sinking of the *Arabic* because it is to us only one amongst several incidents every week of sinking merchant and passenger vessels without regard to civilian lives. But people here are of course watching with intense interest what you are going to do about it. There is I think disappointment that the feeling in America is not more combative. The ruthless invasion of Belgium by Germany, the revelations of the crimes committed there, the sinking of the *Lusitania* and now of the *Arabic*, each in turn produces emotion and indignation in America which seems to evaporate; and people here become less hopeful of the United States in taking a hand and more critical of the President.

On the latter point I tell people what an American said to me the other day; viz. that if the President said he must take action against Germany he would have the whole country behind him, but *solely* because he had convinced the country that he had done his best to keep out of war; they must accept it, though they desired to avoid it.

If I could feel that your people were sure to say, sooner or later, 'though we have no concern with territorial changes between the belligerents themselves, who must settle things of that kind by themselves, there can be no peace till the cause of Belgium is fairly settled in the interest of public morals and future peace,' I should be content.

Yours sincerely

E. GREY

Sir Horace Plunkett to Colonel House

DUBLIN, October 1, 1915

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE,

. . . I hold more strongly than ever that, should the United States be drawn into the conflict, it would be a determining factor in bringing it to an early conclusion. But I am quite happy now about this eventuality because I feel confident that the President will not only take part in the war if he ought to do so, and stay out if he ought not, but, if he does come in, he will bring the people so overwhelmingly with him that no domestic complications will impair the fighting efficiency of the Republic. My chief fear for the future, so far as your country is needed to help in the making of it, is that, in the misunderstanding by the belligerents of the attitude of the leading neutral, the opportunity may not come for the President's mediation. . . .

As I said in a hurried note from London [September 27], Arthur Balfour understands very clearly — and this understanding is the first fruits of your readily acquired intimacy with him — the importance of having the issues upon which the British Empire may appear to be insufficiently regardful for the interests of the United States, frankly faced and clearly explained. . . .

I shall weary you if I go on, so I will only tell you, in the strict confidence with which we write to each other, of one thing that Grey said to me and which I think you ought to

know. I asked him to tell me straight whether he wished the United States to come in, whether he believed that their doing so would hasten the conclusion of the war and whether he had any fears that it would embarrass the British envoys in the peace congress that would follow. He seemed to realize the tremendous effect your intervention would have. He said that, in his private capacity, he hoped you would intervene, but that, of course, he could never in his official capacity express any such hope or desire. As regards the attitude of the United States in negotiation for peace, he said that the mere fact that the whole world would know that, unlike any other belligerent, they had come in for the single purpose of warring against war, would give them a tremendous influence in devising a scheme of peace. And, he added, Germany would have to accept any terms insisted upon by the United States, as her economic life could not possibly be reconstructed without the good will of your country. . . .

Yours sincerely

HORACE PLUNKETT

III

It was fortunate that the influential statesmen both in England and the United States were fully determined to maintain Anglo-American friendship, for otherwise the force of circumstances must have compelled the breach which Grey feared. The tightening of the British blockade in the early summer, the single weapon which at the time could be used effectively against Germany, had evoked a storm of complaints from American shippers, who insisted that Wilson and the State Department were truckling to the British and were careless of American interests. They demanded retaliation.

'Strong protests [said a Washington despatch¹] have been pouring into the State Department for three weeks against the British position. The Southern cotton men; the Eastern dye importers; export houses with Chicago, Kansas City, and St. Louis connections, have all united in demanding action permitting them to fill orders already in their hands for goods destined for Scandinavia and Holland.

'Senator Hoke Smith, of Georgia, mouthpiece of the Southern cotton-growers, has protested personally to the White House and the State Department against British interference with cotton exports. He has warned the President that if England and France are not compelled to modify their interference, it will be a difficult matter to prevent the next Congress from passing an embargo resolution.'

Secretary Lansing agreed with Wilson and House that a breach with the Allies must be avoided. 'In no event,' he wrote the Colonel, 'should we take a course that would seriously endanger our friendly relations with Great Britain, France, or Russia, for, as you say, our friendship with Germany is a matter of the past.' But it was none the less essential that the infractions of international law involved in the maintenance of the Allied blockade should not be passed over. After assuming such a strong tone in the controversy with Germany, Wilson must maintain American principles as against Allied methods; otherwise American impartiality might fairly be called in question and the American position in a future crisis with Germany might be seriously weakened.

All summer Washington waited for an adequate reply from the Allies to the protests already sent. None came, and with the momentary settlement of the crisis with Germany the State Department prepared another and a sharper note, which was despatched on October 21. Colonel House had

¹ June 23, 1915.

canvassed the whole matter with Spring-Rice, and at his suggestion the Ambassador sent a warning to his Government of what they might expect.

‘September 27, 1915: After lunch [wrote House] the British Ambassador called. He understands, or pretends to understand, the great difficulties under which the President is working and to appreciate the position he takes. We talked of the international loan now pending, and he expressed considerable concern regarding its success. He seems to be in a better frame of mind, not so nervous, and very reasonable in his discussion of the subjects covered.’

Ambassador Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October, 1915

You may expect pretty strong communication. Until popular opinion is convinced of necessity of taking sides (which it is not) Government must be impartial. Policy of pin-pricks against one or other party will only give people impression of prejudice and one-sidedness. What is non-essential can be arranged by give and take; what is essential can be referred under existing treaties to arbitral decision.

SPRING-RICE

Mr. Page, in London, was emphatically opposed to the State Department's decision to send another note of protest, presumably because he was not in a position to understand the feeling against the British which their blockade stimulated in American export circles. He wrote frequently and forcibly to House, emphasizing the growing tide of resentment against Wilson in Allied countries, which threatened friendly relations and made his own position so difficult. The Colonel was not unsympathetic, but he pointed out that the United States could never hope for popularity in

Great Britain so long as they remained neutral. It was futile to try to win British esteem by a supine acquiescence in Allied trade restrictions. Nothing short of actual intervention against Germany would satisfy Allied opinion, which was apparently not impressed even by the promise that Wilson had wrung from the Germans not to sink liners without warning, a promise that postponed ruthless submarine warfare and gave a respite to Allied shipping.

Colonel House to Ambassador W. H. Page

NEW YORK, October 6, 1915

DEAR PAGE:

I sympathize with you thoroughly in the position which events seem to have brought upon you. It was inevitable unless this country actively joined the Allies. I remember before Italy went in, how she was criticized in both France and England.

The President has gained the greatest diplomatic triumph of this generation, but I doubt whether the Allies will consider it so, because it leads us further away from intervention.

We have given the Allies our sympathy and we have given them, too, the more substantial help that we could not offer Germany even were we so disposed — and that is an unrestricted amount of munitions of war and money. In addition to that, we have forced Germany to discontinue her submarine warfare. . . .

I am sorry beyond measure that it seems to be our part to be without friends on either side, but that is the usual fate. . . .

Sincerely yours

E. M. HOUSE

‘I had a twenty-five-page autograph letter from Walter Page [recorded House some weeks later]. He is in one of his

most pessimistic moods. . . . The trouble with Page is that he sees but one side of the question. He is correct in thinking that the State Department does not couch its notes in the best diplomatic language.

‘[But] Page overlooks the fact that there is just as much irritation here caused by the British procrastination as they feel over there. In the one instance it is a question of a direct tone with a kindly purpose, and, in the other, a kindly tone with no kindly intention. We have been exceedingly patient with Great Britain and have done as much as any neutral nation could to aid her, without actually entering the war. On the other hand, the British have gone as far as they possibly could in violating neutral rights, although they have done it in the most courteous way.’

Another controversy also threatened with Great Britain which might lead to even more serious consequences. This concerned the German complaint that if a submarine were forced to give warning when stopping a merchant vessel, the latter, which was armed for ‘defence,’ could sink the submarine. House had had correspondence with Balfour over this difficult problem and he took it up with Lord Reading, who had come to the United States to negotiate financial problems.

‘*October 2, 1915:* I called at the Biltmore at ten to see Secretary Lansing, and we had an hour’s conference. . . . Lansing takes the ground that if we are to hold the Germans responsible for sinking ships without warning, we must also insist that merchantmen be unarmed. If a merchantman is armed, and we insist that submarines do not sink without warning, the advantage is all with the merchantman and against the submarine. . . .

‘I can see the English point of view better than Lansing does, but I do not consider it wholly fair. . . .

'I asked Mr. S. R. Bertron to invite Lord Chief Justice Reading to lunch at his home and to have no one else excepting the three of us. Bertron gave us a beautiful lunch; the food was delicious and the appointments perfect. After lunch he left Reading and me together and we talked for more than an hour. I told him of the controversy that had arisen between Great Britain and the United States concerning the change in maritime laws. I did not mention Balfour or Sir Horace Plunkett by name, but I told him I had received letters from England outlining the English viewpoint and I had taken the matter up with Lansing an hour or two ago and had found how many difficulties were involved.

'What the British Government desire is that, on the one hand, we shall demand of Germany that no merchantman shall be sunk without warning, and, on the other hand, that merchantmen shall, as in times gone by, have the right to arm. I mentioned my conference with Lansing on this subject, in which Lansing did most of the arguing, holding that they could not have their cake and eat it too; that it was manifestly unjust to the submarine to give merchantmen warning and then permit them to fire upon the submarine and sink it while she was giving the warning.

'Reading was greatly interested and was evidently hearing of the question for the first time. I told him it was in its incipiency and that it had only been tentatively mentioned, but that as soon as our pressing differences with Germany were settled, it was certain they would bring up this point and argue the injustice done them.

'I called Reading's attention to the growing discontent and criticism of the President's policy in the English press. I cited several cartoons and much written matter. He was exceedingly sorry, but thought it was almost impossible to control the press in such matters. The Government knew and appreciated the President's position, but the lay public

did not; consequently the criticism. He spoke as if he would take the matter up with his Government and find whether something could not be done to right it. I called his attention to the fact that it was more to England's advantage than to ours to have good relations between the two countries continue. I also told him the President was too big to heed such criticism, but that his friends, supporters, and admirers through America would resent it, and the resentment would take the form of anti-British feeling. . . .'

Resentment in America against the British, however, was pale in comparison with the anti-American feeling aroused in England by the reception of the note of protest regarding the holding-up of cargoes. Ambassador Page sent to House a letter of twenty-three sheets, in which the storm of British emotion lost nothing by the telling, and which illustrated by specific anecdotes the degree of America's unpopularity. 'I don't wish to be offensive to you,' said a Londoner to an American salesman. 'But I have only one way to show my feeling of indignation towards the United States, and that is, to have nothing more to do with Americans.'

More serious was the fact that the reaction of British public opinion seemed to be mirrored in the Ambassador at Washington, upon whom depended largely the friendly official understanding between the two countries, which, House insisted, could be preserved despite British methods and American notes of protest. Spring-Rice knew that a strong communication was on its way, but he was apparently unprepared for the force of its phraseology.

'*October 14, 1915:* I had arranged with the British Ambassador [wrote House] to meet him at Billy Phillips' home. I dismissed the White House car a block from there and walked, in order to avoid notice. I at once began to discuss the note, but found the Ambassador in one of his highly

nervous states. He started to talk in a very disagreeable way of the United States. Among other things he said, he supposed I knew that the record would forever stand that when the laws of God and man were violated, there came no protest from us,¹ but that when our oil and copper shipments were interfered with, a most vigorous protest came. . . .

'In discussing the contents of the note which we purpose sending to Great Britain, he said: "No matter how low our fortunes run, we will go to war before we will admit the principle of blockade as your Government wishes to interpret it. If we acquiesced, it would be all to the advantage of Germany, whom you seem to favor; Germany has neutral ports like Malmö and Copenhagen which are just as much German as Bremen or Hamburg, but Great Britain has none; and the rule you wish to lay down would isolate us in the event our enemies could blockade our coasts. On the other hand, no amount of blockade which Great Britain could bring to bear, would shut off Germany."

'I made the suggestion of arbitration and asked him to make it to his Government. I did not like the tenor of his talk and, as is my custom, became more and more silent. In the course of the conversation, he said: "At one time this country was composed of pure rock, but now it is composed of mud, sand, and some rock; and no one can predict how it will shift or in what direction."

'I incidentally mentioned Bernstorff's name and spoke of the Germans. This put him in a fine rage, and he said: "I would be glad if you would not mention Bernstorff's name in my presence again; I do not want to talk to any one who has just come from talking to him or to Germans. At this moment I do not know how many of my relatives have been killed in England by the raid of the German Zeppelins last night."

¹ An exaggeration, in view of the number of notes of protest Wilson had sent to Germany.



Photograph by Underwood & Underwood

SIR CECIL SPRING-RICE

‘At this point I lost my temper, and told him I regarded his remarks as an insult, and I would not permit him to say such things to me. I denied that he represented either his Chief or his Government and declared that his views were not their views, and I knew of no official anywhere who was serving his country so badly as himself. He replied that, if I felt that way, he had better relinquish his post and go home. I advised him to use his own discretion as to that, but, as far as I was concerned, I did not intend to have any further discussion with him.

‘When the Ambassador saw the length to which I was willing to go in severing relations with him, he became apologetic and asked me to forgive him. His feelings, he said, were very much wrought up by the bad news he had received from home, and because of the anxiety he felt regarding last night’s raid. I replied that he should be able to look at public affairs quite apart from his private interests. And as to my discussing Bernstorff with him, he must know how necessary it was in my work to see him, and that I intended to do this no matter how much feeling he might have upon the subject.

‘He again asked me to forgive him and to continue our good relations. He insisted that he regarded me as a friend and very much appreciated my advice and help. He spoke of the President in the highest terms and said he wished to God Great Britain had such a man directing her destinies, since there was no one in the world to compare with him. He said at no time had he ever felt anything but the kindest and greatest respect for both the President and me, and whatever criticism he had made was directed at an element in this country which he was sure we disapproved as thoroughly as he did himself. He said it was because of his affection for me that he spoke as he had done; that if he had not had the greatest respect and friendship for me, he would have been diplomatic and not given his real mind.

'The upshot of it was that while he said things derogatory to the United States and praised the President and me, I praised Great Britain and spoke in a derogatory way of him. I accepted his apologies and we parted amicably. He went immediately to the State Department and told the incident to Phillips. Phillips came to see me and said the Ambassador was much disturbed and asked him to come and talk with me about it. I told Phillips to please reassure Sir Cecil and tell him I was sorry it had happened and had forgotten it, and that everything would continue between us as usual, as far as I was concerned. . . .

'It is due Sir Cecil to say, in explanation of many of his moods and actions, that he was sent over as Ambassador in 1913 and was so ill when he came that he could not perform his duties at first. He took a long rest at Dublin, New Hampshire, and Sir William Tyrrell was sent by the Foreign Office to help. In 1914, when the war burst forth, Spring-Rice was in London and should have been kept there. Washington was no place for a nervous and delicate Ambassador. It was unfair to him and unfair to us. He is a cultivated, high-minded, and scholarly gentleman and, when normal, is of the very best type of British diplomat.'

The tilt with the Colonel steadied Sir Cecil's nerves, and during the following weeks he exerted himself in every way to smooth over the difficulties between the two Governments. But it was hard to say how long the mood might last.

Colonel House to Ambassador W. H. Page

NEW YORK, October 29, 1915

DEAR PAGE:

. . . Polk said yesterday over the telephone that Sir Cecil had changed his attitude entirely in regard to the embargo and our shipping troubles, taking the American side almost more strongly than we do ourselves and asserting that, in his

opinion, his Government has made and is making a series of mistakes. . . .

Sincerely yours

E. M. HOUSE

House was far more deeply disturbed by the evident despair of so fair-minded and cool-headed a statesman as Sir Edward Grey. He wrote the Colonel frankly that, in his belief, the British could not cease their interference with neutral trade directed towards Germany through neutral ports, without danger of losing the war.

Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House

33 ECCLESTON SQUARE, LONDON
November 11, 1915

DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

. . . I do not know what our reply will be to your Note about Blockade and Contraband. The Note is before our Legal Advisers.

My feeling in reading it was that, if we admitted all its contentions, it would be tantamount to admitting that, under modern conditions, we could not prevent Germany from trading, at any rate through neutral ports, as freely in time of war as in time of peace, and that we must either continue the difference of opinion with your Government, or give up definitely and openly any attempt to stop goods going to and from Germany through neutral ports.

The friction and trouble that we have over this matter are so great that I have often wished, in despair, to give it up; but that would go near to abdicating all chance of preventing Germany from being successful.

After fifteen months of practical experience of war under modern conditions, I am convinced that the real question is not one of legal niceties about contraband and other things, but whether we are to do what we are doing, or nothing at

all. The contentions of your Government would restrict our operations in such a way that Germany could evade them wholesale, and they would be mere paper rights, quite useless in practice.

I cannot help feeling that, if we had done all the things that Germany has done in the war, and if we had instigated, as Germans have apparently instigated, criminal plots on American soil, American opinion would have pushed resentment home against us more than it has done against Germany.

As it is, it looks as if the United States might now strike the weapon of sea power out of our hands, and thereby ensure a German victory.

Yours sincerely

E. GREY

IV

The United States was caught between the belligerents, her neutral rights threatened by the war methods of each side. The moment that comparative tranquillity seemed to be secured in relations with Germany, the spectre of the trade controversy with the Allies presented itself.

Colonel House believed it possible to worry along, but he was convinced that in the process the moral credit of the United States with the world would disappear and at the end of the war we should find ourselves without friends. This would be bad enough in case of an Allied victory. It might be fatal if the Allies failed.

Already House had asked himself whether they could defeat the Teutonic coalition without American help. He was appalled by the German triumphs of the autumn, which were inevitably followed by corresponding diplomatic success. The defeats of the Russians led directly to the entrance of Bulgaria on the German side and to the complete conquest of Serbia. The Turkish defences at Gallipoli stood firm.

Rumania had veered away from the Allies and was negotiating with the Central Powers. The German road to the East was open and apparently secure. Italian progress towards Trieste was painfully slow and costly. French and British gains on the western front were measured in yards and their losses in thousands of dead.

On October 1, Ambassador Gerard wrote: 'Of course I may be affected by the surroundings, but it seems to me Germany is winning this war.' On November 2: 'Germany seems to be winning this war, to us here. Efforts to starve her out will not succeed. . . . The military are careless of public opinion of neutrals; they say they are winning and do not need good opinion. I am really afraid of war against us after this war — if Germany wins.' On November 16: 'The German people are still absolutely, and probably justifiably confident in the results of the war.'

The United States could not risk a German victory, House insisted, nor could our Government look forward to an indefinite quarrel with both belligerent groups: with the Germans over submarine 'accidents,' plots, and propaganda; with the Allies over their restrictions upon trade. 'Shall we ever get out of this labyrinth?' Wilson asked of House. 'Only by adopting a positive policy,' was the Colonel's reply.

CHAPTER IV

A PLAN TO COMPEL PEACE

It will not do for the United States to let the Allies go down and leave Germany the dominant military factor in the world.

House to Counsellor Polk, October 11, 1915

I

IN the autumn of 1915, Colonel House recognized three alternatives which lay open to President Wilson. He might drift upon events, trusting that the persistent difficulties which arose with each belligerent group could be met separately and safely. He might push the still unsettled dispute with Germany over the disavowal of the sinking of the *Lusitania* to a point where a break would be inevitable, and thus bring the United States into the war on the side of the Entente. Or he might openly demand a peace conference, stating that the United States would support whichever group would agree to terms securing Europe from the threat of militarist aggression, and would enter the war against the side which refused. If war came in this fashion, it would come indeed as a crusade for peace.

The first two plans he dismissed. A continuance of the drifting policy, punctuated as it must be by sporadic quarrels with both Germany and the Allies, signified the loss of friendship with the Allies and perhaps the victory of German militarism. The second course — a break with Germany over the wording of the disavowal of the *Lusitania* outrage — seemed ridiculous after such long negotiations; if the rupture was to come on this score, it should have immediately succeeded the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and not when the issue was six months old. After accepting Germany's apology for sinking the *Arabic*, how could Wilson lead the country

into war on the ground that Germany omitted this phrase, or that, in her *Lusitania* disavowal?

There were elements of obvious weakness in the third plan. The Allies believed that they would wear Germany down and they would be certain to regard any suggestion of mediation as a move to save her from the consequences of defeat. They wanted no compromise which would leave Germany in a position later to renew the struggle, and they felt that a complete military victory offered the only security. But what House had in mind was no compromise with German militarism. The terms he would suggest meant, indeed, virtual defeat for the Pan-German ideal — complete restitution by Germany, full guaranties against future war. Either Germany would or would not accept such terms. If she accepted them (contrary to all public and private intimations), the Allies would have secured their avowed purposes. As Foch remarked three years later, 'The only object of fighting is to obtain results.'¹ If Germany would yield the results demanded by the Allies, there was no value in further fighting. It was altogether probable, however, that Germany, apparently victorious and certainly undefeated, would refuse such terms. In such a case House proposed that the United States should join the Allies to enforce them, and he suspected that without American aid they could not be enforced. His suggestion thus would be practically to guarantee Allied victory with the assistance of the United States.

Another factor had to be considered. The military unpreparedness of the United States was such that the Germans were likely to be as unaffected by threats of American intervention as the Allies would be unattracted by the promise of our assistance. Colonel House wrote, some years later, 'The United States might have changed the course of

¹ 'On ne fait la guerre que pour ses résultats,' reported by Captain Mantoux, the interpreter during the inter-Allied councils that led to the drafting of the armistice terms, October, 1918.

history had we armed to the teeth at the beginning of the war and waited for the proper opportunity to intervene. This, I think, was the big mistake, for both the Allies and Germans would have heeded any threat of intervention, and we might have intervened pretty much on our own terms.'¹ Fortunately, President Wilson, in the autumn of 1915, had revised his earlier ideas and was now ready to go before the country with a demand for vigorous preparation. In his speech before the Manhattan Club he confessed his change of mind, and he soon undertook an active campaign for preparedness in the pacifist centres of the Middle West. If he would push the movement with energy, despite the precious time that had been lost, America might yet dispose of the material strength necessary to carry through House's plan.

There was a third factor and the most vital of all. Hitherto the cardinal object of Wilson's policy had been to keep the United States out of the war. Would the President accept House's proposition, which looked directly toward military intervention? Would he be willing to tell the Germans that, unless they agreed to terms involving restitution and guaranties against military aggression, he would bring the United States into the war on the side of the Allies? One evening in September, he and House were discussing the problems of neutrality in the President's study in the White House. 'Much to my surprise,' wrote the Colonel, 'he said he had never been sure that we ought not to take part in the conflict and, if it seemed evident that Germany and her militaristic ideas were to win, the obligation upon us was greater than ever.'

The casual remark encouraged House to develop his idea of a positive policy. A few weeks later, Wilson came to New York and the Colonel laid it before him.

'I outlined very briefly [he noted] a plan which has oc-

¹ Letter to the author, April 6, 1925.

curred to me and which seems of much value. I thought we had lost our opportunity to break with Germany, and it looked as if she had a better chance than ever of winning, and if she did win our turn would come next; and we were not only unprepared, but there would be no one to help us stand the first shock. Therefore, we should do something decisive now — something that would either end the war in a way to abolish militarism or that would bring us in with the Allies to help them do it. My suggestion is to ask the Allies, unofficially, to let me know whether or not it would be agreeable to them to have us demand that hostilities cease. We would put it upon the high ground that the neutral world was suffering along with the belligerents and that we had rights as well as they, and that peace parleys should begin upon the broad basis of both military and naval disarmament. . . .

‘If the Allies understood our purpose, we could be as severe in our language concerning them as we were with the Central Powers. The Allies, after some hesitation, could accept our offer or demand and, if the Central Powers accepted, we would then have accomplished a master-stroke of diplomacy. If the Central Powers refused to acquiesce, we could then push our insistence to a point where diplomatic relations would first be broken off, and later the whole force of our Government — and perhaps the force of every neutral — might be brought against them.¹

‘The President was startled by this plan. He seemed to acquiesce by silence. I had no time to push it further, for our entire conversation did not last longer than twenty minutes.

¹ Colonel House had in mind a striking historical parallel which came to him from his historical reading. In the summer of 1813, after the battle of Bautzen, Austria offered mediation between Napoleon and the Allied Governments, intimating that, unless Napoleon resigned the major part of his conquests outside of the natural boundaries of France, she would join his enemies. Napoleon refused the terms proposed, Austria entered the war on the side of the Allies, and participated in the grand coalition that led to his downfall.

'October 11, 1915: Frank Polk took lunch with me. I told him something of the plan I had outlined to the President, concerning our enforcing peace before the Allies reached a position where they could not be of assistance in the event we had war with the Central Powers. I am looking at the matter from the American viewpoint and also from the broader viewpoint of humanity in general. It will not do for the United States to let the Allies go down and leave Germany the dominant military factor in the world. We would certainly be the next object of attack, and the Monroe Doctrine would be less indeed than "a scrap of paper." . . . Polk thought the idea was good from every standpoint, and he hoped the President would finally put it through. . . .'

Not long afterwards, in Washington, House discussed the same matter with Lansing, who, despite the sharpness of his notes to the British, was strongly pro-Ally in sympathy. The Colonel emphasized again the fact that the interests of the United States and of civilization were altogether opposed to a German victory.

'Lansing agreed [wrote House] and was willing to advise a strong course. He seems not to be afraid, and concurs in my opinion that Mr. Bryan did more to endanger the peace of this country than any other man, by his "peace at any price" policy.'

II

House's proposition would not meet the approval of those Allied statesmen who looked forward to utilizing their prospective victory as a means to extensive annexations and crushing indemnities. They were doubtless perfectly sincere in their protestations of a desire for justice and a stable peace, but they interpreted 'justice' so as to conform with the particular interests of their own nation and the stability

of peace as meaning the political destruction of the enemy. The Russians, British, and French had signed treaties which carved up the regions of the Near East with little regard for the interests of their inhabitants, they had brought Italy to their side by promising territories which were certainly not Italian in character; French aspirations extended far beyond Alsace-Lorraine, and Tsarist Russia had plans for the Poles who might be liberated from Austria and Prussia, which did not include independence.

It was by no means the thought of House that the United States should enter the war to assure such aspirations, which the Allies were careful not to confess publicly; and it was probable that many of the allied leaders would prefer to forego American aid rather than give up their dreams of conquest, even though it meant the squandering of many lives. But there were other statesmen in Europe, of the type of Sir Edward Grey, who demanded victory not for selfish nationalistic purposes so much as to build a new system which might abolish competitive armaments and provide an international organization to keep the peace. House hoped that to secure the greater end they might give up their idea of a peace by conquest, especially if in so doing they could have the help of America. He counted particularly upon Grey himself, who made it plain that in his mind the chief object of the war was to prevent future wars and that this end could be secured only through the coöperation of the United States.

Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House

LONDON, August 10, 1915

DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

... My own mind revolves more and more about the point that the refusal of a Conference was the fatal step that decided peace or war last year, and about the moral to be drawn from it: which is that the pearl of great price, if it can be found, would be some League of Nations that could be

relied on to insist that disputes between any two nations must be settled by the arbitration, mediation, or conference of others. International Law has hitherto had no sanction. The lesson of this war is that the Powers must bind themselves to give it a sanction. If that can be secured, freedom of the seas and many other things will become easy. But it is not a fair proposition that there should be a guaranty of the freedom of the seas while Germany claims to recognize no law but her own on land, and to have the right to make war at will. . . .

Yours sincerely

E. GREY

LONDON, *August 26, 1915*

DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

. . . Several neutrals have pressed me about a Conference of neutral States to be formed so that it may be ready to undertake mediation whenever it is opportune. I have said that no one could resent any efforts of neutrals which were impartial and independent to promote peace, but I did not think a Conference of neutrals would be of much use unless the United States was in it.

If the end of this war is arrived at through mediation, I believe it must be through that of the United States. All our efforts are of course concentrated on saving ourselves and our Allies by securing victory in the war. But it is in my mind continually that the awful sufferings of this war will, to a great extent, have been in vain unless at the end of it nations are set and determined together that future generations shall not fall into such a catastrophe again.

And though a great number of people in the United States and everywhere may be indifferent, absorbed in things of the moment and in material interests, you have a great body of reflecting public opinion so disposed that it can give a great impulse and guidance to this idea. Therefore I look forward

to the help of your country under the guidance of the President and impelled by this section of public opinion in those larger conditions of peace, which looking to the future, interest neutrals as much as belligerents. . . .

Yours sincerely

E. GREY

LONDON, *September 22, 1915*

DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

. . . To me, the great object of securing the elimination of militarism and navalism is to get security for the future against aggressive war. How much are the United States prepared to do in this direction? Would the President propose that there should be a League of Nations binding themselves to side against any Power which broke a treaty; which broke certain rules of warfare on sea or land (such rules would, of course, have to be drawn up after this war); or which refused, in case of dispute, to adopt some other method of settlement than that of war? Only in some such agreement do I see a prospect of diminishing militarism and navalism in future, so that no nation will build up armies or navies for aggressive purposes. I cannot say which Governments would be prepared to accept such a proposal, but I am sure that the Government of the United States is the only Government that could make it with effect. . . .

Yours sincerely

E. GREY

This last letter from Grey reached House at the moment that the Colonel was casting about for a method to translate his ideas into a definite policy, and it seemed to provide the opportunity he desired. He immediately took it to Wilson, who agreed that House should draft an encouraging reply to Sir Edward as the first step toward offering American help, if Germany refused the terms they had in mind, which coin-

cided with the public war aims of the Allies. In his notes the Colonel wrote of the reply: 'This is one of the most important letters I ever wrote.' It indicated to the British a way of salvation from the German threat and a means of enforcing a stable peace. Wilson at once approved the letter, making only minor changes in the original draft, one of which was to add the word 'probably.' The President declared the proposal to be altogether right and he 'prayed God' it might bring results.

'October 19, 1915: Miss Denton and I decided [wrote House] that instead of putting the letter in code, we would send it as a 'split message.' I wrote a letter of explanation to Sir Edward, so that when he receives the two letters he will know how to put them together, just as one would a picture puzzle. I hope they may carry safely. We took the precaution to mail them in separate post-offices.'

Colonel House to Sir Edward Grey

NEW YORK, October 17, 1915

DEAR SIR EDWARD:

... It has occurred to me that the time may soon come when this Government should intervene between the belligerents and demand that peace parleys begin upon the broad basis of the elimination of militarism and navalism. . . .

In my opinion, it would be a world-wide calamity if the war should continue to a point where the Allies could not, with the aid of the United States, bring about a peace along the lines you and I have so often discussed. What I want you to know is that, whenever you consider the time is propitious for this intervention, I will propose it to the President. He may then desire me to go to Europe in order that a more intimate understanding as to procedure may be had.

It is in my mind that, after conferring with your Government, I should proceed to Berlin and tell them that it was

the President's purpose to intervene and stop this destructive war, provided the weight of the United States thrown on the side that accepted our proposal could do it.

I would not let Berlin know, of course, of any understanding had with the Allies, but would rather lead them to think our proposal would be rejected by the Allies. This might induce Berlin to accept the proposal, but, if they did not do so, it would nevertheless be the purpose to intervene. If the Central Powers were still obdurate, it would probably be necessary for us to join the Allies and force the issue.¹

I want to call your attention to the danger of postponing action too long. If the Allies should be unsuccessful and become unable to do their full share, it would be increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for us to intervene. I would have made this proposal to the President last autumn, but you will remember that it was not agreeable to the Allies.

It might be well for you to cable me under the code we have between us, unless you prefer to send a letter. The understanding will be that the discussion is entirely between you and me until it is desired that it be broadened further. . . .

Sincerely yours

E. M. HOUSE

On November 9, Sir Edward cabled to the Colonel to ask if the proposal was to be taken in conjunction with Grey's proposal for a League of Nations after the war, as made in his letter of September 22. To this House, with Wilson's approval, answered in the affirmative. The President had begun to break away from his earlier lack of interest in world problems and was ready to take the first steps toward the

¹ On the copy of the letter is endorsed in long hand opposite this paragraph: 'I have expressed myself badly, and I do not mean to be unfair to Berlin. E. M. H.' The 'probably' in this sentence was added by President Wilson.

position of world eminence he was soon to hold. House encouraged him constantly in this course.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, *November 10, 1915*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . It seems to me that we must throw the influence of this nation in behalf of a plan by which international obligations must be kept, and in behalf of some plan by which the peace of the world may be maintained. We should do this not only for the sake of civilization, but for our own welfare — for who may say when we may be involved in such a holocaust as is now devastating Europe?

Must we not be a party to the making of new and more humane rules of warfare, and must we not lend our influence towards the freedom of both the land and sea? This is the part I think you are destined to play in this world tragedy, and it is the noblest part that has ever come to a son of man. This country will follow you along such a path, no matter what the cost may be.

Your affectionate

E. M. HOUSE

III

Colonel House did not conceal from himself the difficulties which his proposition would confront in the United States as well as in Europe. It involved a complete revolution of American policy that would tax Wilson's powers of leadership, and at a time when public confidence in the President seemed none too firm. The middle course which he had tried to follow made him the target for every pro-Ally and every pro-German, for the hysterical criticism of chauvinists as well as for that of pacifists.

'I do not like the general outlook this morning [wrote

House on November 17]. We are beset on all sides, both at home and abroad. By "we" I mean the Administration. The part that gives one faith in the course we are pursuing, is that all the critics differ violently among themselves as to the remedy. I have no doubt that it is the right course and will so prove itself, provided it is not made impossible by the extremists here and abroad. It is all very clear in my mind now what this country should do. The question is, Can the President do it unmolested? The convening of Congress puts a new and disturbing element into the situation. The constant changes in the Cabinets in France and England do likewise. The irrational . . . Ambassador may at any time precipitate matters. I am glad my philosophy holds me serene. I do the best I can each day and give the best advice to the President of which I am capable, and let it rest at that.'

All through the autumn House urged patience upon the extreme pacifist leaders who desired Wilson to call an immediate peace conference, regardless of the stern fact that until the ground was prepared neither the United States nor all the neutrals in combination could hope to make any impression upon the belligerents. The Colonel was himself invited to participate in the naïve adventure supported by Mr. Henry Ford, who planned to inaugurate peace through the despatch of a shipload of enthusiastic pacifists in whom zeal outran information. House's sense of the practical and of the ridiculous combined to save him from an acceptance, but he kept in continuous touch with pacifist leaders whose sentimental influence was not to be underestimated, a factor which might be turned into more effective channels.

He maintained also his relations with pro-Ally friends whose influence in the war area, together with that of the British journalists whom he guided, might help to prepare the way for the policy he and the President had in mind. Thus House kept many wires in his fingers.

‘*September 1, 1915*: Dr. Jacobs and Miss Emily Balch [he recorded] came in the afternoon by appointment. Dr. Jacobs is the Dutch lady who called the Women’s Peace Conference at The Hague in May, over which Jane Addams presided. They had just been to Washington and the President, in a letter which they showed me, referred them to Lansing and to me. Their interview with Lansing was thoroughly unsatisfactory from their viewpoint. They claimed he was pro-Ally and very unsympathetic with their suggestion that the United States should call together all neutral countries in order to make peace overtures. I tried to show them how utterly impracticable their plan was, while evidencing the deepest sympathy with their general purpose. I am to have an interview with Dr. Jacobs later in New York. . . .

‘*October 25, 1915*: David Starr Jordan, President of Stanford University, telegraphed asking for an appointment. . . . He is President of the American Peace Society, and at their last convention in San Francisco they passed resolutions concerning peace proposals, which they authorized him to submit to the President.

‘Jordan said he realized I knew more about the subject than any one and he desired to see me before seeing the President, in order that he might know how to talk to him and how far he should go into the subject. I told in a few words what I had done before the war and since. I let him know that the President was probably the best-informed man in the world as to what could or could not be done, and there was no one more eager to serve than he in the direction indicated. I thought, however, that efforts to force the issue hurt rather than helped the situation. Jordan seemed quite satisfied with my explanation, and said he would merely present the resolution to the President and would not bother him with arguments. He asked to see me again upon his next visit to New York, after he has seen the President.

‘*November 9, 1915*: H. C. Hoover called early this morning

to say good-bye. He sails at twelve. He expressed gratitude for the help I have given him in his troubles. I urged him to impress upon the Germans in Belgium and elsewhere the futility of making Zeppelin raids upon London. I have taken this up with Bernstorff and with Government officials in Berlin, but it seems to have had but little effect. Hoover said he had reason to believe that the German General Staff disapproved them, but the matter is in the hands of the naval authorities, who, failing to do anything in their own department, have been exploiting the Zeppelins. I doubt if any man and his *entourage* have ever done a nation greater harm than von Tirpitz has done Germany. He has accentuated the brutality of his people and has never allowed the world to forget what a triumph of German arms would mean to civilization. . . .

'November 14, 1915: Sidney Brooks called at 11.30 and we motored through the park discussing international questions. I am trying to give him an insight into the President's policy without telling him too much, but enough to get favorable cables and articles from his pen. Northcliffe has sent him over to write for the *Times* and *Daily Mail*. . . .

'He told of his interview with Roosevelt yesterday. Roosevelt is bitter against the President. He calls his foreign policy pusillanimous and avers that his one object now is to defeat him for reëlection. I told Brooks that, for the first time in his career, Roosevelt was up against the real thing when it came to political sagacity, courage, and a well-equipped thinking machine. . . .

'November 15, 1915: Sidney Brooks called this morning very much disturbed by a leading editorial in the New York *Tribune* antagonistic to the President's foreign policy. I told him to calm himself and not be disturbed by what he saw in the New York papers. He said I reminded him of the saying that "England never looked beyond New York, and New York never looked beyond the Palisades."

'He thought the President was making a mistake in not sending Bernstorff home immediately. He thought if he did, it would rally all hesitating Republicans to his support. I again asked him to reserve judgment and have confidence in the ultimate outcome. I was positive in my statement that the President would not permit the Republicans or the Republican papers to dictate his policy. Brooks outlined a cablegram to his London papers that he wanted me to O.K., which I did. I even let him hint in the cable that, contrary to the general opinion, the United States was not through with this war and that at the proper time and in the proper way, her influence would be felt. . . .

'*November 21, 1915*: Misses Jane Addams, Lilian Wald, and von Schwimmer of Vienna called by appointment this afternoon. It was the same old story of trying to get the President to appoint a peace commission jointly with other neutral nations, to sit at The Hague and to continue making peace proposals until accepted. I explained that the President could not do this officially. They then wanted to know whether he would object to an unofficial commission doing it, and I thought he would not. As usual, I got them into a controversy between themselves, which delights me since it takes the pressure off myself. . . .

'*November 22, 1915*: Frau Selenka of Munich, one of the flock of pacifists who are besieging me, called in the afternoon. She displayed some glimmering of reason when she intimated that perhaps the President knew better than they as to the proper time to make a move in the direction of peace. I complimented her upon her acumen. She calls herself "an internationalist," but I think she might better be described as a German with broad sympathies which are anti-military.

'Henry Ford, the automobile manufacturer, called by appointment. He also came in the rôle of pacifist. He brought with him David Starr Jordan's secretary, a young man who did most of the talking, despite the fact that I indicated

very clearly that I wished to talk to Mr. Ford. Ford's views regarding peace were so crude and unimportant that I endeavored to lead him into a more fruitful field; but just as soon as I got him discussing his great industrial plant at Detroit and the plans for the uplift of his workmen, the young man would break in and turn the tide of conversation into another channel. Ford, I should judge, is a mechanical genius . . . who may become a prey to all sorts of faddists who desire his money. . . .'

Colonel House to Ambassador Gerard

NEW YORK, December 1, 1915

DEAR JUDGE:

. . . Henry Ford has been urging me to go on his peace ship, which I have not considered for a moment. Some of the women pacifists suggested this adventure to him, I think, and perhaps in a moment of enthusiasm he consented. I believe he will regret it later. Of course there is no need to tell you that the Government are not interested in it, either directly, indirectly, or otherwise, for it cannot bring any results. . . .

Sincerely yours

E. M. HOUSE

IV

Toward the close of November, Colonel House received from Grey the reply for which he had been so anxiously waiting. Even though House had made what amounted to an offer of American help to end the war on a basis of organized guaranties against militarism, he had not expected a categoric acceptance, for he recognized the influences among Allied leaders which would make them hesitate. Would they forego the broad annexations they had promised themselves, would they have the imagination to realize that by pressing House's suggestion they could in all probability bring the

United States into the war? Even with such doubts in mind, the Colonel was frankly disappointed by the mildness of interest taken by Sir Edward Grey. The British Foreign Secretary was apparently so certain that the Allies would refuse the plan that he had not discussed its possibilities with them. He must have a more definite offer before pressing the matter, and he made it plain that the Allies would be suspicious of any peace conference.

‘I do not see how they could commit themselves in advance to any proposition [he wrote], without knowing exactly what it was, and knowing that the United States was prepared to intervene and make good if they accepted.’

The remainder and by far the longer portion of the letter emphasized the feeling in Allied countries that Wilson had not shown himself friendly and, by refusing to accept the principle of the Allied blockade, was threatening to strike the weapon of sea power from the hands of Great Britain.

‘*November 25, 1915*: Sir Edward is evidently taking a pessimistic view of the situation [wrote the Colonel]. He had not received my cablegram when he wrote, but, even so, the offer which I made in my letter — which was practically to ensure victory to the Allies — should have met a warmer reception. The British are in many ways dull. . . . The richer we grow through the acceptance of their insistence that we sell them munitions of war, the more unpopular we become. They cannot look at the situation fairly, and perhaps we could not under like circumstances. . . . I loathe the idea of our making money out of their misfortune, but nevertheless it is inevitable; and if we refused to give economic aid in this way, our name would have been anathema just the same. . . .’

The proposal made by Colonel House was, on the face of

it, conceived quite as much in the interest of the Allies as in that of America; to carry it through would involve an immense, an incalculable sacrifice on the part of the United States. There was something of the spirit of *Alice through the Looking Glass* in the British assumption that by preparing to help them Wilson would be asking a favor, and he might have been forgiven if he had immediately dropped the whole plan.

But both Wilson and House were too eager to accomplish what might prove a decisive stroke, to permit the proposition to be blocked by what seemed misunderstanding of American motives. Obviously the Allies interpreted our protests against trade restrictions as evidence of unfriendliness to the Allied cause; they were also suspicious of Wilson and did not believe that he would actually bring the United States into the war, no matter what the issue. These points demanded explanation. 'What is most needful at present,' wrote House to Grey, on December 7, 'is a better working understanding with you; and how this is to be brought about is uppermost in our thoughts. The machinery we are using is not altogether satisfactory.'

President Wilson was convinced that this understanding could not be brought about through the Ambassadors. He saw in Mr. Page's letters to him a lack of sympathy with his policies which led him to question Page's ability to explain the Administration point of view. Nor did it seem likely that the British Ambassador in Washington would prove capable of dispelling the clouds that threatened Anglo-American friendship. The constant friction resulting from the blockade question had so rubbed his nerves that officials of the State Department, even those who were most fond of him personally, admitted that it was not always easy to negotiate with Sir Cecil. 'X, who is ardently pro-Ally,' recorded the Colonel, 'said he left him feeling a sympathy for the Germans.'

'November 17, 1915: I arranged with Sidney Brooks to see Frank Polk and discuss trade questions between our two countries. Polk says these are becoming serious; that the British Ambassador "blew off the lid" again on Monday and practically threw down the gauntlet. Brooks maintains that this is not the feeling in [British] Government circles, and I cannot believe that it is. . . .

'December 6, 1915: Sir Paul Harvey called to bring a message from the British Ambassador. I listened to it with scant courtesy, for it was a repetition of the Ambassador's comments upon the American policy, particularly as regards peace measures. I indicated my impatience to Sir Paul by saying the Ambassador must still be nervous and excited over the situation. I explained that all of us were careful in discussing matters with the Ambassador because of his excitability. I expressed the belief that the United States knew quite well what was best for her, perhaps better than the British Ambassador, and that he need not give himself any undue concern as to our safety. . . .'

Every day it became more obvious that the situation demanded some sort of action. A better understanding with the Allies was essential for the carrying-on of regular business, and all the more so if House's plan of American intervention were to be attempted. Mr. Lansing agreed thoroughly with both Wilson and House that matters could not be allowed to run their course dependent upon mere chance. He suggested that the time had come to disregard personal sensibilities and that a change of Ambassadors was necessary.

'November 28, 1915: I tried to impress upon Lansing [wrote House] the necessity of the United States making it clear to the Allies that we considered their cause our cause, and that we had no intention of permitting a military autocracy to

dominate the world, if our strength could prevent it. We believed this was a fight between democracy and autocracy and we would stand with democracy. I pointed out that it was impossible to maintain cordial relations with Germany, not only for the reason that her system of government was different in its conception from ours, but also because so much hate against us had been engendered that it would be perhaps a generation or two before it could die out. Germany was being taught that her lack of success could be directly attributed to us. It was evident that the Government there was looking for some excuse for failure, and the easiest and best, in their opinion, seemed to be the United States' "unneutral attitude in regard to the shipment of munitions of war, and the lending of money to her enemies." I thought also that unless we did have a complete and satisfactory understanding with the Allies we would be wholly without friends when the war was ended, and our position would be not only perilous but might become hurtful from an economic viewpoint.

'Lansing agreed to this and we discussed the best means of reaching an understanding. He thought they should recall the British Ambassador and send such a man as Lord Bryce, with whom we could talk understandingly.'

President Wilson, whose respect for diplomats was limited, and who saw little value in a change of Ambassadors, insisted that the speediest and surest method of reaching the desired end was to send House once more to England and France. There he would explain the factors that compelled American protests against the Allied blockade and the lack of basis for their suspicions of American unfriendliness. If conditions seemed favorable, he would also present the desire of the United States Government to help in winning the war, provided the victory were used to assure, not selfish territorial aspirations, but a real triumph of ideals.

'The President returned at five [continued House], and we had an uninterrupted conversation of an hour and a half. I went very thoroughly into the matters I had discussed with Lansing and in much the same way. He feels that we should let the Allies know how our minds are running, but he did not seem to think it could be done by a change of Ambassadors. . . . He thought my going was the only way properly to accomplish what we had in mind. He suggested that I might say to the British Government that we could not deal with "the highly excitable invalid" they had here to represent them. . . .'

'*December 15, 1915:* I called the President's attention to the impossibility of doing things quickly in London. Matters that he and I would settle in a day, would easily occupy a week or perhaps two there. I asked him to remember the slowness of the British mind, as exhibited even in such a crisis as this war. They have been a year and a half getting thoroughly awakened to the situation. The President wondered if I could not facilitate matters somewhat by going to France earlier than anticipated, and getting them to help push.

'As to Germany, he thought circumstances should determine whether I should visit there. We decided that unless I was invited, I should not go. The excuse for my going on the trip at all, was discussed at some length. Since I last talked with him about it, a new and better reason has occurred to me, and the President accepted it as being the one to use. That is, it is thought inadvisable to bring home any of our Ambassadors from the belligerent countries at this time; and, in order that they may have a more intimate knowledge of our position regarding pending international questions, at the President's request I am undertaking the journey. . . .

'I asked the President to again read me what Gerard had sent in regard to his interview with the Kaiser. He went to

the safe and got it out and read it to Lansing and me. They both criticized Gerard seriously for not sending the full text of his conversation. However, I asked them if he had not epitomized it all in the few lines he had sent and whether, if he had written a volume, he could have made it more pregnant. The upshot of what Gerard wrote was that the Kaiser said "he would attend to America when this war was over; that President Wilson's attitude regarding Germany eliminated him from any possibility of acting as mediator."

V

Colonel House was not greatly disturbed by the Kaiser's moods, since he was fully aware that control of affairs had long ago slipped from his grasp. None the less he studied the letters of Ambassador Gerard with care, for his mission to Europe, which Wilson had definitely decided upon, might be vitally affected by a new crisis in our relations with Germany. At any moment the dispute over the *Lusitania* disavowal, still unsettled, the propaganda that had brought about the dismissal of von Papen and Boy-Ed, or the sinking of the *Ancona* by an Austrian submarine, might lead to a break. This he hoped to avoid, at least for the moment. He believed that in the end the United States must enter the war in order to prevent a German victory and assure a lasting peace, but he wanted to make it plain to the world that Germany refused a peace based upon restitution and disarmament.

The problem was thus how best to clarify the issue, and it was not made easier by the fact that while the military masters of Germany were in no mood for the kind of peace House had in mind, there was much irresponsible discussion of German willingness to cease fighting.

Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House

BERLIN, December 7, 1915

MY DEAR COLONEL:

. . . Of a sudden — peace talk. The Chancellor is waiting to address the Reichstag — waiting to get the sentiment of the members who are all in Berlin, and swim with it. Many members who are not Socialists, favor peace, and the Chancellor will be forced to make some sort of a declaration on why they are fighting and for what.

A banker told me yesterday that they are sick of the war, that the big industrials are making big money (Krupps, etc.) and making the war last by insisting on keeping Belgium (in order to control the European steel, iron, and coal trade) and that the Junkers (Prussian county squires) are also in favor of continuing the war, as they get three or four times the former price for their products and are getting work done by prisoners at six cents a day. He said the 'Kaufleute' (business people) will have to pay the cost of the war and that the Junkers will not be taxed. . . .

Hindenburg is out with an interview saying it is not yet time for peace. This is a Government measure to stamp out peace talk among the Reichstag members.

Best wishes to Mrs. House.

Yours ever

J. W. G.

BERLIN, December 14, 1915

MY DEAR COLONEL:

I think the German press has received orders to step softly on the von Papen-Boy-Ed recall. The greatest danger now lies in Austria, and over the *Ancona* note. Here there is a large body of manufacturers, ship-owners, etc., who at the last moment declare themselves against war with the U.S.A. and use their influence to that end. But in Austria with no such interests to help toward peace and with

a lot of rattle-headed Orientals (for Hungarians are such) in charge of the Foreign Office — almost anything may happen. However, pressure from here may be brought to bear. . . .

Von Jagow also tells me confidentially that Rintelen ¹ was sent to America to buy up the products of the Du Pont Powder Company, and that if he did anything else, he exceeded his instructions. . . .

Yours ever

J. W. G.

BERLIN, *January 3, 1916*

MY DEAR COLONEL:

. . . On fair authority — a man who called on von Tirpitz recently was told by von T. that he, von T., was watched like a spy and all his letters opened. Von T. said that Hindenburg was the real ruler of Germany, that anything Bethmann said was censored by H., and that H. was now against reckless submarine war, but that any substantial defeats in the field would make him change his mind. Von T. said that the K. was losing his mind and spent all his time praying and learning Hebrew. . . .

Yours

J. W. G.

Ambassador von Bernstorff was appalled by the dismissal of the German attachés, and regarded the situation as critical. He naturally hailed the Colonel's mission to Europe with enthusiasm, for it offered, he believed, some hope of coming to an arrangement if not peace.

'*December 2, 1915*: The German Ambassador telephoned [recorded House] and asked for an interview. Knowing the important matters pending, I asked him to come at once. I found him visibly shaken. It is the first time I have seen his

¹ German secret service agent.

equanimity disturbed. Lansing told him yesterday that he intended to send home both the German military and naval attachés, and Bernstorff was evidently nervous about himself. . . . Bernstorff thought we were gradually drifting into an alliance with the Allies and that the newspapers would at once begin a hue and cry against him, hoping to have him also sent home. . . .’

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, December 16, 1915

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . . Bernstorff was in this morning. He pleaded very strongly against sending a sharp note to Berlin. He thought if given time he could get an apology and indemnity for the *Lusitania*. He does not believe it can be done at once.

The Reichstag dissolves Saturday. After that, he thinks, something can be accomplished without danger to his Government. Popular opinion, he believes, will not sustain such an apology as will satisfy us. But he believes it may be given out later in a way that his public will not get it in its full form.

He is inclined to believe Austria will meet our requirements in the *Ancona*.

I spoke to him in regard to my trip, telling him it might not extend beyond London, but that would depend upon his Government. . . .

He declared I would be welcome in Germany if any one would be upon such a mission.

He maintains that there are no plots instigated by Germans brewing here, and that we would find it out sooner or later. He thinks this belief is the main cause of friction and is causing your determination to sever relations.

I let him know that there was a feeling among Americans that if Germany was successful, she would finally quarrel with us, with or without provocation; and if this feeling

could be overcome, and it could be by the elimination of militarism, the hostility would immediately die out. He admitted this.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

NEW YORK, *December 22, 1915*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Bernstorff has just been in. He has heard from his Government. They would like me to come directly to Berlin to discuss peace upon the general terms of military and naval disarmament.

Bernstorff understands that I must go to London first, and he will so inform his Government. Their feeling was that it would be better to come to Berlin first. In my opinion, this would not do.

In the conversation which Bernstorff repeated to his Government, I said I believed if they would consent to a plan which embraced general disarmament, you would be willing to throw the weight of this Government into the scales and demand that the war cease. That we were not concerned regarding territorial questions or indemnity, but we were concerned regarding the larger questions which involved not only the belligerents but the neutrals also.

The Allies will take care of the territorial and indemnity questions, and we need not go into that at this time. If we start with such discussions, it would involve us in controversies that might be endless and footless.

I believe we ought to move with circumspection and not permit the German Government to lead us into an attitude that would place us in a disagreeable position with the Allies. It is possible they will undertake this. I am always suspicious of their diplomacy. However, knowing this in advance, I feel we can avoid any pitfalls. But we cannot be, I think, too cautious.

It will be of great value if you will write me now and then, when you have time, and in such a way that I may show the letter to some member of each Government where I should happen to be. Your messages last year to Poincaré and Delcassé did no end of good. They were indirect and therefore all the more appreciated. It is hard to estimate the effect of flattery and politeness upon Europeans, and this may be said of the British and Germans as well as of the Latin races. They value such things far beyond our conception . . .

I am, with deep affection

Your devoted

E. M. HOUSE

'December 17, 1915: This has been a busy day, gathering up the loose ends preparatory to leaving. The British Ambassador came at four and remained for an hour and a half. I have never seen him more entertaining, affectionate, and reasonable. He was all we know he can be on occasions. He complimented me so extravagantly that I almost lost countenance. He said he intended writing a history of his tenure of office at Washington, in order that he might give me credit for the things I had done and which otherwise would forever remain unknown. He harked back to the time when I had caught the offensive sentence in the message to Great Britain some year and more ago. He insisted, if that message had gone as first written, there could never have been good relations between England and the United States; the insult would have rankled forever. . . . How can I go to London and demand his head? I am trying to think of some way to save him, and it will probably result in some modification of the President's, Lansing's, and my wishes to have him recalled.

'I found in conversation with the Ambassador that X had talked rather too freely. . . . I found that Captain

Gaunt¹ must have told him that I had direct cable communication through code with Sir Edward Grey. It shows the utter impossibility of keeping such matters secret. It is necessary to tell certain people certain things, but when one does, they are sure to be repeated. The problem forever before me is, which is the better end of the dilemma. I am impressed more and more with the human characteristic to talk and to convey information that should properly be held in confidence. Most of the trouble in the world, I feel certain, is caused by conveying information or misinformation from one person to another and from one government to another. That which was information to start with, becomes misinformation before it reaches its goal, and an infinite amount of trouble and misunderstanding results.'

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, *December 21, 1915*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... Sir Cecil was here the other day. He remained with me an hour and a half, and I have never seen him more amiable and reasonable. ... In his note asking for an appointment he closed by saying, 'With much love.' He is a queer Sir Cecil. He wished to know if he was doing anything wrong, or everything to please the State Department. It was rather a staggering question, and I had to tell him that some of his methods might be improved upon. He promised to do better. ...

Your devoted friend

E. M. HOUSE

The President wrote to House on December 24, expressing his irritation with the diplomats at Washington. Sir Cecil he felt to be puzzling and incalculable. Bernstorff was hardly

¹ British Naval Attaché, with whom, following his habit, House had established intimate relations.

more satisfactory, and Wilson agreed with House that it was necessary to get corroboration of everything he reported from Berlin. To House's request for instructions, the President replied that he needed none; the Colonel's letters exactly echoed his own views and purposes. The United States was interested only in the future peace of the world and in its guarantees. The essential guarantees, he insisted, were disarmament, military and naval, and a league of nations to secure each nation against aggression and maintain the absolute freedom of the seas. The necessity for House's mission, he pointed¹ out, was the more imperative because of the demand coming from the Senate for further and immediate pressure upon England and her allies to remove their restrictions upon neutral trade.

VI

The great difficulty which the Colonel must overcome would lie in the task of persuading the Allies that his mission was not designed to inaugurate negotiations in which Germany might capitalize her present military advantage to secure a peace of compromise. They were determined not to consider terms which would simply reëstablish the *status quo ante*; that is, another armed truce, a new era of competitive armaments leading up to a yet more devastating war. Of this determination House was fully informed.

On November 26 Lord Bryce had written to Colonel House, reminding him of their understanding that he would keep him informed when anything occurred regarding British views which House ought to know. He insisted that there was not the slightest change in British sentiment regarding the duty and necessity of prosecuting the war with the utmost vigor and listening to no suggestions for negotiations with the German Government. The British were certain that Germany would not listen to any terms they could propose, since those terms must include the evacuation of

Belgium, with ample compensation to her for all her suffering, and also, of course, the evacuation of Northern France and Luxemburg. Germany, on the other hand, he asserted, would insist upon indemnities, since without them bankruptcy stared her in the face.

Hence, said Bryce, there was nothing for it but to fight on. He had heard that Jane Addams, 'who ought to have known better after her journey around Europe,' and other women and some men of the extreme pacifist type, had been trying to engineer a movement for mediation; they might have spared themselves the trouble. The British were not in the least discouraged by the Balkan difficulties; and the Armenian massacres, which the German Government could have stopped, had heightened British antagonism against them as well as against the Turks. The rule of the latter over Christians, he insisted, must be extinguished once for all.

But Colonel House had no idea of suggesting that the war be ended on German terms. What he had in mind was rather to insist that the war should continue until the Germans accepted conditions that would guarantee the world against the militarist menace and make possible an organization to preserve the peace. If an undefeated Germany refused to yield on such terms, the United States would assist the Allies to secure the necessary victory, and to House it seemed more and more evident that of their own strength they could not win the victory. In return the Allies must agree to give over any plans of annihilating Germany in the political sense and of embarking upon a programme of wholesale annexations.

Thus the Allies were to be given an opportunity which, if they had the wit, they might utilize so as to bring the United States to their side.

CHAPTER V

A SECOND QUEST

Colonel House . . . I may be allowed to say after long and close experience . . . combines in an exceptional degree some of the most useful and attractive qualities of statesmanship, coolness of temper, independence of judgment, and complete personal disinterestedness.

Asquith, 'The Genesis of the War'

I

MUCH to his discomfort, the goings and the comings of Colonel House had developed into events of international interest. 'Colonel House,' said the *Springfield Republican*, 'is perhaps the only private citizen in America who could not go to Europe at this time, without attracting an attention worldwide in its scope.' The American press was filled with news of the mission, announcement of which was made by a Washington correspondent whose ability, in House's opinion, outran his discretion. Speculation as to its purpose varied from the hypothesis of an immediate peace conference to the theory that he was despatched to reprimand American Ambassadors in European capitals. 'Worldwide Attention,' 'An Interesting Mission,' 'Prospects of Peace,' 'Commonsense Diplomacy,' 'Discreet Envoy.' Such were typical headlines of representative newspapers, and every newspaper carried headlines for several days.

The more bitter of the anti-Administration papers raised the question of the President's constitutional power to appoint an 'agent of high diplomacy' without the approval of the Senate. But with certain notable exceptions American journalists, lacking any idea of what the real purpose of the Colonel's mission might be, approved it on the ground that it would demand diplomatic tact and in this respect Colonel House was without equal. 'Colonel House has proved him-

self a discreet and close-mouthed envoy in the past,' said the *Providence Journal*, which was none too cordial in general toward Wilson, 'and will doubtless maintain this reputation on his next expedition.' 'He will be welcomed in England,' commented the *Christian Science Monitor*, 'by newspapermen who . . . will be interested in continuing their study of at least one American who not only possesses the faculty of keeping what he knows to himself, but the even rarer and greater faculty of disabusing the interviewer of the notion that he knows anything that is important enough to print.' Colonel George Harvey was satiric but good-natured: 'Instead of sending Colonel House abroad, President Wilson should go to Europe himself to find out just what the people there think of him. . . . Wilson could leave Colonel House here to act as President during his absence.'

None of the journalists suspected the real significance of the mission. Few of them pretended as yet to understand House. But all of them recognized his influence.

'Although he holds no office and never has held any [wrote a correspondent], he far outweighs Cabinet officers and bureau heads in Washington affairs. He may not be the power behind the Presidential chair, but he is the power alongside of it. He is a figure without parallel in our political history. . . .

'Colonel House asks nothing for himself. He hates the limelight with an intensity that bars him from public office. He is neither philanthropist nor reformer. He is a connoisseur of politics. . . .

'Colonel House is one of the small wiry men who do a great deal without any noise. His is a ball-bearing personality; he moves swiftly, but with never a squeak or a rasp. He cannot be classified because there never has been any one quite like him. Therefore he has been called

“assistant President” — a new name for a new and puzzling figure.’¹

‘December 28, 1915: When we reached the pier [recorded House] there was the greatest array of newspapermen with cameras and moving-picture machines I have ever seen. There must have been fifty of them ranged up to do execution. I was perfectly pleasant, acceding to their demands, and posing for them something like five minutes. After that, I allowed reporters and photographers to keep me busy until the ship sailed. There were a number of friends to see us off.

‘Before leaving the pier, the General Manager of the Holland-America Line had our things moved from the cabin we had engaged to the cabin de luxe, consisting of a sitting-room, two bedrooms, and two baths. . . .’

With Colonel House on this trip as on all his others, went his wife regardless of the perils and inconveniences of war-time travel. Like her husband, she possessed the capacity for making and keeping friends in Europe; she had a taste for adventure and an extending ability for rising above physical discomfort. And from the early eighties she had shared with House every phase of his political adventures. After the war the statesmen of Europe wrote to her in the same tone of regard as that which they used with the Colonel himself. He was also accompanied invariably by his secretary, Miss Denton, without whose aid he could hardly have accomplished his negotiations; at his dictation she daily transcribed the record of confidential conferences, discreetly fulfilled the most delicate missions, coded and decoded despatches, maintained the never-ceasing correspondence which kept him in touch, no matter how rapid his movements, with all his sources of information in America and Europe.

Curiously enough, upon this particular voyage, Captain

¹ Atlantic City *Review*, December 26, 1915.

Boy-Ed, the overzealous German naval attaché, was a fellow passenger. House's natural friendliness toward newspaper reporters must have been strained when, after the voyage, an enterprising journalist combined separate pictures of himself, Boy-Ed, and Brand Whitlock, who was also on board, so as to manufacture an apparently amiable group.

The friendship with Whitlock which began at this time became closer as the years passed. 'He has the kindly human interest,' wrote House. 'He is not given to hate or recrimination. He knows literature and the fine arts. He knows our political institutions and our people and their aspirations. When peace comes, I think the President should send him higher up.'

Disembarking at Falmouth on January 5, Colonel House found that the estimate now placed by the British Government upon the significance of his visit was not less than that of the American public.¹

'January 5, 1916 [Falmouth]: We arrived this afternoon at three o'clock. The British Government had made arrangements to disembark our party. The balance of the passengers will not be allowed to leave the ship under twenty-four hours, because of examinations incident to the war. The naval officers who came on board had our baggage taken by

¹ Compare the following extract from a letter written by Plunkett to Balfour, later secretly printed for the information of the British Cabinet:

'... For more than the life of a generation I have been in intimate touch with men and things in the United States. Interest in American agricultural problems has made me known to the three last Presidents and their Administrations. Thus also, some three years ago, I had the good fortune to become acquainted with Colonel House, with whom ever since I have been in frequent communication. If the story of President Wilson's actions through this crisis is ever told, not the least of the things to his credit will be the departure from all diplomatic precedents in availing himself of the services of this wise and far-seeing political observer and adviser. ...

'105 MOUNT STREET, LONDON

'February 24, 1916'

hand to the railway station, engaged taxicabs, sleeping-car accommodations, and did everything possible to make our journey to London comfortable.'

Colonel House immediately began conversations with the British statesmen. He did not intend, however, to suggest his specific plan until he had formed an exact estimate of the factors necessary to success. He wanted first to explain American opinion on the trade dispute and to discuss the more general aspects of American coöperation in a world organization such as Grey and he himself had in mind.

Colonel House to the President

[Telegram]

LONDON, January 7, 1916

Arrived yesterday. Have had conferences with Grey and Balfour separately. The three of us will meet Monday to try to formulate some plan which I can submit to you and which they can recommend to their colleagues.

Their minds run parallel with ours, but I doubt their colleagues.

Grey is now in favor of the Freedom of the Seas provided it includes the elimination of militarism, and further provided we will join in a general covenant to sustain it.

Your action concerning the *Lusitania* and the *Persia*¹ will have a bearing on what can be done. Grey and Balfour understand, but their colleagues are doubtful as to your intentions regarding a vigorous foreign policy.

It would help in the conference Monday if you could cable

¹ The *Persia* was sunk December 30, 1915, in the Mediterranean. No evidence was forthcoming which could establish the responsibility of Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Turkey. In a memorandum delivered by Bernstorff, January 7, 1916, Germany stated that commanders of German submarines in the Mediterranean had been ordered to deal with enemy merchant vessels in that area as Wilson had required, and that officers disobeying this order would be punished. Apparently Germany was acquiescing in the American contention.

me some assurance of your willingness to coöperate in a policy seeking to bring about and maintain permanent peace.

EDWARD HOUSE

In reply President Wilson cabled to House that he might convey the assurance that he would be willing and glad, when the opportunity came, to coöperate in a policy seeking to bring about and maintain permanent peace among civilized nations. The cable may well be regarded as historic. It marked Wilson's definite embarkation upon a course which was to make him the foremost proponent of a league of nations. It was a clear-cut departure from the traditional American policy of isolation. The President, who, until the summer of 1915, had taken little interest in world affairs, now began to centre his whole being upon a line of action that might rescue the world from the disaster that had overtaken it.

Colonel House, in his talk with Grey, emphasized the value to the British of a general international covenant based upon disarmament and the Freedom of the Seas, and insisted that those were the basic conditions upon which the war might come to an end.

'*January 6, 1916:* It was gratifying [House recorded] to have Sir Edward meet me halfway. I thought the Freedom of the Seas would accomplish for Great Britain what her predominant naval power does for her now, but it would be less costly, more effective, and would not irritate neutrals. If the Freedom of the Seas was agreed upon as an international policy, the nation breaking the agreement would have to reckon with every other nation. If the pact I have in mind was in force, and Germany had broken it, every subscribing nation would be aiding Great Britain in her effort to punish the offenders. On the other hand, if Great Britain had broken the pact, she would be the one facing united opposition.

'He was gratified to hear me express my belief that public opinion in the United States had advanced to a point where it was reasonably certain we would enter some world agreement having for its object the maintenance of peace, if a workable plan could be devised.

'I thought it far better for the democracies of the world to unite upon some plan which would enable the United States to intervene, than for us to drift into the war by breaking diplomatic relations with the Central Powers. He concurred in this view.

'I confessed having advised the President against an actual break with Germany at this time, because I hoped we might come to some agreement along the lines now contemplated. I told him the President was in sympathy with this view. The Secretary of State, on the other hand, was insistent that we make an actual break with Germany.'

II

Colonel House to the President

LONDON, January 7, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... I was with Sir Edward for an hour and a half yesterday and dined with Balfour, and the three of us are to meet together Monday. When Sir Edward asked me what members of the Cabinet I wished to meet at lunch, I suggested that he have only Balfour since we were the only three who speak your language.

I told him if we failed to come to a better understanding with England and failed to help solve the problems brought about by this war properly, it would be because his Government and people could not follow you to the heights you would go.

Having Page's expression of their opinion in mind, I gave him what seemed to me to be the spirit of America. I asked him not to be misled by the motives which actuated New

York, Chicago, and some of the commercial centres, but to accept my word that we were not a people driven mad by money. On the contrary, I thought that no nation in the world had such lofty ideals and would be so willing to make sacrifices for them.

I recalled the fact that our population was made up of idealists that had left Europe for a larger freedom, and this spirit was as strong now as it had been at any time in our existence.

I talked to him about our shipping troubles at some length and urged him to make matters easier for you. He explained the difficulties he encountered, which he felt sure you did not fully realize. . . .

I touched lightly upon Spring-Rice and sowed the seeds for a further discussion.

He admits that things have gone badly for the Allies, but declares that England was never more resolute than now and that the outcome will be successful. I find all with whom I have talked so far of the same opinion. Their confidence seems greater now than it did when I was here before.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

LONDON, *January 11, 1916*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I am seeing as many people as can be crowded into the waking hours and shall continue to do so until we leave on the twentieth. Soldiers, sailors, politicians, and editors are on my list.

Our friend, A. G. Gardiner,¹ was with me for an hour and a half yesterday. I gave him more time than to others because I wanted to increase, if possible, his already high opinion of you.

¹ Publicist and author of biographical studies on British statesmen which President Wilson particularly enjoyed.

These efforts have been merely to create a better and more favorable understanding of your purposes. But my real effort has been directed at Grey and Balfour. I did not think it wise to discuss intimate affairs with all the Cabinet, and these two were chosen because of my confidence in them which you share. It seemed better to place the responsibility directly on them.

The general line of my argument was that you had arranged a closer union of the Americas so if it was thought best not to enter a world-wide sphere, we could safely lead an isolated life of our own.¹ If this were decided upon, I told them, we would increase our army and navy and remain within our own hemisphere.

On the other hand, I explained, you believed that in order to justify fully our existence as a great nation, it might be necessary to bring to bear all our power in behalf of peace and the maintenance of it.

They wanted to know how far you would be willing to enter into an agreement concerning European affairs. I thought you would not be willing to do this at all, but you would be willing to come to an agreement with the civilized world upon the broad questions touching the interests and future of every nation. Such questions, for instance, as the general elimination, so far as practicable, of militarism and navalism. . . .

Balfour made the remark that he would see what concessions his colleagues would be willing to make to American opinion. I asked him to please not put it in that way, since we did not consider they were making any concessions whatever to us, but it was quite the other way round. We were willing to consider some means by which we could serve civilization, but, if we did, we felt it would be at a sacrifice of our own traditional policy and entailed some danger which does not confront us now.

¹ A reference to the Pan-American Pact.

I also told them that unless they were willing to approach the matter in an unselfish spirit, there was no need to attempt it at all.

They are so confident of ultimate military success that I endeavored to shake them somewhat, and I think I did. I asked if it were not within the bounds of possibility that Germany would push Russia further back in the spring and summer, giving her an excuse to make a separate peace upon terms which might be more favorable than if the Allies were victorious. If this were done, Germany might throw her entire weight on the western front and, without seeking to strike France a mortal blow, offer her equally favorable terms. They admitted this possibility.

Germany, I told them, considered she had but one antagonist and, before going under, would be willing to promise Russia a free hand towards warm seaports both to the south and west. She could return to France, Alsace and Lorraine, and could restore Belgium with the exception of Antwerp and the south of the Scheldt. This would leave her with the Austrian Empire practically a part of the German Empire and would secure a free hand in Asia Minor, Egypt, India, and parts of Africa, as her ultimate goal.

Under such conditions British sea-power, I thought, would not last three months — not because it might be defeated at sea, but because all nations would protest against the restrictions on trade. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. House

III

During his two weeks in England, House renewed the personal intimacies he had formed on previous visits. The variety of his contacts was surprising. He had the gift of the accomplished listener, which led people to pour confidences into his ear, and also a genius for quiet persuasion

which helped him to explain the point of view taken by the Washington Government. Many of his conferences might have been described as trivial, except that they solidified the personal understanding which lies at the bottom of successful diplomacy.

‘January 6, 1916: Sidney Brooks invited Mr. Balfour, St. Loe Strachey, and A. H. Pollen to meet me at dinner at Brooks’s Club. I was nearly a half-hour late, being detained by my conference with Sir Edward Grey.

‘Every one was in good form, especially Balfour, and we had a delightful evening. The conversation was mainly of passing interest. Balfour told of the activities of the British submarines in the Baltic. He said the German submarines were not as effective, either in construction or as well manned, as the British; that if they were, they would be a serious menace to Great Britain. . . .

‘January 7, 1916: Page lunched with me. He was full of the growing unpopularity of the President and United States in Great Britain. He questioned whether the President would ever take decisive action concerning the *Lusitania* or similar matters. He thinks the feeling against us here is caused by inaction over the *Lusitania*. He asked whether I thought the President would be offended with what he had written and cabled him. I thought it quite likely. . . .

‘I have been here (England) but little more than twenty-four hours and already the entire two weeks I plan to stay is taken up with engagements for luncheons and dinners.

‘January 8, 1916: Eric Drummond, Sir Edward Grey’s secretary, lunched with me. He has Grey’s entire confidence and I spoke very freely to him. . . . I told him the present situation gave the best opportunity since the United States became a republic, for a closer understanding between our two countries. . . . The difficulty in the way of such an under-

standing was Great Britain's high-handed policy upon the seas — a policy that was not only irritating to us, but to all neutral countries as well. . . .

'H. C. Hoover called in the afternoon to tell of his tribulations in Belgium. The Germans, according to him, are not keeping the spirit of their agreement as to foodstuffs. They are levying tribute upon the Belgians and with the money are buying Belgian cattle to feed their army. This is contrary to the understanding with the British and French Governments. Hoover asked me to dine with him to meet some of the English pacifists, among them Hirst of the *Economist*. He believes the belligerents are tired and would welcome means of ending the conflict. I see no surface evidence of this.

'*January 9, 1916:* I dined with Page to meet Bonar Law and Leveson Harris. . . . Bonar Law is not a man whose mind runs in the same channel as mine, but I got along with him without undue argument. . . .

'*January 10, 1916:* I lunched with Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Balfour to discuss the real purpose of my visit to Europe. . . .

'Mr. Skinner, American Consul, called, and we talked of trade questions between Great Britain and the United States. He takes the American point of view as strongly as Page takes the British. He is a clear-headed, sensible fellow, and I believe is doing good work. . . .

'*January 11, 1916:* Clifford Carver invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mrs. McKenna, and the President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Runciman, for lunch. . . .

'McKenna and I discussed the ever-burning question of relations between Great Britain and the United States, and the part we should play. He was generous enough to say we had done a noble part by the Allies and that it would never be forgotten; that without the help we had already given them, it was quite possible the war would have ended last autumn, favorably to Germany. I expressed a hope he would

say as much to the British people. Both McKenna and Runciman repeatedly asserted that all criticism of the United States was done by irresponsible and ignorant people. . . .

'Lord Bryce called just after the luncheon party was over. . . . Bryce is to come again Thursday at ten o'clock for a further talk. I wish the benefit of his advice before I take up the discussion again with Grey and Balfour.

'Page had Lloyd George, Reginald McKenna, Austen Chamberlain, and Lord Reading to meet me. . . . It was curious to find McKenna and Lloyd George at the same table, for they have not been on speaking terms during the past few weeks. It was even more curious to see Chamberlain with the other three, for until the advent of the war it would have been impossible to have induced him to put his feet under the same table with them.

'Page started the conversation by saying that Mr. Chamberlain and others had asked him "what the United States wished Great Britain to do," and he requested me to give an answer. I replied, "The United States would like Great Britain to do those things which would enable the United States to help Great Britain win the war." Page generously said, "You have answered the question with more cleverness than I had the wit to do."

'My reply brought general approval, as naturally it would, and then came the discussion as to what Great Britain must do to help the United States help her. I went into our shipping troubles at some length and told them of the burden their restrictions placed upon the President.

'The question of atrocities came up, and I made the following observation: "England should be thankful for every act of frightfulness Germany has committed, for every man, woman, and child that has died at sea or on land, has died for England just as much as the soldiers in the field."¹

¹ Colonel House's argument was that German attacks on non-combatants brought home the proximity of the War to the British as nothing else could have done.

'January 12, 1916: I lunched with Page to meet Sir Edward Grey, Lord Robert Cecil, and Irwin Laughlin. . . .

'January 13, 1916: Lord Bryce called at ten o'clock and remained until noon. We had a good talk. I feel he knows America so well that he can understand and advise in the many perplexing questions confronting us. I suggested to Grey yesterday that he ask Bryce to go to the United States. Bryce does not wish to make a winter voyage, but is willing to do so should it become necessary. . . . Bryce sees as many difficulties in a visit to America as I saw in one in Europe. The wounding of ambassadorial dignity would be not the least of them. . . .

'I went to lunch at Brooks's to meet Garvin of the *Observer*, Spender of the *Westminster Gazette*, and Captain Hall of the Intelligence Department. The lunch was given by A. H. Pollen. . . .

'We dined at the Embassy. The other guests were Lord and Lady Northcliffe and Mr. and Mrs. Irwin Laughlin. Northcliffe talked rather foolishly about the length of the war, the blockade, the Dardanelles, the Kaiser's health, and gave us much misinformation.

'January 14, 1916: I called at Buckingham Palace at eleven o'clock and had a pleasant hour with the King. He was not at all pessimistic as to the attitude of the United States, but, on the contrary, as soon as I explained some doubts in his mind, he cordially agreed with our position. I made my usual argument concerning the submarine issue, the German-Americans, and our difficulties with Mexico which are troubling us afresh. He said he understood quite well why the President did not intend to permit Germany to force us into war with Mexico.

'Northcliffe said last night that the Kaiser was dying of tuberculosis of the throat. The King declared this was nonsense; that he merely had a carbuncle on the back of his neck. . . .

'I dined at the Savoy Hotel with Lord Reading and Mr. Lloyd George. They had a private dining-room. . . . Lloyd George had been to see "The Birth of a Nation" and was much interested in my account of the reconstruction period in the South. During dinner, while the waiters were present, we discussed matters in general, such as the American political situation and the coming campaign. I found George as ignorant as ever of our public men and affairs. . . .

'He believes Great Britain will not come out of the war any the worse. Life will be lengthened because of better habits and the training of youth. The productive power will be strengthened because the drones have all been put to work and will probably continue there. He estimated this would add more than a billion dollars to England's wealth, and that untold millions will be saved because of the simple lives people will lead from now. . . .

'*January 16, 1916:* Lady Paget dined with us and we went to the theatre with her. She has been spending the week-end at a house party where Lord Curzon was also a guest. She said he spoke with great bitterness of the United States. She thought it would be a good thing if Lloyd George became Prime Minister. . . .

'*January 18, 1916:* We lunched with Mr. and Mrs. Asquith to-day. Mrs. Asquith and I had considerable conversation. She can be delightful when she tries, and she seemed to try her best. Our conversation covered a wide range of men and measures, and I found her well-informed, alert, and intelligent. . . .

'I dined with St. Loe Strachey. The other guests were the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Lord Stamfordham, Captain Hall, and Colonel Hankey of the National Defence Board. Strachey sat at one end of the table and I at the other, with the Archbishop at my right and Stamfordham at my left. It was a quiet and pleasant dinner. The conversation was not exciting and embraced many subjects other than the

war. We discussed Lincoln, the Civil War, and features of the blockade during that time. We also talked of Mark Twain, Artemus Ward, and Josh Billings, and I found most of the company familiar with their writings. I was surprised to hear Stamfordham say that the late King Edward read Artemus Ward frequently.

‘One of the curious phenomena the war has developed is the childlike belief which intelligent people have in stories circulated about spies, the cruelty of the enemy, and what not. One finds it here, in France, in Germany, and elsewhere. One such story has been going the rounds in London. It was told again at this dinner. The substance of it is that a distinguished American writer, whose sympathy was anti-German, went to Holland. The German Minister at The Hague invited him to go to Berlin and interview the Kaiser. A Zeppelin was to come for him, wait until the interview was over, and bring him back to The Hague. The American was delighted with the invitation and accepted. The Zeppelin called for him, and took him to an altitude which caused him to die of heart failure.

‘It was thought to be a dastardly plot, and denounced in unmeasured terms. I asked if they knew the name of the American, and was told it was James Creelman. I unfeelingly punctured the story by telling them I knew Creelman well; that he had had diabetes for years, and died in a hospital in Berlin of that disease, and not in a Zeppelin. After I finished, there was a long silence, and I felt guilty of spoiling a favorite war pastime.

‘*January 19, 1916:* At seven o’clock I went to No. 33 Eccleston Square. Sir Edward was awaiting me. He said the Prime Minister was giving a dinner to-night in honor of Aristide Briand, the French Premier, and he had been requested to invite me. There is no one to be present excepting important members of the Government and Ambassadors of the Allied countries; therefore I did not think it well to accept. . . .’

House might well feel complimented, not merely by this invitation, but by the invariable symptoms of confidence that were manifested to him. It was a rare tribute paid to his discretion and integrity that the ministers of governments should discuss the problems of the war with him, a foreign citizen, almost as though he were one of themselves, and that too at the moment when he was on the point of leaving for an enemy country. When, long after the war, they were asked to explain so extraordinary a situation, they replied simply: 'Well, you see, it was Colonel House.'¹

IV

The really important conferences into which House entered were those in which he discussed with Lloyd George, Grey, and Balfour the end of the war and the rôle of co-operation which the United States might play, if the British should agree to his plan of American intervention.

'*January 14, 1916* [conference with Lloyd George]: His view of what may happen during the spring and summer largely coincides with mine. The British, he tells me, will have four million men fully equipped and trained and with guns larger than any now in use. While he does not expect conclusive results, he believes the Germans may be thrown back at many points, much to the advantage of the Allies. . . . He thought by September first, the big battles of the summer would have been fought and that a forecast could then be made of what the final end might be.

'George believes the war could go on indefinitely, and will do so unless the President intervenes; but he does not think

¹ Conversations with Lord Grey and Lord Balfour, June, 1924. According to the best information available, Colonel House was the only foreigner who had ever been given the use of a British Foreign Office cipher code.

intervention, to be effective, should be offered until around September first. . . .

'He had looked upon the Freedom of the Seas as a German proposal. When he found it was mine and in accord with the President's views, he seemed to think better of it.

'He was insistent that the Turkish Empire must go, and that Poland should again become a nation. We discussed all these matters at considerable length. His mind acts quickly, largely upon impulse, and he lacks the slow reasoning of the ordinary British statesman. He was interested in my forecast concerning Asia, and in my conviction that Great Britain should make her plans some day to leave that continent. I thought that China in the future might play the same rôle Turkey has in the past, and be the cause of innumerable bloody conflicts.

X 'I tried to scare him as I have others regarding Russia making a separate peace.¹ . . . He thought if the United States would stand by Great Britain, the entire world could not shake the combined mastery we would hold over the seas. In this he is probably right. . . .

'What I was most interested in was George's insistence that the war could only be brought to an end by the President, and that terms could be dictated by him which the belligerents would never agree upon if left to themselves. Fantastic as this may seem, there is some truth in it; and if the President had taken my advice and increased the army of the United States in the early months of the war, as I strongly urged him to do, he would be in a position to-day to do what George wishes him to do this coming autumn.

'*January 15, 1916:* At half-past three o'clock, I walked to

¹ We may note the insistence with which House returns to this danger in his conversations, a danger finally realized in the peace of Brest-Litovsk, but which might perhaps have been averted if the Western Allies had handled the Russian problem differently.

No. 4 Carlton Gardens to meet Balfour and Grey. Grey arrived close upon my heels and we lost no time in getting deep into our discussion. A large map of southeastern Europe and Anatolia was upon the wall. I stood before the map and told them the story of my last night's meeting with Lloyd George and Reading. I gave them in detail the division of the world, as George outlined it, and the extraordinary part he would have the President play. I asked if they had discussed the matter with him. They replied, "Not at all; he has probably thought the thing out and seized upon your being in London to discuss it with you."

'Balfour and I did most of the talking — I proposing, he always objecting. He has an argumentative mind. . . . Sir Edward was mostly silent; but when he spoke it was to agree with me, and to present an additional argument in behalf of the position I had taken. We went through the international phases of what would constitute the Freedom of the Seas and the elimination of militarism, and what protection Great Britain would secure on the one hand and lose on the other. Balfour raised many supposititious cases, none of them having any real bearing upon the matter proposed. He is unalterably distrustful of Germany, and was forever coming back to whether Germany could be counted upon to keep any bargain or play any game fairly. That, I told him, was beside the mark. What should be done was to get all nations in league together, and at least a majority of them would play fairly under the lead of Great Britain and the United States; and Germany would be the loser if she failed to keep to her agreement. Grey reënforced me here strongly. We parted with the understanding that they should think the matter over and discuss it with the Prime Minister and Lloyd George, and take it up with me when I returned from the Continent.

'Grey and I left together and walked up Pall Mall to St. James Street, where I left him at Brooks's Club. During the

walk we moralized upon how difficult it was to do the things that seemed best, because the people did not understand and would not permit free action. Again I wish to pay tribute to Grey's unselfish statesmanship. I wish the destinies of Great Britain were more nearly in his keeping.

'January 19, 1916: I wish Lloyd George was Prime Minister, with Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Minister, for I believe we could then do something. The Cabinet are all too conservative, and boldness is needed at this time. George has this quality, I believe. . . .

'I fear that British conservatism will make improbable any real accomplishment. They will delay decisions as long as they can, even as they delayed the proposal I made in June, 1914, looking toward a better understanding with Germany. I have always felt that the war might possibly have been avoided if they had acted with expedition.'

V

There were especial reasons why delay might interfere with the success of House's plan. The dispute between the Prussian Foreign Office and the Department of State over the wording of the *Lusitania* disavowal was likely to produce, at any moment, a new diplomatic crisis. More imminent, however, inasmuch as the Germans appeared to have assumed a conciliatory attitude, was the demand of the United States Senate for action against the Allies, perhaps an embargo, as retaliation for interference with American commerce. If the Senate compelled Wilson to take decided measures, all chance of a working understanding with the Allies would disappear. Warned of the situation, House urged the President to hold matters as they were as long as possible.

Wilson had cabled him on January 12 that it appeared likely that the difficulties with Germany would soon be arranged and that in this case the demand, especially from the Senate, would be imperative that the United States force

England to make at least equal concessions. Wilson himself felt this to be only just.

Colonel House to the President

LONDON, January 13, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Your cable concerning our shipping troubles has come.

I wish I might be with you to-day to tell you of conditions here. Page had Sir Edward Grey and Lord Robert Cecil¹ to lunch, and we discussed these matters at length. Lord Robert told me, and Sir Edward confirmed it, that if he acceded to your request his resignation would be demanded at once. Personally, he is willing to do anything. He even goes so far as to suggest that it might come to the complete abandonment of the blockade, in which case Germany would perhaps win.

He does not believe there can be halfway measures. It has to be rigid, or not at all. . . .

I have presented our side of the argument to nearly every member of the Cabinet. I have given them the state of public feeling in America and have told them of the danger which the Allies run in doing these things and in creating adverse opinion against them. They know your position now as well as I know it, and they appreciate it.

Among the many editors I have talked with is Robert Donald of the *Chronicle*. The *Chronicle* has now perhaps the largest circulation of any paper in England. Donald promised yesterday to write a leader concerning you. . . .

I believe I have gotten enough sentiment in influential quarters favorable to the position you have taken, to bring public opinion in England entirely around. It is not advisable, however, to use it at this time, but it may be later; and then I think it can be done.

I have had two conferences with Bryce. I talk to him more freely than to any one excepting Grey and Balfour. I

¹ Minister of Blockade.

wish he could be in America, for he would sense the situation there better than any one else. I told him in the strictest confidence something of our difficulties with Sir Cecil, and asked his advice. He thought it would be exceedingly unwise for me to take the matter up here. . . .

I believe we had better leave the matter in abeyance until I return, for, if done now, it may interfere with some of the plans we have in mind.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

LONDON, *January 16, 1916*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . It would be a calamity if anything should happen to prevent Sir Edward's continuance in the Government until peace is made. And yet if we push them too hard upon the question of neutral trade, he is likely to go.

The feeling is becoming more and more set, and the country is demanding that the Government stand firm. . . .

Grey, Balfour, and George say if they could tell the country that there was a chance of bringing about a tentative understanding with us, the people would yield to almost any demand we might make. But the opinion is firmly fixed that America will do nothing, and that England must fight the battle alone, with the only weapon that has so far proved effective.

Nearly every American here, and this includes our entire Embassy I think, would be glad to see us come into the war on the side of the Allies. This feeling is shared, of course, by many Englishmen and by nearly all the French, although one is constantly told that this is not desired. . . .

I am sure that our policy should be to have no serious break with the Allies over the blockade, and to keep upon such terms with Germany that our diplomatic relations may be maintained. . . . It does not matter how much you are

reviled now, if the end justifies your course. The criticism, both in Europe and America, comes from ignorance and from partisan feeling, and can be swept aside by your final action.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

P.S. Of course, I do not mean to advise that diplomatic relations should not be immediately broken if the Central Powers sink another passenger ship without warning. If this were not done, it would discredit us everywhere and greatly minimize your influence.

CHAPTER VI

DEADLOCK IN EUROPE

We are the only nation left on earth with sufficient power to lead them out.

House to Wilson, February 9, 1916

I

ON January 20, Colonel House left England for Germany, by way of Paris and Geneva. He had not as yet specified the exact terms of the American offer of assistance. He wished first to see for himself whether the Germans would yield sufficient to raise the hope of an early peace based upon the general conditions he and Grey had agreed upon; or whether they were determined to continue the struggle, even with the United States entering to enforce a 'reasonable' peace.

House had made plain to Grey what he regarded as the basis of a reasonable peace: the cession of Alsace-Lorraine to France, restoration of Belgium and Serbia, Constantinople for Russia, a league of nations to prevent aggressive war. He believed that the acceptance of such terms by Germany would mean the defeat of German militarism and the failure of the militarist plan for the control of Europe. He was willing to give Germany a chance to accept such terms, for he feared that, if the war went on to a complete smash of Germany, the entire world, victors and vanquished, would go down in economic ruin. Furthermore, he was not convinced that it would be easy to secure a just and permanent peace through the 'knock-out blow,' for he appreciated the extent to which the ideals of the Allies were in danger of taint by selfish aspirations.

Mr. Page did not approve Colonel House's mission to Germany. He insisted upon her smashing defeat without nego-

tiation and he was glad to permit the Allies to dictate any terms they chose.¹ House's efforts, however, received the sanction of the more moderate of the British, who, in the midst of belligerent passion and determined though they were not to compromise with militarism, never forgot the cost of war and its aftermath. They were anxious that every loophole should be explored.

'*January 19, 1916: Both Sir Edward Grey and Lord Bryce [wrote House] thoroughly approve my trip to Berlin. I asked them the question direct, because Page discouraged it and said it was a mistake. . . .*

'*January 20, 1916: We left this morning for Paris, via Folkestone-Boulogne. A private car was placed at our disposal. An army officer, a Scotland Yard man, and the commander of the ship all looked out for our comfort and made it an easy passage. There were hundreds of troops on the boat, but no other civilians excepting ourselves. Each soldier donned a life preserver before we left the dock, and made ready for any emergency. A torpedo-boat destroyer accompanied us all the way. Two boats had been sunk within forty-eight hours, and extraordinary precautions were taken. . . .*

'Upon arriving at Boulogne, we were met by the French Chief of Police and the British Provost Marshal. Military automobiles were waiting to convey us to the hotel or to Paris, as we desired. The weather was so wild that we preferred stopping the night at Boulogne. The hotel was filled with British officers. There were no civilian guests other than ourselves. The town looks more British than French. I was

¹ If the reader feels inclined to criticize Mr. Page's judgment, in view of the Allied failure to achieve security even after the smashing defeat of Germany, he should remind himself that the American Ambassador's views were those of the vast majority of the country to which he was accredited, opinions which he heard reiterated many times every day.

told that as many as 22,000 British wounded had been brought in here in one day. The entire city has the appearance of a huge military camp and arsenal.'

House stopped for a few days in Paris, evading all decisive conversations, which he reserved for his return, after he had formed his impressions of Germany. He passed hastily through Switzerland, where authorized and unauthorized agents of the belligerents met upon the field of intrigue — a vast whispering gallery — and crossed the German frontier at Basle.

'*January 26, 1916:* We arrived in Berlin in the early morning, on time. I was met at the station by some of the Embassy staff, including Secretary Grew. We drove directly to the Embassy. Soon after arriving, Gerard and I exchanged confidences. . . .

'Newspaper reporters, the Embassy staff, Americans, Germans, and what not, have kept me busy all day.

'Gerard gave a dinner of twenty-four. The Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, was to have been at this dinner, but the Kaiser called him to the front; consequently he will not be here until Friday. The Dutch Minister, Gevers, was among the guests with whom I talked. He has been in Berlin for nine years and I assumed he was pro-German. He started the conversation in a way that would have indicated he was pro-Ally, but this did not disarm me, and I gradually brought him around to a point where he expressed his real views and I obtained the information I was seeking regarding the relations between Holland and Germany, and Dutch sentiment as to the war. . . .

'I have forgotten to mention that Count von Moltke called during the day. I find him more unreasonable and not at all the unprejudiced man he was before the war. Von Moltke believes me to be entirely without prejudice. He

does not know that I feel that the guilt of this stupendous tragedy lies with the Prussian military autocracy.

'January 27, 1916: The most important people seen to-day have been von Gwinner, of the Deutsche Bank, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Herr Solf, both of whom came to lunch.

'Solf . . . is the fairest and broadest of all the German officials, and largely, I take it, because he has lived a great part of his life out of Germany. He told me in confidence, "not to be repeated," he said, "to the Ambassador or any one," that there was a controversy in process between the Chancellor on the one hand, and von Tirpitz and von Falkenhayn on the other, regarding undersea warfare. For the moment the Chancellor holds the ascendancy; but von Falkenhayn is leaning more and more toward von Tirpitz, and Solf is uncertain as to the final outcome. He urged me to talk to the Chancellor as frankly as I had to him, and to let him know the danger of a break between the United States and Germany if the von Tirpitz idea should prevail. . . .

'I talked to von Gwinner next. I found him fairly reasonable, much more so than Gerard had led me to expect. He, too, wants peace and has no illusions as to how it might be brought about. . . .

'Von Jagow (the Foreign Secretary) has asked us to dinner Saturday evening, but we declined, as I think it best to accept no invitations outside the Embassy. I do not wish to meet von Tirpitz by any chance, and this will be beyond my control if I am entertained elsewhere. I feel that von Tirpitz is almost solely responsible for German frightfulness upon the sea. . . .

'Gerard told me to-day of his conversation with the Kaiser. The Kaiser did not approve the sinking of the *Lusitania*, or killing women and children. He thought the commander should not have done it. He takes this position now, but he must have known well in advance that it was con-



To my dear
and dearest
Mentor, with affection
and respect
James W. Gerard
Bellevue Jan 24, 1916

JAMES W. GERARD

templated. He was very belligerent at first, in talking to Gerard, but finally became more reasonable as the discussion advanced.

'The Kaiser talked of peace and how it should be made and by whom, declaring that "I and my cousins, George and Nicholas, will make peace when the time comes." Gerard says to hear him talk one would think that the German, English, and Russian peoples were so many pawns upon a chessboard. He made it clear that mere democracies like France and the United States could never take part in such a conference. His whole attitude was that war was a royal sport, to be indulged in by hereditary monarchs and concluded at their will. He told Gerard he knew Germany was right, because God was on their side, and God would not be with them if they were wrong, and it was because God was with them they had been enabled to win their victories.

'I asked Gerard whether he was crazy or whether he was merely posing. . . .

'I am wondering how long any part of the world will continue to be ruled by such masters. Long ago, in my inexperience I thought governments were controlled by the great, who were actuated solely by patriotic motives. Now that I am playing the game with them, I find that selfishness plays the major part. It is appalling to me to see how heartless some are who are profiting in one way or another by the war. I say this with knowledge, and I wish the world could realize it.'

The following evening, House had long conferences with the Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary. That with Bethmann is of the keenest interest to historians since it furnished an explanation of the origin of the phrase 'a scrap of paper,' utilized by the Chancellor in his conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, during the crisis of 1914, a phrase which brought infinite damage to Germany

in the years that followed. Bethmann's explanation is plausible, the more so in that the conversation with the British Ambassador seems to have been in German and Goschen might have caught the phrase without the context.

'*January 28, 1916:* Among the guests at dinner to-night [House wrote] were the Chancellor, von Jagow, the Turkish Ambassador, and many others. There were twenty-two in all. After dinner the Chancellor and I went into the Blue Room alone and talked for an hour and a half. One of the first things he explained was the now historic remark concerning the Belgian Treaty being "a scrap of paper." He said the way it occurred was thus: Sir Edward Goschen called, before hostilities began between Germany and Great Britain, to discuss the critical situation. The Chancellor, according to his story, spoke with much feeling of the enormity of the crime which would be committed against civilization and the "white races," should Germany and Great Britain war upon one another. By the "white races" he meant English, Germans, and Americans, for he believed that the peace, the civilization, and the security of the world were in their keeping. When Sir Edward Goschen protested and argued against the invasion of Belgium, insisting if it were done Great Britain must necessarily declare war against Germany, the Chancellor explained that in comparison to the great harm that would result from war between these two countries, the Treaty with Belgium was "as a mere scrap of paper."¹

'The Chancellor insisted that he did not intend to convey the idea which was afterward ascribed to him, and he still contends he was right.

'He told me, too, that Germany had no alternative other

¹ This explanation softens the brutality of the phrase, but it does not alter the essential fact that the Berlin Government, in pursuit of selfish interests, grossly and cynically violated a treaty which Prussia herself had signed. Whatever he called it, the Chancellor made of the Belgian Treaty a 'scrap of paper.'

than to declare war, because of Russian mobilization; that he had repeatedly requested them to cease mobilization, but they declined to do so, and there was no escape for Germany excepting war. I called his attention to the fact that England had suggested a conference, and Russia acquiesced while Germany declined. This he admitted, but insisted that Russia was not playing fair and was continuing mobilization, and would have continued in spite of the proposed agreement for a conference. . . .

‘We talked of Sir Edward Grey — I in the most complimentary terms, and he in terms not unfriendly. I have endeavored to make it clear to the German Government that Grey is the most reasonable of English statesmen and that it would be a calamity if he should be displaced.’

House soon discovered that the rulers of Germany were in no mood to consider peace terms that would satisfy the Allies. Bethmann himself, probably one of the most pacific Germans alive, felt that he approached moderation when he suggested giving up the territory conquered by German arms in return for an indemnity. So long as the Germans persisted in the belief that they could win the war in a military sense, discussions of a settlement would be fruitless.

‘The most interesting part of our conversation [House continued] related to peace. He said he was the only one in authority among the belligerents who had spoken for peace, and he could not understand why there was no receptive echo anywhere. He deplored the war and its ghastly consequences, and declared the guilt did not lie upon his soul. I tried to make him see that his peace talk was interpreted merely as Germany’s desire to “cash in” her victories, and that the Allies did not believe she could hold her own from now on, and that another story would be told before the end. We went over this ground again and again, he maintaining

that he did not understand why the Allies were so stubborn, and I, on the other hand, explaining the real situation.

‘I told him the British were a stubborn race and felt no concern as to the ultimate result. I called his attention to the South African War, when every one thought the British would be driven out. I knew at the time, I said, that they would wage war until they had either won or had expended their last guinea and last man. I also went over this same ground later in the evening with von Jagow, and it did not seem to sit easily upon the chest of either.

‘They admitted that the British were a stubborn race, but added the word “unreasonable” as being more descriptive of them. The Chancellor intimated that Germany would be willing to evacuate both France and Belgium if indemnity were paid. That, I said, the Allies would not consider for a moment. He stated it had been the dream of his life to bring Great Britain, Germany, and America closer together, and he indicated a hope that even now this might be brought about. He spoke slightly of Russia and France, insisting that the three great nations of the world were those mentioned.

‘We talked of undersea warfare, of the blockade, and he said it was futile for Great Britain to try to starve Germany. I told him western civilization had broken down, and there was not a market-place or a mosque in the East where the West of to-day was not derided. He admitted this, but said the fault was not Germany’s.

‘I was growing weary by now of the conversation, indicating it by silence; and in a few minutes we arose and joined the other guests.

‘The Chancellor drank copiously of beer, which was served to us from time to time. I contented myself with mineral water, matching him glass for glass. The beer did not apparently affect him, for his brain was as befuddled at the begin-

ning as it was at the end. Into such hands are the destinies of the people placed.

‘Von Jagow and I then went into the Blue Room and went over much of the ground I had covered with the Chancellor. He was somewhat more reasonable than the Chancellor, and argued Germany’s position with more subtlety. We talked of the undersea warfare as it relates to the United States. I spoke of the folly of torpedoing the *Lusitania* and the *Arabic*, particularly the latter, which was westward bound without cargo and could by no possibility have carried munitions of war. He admitted this, but said he had talked to the submarine commander who had sunk her and he was convinced the captain believed the *Arabic* was trying to ram him. Had he been in the captain’s place, he thought he would have done likewise.

‘Von Jagow spoke with much feeling of the criticism made of Germany for her undersea warfare, and tried to explain how difficult it was for commanders to properly discriminate. I insisted that it was as brutal and useless as their Zeppelin raids. The sum total of deaths from Zeppelin attacks was less than two hundred at present — mostly women and children. The net result, I thought, was of enormous value to the Allies. This opinion was concurred in by a British Cabinet official, who regretted that the Zeppelins did not go to the West of England, where recruiting was slack. I said I suggested to Lloyd George that a line of electric lights should be strung across England, showing the way.

‘By the time von Jagow and I finished, it was nearly midnight, and when we returned to the other guests they quickly dissolved. I went to bed with a feeling that not much had been accomplished by my discussions with the Chancellor and von Jagow. I hope for better results to-morrow with Zimmermann, who is, in some ways, the ablest, though not the most trustworthy, man in the Government.’

II

The chiefs of the civil Government showed themselves friendly, but obviously impotent to engage in any step that might lead toward peace; and all that House could do was to urge them to restrain their methods of warfare, so as not to make impossible a sincere reconciliation when the struggle came to a close.

‘Zimmermann to-day [he wrote on January 29], and von Jagow yesterday, expressed their keen appreciation of my endeavors to promote peace. I gave Zimmermann perhaps the most earnest talk I have made to any German official, for the reason he seems able to rise to it. I urged him not to allow his Government to do any of the petty things that irritate other belligerents and which have no military value. I said Germany was too great a nation to descend to such practices; that he was one of the statesmen who might lead his country into better paths; that there were statesmen in America, Great Britain, and France who had high ideals, and who were not actuated by selfish motives, and it was to them and those like them in Germany that the world must look for higher and better statesmanship. If it were not done by such men, our civilization would move backward rather than forward.

‘Zimmermann spoke in emphatic terms of what he called the “white races,” meaning Great Britain, Germany, and America, and he hoped, like the Chancellor, the time would come when there might be a more sympathetic accord between them. . . .’

Not until he had crossed the border into Switzerland did Colonel House dare send the President a detailed report on the German situation.

‘I have been under constant surveillance [he recorded

privately in Berlin] since I have been in Germany, as, indeed, I was in both France and Great Britain. The German Intelligence Department picked me up at Basle and will not turn me loose until I am across the German border. I am not sure they will not see me out of Switzerland. In front of our Embassy here, a number of plain-clothes men are always on duty, so I am told, as long as I remain. This was true during the last trip as well. It is done unobtrusively and in an unobjectionable way, and may be as much for my protection as to ascertain whom I see and what I do.'

His first cabled report, sent from Geneva, indicated the uncertainty of affairs in Germany. At any moment the extremists might come into power and declare void all the pledges given as to submarine methods. The Colonel felt more strongly than ever that if his plan for forcible mediation were to be given a chance, the dispute over the wording of the *Lusitania* apology should not be allowed to reach the breaking-point. Should the United States intervene, it would be far better to enter the war on the ground that our assistance would bring a decisive and permanent settlement, or because of a direct affront by Germany, rather than on an issue that was nearly a year old.

Colonel House to the President

[Telegram]

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
January 30, 1916

The situation is like this. A great controversy is going on in Germany regarding undersea warfare. The navy, backed more or less by the army, believe that Great Britain can be effectively blockaded, provided Germany can use their new and powerful submarines indiscriminately and not be hampered by any laws whatsoever. They also believe failure has resulted from our interference and Germany's endeavor to

conform to our demands. They think war with us would not be so disastrous as Great Britain's blockade. The civil Government believe that if the blockade continues, they may be forced to yield to the navy; consequently they are unwilling to admit illegality of their undersea warfare. They will yield anything but this. If you insist upon that point, I believe war will follow. Gerard understands the question and I would suggest letting him try to arrange something satisfactory direct. I hope final action may not be taken until I have had an opportunity of talking with you. This, I think, is of great importance, since there are phases of the situation that cannot be conveyed by cable or letter. . . . I reach Paris Tuesday morning.

EDWARD HOUSE

PARIS, *February 3, 1916,*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

So much has happened since I last wrote that I scarcely know where to begin. I will not try to go into detail, leaving that for a personal conference.

I was well received in Germany — better than before, if anything. . . .

The Chancellor, for the moment, is in control with the Emperor. When I was there before, von Tirpitz and Falkenhayn were in the ascendancy. The Chancellor's advantage has brought von Tirpitz and von Falkenhayn closer together, and the Army is now more favorable to the Navy's contention for an aggressive undersea policy.

I do not believe the Chancellor will be able to hold the first place long, particularly if we do not take measures against the Allies — which, indeed, it would be impossible for us to take in a way that would satisfy Germany.

When they find that this cannot be brought about, and when the pinch of the blockade becomes even greater than now, a revulsion of feeling will probably take place and

a sentiment will develop for any measure that promises relief.

The Navy crowd are telling the people that an unrestricted undersea warfare will isolate England. I look, therefore, in any event for troublous times with Germany during the next few months, and I am afraid that my suggestion that we remain aloof until the times become more propitious for you to intervene and lead them out, is not promising.

The reason I am so anxious that you do not break with Germany over the *Lusitania* is that any delay may make it possible to carry out the original plan in regard to intervention. And if this cannot be done because of Germany's undersea warfare, then we will be forced in, in a way that will give us the advantage.

I discussed peace with the Chancellor, with Zimmermann, and with Solf. The Chancellor was the most unreasonable, coming back always to the point that he was the only one in power amongst the belligerents that had spoken for peace. He said he felt that the guilt of continuing the conflict was upon their shoulders and not upon his. Time and again, I brought him back to the point that his expression of a desire for peace meant a victorious peace and one which included indemnity from his antagonists. . . .

He is an amiable, well-meaning man, with limited ability. Zimmermann is much abler and my talk with him was more satisfactory.

There are reasons why the officers controlling the army are not pressing for peace. They are directing affairs and it is to their advantage to continue to do so. For instance, Hindenburg received something like two thousand dollars before the war began. He now receives, I am told, something like twenty-five thousand dollars, with a palace to live in.

The Prussian junkers formerly paid seventy-five or eighty cents a day for laborers on their farms. They now get Rus-

sian prisoners at six cents a day and their products bring four times as much as they did before the war. They, too, do not desire peace.

I doubt whether internal trouble will come during the war. They have all the discordant elements at the front harnessed to the war machine, impotent for harm. If the war goes against Germany, when the army is disbanded trouble will surely come for the masters. If victory is theirs, the war lords will reign supreme and democratic governments will be imperilled throughout the world.


Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

III

On his way back from Berlin to Paris, House conferred with the American Ambassador to Austria-Hungary, who came to Geneva to meet him. He was urged by Thomas Nelson Page to come to Rome, which Page felt he could not leave at a moment which he regarded as critical. House, however, was in a hurry to get back to England to push his plan of American mediation or assistance.

The news from Vienna and Rome confirmed his opinion that the war was approaching the condition of stalemate and the opportunity seemed ripe for his proposition. The French and British were firmly entrenched on the Western Front and hoped confidently to wear down the Germans. But in the other theatres of the war the advantage was with their enemies. The failure of the Allied attack on Gallipoli and the evacuation of their expeditionary force encouraged Turkey morally and strengthened her materially. The road from Berlin to the East was open and, through German domination of Austria, the dream of a Teutonic Central Europe seemed close to fulfilment. The Germans profited daily by the extraordinary lack of coördination between the Allies and Italy. As a result of the elimination of Serbian armies, which



had not received effective assistance from the Allies, Montenegro had surrendered. Criminations and recriminations between Italy and the Allies were lively.

Colonel House to the President

PARIS, February 3, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR

Penfield¹ came to Geneva to see me. I thought it best not to go to Vienna and he thought it best not to come to Berlin, both having very much the same reason.

He confirmed our belief that Austria-Hungary and Turkey are now but little more than provinces of Germany. The Central Empire runs from the Baltic to the Dardanelles and beyond. The Germans took charge during the troublous days of last spring, when Russia was slowly overrunning Austria, and by their efficiency and organization threw the Russians back. The Austrians are consequently grateful.

The Empire, as you know, is made up of many divergent elements, none of which work in harmony and all of which are more distrustful of each other than of Germany.

Food is more plentiful there than in Germany, but the distribution and the levelling of prices is not nearly so well done. The desire for peace is also prevalent, but there again the people are mere cogs in the great German war machine and as helpless to express their desires as the German soldier in the trenches.

Penfield tells me that the feeling against America is stronger than against Russia, France, England, or even Italy. He ascribes this to three causes: one is the furnishing of munitions to the Allies, another the sending of Dumba home, and the third the *Ancona* notes.

The Austrian Empire is the proudest in Europe and they cannot view with complacency such a rebuff from 'a crude republic.'

¹ United States Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.

Penfield is giving freely to charity and stands well because of this and his relations with the Pope. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Ambassador T. N. Page to Colonel House

ROME, February 1, 1916

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

. . . We are much disappointed that you could not get to Rome; but we hope you will come next time. . . .

Here, matters are not quite what might be called 'imminent'; but so many rumors are rife that I think it better not to leave Italy for the moment, and must content myself with putting you in possession of them in another way.

For some time, there have been stories going the rounds of clashes in the Cabinet here, and a short time ago it was said among those who assumed to know of such things that not only General Cadorna had resigned; but that both the Premier Salandra and Foreign Minister, Baron Sonnino, had tendered their resignations and that the King's return from the front to Rome about three weeks ago was for the purpose of settling this grave difficulty and preventing a Cabinet crisis. The grounds of the dissension are said to have been their opposing views touching Italy's sending a strong expedition to the other side of the Adriatic. . . .

The best orator in the Cabinet hurried off to speak in important places in defence of Italy's attitude — his defence being that the only way to save Montenegro would have been to save Serbia, and that after Serbia fell, Montenegro's fall followed necessarily.

This was accepted as a charge that Montenegro was not overthrown through lack of effort on the part of Italy, but of Italy's allies.

It happened that just at this time the English and French press were very caustic in their criticism of Italy for her fail-

ure to protect the Adriatic and rescue Montenegro, and this seems to have incensed the Italians, for the newspapers suddenly opened up against England especially in a way which has distracted attention from the eastern Adriatic problem so far as the public is concerned.

At the same time, the great rise in sea freight from England to Italy, especially of coal and other necessities of life, drew public attention to them and a number of sharp editorials have been written in the press against England's attitude in this matter as well as in the matter of her partial military system.

What has impressed me in this affair is the lack of anything like complete harmony between the belligerent peoples. They seem to me extraordinarily critical of each other. They are critical of us and the press in all the countries have many nasty slings at us; but they do not appear to me any more critical of us than of each other, when it comes to cases where representatives of the different peoples can express their minds privately. They fight on the same side and, to some extent, for each other; but not because of any other reason than that they must do so in sheer self-defence.

Unfortunately for them, this is apparent not only to those like myself who view the matter from an independent standpoint, but to their opponents, who are able to use the result of their observations to good effect.

I gather from what I hear that even in situations like the eastern Mediterranean, where absolute and complete harmony alone could render effective movements against the thoroughly organized movements of their common enemy; they act side by side with each other but not really together, and there seems a tendency by each one that it has to bear a disproportionate part of the brunt of the fight, which augurs badly for any near settlement.

This, taken in connection with the manifest want of efficient organization in many directions, is, I hear, taken by

the people along the eastern Mediterranean as an evidence that the Central Powers are winning, if they have not already won the war. . . .

Italy stands in a position somewhat off to herself. . . .

She is very proud, very suspicious, impressionable, even excitable, and, if I might use the term without offence, very egotistical. Doubtless they would say we ourselves are not wholly lacking in this trait.

At any rate, they do not care anything about anybody outside of Italy. To charge that Italy went to war for what she could make out of it, is not true when baldly stated as has been stated. She went to war partly to fulfil a dream which she has been fulfilling, bit by bit, for generations, and partly to preserve herself from a very real and vast danger. She went to war to become a great power; but also to save herself from becoming, again, a congeries of Austrian provinces.

Strong efforts have been made to induce her to declare war on Germany.¹ Her statesmen seem to me to have been wise in not taking more on their hands than they were absolutely forced to take; and I hear rumors of considerable bitterness being felt because some imagined that new pressure is being exerted to force her to make a declaration of war which she does not wish to make.

Her contention is that her people had no hostility against the Germans, such as they have had against the Austrians, and that first by denouncing the Triple Alliance — or, rather, first by declaring her neutrality and then by denouncing the alliance — and going to war with Austria and afterwards with Turkey, which last had given her cause to declare war, she had performed her full duty.

A considerable section of her people have no hostility whatever to Germany, while nearly all had hostility towards Austria and a large part of her people towards Turkey; and

¹ Italy did not declare war upon Germany until August, 1916.

the Government does not wish to go any faster than the people go.

Another reason for abstaining from declaring war against Germany is undoubtedly an apprehension that with Austria holding the southern slope of the Alps, should Germany unite with her in a determined push against Italy, their combined efforts might avail to sweep down from the Alps and force the fighting on the soil of Italy proper, which has been the battle-ground for centuries of Europe and which, if possible, Italy desires to save now from this disaster. . . .

Germany obtained her ascendancy in the commercial affairs of Italy by work applied with good common sense. She sent her people here, observant, clear-headed, pushing, and resourceful; studied the situation, familiarized herself with it, and financed them on terms mutually advantageous both to her own people and to the Italians. She established banks, financed great enterprises, and built up a great business for herself which only such a war as this could have shaken, and even this has not destroyed. . . .

It seems to me that the King has strengthened himself greatly during this war by going and living at the front among his soldiers. He keeps himself effaced, but talk is beginning to be heard that the King is the real commander of the armies; and, although there is a class which is always critical according to report, the King and the Queen seem to me to be very close to the people and, if possible, to have grown closer to them during this war. Both have filled their places, so far as I can tell, in the most admirable way; and whatever cavillers of the class referred to may say, I feel that the King and Queen have the people with them. One thing I am certain of: They have but one thought, and that is Italy. . . .

Faithfully yours

THOS. NELSON PAGE

Colonel House arrived in Paris with an intensified conviction that the German Government would not agree to peace terms that even the most moderate of Allied statesmen would offer. Even had the civil rulers of Germany been so inclined, they would not have dared confess it to the public and they would not have been permitted to take any action by the military. His four days' stay in Berlin, however, had not been fruitless, for in his conversations with the Chancellor, von Jagow, and Zimmermann he had for the moment eliminated the danger of a break over the *Lusitania* disavowal.

'Colonel House's air of satisfaction and his genial smile [thus ran a cable from Berlin] indicated that the Berlin end of his mission at least had been a success. . . . Official Germany is no less pleased by his visit. He is leaving the best of impressions. . . . The moral effect of the Colonel's brief visit is highly valued here. In well-informed quarters it is believed that he was able to dispel certain ideas which have been unfortunately persistent here, particularly that America was not acting in good faith.' ¹

'Your visit did a great deal of good,' wrote Gerard on February 15. 'You have the satisfaction of knowing you probably kept us out of war.' And a week later: 'The Germans all feel that if matters are arranged it will be due to you, and seem most grateful.'

House realized that if the Chancellor wavered, the advocates of ruthless submarine warfare would force their policy upon the Kaiser and reckless torpedoing would recommence. He was more than ever convinced that the future of the United States was bound up in Allied victory, and he wanted to find a way to help the Allies. The difficulty lay in the fact that they wanted our help merely for the purpose of smashing Germany, whereas House felt that the only justi-

¹ New York Times, January 30, 1916.

fication of American participation would be the hope of ending the war. Both belligerent groups, to tell the truth, feared American intervention, and yet without it neither was able to achieve victory. The Colonel realized that a desperate effort would be made by each side during the coming months, and he foresaw the impotence of each armed group to end the war by military victory in 1916. Europe showed signs of becoming helpless.

As in London and Berlin, so in Paris speculation as to the meaning of House's mission was unrestrained and entirely fruitless. The Colonel faced a battery of experienced reporters, who retired baffled before his suave but monosyllabic responses to pertinent questions. The press was mystified. 'A Sphinx in a soft hat.' 'In seven minutes,' said the *Temps*, 'Colonel House replied by more or less complete muteness to more than a hundred questions.' But the charm of his personality evidently magnetized them. Confessing that they did not understand what he was about, they proceeded to approve it: 'It would have been difficult [said the *Libre Parole*] to exaggerate the real importance of this mission which passes in our midst — discreet, reserved, and full of the future.' House's interviews with the reporters were not facilitated by the evident pride which Berlin took in his visit to Germany.

'February 1, 1916: A copy of the Berlin *Tageblatt* [he noted] containing what purported to be an interview with me, reached Paris before we did. In this interview I am supposed to have said, among other things, that "every time I visit Germany, I love it more." The French reporters asked whether I was correctly quoted. As is my rule, I would neither confirm nor deny the statement. I could feel the bad impression this made, but I stuck to it. When the conference was ended, I told the reporters of two leading Paris papers that I had given no interview, therefore could not have

said what was quoted. This was passed about, and all was serene once more.'

However mute he might be in the company of reporters, to the political leaders of France, House talked with the utmost frankness. The Premier, Briand, who had been accurately described to the Colonel as 'very able but very lazy,' had taken over the functions of Foreign Minister. House found him 'reasonable,' less touched by belligerent emotions than many of his countrymen, but insistent upon the necessity of military victory. With Jules Cambon, formerly Ambassador at Berlin, then actively directing the Foreign Office, a ro-tund but distinguished diplomat, House had come into touch the previous year. They made haste to receive him immediately upon his arrival in Paris.

Colonel House to the President

PARIS, February 3, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I have seen the Prime Minister and Jules Cambon, and have had most interesting and satisfactory talks with them both.

The French press has again treated my coming with cordiality, and I am told on all sides that it has greatly added to the good feeling between the two countries.

I talked to Cambon quite freely, outlining the entire situation as it seems to me, and I am hopeful that the result of what I have said will show itself in the immediate future. I took up our shipping troubles with him, and he seemed more readily to understand our difficulties than they do in England. I have told them all that what we wanted most was for them to do those things which would help us to help them best.

I am to see Poincaré Saturday with Sharp. I saw the other two alone, for there was too much of a confidential nature to risk a third person.

I cannot begin to tell you by letter how critical the situation is everywhere, not only as between themselves, but with us as well. In my opinion, hell will break loose in Europe this spring and summer as never before; and I see no way to stop it for the moment. . . .

My suspicions regarding Russia have had some confirmation which I had best not write. Thomas Nelson Page sends Richardson, his Second Secretary, with confidential letters to-day. Richardson tells me that Italy is tired of war and that a change of Ministry might occur at any time. The feeling there is strong against England, because of her failure to do things that Italy desires. It is stronger, Richardson thinks, against England than it is against Germany.

I am trying to impress upon both England and France the precariousness of the situation and the gamble that a continuance of the war involves. I know I am making an impression in some quarters where reason has not altogether fled.

I am pleased beyond measure to see your efforts to arouse our people to the necessity for defence. You cannot put it too strongly, for the dangers are greater than even you can realize.

I want to tell you, and Mr. Lansing through you, the importance of not letting notes to and from Governments leak. There is complaint of it everywhere, and it is a useless cause of friction. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

‘I did not hesitate to tell Cambon [commented House in his private notes on February 2] that I was doing all I could to avert a break with Germany over the *Lusitania* affair. My belief was that a break could only be deferred and not averted, but it would place the United States at a disadvantage to go to war over an incident ten months old. In

my opinion, Germany would give us another opportunity if we desired one, as the pinch of the blockade would cause her to revert to her original undersea warfare.

'I informed Cambon of my discussions with the German Chancellor, von Jagow, and Zimmermann, regarding peace terms. He was pleased with the answers I had made, and seemed to accept them as interpreting the position of the Allies. I told him, in my opinion, unless something unforeseen occurred, it was not probable the Allies would be able to have a decisive victory on any of the fronts during the coming spring and summer; and in the autumn the same situation would face them as now, with the exception that the position of the Allies would be somewhat improved.'

Two days later, House developed his intimacy with Briand, without touching on the real object of his mission. As he wrote the President, he was interested first in creating a 'good atmosphere.'

'The main incident of importance to-day was the dinner given us by Ambassador and Mrs. Sharp. The Prime Minister was the most notable guest. After dinner Briand and I got together, using my old friend, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, as interpreter, and talked the entire evening. The British Ambassador, who was also a guest, arose to leave before the Prime Minister, which is the British of it. I suppose he was irritated by our continued talk, in which neither he nor the American Ambassador was invited to take part. . . .

'I started it by telling of my visit to Berlin, Paris, and London in May and June of 1914, prior to the war. Briand was more interested than ordinarily he might have been, because the Kaiser invited him to come to Kiel at that time, and he has often wondered since if his acceptance might have had favorable results. He believes not, but there is always a

doubt. I analyzed the different governmental systems of Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States, and enlarged upon the advantage an autocracy had over a democracy in time of war. For many years I had been hoping the United States would become as democratic as Great Britain and France, but I now wondered whether at present we were not better off than they. I startled them when I made the statement that no sovereign in Europe was so powerful as our President for the limited term of his office, and I explained why this was true.

‘I spoke of my present difficulties in both England and France in trying to obtain action and reach definite conclusions. I could get from each Cabinet official his individual view, but it was almost impossible to get the collective view of the Government upon any question. In France, we had no feeling of security because the Government shifted so frequently that continuity of policy could not be relied upon. In Germany and the United States, more definite results could be reached in a day than in a month in either England or France. . . .

‘We discussed different phases of the situation as it is now, as it might be at the end of the war, and the effect the war may have upon the future of civilization. Briand thought if Germany had not made war when she did, she would have made a peaceful conquest of the world. This follows my own conclusions. His idea is that France would have become lazy and indifferent, and would have furnished the necessary wealth. Germany would have furnished the initiative, and finally would have dominated both countries. De Constant disagreed with this. He thought France would have taken some of Germany’s efficiency through contact with her, and that Germany would have become more refined in thought and purpose by contact with France. In this way both would have benefited and neither would have dominated.’

IV

In the meantime, House followed his habit of making and developing all the personal contacts possible. It was important, for public opinion in France regarded Wilson with suspicion and even disfavor. People could not understand why the United States should sympathize with the Allied cause and yet remain aloof from the war. House spent many hours in explaining.

Colonel House to Mr. Gordon Auchincloss

PARIS, February 4, 1916

DEAR GORDON:

The pressure upon me here is beyond anything. Newspapermen, photographers, Americans, Frenchmen, and what not, take up every moment of my waking hours. . . .

I have an invitation from the Swedish Government to come there. I had one from the Swiss Government to come to Berne, and Thomas Nelson Page pressed me to come to Rome. I could not go, and in lieu of that he sends one of the Secretaries with confidential messages and letters to me here. Penfield came to Geneva for a conference and Morgenthau wanted to come from Constantinople, but I could not wait for him. Willard I am to see in a day or two, so I will have covered the ground that was necessary. . . .

Paternally yours

E. M. HOUSE

'February 5, 1916: At five o'clock, Sharp and I called at the Élysée Palace to see the President. He was exceedingly cordial, but the conversation was unimportant. I thought it best to do nothing more than pass the compliments of the day, which we did for some ten minutes and then took our leave. . . .

'We dined with the Princess Lusinge. There were some

eight or ten other guests, including the Ambassador. I did no talking, but listened. . . .

'After lunch I had a conference with Ambassador Willard, putting him *en rapport* with the situation to as great an extent as I considered prudent. He agreed with my conclusions regarding the *Lusitania* controversy, and so does Sharp and Hugh Wallace.¹ They are the only three [Americans] with whom I have conferred here.

'One of my most interesting conversations was with Joseph Reinach. I told him of President Wilson, of his Pan-American policy and its bearings upon Mexico. Reinach saw the light for the first time, and was good enough to say he would write an article in the *Figaro* calling attention to its importance. I intimated that he had a European policy even more important, and that in the end Europe would be compelled to admit it had misjudged him.

'February 7, 1916: I met the newspaper correspondents at the Embassy at twelve o'clock. They quizzed me for fifteen or twenty minutes, but were unsuccessful in getting anything. They asked if the statement in the *Herald* concerning Loulie purchasing clothes in Paris was true. One of them said that this seemed likely to be the only information of a positive character they were to receive during my visit to Europe. They were very good-natured, and understood how impossible it was for me to talk. . . .

'M. Stephen Pichon, one-time Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, now editor of the *Petit Journal*, called in the afternoon. Sharp thought it important for me to see him because of his influence with Briand, and other members of the Ministry, as well as his general influence throughout France.'

The effects of Colonel House's visit were to appear shortly

¹ Mr. Wallace succeeded Mr. Sharp as Ambassador in the spring of 1919.

in the friendly attitude taken by the Briand Government toward Wilson, which it displayed in characteristic fashion.

Mr. A. H. Frazier ¹ to Colonel House

PARIS, February 15, 1916

DEAR MR. HOUSE:

... The day before yesterday, *L'Homme Enchaîné*, Clemenceau's newspaper, appeared with half of its leading article blocked out by the censor. From a reliable source I learn that the part objected to by the censor was an attack upon President Wilson and that it was eliminated at the instigation of M. Berthelot; you may remember he is the man whom I wanted you to meet on account of his growing influence with M. Briand. Yesterday the same paper published a sarcastic allusion to Berthelot and his activity at the Foreign Office. The whole matter is of little importance, but it shows plainly, I think, that your words have borne fruit and that the French Government is disposed to suppress any unfriendly comments on President Wilson.

In this connection I can tell you that Reinach was enormously impressed by your remarks to him; he told a friend of mine that you had opened his eyes as to President Wilson's real views as regards the Allies and the Central Powers. All sorts of opinions are attributed to you by persons one meets, but I was interested to hear the Spanish Ambassador quote you very correctly as regards Germany's powers of resistance. He, by the way, is looking for the psychological moment to unite the neutral nations in some proposal of mediation; he is satisfied that the present is not the moment. . . .

Respectfully yours

ARTHUR HUGH FRAZIER

¹ Secretary of Embassy at Paris, diplomat of distinction and discretion, a close friend of Colonel House.

At the same time Ambassador Sharp wrote to the Colonel: 'If the all-around good feeling which has followed your visit to this place reflects that which exists at the other Embassies you have visited, you may be well satisfied.'

V

Before leaving Paris, House decided that he would open his mind completely to the chiefs of the French Government, in order that they might understand definitely Wilson's willingness to aid the Allies in bringing the war to an end upon a reasonable basis. If they felt they could secure victory themselves, unaided, the President would remain aloof and they might dictate their own terms. If they felt they were losing ground, he would intervene to save them and guarantee a settlement based upon justice. On February 7, House canvassed the whole matter with Briand and Cambon. 'It was an important — perhaps the most important — conference,' he wrote, 'I have had during this visit to Europe. We had a complete understanding as to the immediate future. . . . I again told them that the lower the fortunes of the Allies ebbed, the closer the United States would stand by them.'

Colonel House to the President

BOULOGNE, FRANCE
February 9, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I shall not go into much detail in regard to my [last] conversation with the Prime Minister and Cambon, but will give you a brief outline.

In the first interviews I tried to create a good atmosphere, and I was undetermined whether to leave it at that or go further. Up to the present I have been confidential with the British Government alone, and have left to them the bringing into line of their Allies.

However, I was never more impressed by their slowness and lack of initiative as upon this trip, and I concluded that we had better take the risk and talk plainly to the French. The result was surprisingly satisfactory.

I outlined the situation to them as I see it, bringing in all the doubtful elements which might throw the balance against them — their lack of victories, their mistakes, the efficient German organization under an autocracy as against an inefficient organization under democracies, and the danger of separate peace with Russia and Italy. All this I outlined with care. I pictured what was at stake, not only for them, but for the whole world, and, while declaring that we felt able to look out for our own interests in our own way, yet I let them see how deeply concerned we were for the future of democratic government.

It was finally understood that in the event the Allies had some notable victories during the spring and summer, you would not intervene; and in the event that the tide of war went against them or remained stationary, you would intervene. This conversation is to go no further than between Briand, Cambon, and myself, and I promised that no one in America should know of it excepting yourself and Lansing.

I told them I had had a similar conversation in England and that there it would go no further than a group composed of the Prime Minister, Sir Edward Grey, Balfour, and Lloyd George. This seemed agreeable to them.

They are to keep in touch with me by letters and messages, and I, in turn, am to do likewise. This was done to give more freedom, because of its unofficial character.

Briand and Cambon know and seemed to agree to the advice I gave you concerning the settlement of the *Lusitania* matter. It is impossible for any unprejudiced person to believe that it would be wise for America to take part in this war unless it comes about by intervention based upon the highest human motives. We are the only nation left on

earth with sufficient power to lead them out, and with us once in,¹ the war would have to go to a finish with all its appalling consequences. It is better for the Central Powers and it is better for the Allies, as indeed it is better for us, to act in this way; and I have not hesitated to say this to the British and French Governments, and have intimated it to Germany.

A great opportunity is yours, my friend — the greatest, perhaps, that has ever come to any man. The way out seems clear to me and, when I can lay the facts before you, I believe it will be clear to you also.

In each government I have visited I have found stubbornness, determination, selfishness, and cant. One continually hears self-glorification and the highest motives attributed to themselves because of their part in the war. But I may tell you that my observation is that incompetent statesmanship and selfishness is at the bottom of it all. It is not so much a breaking down of civilization as a lack of wisdom in those that govern; and history, I believe, will bring an awful indictment against those who were short-sighted and selfish enough to let such a tragedy happen.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

House might have added his conviction that history would bring an equally severe indictment against those statesmen who failed to bring the tragedy to an end at the first possible moment. The sole means at this time, he believed, was the agreement he planned between the United States and the Allies for American armed intervention. He hastened back to England, therefore, to impress upon Sir Edward Grey the need of an immediate decision.

¹ That is, on the basis of a separate quarrel with Germany.

CHAPTER VII

AMERICA OFFERS TO HELP

If the Allies put off calling for our assistance to a time when our intention cannot serve them, then we will not make the attempt.

Extract from Diary of Colonel House, February 17, 1916

I

ON his way from Paris to London, House stopped for a brief interview with the King of the Belgians, to which he had been invited before leaving New York. The blond, blue-eyed giant, Vikingesque in appearance, solid in character, restrained in his judgments, was one of the two outstanding figures of the early phases of the war — the other, his compatriot, Cardinal Mercier. Strange revolution of the historical wheel which in the twentieth century brought once more to the top, and for a moment, a King and a Cardinal! King Albert was interesting through the completeness with which he had merged his personality with that of his people. He was the justification of monarchy under modern conditions, for he gave to Belgium a personification which was of infinite political value.

‘February 8, 1916: We left Paris to-day at 8.45. A beautiful salon car was placed at our disposal. The Chief Engineer of the Railway, some of the Directors of the Chemin du Nord, and the Chief of Police were at the station to pay their respects, and to do what they could to make our journey comfortable.

‘Many times while I was in Paris I heard it remarked that there would be no Zeppelin raids while I was there. While, indeed, there were no Zeppelin raids, my being there doubtless had no more to do with it than the rise and fall of the tides. Another curious thing is the number of people desiring



A Monsieur le Colonel House, en souvenir de son aimable
visite à Malines et en gage de bien cordiales salutations,
+ O. J. Card. Mercier, archevêque de Malines.

19 Juin 1919.

CARDINAL MERCIER

to cross the ocean on the same ship with me, believing that safety is thereby ensured. . . .

‘We arrived at Boulogne about two o’clock. The Commissioner of Police, the British Provost Marshal, and King Albert’s Aide-de-Camp met us. I turned the rest of the party over to the Provost Marshal and Commissionnaire, and went directly to the King’s motor, which was waiting to take me and my aide, Clifford Carver, to La Panne.

‘For the first twenty-five miles we drove at a terrific pace, estimated by Carver at seventy-five to eighty miles an hour. We reached Calais in twenty-five minutes, having lost five minutes on the road by having to slow up for traffic. After that we went at a more reasonable pace. Both Carver and I thought perhaps they were trying us out, to see whether we would ask them to travel more slowly, for the Aide-de-Camp asked me several times if we were driving too rapidly, a fact which I declined to admit. We made the trip of sixty miles to La Panne in about an hour and a half, including many stops. The worst of it was that the roads were slippery from recent rains and, in places, clogged with army traffic.

‘We arrived at La Panne in the rain. We were saluted by many officers, and I was received upon getting out of the motor by several Generals. I walked with them as quietly and slowly through the pouring rain, without an umbrella, as if it were all to my liking. As soon as I reached the house and my overcoat and hat were taken, the King entered and we talked for an hour and a half. . . . The King has but little power to carry out any policies he may have in mind. There is no monarch in Europe more completely led by the people. He admitted this and was cautious about expressing what Belgium would or would not do. . . .

‘He spoke in complimentary terms of the President, and of America, asking me to express his thanks to President Wilson for all that the United States had done for his people. I, in turn, told him that the valor of Belgium had lifted his coun-

try upon a high plane, and that history had no record of a more heroic defence.

'We discussed peace terms. . . . He eagerly accepted my suggestion that an indemnity be paid Belgium by all the belligerents. He thought his people would be unhappy with any peace terms that did not contain something which would help repair their shattered fortunes. I thought the entire world desired good terms for Belgium, and that he would find strong influence exerted in behalf of justice for her.

'He asked if I saw any indications of peace. I did not. I told him matters were just as they were when I was here last year, with the exception that in Germany the hate was not so strong, but in England and France it was stronger. . . . He thought it was a mistake to believe the belligerents (he did not mention Germany by name, but it was clear he included her) were in an exhausted condition, either as to men or economic resources. . . .

'He spoke time and again of having to be a good citizen, and do what the people thought a good citizen ought to do. . . . He should not give vent to his own feelings or his own thoughts, but should think as the Belgian people think and feel as they feel. . . .

'He asked me to have tea, which I declined, telling him I desired to hurry back to Boulogne. He bade me a cordial farewell and, before parting, sent further messages to the President.

'Our ride back was as wild as the one going, for it was very dark and wet and we made the sixty miles in two hours, including the many stops. It was a weird and exciting experience. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery would loom up out of the mist like ghosts, for the space of a few seconds, and then disappear. We reached Boulogne in time for a late dinner, to which I invited the King's Aide, who returned with us.

'*February 9, 1916 [London]:* We crossed on a troopship leaving Boulogne at 12.15. There were a thousand or more

troops returning home, some wounded and some on leave. There were no civilians excepting Lord Curzon. The weather was clear and the water smooth and we were amply convoyed. When we were within five or six miles of Dover, there was a sudden stop. A secret service man, the presence of whom I had not known, asked Carver to tell us to come on deck and stand by one of the lifeboats. It seems that a tramp steamer had just been torpedoed and sunk quite near us and, in addition to that, there were two German seaplanes dropping bombs on the Kentish coast. In order to avoid the submarine, we made for Dover instead of Folkestone, and, under Admiralty orders, remained stationary for a half-hour. It was thought at one time we would have to return to Boulogne.

‘Two British airships circled over us looking for submarines, and also to protect us from the German seaplanes. No one on the boat knew, excepting ourselves, what had happened or what was imminent, although every one had lifebelts on. When we steamed up, it was decided to run along the coast to Folkestone, which we did at top speed.

‘There was a tremendous crowd at Victoria to greet the arrival of our train, in order to welcome the homecoming veterans. . . .

‘Telegrams, cables, notes, letters, and newspaper clippings were awaiting me. Newspapermen began to call, but I refused to see any one, stating I would meet them at four o’clock to-morrow afternoon.

‘*February 10, 1916:* Among the many callers was the Lord Chief Justice,¹ who came immediately after breakfast. I had an engagement and could only see him for a few minutes. He called to say that Lloyd George wished to see me alone within the next day or two, to continue the conversation we had when I was here before. I asked Reading to arrange it. We agreed if possible he should arrange a dinner for Monday

¹ Lord Reading.

evening and invite the Prime Minister, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Arthur Balfour, Mr. Lloyd George, and Ambassador Page.

'I urged him to be expeditious and to tell those mentioned that, if the work we had in mind to do was to be accomplished, there must not be the usual British delay.' . . .

Colonel House was pleased with Reading's call, since it indicated that Lloyd George at least took his proposition seriously. Of Grey's approval the Colonel felt assured, and his confidence was justified by his first interview with the Foreign Secretary on February 10. House gave him the net result of his Continental observations. It was that the German Government was being pushed by the navalists and public opinion toward the resumption of unrestrained submarine warfare. They would consider nothing but a 'victor's peace.' House recognized two possible alternatives: The United States might wait until the Germans withdrew their submarine promise, and enter the war upon the submarine issue. Or the President might demand a peace conference and, if Germany refused the 'reasonable' terms which would be offered, the United States would enter the war to enforce them.¹

Of the two alternatives House preferred the latter. It would at least give Germany the opportunity to yield. If she did not embrace it, and House did not believe she would, the entrance of the United States into the war would be based upon the clearest and the highest of motives. And America could say to the Allies in definite accents: 'We have come to

¹ 'Reasonable terms' seem to have been agreed upon as follows: Complete restoration of Belgium and Serbia, return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, Constantinople for Russia, an independent Poland, cession of Italian-speaking regions by Austria to Italy, compensation for Germany outside of Europe, abolition of competitive armaments and guaranties against military aggression. The chief weakness of such a programme lay in the fact that it would leave the Austrian question unsolved.

help in a war to end war. But when the victory is won, we shall insist that you join with us to make a peace of justice and security and not of revenge or selfish profit.'

Colonel House to the President

LONDON, February 10, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... I had written Sir Edward from Paris and he reserved the entire morning for our conference. I was very frank with him, as I always am, telling him everything that had happened in both Berlin and Paris. I also told him of my advice to you in regard to the settlement of the *Lusitania* and why I thought it essential for us to keep out of the war, at least for the present. He disagreed with this, as Page intimated he would, but in ten minutes I had brought him round.¹

After going over the situation with great care and taking up every detail of foreign affairs, we finally agreed that it would be best for you to demand that the belligerents permit you to call a conference for the discussion of peace terms. We concluded this would be better than intervention [on the submarine issue], and it was understood, though not definitely agreed upon, that you might do this within a very short time — perhaps soon after I returned.

The Allies will agree to the conference, and, if Germany does not, I have promised for you that we will throw in all our weight in order to bring her to terms.

You will see that we have progressed pretty far since I left Paris — further than I had any idea that it was possible to do. I am to meet the Prime Minister, Balfour, and Grey

¹ Did House actually convince Grey? For the moment, perhaps, yes. But one of the Colonel's defects was that he was so irresistible in his quiet manner that he persuaded many persons out of their real beliefs. There is ample testimony to the fact that at the end of a discussion it was very difficult to disagree with him; but after the immediate personal influence had passed, there was a tendency to lapse back into the original conviction.

to-morrow at lunch to acquaint them of our discussion and to endeavor to get their approval. If this is done, there will be a dinner on Monday at which I have requested that Page be present. At this dinner there will be the Prime Minister, Grey, Balfour, Lloyd George, and the Lord Chief Justice. There will be no others taken in at any later conferences, but what is determined there will be a finality and I can bring you home definite news.

I cannot say with certitude what attitude Asquith and Balfour will take to-morrow, but I doubt whether Grey would have been as positive if he had not been reasonably certain of their coöperation.

I am very happy to be able to write you this, and I hope to-morrow I may be able to confirm it by cable. If you can hold the situation at Washington clear of all complications, sending no notes, protests, etc., etc., to any of the belligerents, it looks as if something momentous may soon happen.

The discussion of the *Lusitania* settlement in the public prints has been most unfortunate. Practically the whole controversy has been cabled over from Washington and the papers are commenting upon it, which makes the situation exceedingly dangerous. I have asked Grey to undertake to restrain all adverse criticism for the moment, and he has promised to do this. I shall also ask the Prime Minister to do the same thing.

If I were you, I would ask Frank Polk to put the Secret Service on the question of leakage and endeavor to find its source. This seems to me imperative, for it may endanger the great work you are trying to do. If decoy messages are given to those that are suspected, it ought not to be difficult to find the guilty party. I cannot impress upon you too strongly how important this is, and I hope you will immediately take it in hand.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

In his private notes, Colonel House added details of his conversation of February 10 with Sir Edward Grey.

‘Before Grey consented to having the President intervene, I laid bare the plight of the Allies and the possibilities of defeat, particularly the possibility of Great Britain finding herself alone in the contest. He was interested in what I told him of my interview with Briand and Cambon, and expressed pleasure that I had taken the matter up with them direct, so as to relieve his Government of the suspicion of being the one desiring peace. That, he felt, was the point to be guarded. If the Allies thought Great Britain was preparing to discuss peace, something like a panic might ensue.

‘I outlined the general feeling among the Allies regarding Great Britain. Russia, I told him, was dissatisfied; Italy I knew to be; and France would probably grow to be. . . . I said it was my habit to think of myself as the other man and determine what I would do if I were in his place. This had led me to the conclusion that Germany would first try to secure peace with Russia, then with Italy, and later with France, and finally defy Great Britain. I gave him my views upon the social and economic condition of Germany, maintaining that Germany could still place as many men on the western front as were needed to hold the line, and that she was in no great economic distress and that no revolution would disturb her equilibrium until after the war.’

II

On the following day, House had lunch and dinner with different members of the Cabinet, lunch at Sir Edward Grey's with Asquith and Balfour, dinner with Lloyd George and Reading. Both groups were cautious. They evidently wished the United States to enter the war on the submarine issue, for it would leave the Allies free as regarded peace terms. Also, in view of the anxiety which Wilson had dis-

played to avoid war with Germany and the American Ambassador's conviction of his unalterable pacifism, it is possible that they distrusted the President's willingness to bring the United States into the war if Germany refused terms.

'February 11, 1916: When I went to 33 Eccleston Square [wrote House], Sir Edward had already arrived. This gave me time to have a little private talk with him. It seems he mentioned the subject of our conversation to both the Prime Minister and Balfour, but no discussion had taken place. He has also talked with M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador, who told him of my first interview in Paris with Briand and Jules Cambon. He had an abstract of it, which he did not show Grey, but of which he told him.

'He did not have a memorandum of my second and more important interview of February 7. Grey asked him to get this. His purpose is to find what the French think of it, so that he and I can better understand the situation. Grey desired that I should know this, so there would be nothing left in the background.

'As soon as the Prime Minister and Balfour came, we began lunch. The conversation was general during the first part of it, but when the meal had been served Grey stated what he and I had talked of yesterday. I took but little part in the conversation at first, but let each of the others outline his position. Balfour was less argumentative than I have seen him, and we got down to the real question quicker than I anticipated.

'The Prime Minister thought I was pessimistic as to Russia. I explained that it was not a question of pessimism, but a question of playing for safety; I thought Russia would stick; but was it well to take chances?

'Sir Edward thought Great Britain could do nothing until some one of her allies was ready to discuss peace. He took the view that Great Britain had not as yet been seriously

hurt by the war, since but few of her men had been killed and her territory had not been invaded. This seemed to meet both Asquith's and Balfour's views. I raised the point that, if Russia should announce she had come to the end of her resources and was ready for peace, it might mean that she had already concluded a secret agreement with Germany. Sir Edward's idea was that, when one of the Allies proposed peace discussions, Great Britain should say we were ready to intervene. This, I thought, would not suit Russia, and her reply would be that she preferred to conclude an agreement herself without the intervention of the United States. They all admitted this would happen in the event she had made a separate peace with Germany. The point I made was that it would be dangerous to wait until Russia was ready to say that the time had come for us to intervene. If they wait for that, they run the danger of making our intervention impossible because of the reasons stated.¹

'The next point that came up was how the British Government could let us know they considered the time propitious for us to intervene, without first submitting the question to the Allies, and, if they did not submit it to the Allies, how to avoid the charge of double-dealing.

'The solution I suggested for this was that at regular intervals I would cable Sir Edward Grey, in our private code, offering intervention. He could ignore the messages until the time was propitious, and then he could bring it to the attention of the Allies as coming from us and not as coming from Great Britain.

'Balfour asked what I desired the Prime Minister, Grey, and himself to say, and what assurance did I wish to take back to the President. My reply was that I wished a definite understanding that it would be agreeable to the British Government, in the circumstances outlined, to have the United

¹ House had already insisted that if they wanted American help they must not wait until serious danger of defeat by Germany arose.

States propose cessation of war and a conference to discuss peace terms. If I could take a favorable reply to the President, we would then know what to work to.

‘I cautioned them again about allowing the matter to run too far. I declared if they made the mistake of waiting until Germany had a decisive victory, or nearly so, they need not expect action from us, for it would be foolhardy for the United States to enter at so late a day in the hope of changing the result in their favor. In these circumstances we would probably create a large army and navy, and retire entirely from European affairs and depend upon ourselves.

‘If my plan was adopted, I believed it would inevitably lead to an alliance between the United States and Great Britain, France, and Italy, the democracies of the world.

‘It was agreed that we should leave Grey’s house separately. The Prime Minister went first, then Balfour, and Sir Edward and I left together. We are to meet at the Lord Chief Justice’s at dinner Monday evening, with him and Lloyd George as additional members of the conference. Grey and I are to meet again at half-past ten Monday morning. . . .’

In the meantime House talked the matter over with Lloyd George and Reading. It was generally recognized that, if the Colonel’s plan were to be accepted, the enthusiastic approval of Lloyd George would be necessary. For the erstwhile pacifist of the Boer War period had now become the vigorous champion of complete victory. He liked the proposal of House, for he saw that it would ensure Allied victory, but he was doubtful of that part of it which provided for a preliminary demand for a peace conference by Wilson; since acceptance of the offer would shake even his popularity. Grey was more encouraging and seemed ready for immediate action.

‘Sir Edward [House noted] believes the time has come for

the President to demand a peace conference; but this feeling is not shared by the other members of the Cabinet or, if it is, they do not want to express it. Public opinion here would condemn any Minister who would dare endorse such a proposal. . . . However, Grey lacks nothing in courage and has less regard for his personal fortunes than any statesman I have met in Europe. If Grey continues in the Government until the end of the war, he will probably become a great figure because of his unselfish outlook, broad vision, and high character. I have never known him to suggest a mean or unworthy thought. . . .’

From these conferences Ambassador Page remained apart, in principle because they must necessarily be of a purely unofficial character until House’s offer was formally confirmed by President Wilson. Mr. Page was doubtless not sorry that there should be so good a reason for his absence, since he evidently did not wish to participate in anything that might be called peace negotiations. House found him impervious to the argument that, if the Germans accepted the terms suggested, militarism would be doomed, and that if they refused them America would help the Allies, which was what Page desired. He was unwilling to believe that the President and the State Department could carry through so energetic a policy, and he did not wish to assist in the attempt. On February 10, Colonel House recorded:

‘We dined at the Embassy in order that Page and I might have a quiet talk. My entire evening was spent in listening to his denunciation of the President and Lansing, and of the Administration in general. He thought the State Department should be “cleaned out from top to bottom.” He humorously suggested that the Department should not remain in the same quarters, but should take a large tent and place it on the green near the Washington Monument, in

order to raze the present building to its foundations and start afresh with new surroundings and a new force.

‘I did not argue with him. . . . “The President has no policy. He has lost the respect of Great Britain and the world. Lansing insults every one with his notes, etc., etc.”’

It was unfortunate, certainly, that Mr. Page had become so critical of his own Government that he was unwilling to participate in this plan to rescue Europe from the war of exhaustion. One wonders whether the lack of confidence felt in Wilson by the Allies, which Page emphasized so strongly, was not partly inspired by his own attitude. And it is interesting to observe the definiteness of his refusal to coöperate in the positive policy which Wilson had undertaken. The following memorandum made by Mr. Page is significant:

‘House told me that we’d have a meeting on Monday — Asquith, Grey, Reading, Lloyd George, he and I. No, we won’t. No member of the Government can afford to discuss any such subject; not one of them has any confidence in the strength of the President for action.

‘Therefore, on Friday, 11th of February, I told House that I couldn’t go with him to any such conference, and I wouldn’t.’¹

Mr. Page’s opinion that the leading members of the British Government would not discuss House’s scheme proved to be without foundation, for on February 14 the conference was held as planned. House was hampered by Page’s refusal to coöperate, for his attitude necessarily weakened their faith in Wilson. Even so, they approved the principle of the American offer, although they refused to set a date for Wilson’s intervention. They still wished to try the fortunes of war against Germany unhampered by any conditions as to

¹ *Life and Letters of Walter H. Page* (Doubleday, Page & Company), III, 282.

the terms they might lay down in case of victory. On the other hand, they agreed that if in the future it might become apparent they could not make a serious impression on the German lines, President Wilson should demand a peace conference; and House promised that if the Germans refused to accept the terms he had outlined, the United States would enter the war. This tentative understanding, of course, was to be dependent upon the approval of the allies of Great Britain.

'February 14, 1916: The dinner at the home of the Lord Chief Justice [recorded House] was for 8.30 o'clock. I arrived first, then Lloyd George, Grey, Balfour, and Asquith in order. Reading had the Prime Minister to his right, me to his left, Sir Edward next to me, and Balfour next to the Prime Minister, and Lloyd George at the other end of the table.

'The conversation was general while dinner was being served, and was largely about English domestic affairs. When the butler withdrew, there was general discussion of the war, the mistakes that had been made, and possible remedies. They talked quite freely before me, discussing the question of ammunition on hand, the wasteful way in which the Russians were expending what Great Britain was sending them, the general morale of the troops, etc., etc. I gave it as my theory that the Germans would probably attack the Allies on the west and perhaps at Verdun, and would attack quickly, not waiting for the spring weather to open. My reasons for believing this were that they could not get into the Russian field until the end of April, and the fact that they were not pushing matters in the Balkans convinced me that they would almost immediately open a violent offensive on the western front. My theory is that the Germans are still at their highest point of efficiency, and if they could strike a decisive blow, break through and capture either Paris or Calais, it might conceivably end the war.'

The Colonel's reference to the imminence of a great German offensive, his specification even of the point where it might be directed, Verdun, must have maintained his reputation as a prophet; since it was exactly a week later, February 21, that the German artillery drum-fire, northeast of Verdun, inaugurated the greatest battle the world had yet seen.

'The discussion ran along the lines of new inventions and what the Germans had "up their sleeves." My whole idea in leading the conversation in this direction was to make them feel less hopeful and to show them, as I have often tried to do, what a terrible gamble they are taking in not invoking our intervention. . . .

'It was 10.30 before we got down to the real purpose of the meeting. Lloyd George began by making some such speech as he did at the first dinner that he, Reading, and I had together before I went to Germany. I interrupted him in a moment and said, "Let us get the setting just as we all now think it might be. Sir Edward and I in our conference this morning thought it would be impossible to have a peace conference at Washington, and I have promised that the President will come to The Hague, if invited, and remain as long as necessary. Then let us assume that the conference is at The Hague and that the President is presiding over it. With that setting, please proceed with what you think would happen."

'Before George started again, the Prime Minister and Mr. Balfour expressed pleasure that the President would consider coming to Europe, giving the same reason Grey and I had each thought of; that is, it would be impossible for the leading statesmen of the belligerent countries to leave Europe for so long a time and go such a great distance as Washington. Besides, there would be too much needful data which could not be obtained readily except in Europe.

‘George then began to outline what he thought the peace conference might do. . . . The Prime Minister and I joined in, commenting upon the different phases of the questions as they arose.

‘For instance, the nationalization of Poland was discussed at great length, and the objections which might be raised by Russia. Balfour thought if Poland was made an independent kingdom, becoming a buffer state between Russia and Germany, it would leave France at the mercy of Germany in any future war, for the reason that Russia would not be able to reach Germany without violating the neutrality of Poland. He thought this would be a serious objection from the French viewpoint, and also from the Russian, and, if it happened, it would probably cause an end of the alliance between Russia and France.

‘We all cheerfully divided up Turkey, both in Asia and Europe. The discussion hung for a long while around the fate of Constantinople. George and Balfour were not enthusiastic over giving it into the hands of Russia, Grey and Asquith thinking if this were not done material for another war would always be at hand.¹ I suggested the neutralization of Constantinople. . . .

‘It was growing late, and I drew them back to the point of our meeting; that is, when should the United States demand that the war should cease and a conference be held. I drew George out upon this subject and thoroughly committed him to the idea that the President should act in this capacity. But he was rather chary of naming a definite time. Grey was evidently leaning toward an immediate venture in this direction. The discussion then ran as to how the Allies could be approached and what had best be done about them.

‘Asquith asked my opinion as to the proper time. I thought if the Allies could make an impression on the

¹ Great Britain had already signed treaties partitioning the Turkish Empire and agreeing to Russia’s acquisition of Constantinople.

German lines of sufficient importance to discourage Germany, that would be the psychological moment. Asquith agreed with me heartily, and it seemed to be tentatively agreed by all that this course should be followed. I asked them, however, to consider this feature: if the Allies made a deep dent in the German lines, the opinion in Allied countries would be enheartened and they would feel they must go further. Therefore there would be considerable public feeling against peace proposals. Asquith thought this would not be true unless the success of the Allies was greater than he now considered possible.

‘Lloyd George and Balfour were inclined to take the risk which I held up before them, and postpone action until some time later.

‘It was now twelve o’clock and the Prime Minister made a move to go. While the conference was not conclusive, there was at least a common agreement reached in regard to the essential feature; that is, the President should at some time, to be later agreed upon, call a halt and demand a conference. I did not expect to go beyond that, and I was quite content.

‘Asquith asked what we would do in the event Russia and France made separate peace with Germany before Great Britain could bring them into an agreement for the President to act. I replied that we would probably immediately set about building a large navy and army, and withdraw entirely from any interference with European affairs.’

III

‘*February* 15, 1916: Sir Edward was visibly pleased with the result of our meeting last night. He congratulated me upon committing Lloyd George so thoroughly to the proposition of intervention by the President. He said he did not wish to do this himself, and he was wondering how it was possible to bring it about. It was his opinion that the British

Government had not faced so momentous a decision as the one I had asked for, since July, 1914, when the question of war or peace was before them. He showed considerable emotion, walking up and down the room as he talked, making it clear, as far as he was concerned, that he thought immediate action should be asked for, so that the lives of millions of men might be saved and the havoc which would follow another spring and summer campaign might be avoided.

'He said he knew it would be unpopular in England — so unpopular, indeed, that he would expect to have the windows of his house broken by angry mobs; nevertheless, he is ready to face it because he feels he is right. He thought it would be necessary to place the proposal before the entire Cabinet, a decision in which I readily concurred. He is to write a memorandum of our understanding, which is not to be signed, but which I am to take with me. He thought it would not be necessary to have another meeting for general discussion, but that he and I could button up the details better alone. This also met with my approval.

'*February 16, 1916:* After lunch I drove with X to the House of Commons, in order that we might have a few minutes' private conversation. He, too, appeared satisfied with our meeting of the other night, but expressed regret that the Prime Minister was willing to sit, as he termed it, "as a passenger and not take a directing hand in the discussion." He said this was the Prime Minister's weakness, though he did not believe he realized it. X declared he would not care to be Prime Minister under present conditions. I thought Asquith did not hold the reins of government firmly enough. . . .

'I confessed to a feeling of disappointment that it was necessary for me to go from one Cabinet Minister to another to discuss matters which I thought should be discussed solely with the Prime Minister. I thought I should receive authoritative answers from him, and that he should be the

one to see his colleagues and bring them into line so as to give me the united opinion of the Government.

'February 17, 1916: The Lord Chief Justice called this morning. He came to say that in his opinion the conference at his home the other evening was a great success. Like Sir Edward Grey, he thought it remarkable that Lloyd George, Balfour, and Asquith should talk so freely before one another. He considered a great work had been accomplished by getting them all committed to the general proposition in the presence of each other. There was no way now by which one could attack the other to his disadvantage. This is because Reading knows, as I know and they know, that peace discussion at this time would be about as popular in England as the coronation of the Kaiser in Westminster Abbey.

'I told Reading that both Grey and Balfour had complimented Lloyd George upon the breadth of vision and courage displayed. . . . Reading thought the Prime Minister had committed himself more strongly than he had any idea he would.

'February 22, 1916: The Lord Chief Justice called. He wished to tell me of a private talk he had with the Prime Minister concerning our conference at the Reading dinner. He said Asquith talked to him much more strongly in favor of the agreement than he had at the conference. It is the intention to make a push in the West at the earliest possible date, so that the President's proposal may come as soon as possible. I feel the responsibility I have taken in this matter, for it is upon my assurance that the agreement will be carried out that they are preparing for this quick and powerful offensive.¹

'Howard Whitehouse, Liberal Member of Parliament,

¹ The offensive was not undertaken as planned, since it was forestalled by the German attack on Verdun, which engaged the main forces of the French and prevented their coöperation until the Allied drive on the Somme.

called to ask me to urge the President to again offer his services in mediation. I obtained considerable information from him by questioning him closely and without telling him anything. He said the entire Irish Party, of about eighty members, would be willing to accept mediation now, and that more than one hundred of the Liberal Party would join them. I asked what effect it would have if the Liberal members of the Government, and such Conservative members as Lansdowne, Balfour, and Bonar Law would accept the President's proposal for a peace conference. In that event he thought that there would be at least a majority of one hundred in the House of Commons who would favor it, and that the country would sustain them by an overwhelming majority. I asked Whitehouse to give me his estimate of the views of the different members of the Cabinet regarding mediation. I was surprised to find how accurately he stated it. The only mistake of importance was concerning Lloyd George. He thought Lloyd George would oppose it as vigorously as Lord Curzon. . . .'

IV

These important negotiations were crowded into the crevices of a constant succession of less important engagements and conversations, which House none the less felt compelled to maintain because of the opportunity they gave him for securing information and influencing opinion.

'*February 10, 1916:* I went to lunch at Lady Paget's to meet Dr. E. J. Dillon, an authority on southeastern Europe. Lady Minto, Colonel Repington, and several others were present.

'Dillon is a conceited, well-informed, and interesting personage, and I enjoyed my talk with him.

'In the afternoon I received some fifteen or more English and American newspaper correspondents. I gave them no

information, but it was amusing to have them quiz me, and I enjoyed parrying their questions.'

The reaction of the newspaper correspondents to this interview was similar to that of the Parisians. Even in their disappointment at failing to elicit information, they could not escape the humorous aspects of the conference.

'To talk and yet say nothing has been made a delicate art by Colonel House, the Envoy of President Wilson to Europe. [Thus ran the report of the interview.]

'Colonel House — a little active man, with iron-grey hair and moustache — is the perfection of courtesy, but the dumbest of diplomats.

'On his arrival in London he amusingly defeated the efforts of journalists, English and American, who yesterday tried to extract information about his visit to Paris, Geneva, and Berlin. He has adopted the Presidential plan of meeting the journalists *en masse* and allowing them to question him to their hearts' content.

'Few persons know so much as he does about the war and the general situation. Here was a chance of learning a thousand interesting secrets. But all that his audience obtained from him was a series of sad and quiet negatives, punctuated by long and eloquent periods of silence.

'Entering his room at the Ritz Hotel, where the Pressmen awaited him, he thrust his hands into his trouser pockets and remarked jovially, "If there is any question you gentlemen wish to put to me that I shall not answer, fire away."

"I suppose," one of the American journalists began, "you had a very lively time in Berlin?"

"In what way?" Colonel House asked.

"Why, in every way."

"They would be glad to tell you that over there," he replied quietly.

““Where did you stay in Berlin?” — “I stayed with the Ambassador, and all the entertaining that was done was done at the Embassy.”

““Did you see Prince von Bülow?” — “No, I did not. I returned to Basle, back to Paris, then to London. I shall stay here until the 19th, and then home by the *Rotterdam*.”

““Did you hear any discussion on the possibilities of peace?” — “I have not heard peace discussions anywhere because I purposely avoided them.”

““Did you see any signs of a shortage of bread?” — “I did not see any signs of anything in particular.”

““Will you make any official visits in London?” — “Naturally I shall see members of the Government. Most of them are friends, and I often see my friends here both in times of peace and in war.” . . .

““You will report to the Senate on your return?” — “I do not know what I shall do. I may have nothing to report.”

‘There was a painful pause. At length:

““Are they having nice fine weather in Berlin?” — “Yes, I found the weather very mild everywhere.”

““Did you find the Berlin people very cheerful?” — “I made no inquiries of any kind. I did not make any observation of any kind.”

““Have you seen the Kaiser or Crown Prince?” — “Yes (after a pause), but not this time. . . . I was in Berlin but four days.”

““Did you form any impression as to how long the war will last?” — “Not the slightest.”

““But there was a good deal that interested you?” — “Europe is always interesting.”

““Perhaps you could say what has interested you most of all on your visit?” — “I am afraid I shall have to think about that.” . . .’

‘Wild expectations were raised when, toward the end of the interview, he observed, quite voluntarily, “What I would

like to say is —” But the pronouncement was nothing more thrilling than an expression of appreciation of the courtesy of journalists everywhere. . . .’¹

‘*February 11, 1916:* At luncheon [wrote House] both Asquith and Balfour spoke of my interview with the newspaper correspondents. I told them that the first time I had seen the President do it, I almost shivered with anxiety; but after doing it myself, it was so simple that I wondered why I had so greatly overestimated the ordeal. Lloyd George said the interview had created much amusement, and London wondered how I could meet all the correspondents in town, tell them nothing, and get away with it. He felt certain he could not do it. As a matter of fact, there is no man who could do it better than George.

‘We talked about the war and its conduct and its mistakes. I thought the Allies had lacked genius and initiative. I asked if they had anything new for the spring and summer campaign, or whether they were merely trying to make themselves as efficient this year as the Germans were last. He admitted this was about all that was expected.

‘I told them a story of a certain political campaign I directed in Texas. The opposition candidate had nearly all the chances in his favor. When the campaign was well started, I noticed the opposition were copying our methods, but always a little late. I told our people we would win and, when asked the reason for my optimism, I replied it was because they had no initiative of their own and were merely following our trail. We were, I told George, always one or two laps ahead; and in this war on land, the Germans were always one or two laps ahead.’²

‘I asked George why the French did not give the English

¹ *London Globe*, February 11, 1916.

² British initiative in the matter of inventions was soon to justify itself by the introduction of tanks in the battle of the Somme.

the coast to hold, and why they injected themselves between. He did not know unless it was that the French were suspicious and thought that the British, once there, might want to remain. He thought it a mistake. He said the English were like a walrus or a sea-fowl, they liked one wing in the water. They did not know what to do in the interior, but if they could flap one wing in the dear old ocean occasionally, no power on earth could dispossess them. . . .

'February 14, 1916: To-day was enough to drive one mad. Callers, telephone calls, newspaper people, photographers, and everything else that could cause confusion.

'I have a telegram from Hugh Wallace suggesting that I have Laszlo paint my portrait. I called on Laszlo and found him pleased with the idea. He was very busy, but he seems to be a statesman in embryo, for he kept me more than a half-hour telling how the European situation should be settled. Since he is to paint my portrait, I thought it wise to be patient with his views.

'February 15, 1916: Last night I told the Prime Minister and the others who were at Reading's dinner, that one of the most beneficial things they could do would be to get the metropolitan press to change their tone in regard to Germany. These papers have considerable circulation in Germany, and when I undertook to tell the German Government and people that Great Britain did not desire to crush Germany as a nation, they immediately gave me editorial clippings from the London press, stating directly the contrary. These statements were freely circulated among the German people, who were led to believe that England not only desired to annihilate them as a nation, but wished their entire trade. Such articles worked directly into the hands of the military party, and helped them hold the German people as a unit against the Allies.

'Grey drove me to the Palace and left me at the Privy Entrance. After a few minutes' conversation with the Lord

Stamfordham, I was shown up to the King's study, where we had nearly an hour's talk. . . . We discussed submarine warfare, disarming of merchantmen, my trip to Germany, the Kaiser, German feeling against the United States, etc., etc. He was pleased when I showed him a fifty-mark piece upon which was stamped, "Gott strafe England und Amerika."

'I asked if he had seen the "John Bull Number" of *Life*. He surprised me by saying that he had taken *Life* for twenty-five years and read it with much pleasure. He was delighted to hear something of its editor, Edward S. Martin. He sent most cordial messages to the President and deplored the criticism of him in English papers. . . . He was exceedingly friendly and insisted that whenever I returned I should let him know immediately.

'*February 17, 1916*: I went to a dinner given me by General Ellison. He placed Admiral Lord Fisher to my left and General Ian Hamilton to my right. The other guests were General Sir David Henderson of the Flying Corps, and two officials of India House. It was one of the most interesting dinners I have attended. Lord Fisher was at his best; he criticized the Government, Winston Churchill, the Allies, and everything and everybody in such a humorous way that it kept the table in an uproar.

'He told of the fateful days preceding the war, when Great Britain's decision hung in the balance. According to him, it was he who suggested immediate mobilization of the fleet, and he was the one who first brought eighty per cent of the fleet into home waters.

'Out of his humorous stories I gathered much of value. He is a great believer in fast battle cruisers and in large guns; that is, he does not believe in having a variety of guns on any one ship. It is the fast battleship and the big guns, according to him, that win. He said trying to win a battle with numerous ships of slow speed and small guns, is like

trying to catch a hare with an army of tortoises. "God made the hare to be caught by the greyhound, and not by the tortoise." He said the whole thing revolved itself into the cook-book formula for cooking a hare, which starts by saying: "First catch the hare."

'He it was that took two of the fastest battleships from Jellicoe's fleet and sent them after von Spee's cruisers in South American waters. The ships reached there in the nick of time and did the work without harm to themselves, and simply because they were out of reach of von Spee's guns.

'Fisher claims to have told the Japanese how to destroy the first Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese War. The Russian Admiral, he thought, would do the stupid thing. His ships were three knots slower than the Japanese to start with; they were loaded with coal, which reduced their speed another knot or two. Fisher advised the Japanese to coal as lightly as possible; just enough, in fact, to reach the Russian fleet and then manœuvre. The result was that the Japanese were able to steam in front of the advancing Russians and pick them off one by one.

'He spoke enthusiastically of the United States and said: "It was a great old bird that hatched the American Eagle."

'General Hamilton told of the Gallipoli campaign, of its trials and heartaches. He believes it was a mistake to abandon it, and that with a little further effort it could have been put over. He claims not to have been supported at critical times. . . .

'Fisher told me of his advice to the British land forces. . . . He wanted the French to give the British the entire coast to defend. He then wished to bring up the fleet and shell the German trenches from the sea. He thought in this way they could have shoved the Germans back all along the coast for a distance as far as the British naval guns could reach. He said General French approved, but Joffre would

not permit the British to occupy the seacoast exclusively — threatening, if the British insisted, to make a separate peace. Fisher said he would have told Joffre to make a separate peace and go to hell; that Great Britain had control of the seas; had all the German colonies; was putting up all the money; and had to do the fighting on land as well. If they wanted to make a separate peace, Great Britain was ready, and was the only nation that would come out of the war successful. . . .

February 19, 1916: Lord Bryce called at noon and remained for an hour and a half. We discussed disarming of merchantmen, undersea warfare, Germany, peace conditions, Anglo-American contentions, etc., etc. . . . I asked him to write me a letter, giving his argument against disarming merchantmen, so I might present it to the President with other arguments I have gathered. He said if I had no good way to reach the British Government, I could always do so through him.

February 21, 1916: Lord Loreburn was alone, waiting for me. He asked what I thought of his making a speech in the House of Lords, denouncing the blockade. I cautioned him against doing this, urging him to say instead that the Allied Governments ought not to do anything to needlessly irritate either the neutrals or the Germans, but to do only those things which had real military value. Great Britain, I said, in a way was doing in the blockade what Germany was doing with her Zeppelins. While one was not as atrocious as the other, at the same time they had an irritating effect and caused . . . hardening of public opinion.

Loreburn made notes of what I said and promised to bring it out in his speeches. I urged him to say that England should cease stating through her press and public men that this was a war of annihilation, both of the German nation and German trade. On the contrary, it was a war, as far as Great Britain was concerned, to prevent a few selfish individ-

uals from plunging the world into war for their own purposes. I thought if he would strike this high note, it would hurt militarism in Germany and would make clear the purposes of the Allies. A high note had not as yet been struck and, while the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey meant to voice it, if they failed to do so, he should.

‘Loreburn criticized Sir Edward Grey for being drawn into the war. He thought there was no need for even a tentative alliance with either Russia or France and said Grey had misled him . . . by not informing him during the trying days prior to the war that there was an alliance between France and Great Britain. He said later Grey declared in a public speech it was impossible for England to ignore her obligations to France. He does not think well of Grey’s ability, though he admires his character. I begged him to support Grey, saying he was the one man of whom I had hope, and I thought that he, Loreburn, ought not to allow anything which had been done previously to interfere with what good might be done now by working together. Loreburn promised he would do this, though he admitted it was a bitter dose.

‘I went to Mrs. Asquith’s for tea. I was nearly an hour late. She was alone and waiting for me. We had rather an intimate talk, she telling about the official family in general and Mr. Asquith in particular. She was distressed at being considered pro-German, and was annoyed because of the suit she instituted against the *Globe*, in which she will probably be a witness. She started to criticize the President, for she has a free tongue and says what comes first to mind; but I silenced her by saying she did not know conditions or anything of the situation, nor did she know what the President had in mind, and had gotten the usual prejudiced view of him which was untrue and unfair.

‘When I returned to the Ritz, Lady Paget was there and remained until eight o’clock. She is serving our cause well,

and is one of the few Americans living in London who is loyal to her country and maintains it on every occasion. In this she has the respect of the English people.'

v

Before returning to Washington in order to secure the final sanction of President Wilson, House proceeded to 'button-up,' as he expressed it, the tentative understanding with Grey. This was accomplished in a long conference on February 17.

'Grey showed me a memorandum he had received from the French Ambassador, giving in detail my second conversation with Briand and Jules Cambon. The account was correct with a few exceptions. They reported me as saying that no matter how low the fortunes of France got, when they said the word we would intervene. I asked Grey to be certain to correct this impression in their minds, because it is important for several reasons — the main one being that if the Allies put off calling for our assistance to a time when our intervention cannot serve them, then we will not make the attempt.

'I am trying to force early action by making both England and France feel that they run the risk of losing our support entirely unless they act quickly.

'Grey and I drew up a memorandum covering what I actually said, not only in Paris, but at the meeting the other night at Lord Reading's. He is to show this to the French Ambassador and is to give me a copy before I leave, so there may be no mistake as to how far I committed the President and upon what lines.

'I called attention to the fact that, if the Allies were completely victorious, Russia, Italy, and France would undoubtedly make demands and do things Great Britain would not approve, and which would not be in the interest of

permanent peace.¹ I drove in as hard as I could the gamble they were all taking by postponing action. One of the gambles Sir Edward had not thought of was the possible death of the President, either from natural causes or by assassination. . . . I called attention to the fact that the President had only another year of office, and of the uncertainty of his reelection. If the Republicans won, it might be very much the same as if Lord Curzon became Prime Minister here with a reactionary Cabinet. . . .

‘Grey said with much feeling, “History will lay a grave charge against those of us who refuse to accept your proffered services at this time.”’

‘Sir Edward and I did not differ as to the importance of acting quickly. We both think there is more to gain for Great Britain by the President’s intervention now, than there would be if the Allies won a complete victory a year from now. He believes, as I do, that the good which would come by having an active working arrangement between Great Britain and the United States in the settlement of the world’s affairs, and the number of lives which would be saved by immediate action rather than deferred action, would more than offset a complete victory. . . .

‘*February 21, 1916:* Grey has shown the French *communiqué* to Asquith, Balfour, and George, and has also shown them the memorandum which he and I agreed upon last week. He has seen the French Ambassador, who asked Grey how serious he thought my proposal was; whether the President and I were in earnest, or whether we had in mind merely the influencing of the British and French favorably to the President, in order that it might have a bearing upon the presidential campaign. Grey assured Cambon my proposal was genuine. I asked Sir Edward to tell him that he had been thinking about what he, the French Ambassador, had said, and he thought he should remind him that the President

¹ Compare the history of the Paris Peace Conference.

and I could not have any political advantage in mind — for it was a well-known fact that adverse foreign comment was a political asset to any candidate running for President in the United States. Grey smiled at this, but recognized its truth and said he would be certain to convey it to Cambon.

‘We walked together from 33 Eccleston Square toward the home of Lord Loreburn. Grey had given me his photograph, and smilingly said I had better not let Loreburn see it if I wanted to keep him in a good humor.

‘*February 23, 1916:* Sir Edward Grey and I conferred for an hour or more this morning. He had prepared and gave me a copy of the understanding to which he, Asquith, Balfour, Lloyd George, and I have come. He intended giving each member of the Cabinet a copy, but upon my strong protest he agreed he would read it to them instead. I asked Grey to send Lord Reading to the United States in the event I cabled for him, in order that he might go with me to the President and take back direct word of any modification or amplification of our agreement.¹ I would have suggested Lord Bryce, but his age forbids.

‘I am considering this as a precautionary measure and for my own protection. The President might agree, and I would cable as much to Grey; then something might arise to cause the President to change his mind and I would be censured here in unmeasured terms. Meanwhile the Allied Governments might have gone ahead with this understanding in mind, and followed a course which they would not have done had they not had the agreement with us.

‘I have had a continuous stream of callers of low and high degree. The Government are doing all they can to facilitate our getting away comfortably. They offered a special train, which I declined, but I accepted a private car. Since we

¹ In 1917, after the United States entered the war, Lord Reading came to Washington on a special mission and succeeded Sir Cecil Spring-Rice as Ambassador.

are returning on a Dutch steamer, they are sending with me a Secret Service man from Scotland Yard to guard my papers. . . . The British Intelligence man will appear on the ship list as my valet.'

On February 25, Colonel House sailed from Falmouth. Even without guessing the real significance of his mission, the press on both sides of the Atlantic applauded the skill with which he was supposed to have explained the position of the United States and the President's policy, and the political value of the impressions he had formed.

'Colonel House's visit to us, which has just come to an end [said the *London Nation*], stands, I think, for a landmark in the war. No one has had anything like his chances of valuing the general factors which will decide the fate of Europe, now dreadfully in the balance. This is not a small function. Save for the conferences of the Allies, diplomacy has come to an end over the great field of Europe. Neither side knows what the other side thinks; and the more men strain the ear, the more loudly sounds the roar of the cannon. It is well, therefore, for the world to have at least one carrier of ideas and intelligence. Colonel House has impressed everybody with his sense, prudence, reserve, sincerity, power of estimating forces and giving them their due weight in the balance of affairs.'¹

'No Englishman knows of Germany as Colonel House knows [said an American paper]. No German has had Colonel House's opportunity for weighing public opinion and the possibilities of the future in England and France. He has gone his way, heard all the stories of all sides, and has kept his own counsel. He has absorbed, but has given out

¹ February 26, 1916.

nothing, and will reach home without having made an enemy, spoken an imprudent word, or raised a suspicion.' ¹

Even the strongest of the anti-Wilson press in New York were compelled to print laudatory articles written by their British correspondents.

'House managed to be both elusive and significant [ran an article in the *Tribune*], and this without departing from his ordinary manner. He saw everything and heard everything while showing himself a notable master in the gentle art of saying as little as possible. His glance showed that his silence covered a good deal of humor. He succeeded so well in the difficult task of being both taciturn and agreeable that he was even popular with the newspaper reporters when he told them nothing. Clearly one of the shrewdest of men.' ²

So greatly were the British impressed by the value of House's mission that the *Observer* suggested that Grey should follow Wilson's example and 'send some sufficiently distinguished and authoritative statesman upon a special mission to the American Government and the American people. That mission would imply no reflection on other persons and previous methods. It would recognize that the situation cannot be adequately dealt with by professional diplomacy, no matter how assiduous and accomplished in its sphere. . . . Colonel House will have a remarkable report to make to President Wilson and we hold a strong opinion that this country ought to enjoy a similar advantage.' ³ A little later Gerard wrote from Berlin that the German Government was considering the need of sending over some 'Colonel House' of their own. Already the Colonel's name was coming to represent a function.

¹ *Weekly Times*, Albany, March 2, 1916.

² February 27, 1916.

³ *London Observer*, February 20, 1916.

VI

The chapter of history which House had made far exceeded the liveliest dreams of any correspondent. Even if it had no sequel, it must compel wonder. Of his own efforts and without any authority except that conferred by a casual letter from the President, he had created a great opportunity — one which, if the President and the Allies should seize it, offered a means of imposing peace, either through American mediation or through the entrance into the war of the United States upon the side of the Allies. The capacity of the Allies to appreciate the value of the opening was a matter of doubt. Of the President's approval House had no question.

His confidence was justified when, on March 6, he arrived in Washington and made his report to the President. Mr. Garvin had cabled to the New York *Tribune*:

‘When Colonel House has his first long talk alone with President Wilson the walls in Washington, if walls had ears, would have a very exceptional privilege. The preliminaries of that conversation are locked in the safe deposit of Colonel House's own breast. I will not attempt to guess at them.’¹

As a matter of fact, the first long talk took place in the open air and there were no walls to listen.

‘*March 6, 1916:* After lunch [recorded House] the President, Mrs. Wilson, and I took an automobile ride of something over two hours. During this time I outlined every important detail of my mission. The President on our return dropped me at the State Department, and I had an interview of an hour with Lansing, giving him a summary of what I had told the President.

¹ New York *Tribune*, February 27, 1916.

'I returned to the White House, and the President and I went into session again until nearly seven o'clock. I showed him the memorandum which Sir Edward Grey and I had agreed was the substance of my understanding with France and Great Britain. The President accepted it *in toto*, only suggesting that the word "probably" be inserted in the ninth line after the word "would" and before the word "leave." He also suggested that to-morrow we write out the full text of the reply which I shall send Grey. . . .'

Critics of the President have insisted that his manner was cold and that he was not given to expressions of gratitude. On this occasion, at least, he belied such criticism, for as House rose to leave he placed his hand on the Colonel's shoulder and said, 'It would be impossible to imagine a more difficult task than the one placed in your hands, but you have accomplished it in a way beyond my expectations.' When House intimated the pride he would feel if Wilson were only given the opportunity to realize the plan, the President responded, 'You should be proud of yourself and not of me, since you have done it all.'

The formal sanction of House's promise to the Allies was given by the President on March 7 and in the most emphatic manner, for, although the cable to Grey approving his memorandum was signed by House, it was written by Mr. Wilson himself.

'The most important happening of to-day [noted the Colonel] was the writing of the cable to Sir Edward Grey. After some discussion the President took down in shorthand what he thought was the sense of our opinion, and then went to his typewriter and typed it off. . . . The fact that he has approved in writing all I have done, gives me great satisfaction.'

Grey's memorandum and the cable approving it, drafted



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THE PRESIDENT, MRS. WILSON, AND COLONEL HOUSE

GREY'S MEMORANDUM OF THE PROPOSAL 201

by Wilson and House, may be regarded as documentary evidence of the willingness of the President to throw all our strength on the side of a just settlement of the war. These documents follow:

Memorandum of Sir Edward Grey

(Confidential)

Colonel House told me that President Wilson was ready, on hearing from France and England that the moment was opportune, to propose that a Conference should be summoned to put an end to the war. Should the Allies accept this proposal, and should Germany refuse it, the United States would probably enter the war against Germany.

Colonel House expressed the opinion that, if such a Conference met, it would secure peace on terms not unfavourable to the Allies; and, if it failed to secure peace, the United States would [probably]¹ leave the Conference as a belligerent on the side of the Allies, if Germany was unreasonable. Colonel House expressed an opinion decidedly favourable to the restoration of Belgium, the transfer of Alsace and Lorraine to France, and the acquisition by Russia of an outlet to the sea, though he thought that the loss of territory incurred by Germany in one place would have to be compensated to her by concessions to her in other places outside Europe. If the Allies delayed accepting the offer of President Wilson, and if, later on, the course of the war was so unfavourable to them that the intervention of the United

¹ Inserted by President Wilson, to correspond with the 'probably' three lines above and eight lines below. The value of the offer was in no way lessened by the use of the word 'probably,' which was a conventional covering expression common in diplomatic documents. Since the power to declare war resides in Congress and since the President shares with the Senate the control of foreign policy, it would have been impossible for Wilson to give a categorical guaranty of the future action of the United States. As a matter of practice, however, the President can determine the question of peace and war, and the expression of his intention appears here in the strongest permissible form.

States would not be effective, the United States would probably disinterest themselves in Europe and look to their own protection in their own way.

I said that I felt the statement, coming from the President of the United States, to be a matter of such importance that I must inform the Prime Minister and my colleagues; but that I could say nothing until it had received their consideration. The British Government could, under no circumstances, accept or make any proposal except in consultation and agreement with the Allies. I thought that the Cabinet would probably feel that the present situation would not justify them in approaching their Allies on this subject at the present moment; but, as Colonel House had had an intimate conversation with M. Briand and M. Jules Cambon in Paris, I should think it right to tell M. Briand privately, through the French Ambassador in London, what Colonel House had said to us; and I should, of course, whenever there was an opportunity, be ready to talk the matter over with M. Briand, if he desired it.

(Intd.) E. G.

FOREIGN OFFICE
22 February 1916

Colonel House to Sir Edward Grey

[Telegram]

NEW YORK, March 8, 1916

I reported to the President the general conclusions of our conference of the 14th of February, and in the light of those conclusions he authorizes me to say that, so far as he can speak for the future action of the United States, he agrees to the memorandum with which you furnished me, with only this correction: that the word 'probably' be added after the word 'would' and before the word 'leave' in line number nine.

Please acknowledge receipt of this cable.

E. M. HOUSE

Thus did Opportunity knock loudly upon the door of the Allied Cabinets. They had their invitation and their warning. If they accepted the invitation and Germany agreed to the terms House had outlined, the Allies would have achieved everything which moderate opinion regarded as essential; if Germany refused, as seemed likely, Wilson offered the aid of the United States in forcing those terms upon her. House had shown them how, by merely raising a beckoning hand, they might have the assurance either of a peace of justice or a victory won with American assistance. But if the Allies failed to give the signal, then they were warned that the United States must protect themselves in their own way.

This offer was made at a moment when the United States Government was being anathematized for its supreme indifference to the cause of justice and humanity. Roosevelt thundered his imprecations upon the weasel words of a President who permitted the Allies to save civilization from the menace of the barbarous Huns while the United States remained apart, cowardly and selfish. Public opinion in France and Great Britain was openly contemptuous. Ambassador Page, in one of his most carefully written communications to the Secretary of State some months later, epitomized the gist of British opinion and used as his text not the cruel gibes that were poked at the President on the music-hall stage nor the humor of the trenches which named the unexploded dud a 'Wilson.' He spoke of the moderate opinion of the average well-intentioned Britisher, and with an eloquence which indicated his own sympathy with that opinion.

'The British have concluded [he wrote] that our Government does not understand the moral meaning of their struggle against a destructive military autocracy. . . . They doubt our appreciation of the necessity of English-speaking sympathy, our national unity, our national aims, our national virility. They doubt whether we keep our old vision of the

necessary supremacy of democracy as the only safeguard against predatory absolutism. They have not expected us to abandon neutrality. But, since they are fighting for the preservation of free government, they are disappointed that our Government seems to them to make no moral distinction between them and the enemies of free government. They feel that the moral judgment of practically the whole civilized world is on their side except only the Government of the United States. They wonder whether our Government will show in the future a trustworthy character in world affairs.'

To all this President Wilson had made no public response, had essayed no self-justification. But, in private, the offer which he made through House was the most complete of responses. If France and Great Britain failed to take advantage of the opportunity, they raised the suspicion that they were fighting rather for selfish profit than for a peace of justice. At least they could no longer maintain that they were carrying the burdens of humanity while America stood aloof.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SUSSEX AND AFTER

It is easy enough for one without responsibility to sit down over a cigar and a glass of wine and decide what is best to be done.

Extract from Diary of Colonel House, April 9, 1916

I

PRESIDENT WILSON was willing to bring the United States into the war on certain conditions. So much was indicated by the offer he made to the Allies through Colonel House. But he was not willing to enter the war merely to achieve the nationalistic aspirations of the Allied Powers and without any guaranty that American assistance would serve the cause of permanent peace.

‘We are holding off [he said publicly some months later], not because we do not feel concerned, but because when we exert the force of this nation we want to know what we are exerting it for . . . Define the elements, let us know that we are not fighting for the prevalence of this nation over that, for the ambitions of this group of nations as compared with the ambitions of that group of nations; let us once be convinced that we are called in to a great combination to fight for the rights of mankind and America will unite her force and spill her blood for the great things which she has always believed in and followed.’

In these words he warned the Allies that, if they wanted American help, they must hold sincerely to their public protestations that they were fighting for the peace of the world and the security of small nations, and not for the destruction of Germany. The supreme justification for American intervention lay in the hope of ending this war and

preventing future wars. Germany should at least be given the chance to agree to a reasonable settlement; if she refused, then the duty of America would be clear. 'Valor,' said Wilson on February 26, 'withholds itself from all small implications and entanglements and waits for the great opportunity when the sword will flash as if it carried the light of Heaven upon its blade.' Thus did he publicly issue his call to the Allies to provide the opportunity for American intervention.

While he waited for their response, he had a difficult course to follow. Relations with Germany were tense and, in view of House's negotiations, the President wished above everything to avoid a rupture before the Allies had given their answer. Germany had yielded on the *Arabic* issue and promised to sink no passenger liners without warning. The unrestrained submarine campaign which the German navalists demanded was suspended by the Chancellor's command. But the disavowal upon which Wilson insisted in the *Lusitania* case, Berlin still steadfastly refused. The Germans agreed to pay an indemnity for the lives of American citizens, 'out of regard for the friendship of the two countries,' and to express regret. Zimmermann, however, insisted that the sinking of the *Lusitania* was justified by the British food blockade, as an act of retaliation, and he declined to admit that it was illegal. Lansing, on the other hand, arguing that retaliatory measures, if affecting neutrals, are in contravention of the rules of warfare and that, by issuing new orders to submarine commanders after the sinking of the *Arabic*, Germany tacitly admitted the illegality of the attack on the *Lusitania*, demanded a frank confession from the German Government of such illegality.

The difference was more than one of verbiage. Until this time Germany, while agreeing to Wilson's insistence that submarines give warning of attack and provide for the safety of passengers and crew, had not admitted the illegality of unrestricted submarine warfare. Nor would she, for this

admission would make it impossible for her to alter the orders issued to submarine commanders and begin an intensified attack on British trade. For the moment she might hold her hand, but she would not shackle her freedom of action for the future by committing herself on the legality of the attack on the *Lusitania*. The following letters illuminate the German point of view:

Herr Zimmermann to Colonel House

BERLIN, January 29, 1916

MY DEAR COLONEL:

... I am sorry to say that the latest proposal which has just been transmitted to us by Count Bernstorff is not acceptable for the Imperial Government. While we are perfectly willing to settle the incident in a way which seems acceptable to the United States Government the latest proposal contains the following two sentences to the underlined passages of which we could not possibly agree:

‘Thereby the German retaliation affected neutrals which was not the intention, *as retaliation becomes an illegal act if applied to other than enemy subjects*,’ and ‘The Imperial Government having subsequent to the event issued to its naval officers the new instructions which are now prevailing, expressing profound regret that citizens of the United States suffered by the sinking of the *Lusitania*, *and recognizing the illegality of causing thereby danger and admitting liability therefor*, offers to make reparation for the life [sic] of the citizens of the United States who were lost by the payment of a suitable indemnity.’

I am afraid that if the United States Government insists on this wording, a break will be unavoidable which, I am sure, you would regret just as much as I would for the reasons we both recognized as most important for the future policy and the welfare of the white races.

After all the trouble which has been taken on both sides to

smooth matters over, I am not yet willing to believe that things are quite as bad as they seem, and I think there ought to be a way out of it. But the proposed wording which practically amounts to declaring submarine warfare as illegal could never be approved by the German Government and would besides not be tolerated by public opinion in Germany which cannot be brushed aside entirely.

I should be much obliged to you, my dear Colonel, if you could see your way to bring the above to the knowledge of the President in the way you so kindly suggested.

Thanking you in advance for your kind offices . . . I am,
my dear Colonel,

Yours very sincerely

ZIMMERMANN

Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House

BERLIN, February 1, 1916

MY DEAR COLONEL:

I dined last night at von Jagow's. He said I would get a note to-day which would accept all Bernstorff's propositions except, as he put it, one word, viz: Germany will acknowledge liability for the loss of American lives by the sinking of the *Lusitania*, but will not acknowledge that the act of sinking was illegal. He said that international law had to be changed, that the submarine was a new weapon, and that, anyway, if a break came with America, they had a lot of new submarines here and would make an effective submarine blockade of England. . . .

Yours ever

JAMES W. GERARD

BERLIN, February 8, 1916

DEAR COLONEL:

Morgenthau was here for a day. I took him to see von Jagow, where we talked about an hour. Later through

some Germans he met Zimmermann, who asked him if he did not think the German-Americans in America would rise in rebellion if trouble came between Germany and America.

Von Jagow was very explicit in saying that Germany had made *no agreement* with us about submarine warfare, but had only *stated* that certain orders had been given to submarine commanders. He said distinctly that Germany reserved the right to change these orders at any time. On the general question, he again said that the submarine was a new weapon and that the rules of International Law must be changed — apparently claiming the right for Germany to change these rules at will and without the consent of any other Power involved. . . .

Ever yours

JAMES W. GERARD

The controversy was confused by a new issue which in its sequel threatened to produce not merely a quarrel with the Allies, but a domestic crisis involving the leadership of President Wilson. Since the preceding autumn, Mr. Lansing had been considering a method of meeting the German complaint that it was impossible for the submarine to conform with the laws of visit and search, in view of the fact that an armed merchant vessel could sink the submarine while it was giving warning. The Germans contended that such merchant vessels were in effect armed for offensive purposes and should be regarded, therefore, as auxiliary cruisers.

Mr. Lansing agreed that the shortest solution was to abandon the rule which permitted the arming of merchant vessels for defensive purposes.

‘Prior to 1915 [he maintained] the right of arming merchant ships seemed to have been based upon the inferior defensive strength of such armament as compared with

cruisers carrying heavy armaments, and upon the inferior armament of piratical ships and privateers against which armed merchantmen could defend themselves. The use of the submarine, however, has changed these conditions, because, relying for protection on its power to submerge, the submarine is almost defenceless in point of construction, so that even a merchant ship with a small gun could use it effectively for offence against a submarine. Moreover, pirates and sea rovers have been swept from the main trade channels of the seas and privateers have been abolished; consequently the placing of guns on merchantmen at the present day of submarine warfare can be explained only on the ground of a purpose to render merchantmen superior in force to submarines and to prevent warning and visit and search by them. Any armament, therefore, on a merchant vessel would seem to have the character of an offensive armament.’¹

Many Americans, including the Ambassador to Germany, felt the logic of Lansing’s arguments. ‘I always rather sympathized with the submarine on this,’ Gerard wrote to House on February 15. And a week later:

‘A submarine is a recognized weapon of war as far as the English go, because they use it themselves, and it seems to me to be an absurd proposition that a submarine must come to the surface, give warning, offer to put passengers and crew in safety, and constitute itself a target for merchant ships, that not only make a practice of firing at submarines at sight, but have undoubtedly received orders to do so.’

The British did not attempt to dispute the logic of Lansing’s position. They placed their case on the broad ground

¹ Circular despatch from the Secretary of State to European Embassies, January 26, 1916.

that Germany could not be trusted, and that if merchant vessels disarmed they would be sunk without mercy. 'The one fatal objection,' wrote Lord Bryce to House on February 19, 1916, 'to our accepting any promise by the German Government as to its action by submarines if we were to undertake that our merchant vessels should be unarmed, is that we could not trust any German promise. . . . And while we should lose something positive and tangible, we should gain nothing but a promise altogether illusory. . . . We have to deal with an evasive and faithless Government.'

At the very inception of the controversy, early in the previous autumn, Mr. Balfour had written to House, avoiding all technical argument and merely maintaining that, if the United States approved the German contention, it would thereby facilitate and abet inhuman maritime warfare.

Mr. A. J. Balfour to Colonel House

September 12, 1915

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

You were good enough to say that I might write to you privately on any matter of interest, and I would have done so long before this had I not been aware that others had kept you fully informed upon all that is going on here. A matter, however, has just come to my knowledge which may have a very important bearing, not only upon the interests of this country, but as I think upon the interests of the civilized world, whether neutral or belligerent. It will without doubt be the subject of official communication between the Foreign Office and the State Department; but what I am now writing to you is not between Department and Department, but between man and man.

It was only an hour ago that I heard from the Foreign Office that the State Department were considering whether they ought not to modify the rules laid down at Washington for the treatment of belligerent merchant ships armed for

purely defensive purposes and carrying out purely commercial operations. The ground for this alteration is the alleged fact that such vessels, though armed only for defence, have in fact taken the offensive against German submarines. The position taken up by the State Department is (as I understand it) that the U.S. rules, which were properly applicable to the old condition of things, require modification in the face of new developments; and into the necessity and character of these modifications they are now examining.

I am, as you know, the last person to suggest that in the presence of ever-varying conditions of war, old rules can remain unmodified, and it is on much broader grounds than those which are based on precedent alone that I now base my appeal.

The German practice is to sink without notice any ship which they suppose to be trading with Britain. All neutrals admit that this is contrary both to the Law of Nations and the principles of humanity. But so far they have been powerless to stop it; and no one supposes that Germany is likely to listen to any appeal on the subject except an appeal to her self-interest. But neutrals who have got no effective weapon short of war which they can use against the Germans, possess a very powerful weapon in the shape of their Municipal Law which they can use against the Allies. If they can do little to paralyze the attack, they can do much to embarrass the defence; and I greatly fear that this unfortunate result would be achieved if the leading neutral of the world were to throw in its weight against the defensive armament of merchant ships.

The German arguments on this subject are, it seems to me, as cynical as the German practice is unhuman. They complain that merchant ships in submarine-infested seas adopt a zigzag course, which no doubt may occasionally make either their bow or their stern point in the direction of the submarine. This, they plead, is a proof of aggressive intention

on the part of the merchant ship: if the bow is pointing towards the submarine the obvious intention is to run her down; if the stern is pointing in the direction of the submarine, the object is clearly to bring the merchantman's guns to bear upon it. In either case the submarine in self-defence is justified in torpedoing at sight. In other words, the Germans argue that the mere attempt of the victim to escape involves a threat of hostile action which justifies the extremest degree of brutality.

It may no doubt be urged that it is not always in this fashion that matters proceed. If the captain of a merchantman, armed or unarmed, saw a hostile submarine across his bows, I think it extremely likely that he would endeavor to ram her. I frankly admit that if I were the captain that is how I should proceed, although well aware that if my attempt failed the submarine would attempt to sink me. But this is what the submarine would do in any case; and I do not see how the merchant captain can be blamed. When maritime warfare was carried on under civilized rules, it would have been in the highest degree blameworthy for any merchant ship to initiate hostile action. By so doing she would convert herself without notice into an armed cruiser and would have no claim to be treated as a peaceful trader when she called at neutral ports. But when we are dealing with an enemy who knows no law, and who not once nor twice and accidentally, but repeatedly and of set purpose, has sunk peaceful traders without notice, how is it possible for these to wait until they are summoned to surrender? No summons of surrender is ever uttered. A torpedo is discharged or guns are fired, and all is over. Cold-blooded butchery takes the place of the old procedure sanctioned and approved by International Law.

I cannot help thinking that if this question is looked at in a broad spirit, it will be seen that whatever are to be the laws of maritime warfare, and however they are to be enforced, it

cannot be in the interests of international morals that the Municipal Law of any great neutral should be modified in the direction favourable to the perpetrator of outrages and hostile to his victims. Doubtless the problems which this war will leave behind it for peaceful solution are of extreme difficulty; but those difficulties would I venture to say be increased and not diminished if, while the weight of the best neutral opinion is hostile to the German misuse of submarines, neutral action was, however unintentionally, employed in its favour.

Pray believe me

Yours very sincerely

A. J. BALFOUR

Mr. Lansing, however, despite his personal feelings in favor of the Allies, insisted upon the logic of the German position and argued that, unless it was fairly met, he could not hold the Germans strictly to the law of visit and search. On January 18, 1916, he presented to the Allied Ambassadors an informal note, suggesting that all merchantmen be disarmed, in return for which they were not to be attacked without warning, nor to be fired upon except in case of resistance or flight. The Allies were not pleased. And Lansing's position was weakened by the suspicion that he had made the suggestion in order to render Germany more yielding in the dispute over the *Lusitania*. What was worse, the proposal was published, on January 28, 1916, so that the entire question was thrown into the arena of open discussion. Regardless of the fact that Lansing's suggestion was tentative and informal, the British press fulminated against the 'surrender' of Wilson to Germany.

Secretary Lansing to Colonel House

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1916

... Page cables that Grey is seriously disturbed over proposal, as he claims it is wholly in favor of the Central Powers and against Allies.

Page fears that this proposal will be considered a German victory and that all our influence with the Allies will be lost.

I feel strongly that the proposal is fair and the only humane solution of submarine warfare. If merchant vessels are armed and guns are used to sink attacking submarines, as has been done and as merchant vessels are now instructed to do, then it is unreasonable to insist that submarines should risk coming to the surface to give warning.

I feel that the alleged refusal to consider the proposal calmly will strengthen Germany's position. This proposal has no relation to the *Lusitania* settlement, and has not been mentioned to Germany, but is made necessary by conditions in Mediterranean and as merchant vessels are arriving here carrying guns. I feel we are asking too much of Germany in the case. . . .

LANSING

II

Some color was given to the British suspicion that Lansing's proposal was made in the hope of pleasing Germany and securing a favorable settlement of the *Lusitania* controversy, when on February 10 the German Government announced that, after February 29, armed merchant vessels would be regarded as warships and would be dealt with accordingly. Whether the Germans thought thus to force Wilson's hand and lead him to inform the Allies that armed merchant vessels in American ports would be interned as warships, is doubtful. If so, they made a mistake. Wilson would not permit his hand to be forced, least of all by Ger-

many. He immediately let it be known that the Lansing proposals were tentative, that according to custom merchant vessels had the right to arm defensively, and that, if a German submarine attacked an unresisting merchantman without warning, Berlin must face the diplomatic consequences. He demanded that Germany give assurances that the submarine warfare against merchant vessels would be conducted in such a way as not to imperil Americans travelling on the high seas.

There were other Americans whose reaction to the German threat was less decisive. For a long time many citizens, chiefly those who lived inland and seldom travelled, had insisted that it was the business of Americans to avoid beligerent vessels, where their presence might lead to international complications. If Americans kept out of the danger zone, they would not be drowned and the submarine dispute with Germany would lapse. Congress, which was clearly afraid of trouble with Germany, took up the demand.

The President dared to risk his national leadership on the issue, for he faced what seemed for the moment an open revolt of Congress led by his own party. Members of the House of Representatives virtually served notice upon him that, unless he would warn American citizens that they must not take passage on armed ships, the House itself would issue such a warning in the form of a resolution. Such a resolution was actually presented by Jeff: McLemore of Texas; Champ Clark, Speaker of the House, led a delegation to interview the President and told him that it would be carried two to one. Senator Stone, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, insisted that unless Wilson yielded he would be repudiated by his own party; and Gore of Oklahoma presented in the Senate a resolution similar to McLemore's.

But the President was quite as fully disinclined to surrender to the threatened revolt of his own party as to the threat of the Germans. He at once wrote a letter to Stone,

insisting that he would protect American right to travel on the high seas in safety.

‘No group of nations [he wrote], has the right, while war is in progress, to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings of war, and if the clear rights of American citizens should very unhappily be abridged or denied by any such action, we should, it seems to me, have in honor no choice as to what our own course should be.

‘For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-respect of the nation is involved. We covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. . . . Once accept a single abatement of right, and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by piece.¹ What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own impotency as a nation and making virtual surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world. . . .’

Wilson’s determination was supported by public opinion and vindicated by a vote in the House of Representatives, which on March 7 tabled the McLemore resolution 275 to 135. The President dominated his party in even more marked fashion than two years before in the Panama tolls controversy. Democratic leaders voted against him, but the rank and file stood by him; most of the votes favoring this resolution that yielded American rights were cast by Republicans.²

¹ Compare House’s letter to Wilson, July 10, 1915, quoted above, pp. 15, 16.

	¹ <i>For tabling</i>	<i>Against tabling</i>
Republicans	93	102
Democrats	182	33
	<u>275</u>	<u>135</u>

The result served to strengthen his position in the country, for the public realized that, while seeking to avoid a break with Germany, he was determined to maintain American rights on a clear-cut issue; it weakened the Republicans who had maintained that they were the protectors of American liberties, but whose representatives, when it came to the test, formed the nucleus of the group that advocated surrender.

House had been seriously disturbed by the armed merchantmen controversy, for he saw in it danger of an upset to his plan for American mediation with a threat of force. It had been pushed during his absence in Europe, and he feared lest the Allies should regard the Lansing proposals as an indication of unfriendliness and refuse to put confidence in Wilson's offer of help to secure a reasonable peace. On February 5, he cabled Lansing that his proposal 'seems fair taken by itself, but there are many collateral questions to be considered with it.' And a week later: 'There are so many other issues involved in the controversy concerning armed merchantmen, that I sincerely hope you will hold it in abeyance until I return.'

While on the Atlantic, House kept in touch with the situation at Washington and was not reassured.

'*March 4, 1916:* The Captain has delivered to me each day his Marconi messages. In them I find that the President and Lansing have gotten themselves into deep waters, brought about by their ill-timed proposal as to the disarming of merchantmen. I have received two wireless messages from the President, one asking me to come at once to Washington, and the other warning me that Bernstorff was waiting in New York to see me and advising that I avoid him. . . .

'In precipitating this controversy with Congress and by making the situation so acute with Germany, I feel that the President and Lansing have largely interfered with my efforts abroad. If they had held the situation quiescent, as I

urged them to do, I am sure the plan for intervention by the United States to end the war would have gone through without trouble. I am deeply disappointed, but I hope matters can be ironed out in a way to yet make the plan possible.'

Germany's reckless haste, in declaring that on March 1 submarines would regard armed merchantmen as ships of war, furnished an opportunity for the United States Government to drop the Lansing proposals. 'In view of Germany's new Orders in Council in regard to armed merchant ships,' telegraphed Lansing to House, 'and the interviews given out by various German officers misstating the position of this Government, it is our intention to move slowly in the matter.' When House explained to Wilson the attitude taken by the Allies, the President was disturbed. He 'took occasion to blame himself and Lansing,' recorded House on March 7, 'for allowing this controversy to crop out. . . . The President showed an admirable spirit in refusing to shirk responsibility. The proposals of Lansing were declined by the Allies and were forgotten; the United States Government contented itself by taking affidavits from captains of merchant vessels that their armament was for defensive purposes.

III

The controversy over the arming of merchantmen had indeed threatened to nullify House's plans, for the Allies were convinced that the Lansing proposals were made to aid Germany and secure a settlement of the *Lusitania* dispute. House felt, however, that the firm attitude assumed ultimately by Wilson toward both Germany and the more cautious Congressional leaders, was an earnest of the President's willingness to act with decision, if they would put confidence in him and accept his offer of mediation.

But they were not ready to accept. The defensive strength displayed by the French at Verdun encouraged them to be-

lieve that an Allied counter-offensive might lead to the conquest of Germany on the Western front and they could then impose terms on Germany more rigorous and crushing than those suggested in the House-Grey memorandum and approved by Wilson. Accordingly there was nothing for the United States to do but wait until each belligerent group realized the deadlock. The Colonel did not fail, however, to remind the Allies of the opportunity which was open to them if they did not delay overlong.

Colonel House to Sir Edward Grey

NEW YORK, March 10, 1916

DEAR SIR EDWARD:

After explaining to the President all that occurred at our conference, he wrote the cable I sent you on March eighth. I added nothing, for it was a complete approval of what had been done.

If the situation continues as now, and if Congress does not restrict him, everything will go through as planned. His recent victory in Congress was complete and indicates that the matter is entirely in his hands.

All the Democratic leaders in Congress opposed the President, just as they did in the Panama tolls controversy, and yet they were not able to muster more than thirty-three Democratic votes. The adverse votes given were largely those of Republicans who, contrary to expectation, reversed all their protestations at the critical moment.

It is now squarely up to you to make the next move, and a cable from you at any time will be sufficient. If you think best, I will send a cable every fortnight repeating the offer, so it may be used in the way we planned. Please let me know whether I shall do this or whether I shall do nothing until you indicate.

Be assured, my dear friend, that I am thinking of you al-

ways and I wish I could in some way lighten the load which bears so heavily upon you.

Sincerely yours

E. M. HOUSE

While the Allies hesitated to ask for American aid on the conditions which House outlined, American relations with Germany seemed to improve. The dispute over the claim of Germany to attack armed merchantmen without warning lapsed after the President's victory in Congress, and the fateful date of March 1 passed without the inauguration of the campaign of wholesale submarine activity which had been promised. As always, the policy of the moment in Berlin depended upon the ups and downs of the never-ending contest between the civil Government, restrained by the fear of a break with America, and the supporters of von Tirpitz, who insisted that England could be isolated and the war won if they had a free hand. The officials of the civil Government were 'pained' by Wilson's refusal to accept German interpretation of what constituted offensive armament; but they still held out against von Tirpitz, who finally resigned, evidently hoping through an appeal to popular opinion to come back as master of the situation.

Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House

BERLIN, *February 29, 1916*

MY DEAR COLONEL:

I had the grippe, went to Partenkirchen for a few days; but the first night in country air since July, 1914, was too much for me and filled me with such energy that I tried skiing, fell and broke my collar-bone. Came to Berlin and can sit at my desk, but am very uncomfortable.

I think Germany was about to offer to sink no merchant ships without notice and putting crews, etc., in safety, if England would disarm merchant ships; but now, since the

President's letter to Stone, both the Chancellor and von Jagow say they are convinced America has a secret understanding with England and that nothing can be arranged. . . .

Yours ever

J. W. G.

MY DEAR COLONEL:

BERLIN, *March 7, 1916*

. . . I think the food question here is getting very serious; but before they are starved out they will starve six million Belgians, eleven million Russians and Poles, and two million prisoners, so that, after all, this starvation business is not practical.

There was a Grand Council of War last week at Charleville to determine whether von Tirpitz's propositions to start an unlimited submarine blockade of England should be started or not — i.e., sink all ships, enemy or neutral, at sight. Falkenhayn was for this, the Chancellor against; and von Tirpitz lost. The decision, of course, was made by the Emperor. . . .

Yours ever

J. W. G.

MY DEAR COLONEL:

BERLIN, *March 14, 1916*

. . . Von Tirpitz is said to be 'ill.' I feel that it means his resignation, and have so cabled Washington. Very probably his resignation will never be made public.

The K. and the Military did not favor the idea of any one officer or official appealing to second-rate newspapers and the crowd in general, in a conflict with superior authority.

I heard that both the Chancellor and von Jagow threatened to resign if von Tirpitz's unlimited submarine policy against England was adopted. This incident is said to have taken place during the Charleville conference. . . .

Yours ever

J. W. G.

BERLIN, *March 20, 1916*

MY DEAR COLONEL:

Events are beginning to march. At first von Tirpitz's 'illness' was announced, then came his resignation.

Yesterday was his birthday and a demonstration was expected; there were many police out, but I could see no demonstrators. The row may come in the Reichstag.

There are two sources of danger. First — a failure at Verdun and the new food regulations may make people ready to accept Tirpitz's GUARANTY that if he is allowed his way the war can be won and ended. He has a large following already who favor this plan. Second — there are some Reichstag members and others who think the Tirpitz people can never be reconciled unless there is a new Chancellor. . . .

Yours ever

J. W. G.

In Washington and New York, Colonel House kept in touch with Ambassador Bernstorff, who insisted that the Berlin Government would strictly respect the promises made in the *Arabic* case.

'*March 10, 1916*: I have a letter from the German Ambassador [wrote House], stating that he will be here Saturday and Sunday. I have written giving him an appointment at ten on Sunday. To show how closely his movements are known, Flynn ¹ knew of this appointment I had made with him. Flynn considers it advisable to have my telephone wire tested, and this will be done each week. . . .

'*March 12, 1916*: I repeated [to Bernstorff] what I had told his Government in Berlin concerning their senseless Zepelin raids upon England and France, and proved to his satisfaction that it was of military advantage to England and harmful to Germany.

¹ Chief of the Secret Service.

‘We discussed the entire international situation and speculated as to what would happen in the event the United States joined the Allies against the Central Powers. I believe I convinced Bernstorff that the only hope of ending the war soon was for the United States to intervene. If we can get the Allies to give the word, I believe Germany will acquiesce; but delay is dangerous. . . .’

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, March 12, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Bernstorff was with me for an hour this morning. As usual, I found him reasonable and willing to discuss pending matters quite impartially.

He thinks the best thing that can be done now is to do and say nothing further in regard to the disarming of merchantmen. He intimated that they would drop it if we would. He claims to have gotten into it innocently and at our instigation.

He believes there will be no submarine violations that will embroil our two countries, at least for the present while the Chancellor is in control. I expressed the belief that another outrage of this kind would precipitate war, and I gave him my reasons for believing that it would be the worst thing not only for Germany but for the Allies as well; that if we became involved, there would be no one to lead them out.

He was quite interested in this phase, and wanted to know when I thought you might intervene. I told him you had expressed no opinion upon the subject, but that I was advising you to intervene at the proper time. He wished to know when I thought would be the proper time. I replied, not until after their Western offensive had been finished and perhaps not until the Allies had made a counter-offensive. He wished to know how long I thought this would take. My opinion was it might be several months. He thought Ger-

many would welcome the intervention and asked if I thought the Allies would accept it. My opinion was that the English would resent our interference. This is true, but, of course, it was given to him for a purpose. . . .

If things can be held as now, I believe that our plan will work out before midsummer and perhaps much sooner. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

IV

The hope of Colonel House that the diplomatic situation might remain undisturbed was soon rudely shattered. On March 24 the Channel steamer *Sussex*, an unarmed passenger boat, was struck by a torpedo which blew off the entire forward end. The after part continued to float, but about eighty of the passengers, non-combatants of all ages and sexes, were killed or wounded. The attack was made without warning, in fact the submarine was not even seen, the first indication of danger coming from the wake of the approaching torpedo. Furthermore, the attack seemed to indicate a studied purpose to renew the submarine warfare without restrictions, for between March 9 and March 29 eight boats were sunk. In each of these cases American citizens were on board, although no American lives were lost.

The suddenness of the revived attack certainly surprised Ambassador Gerard and apparently mystified Bernstorff. If the historian may judge from the attitude of the German Chancellor and Foreign Secretary before and after the crisis, it was launched without their orders, and simply illustrates the extent of political anarchy in Germany, where, regardless of the political chiefs, the naval commanders took matters into their own hands for a season.

Whatever the responsibility of those supposed to control German policy, House believed, as after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, that a break with Germany could not and ought

not to be avoided. He had hoped that the United States could intervene to stop the war; once in, he realized that it would continue until Germany was utterly crushed, and he feared the economic and the moral consequences of such prolongation. But unless Wilson acted decisively in the crisis, he knew that American influence in the world would disappear.

‘It looks as if we should have to act this time without further parley [he noted on March 27]. I am hardly well enough to make the trip to Washington, but I feel I ought to be there to advise the President during these critical hours. I am afraid he will delay and write further notes, when action is what we need.’

The following day he left for the capital, and upon arrival went immediately to the White House for discussion with the President.

‘We had only a few minutes before dinner [he recorded], and agreed to postpone more detailed discussion of affairs until to-morrow. We talked enough, however, for me to fathom what was in his mind; and from the way he looked at me, I am inclined to believe that he intends making excuses for not acting promptly in this new submarine crisis forced upon him by the sinking of the *Sussex*. . . . He does not seem to realize that one of the main points of criticism against him is that he talks boldly, but acts weakly. . . .

‘*March 29, 1916:* Neither the President, Lansing, Polk, nor I can understand the new submarine activity by the Germans. Bernstorff has not come near the State Department and, from all we can learn, he is not worried in the slightest.’

Mr. Lansing was bellicose and believed that the United

States had no recourse but an immediate rupture with Germany.

‘... He read a letter [wrote House] he had written the President concerning the controversy, in which he strongly advised sending Bernstorff home and breaking relations with Germany. His letter was calm and met with my approval provided the subsequent facts justified his desires.¹

‘We both believe the President will be exceedingly reluctant to back up his own threats. ...

‘There is another thing I cannot bring the President to realize, and that is the importance of making ready to meet the crisis which may fall upon him any day. He was compelled to go into Mexico ² at a moment’s notice. The same will happen in the European situation. ... For the first time, the depletion of the army is beginning to be filled, and this only because of the chase after Villa and the consequent realization that we have no army worth speaking of. I tried to get him to do this last summer, and I tried to get him, almost a year before the war began, to pay attention to the army.’

Mr. Wilson hesitated. His great desire was to end the war, and he believed that the United States could bring it to a close more easily by mediation as a neutral than by intervention as a belligerent. If intervention were necessary, he wished to base it upon the hope of ending the war rather than upon a German attack on our rights. On March 30, the President and Colonel House had a long conference.

‘After lunch the President and I went into executive session again. I put the matter of our controversy with Ger-

¹ That is, provided it were shown that the *Sussex* was struck by a torpedo from a German submarine.

² Following Villa’s raid on Columbus, Pershing was sent at the head of a small force ordered to catch the Mexican patrio-bandit.

many quite strongly to him. He was afraid if we broke off relations, the war would go on indefinitely and there would be no one to lead the way out. He was repeating the argument I have been giving him for the last six months, and somewhat to my embarrassment. I told him, however, I had thought of another way by which we could lead them out even though we were in.

‘I suggested that, when he sent von Bernstorff home, he should make a dispassionate statement of the cause of the war and what the Allies were fighting for. I suggested that he should say nothing unkind of the German people, but should strike at the system which had caused this world tragedy, and contend when that was righted the quarrel with Germany, as far as we were concerned, would be ended. Then I thought at the right time — which would perhaps be by midsummer — I could go to Holland and, after a conference with the Allies and with their consent, I could open negotiations directly with Berlin, telling them upon what terms we were ready to end the war.¹

‘I thought the same arrangement could then be carried out I had planned; that is, he should preside over the conference and we should take part. This would make our participation more effective than as a neutral, and we could do greater and better work in this way than we could in the way we planned.

‘He was pleased at my suggestion, and I believe will now be more inclined to act. What I tried to impress upon him was that if he failed to act he would soon lose the confidence of the American people and also of the Allies, and would fail

¹ On re-reading his diary nine years later, Colonel House remarked: ‘My suggestion seems now like nonsense and not even good nonsense.’ The comment is not quite fair. His purpose in making the suggestion was obviously to convince Wilson that the entrance of the United States into the war could and should become the factor making the war one to ensure peace. He appealed to the President’s pacific instincts in order to arouse his belligerent will. As it turned out finally, President Wilson accepted the idea in 1917 and preached war as a crusade for peace.

to have any influence at the peace conference. I tried to make him see that we would lose the respect of the world unless he lived up to the demands he has made of Germany regarding her undersea warfare. . . .

'The President desired me to see Bernstorff and say to him that we were at the breaking point and that we would surely go into the war unless some decisive change was made in their submarine policy.

'April 2, 1916: The President's penchant for inaction makes him hesitate to take the plunge; but, if he once takes it, I have every confidence he will go through with it in a creditable manner. Anyway, his immediate *entourage*, from the Secretary of State down, are having an unhappy time just now. He is consulting none of them and they are as ignorant of his intentions as the man in the street. I believe he will follow the advice I gave him, . . . but even to me he has not expressed his intentions. This, however, is not unusual, as he seldom or never says what he will do. I merely know from past experience. . . .'

Returning to New York, Colonel House reiterated his conviction that the President must adopt a strong tone. He suggested, however, that a chance should be given the Allies to say whether they would prefer to have the United States demand that the war should stop, rather than enter as a belligerent.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, April 3, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . Unless the Germans discontinue their present policy, a break seems inevitable. Before it comes, do you not think it would be well to cable Grey, telling him the status of affairs and asking him whether or not it would be wise to intervene now rather than to permit the break to come?

Our becoming a belligerent would not be without its advantages, inasmuch as it would strengthen your position at home and with the Allies. It would eliminate the necessity for calling into the conference any neutral, because the only purpose in calling them in was to include ourselves.

Your influence at the peace conference would be enormously enhanced instead of lessened, for we would be the only nation at the conference desiring nothing except the ultimate good of mankind.

We could still be the force to stop the war when the proper time came, and in the way I outlined to you when I was in Washington.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Colonel House followed his own letter to Washington, and frequent conferences with the President and the Secretary of State took place. A note that severed diplomatic relations with Germany was already drafted.

'April 5, 1916: Lansing came at six o'clock and we talked for nearly an hour. After the President received my letter of April 3, he evidently made up his mind to follow my advice and take more vigorous action, for he told Lansing to prepare a memorandum for Gerard to present to the German Government. Lansing showed me what he had drawn up. It is an exceedingly vigorous paper and one which I think the President will modify greatly before he sends it. It was well written and very much to the point. It recalls Gerard and notifies the Imperial German Government that Count von Bernstorff will be given his passports. . . .

'April 6, 1916: Before the President started his dictation, we held a conference where we met in the hall just outside my room; and it lasted so long that he gave up all thought of his mail and dismissed his stenographer so we might finish.

‘I told him it seemed to me a break with Germany was inevitable; they were torpedoing boats without warning, contrary to their solemn pledge not to do so; and that the *Sussex* case was in a way as bad or worse than the *Lusitania*. I thought he ought definitely to make up his mind what he intended to do; and if he agreed with me that a break was inevitable, then he should prepare for it from to-day in order to give us the advantage of two or three weeks’ time to get ready before the Germans knew of our purpose.

‘We discussed whether it would be advisable to give the Allies a last chance to accept our offer of intervention. There were many arguments for and against it. The suggestion was originally mine, made in my letter of April 3, but I was uncertain as to the advisability of doing so. He thought, too, it might cause them to think we wished them to act in order to save us. The President did not wish to indicate any weakness in this direction. And yet he thought they should know that in our opinion the war would last longer with us as a belligerent than as a neutral.

‘The President asked me to frame the despatch to Sir Edward Grey, but I yielded to him and insisted that he do it. . . . The despatch as finally drafted by him in “his own handwriting,” as we call his little typewriter, is as follows:

“‘Since it seems probable that this country must break with Germany on the submarine question unless the unexpected happens, and since, if this country should once become a belligerent, the war would undoubtedly be prolonged, I beg to suggest that if you had any thought of acting at an early date on the plan we agreed upon, you might wish now to consult with your allies with a view to acting immediately.’”¹

¹ On March 14, 1925, looking back at these negotiations, Colonel House writes: ‘I think the cable that Wilson and I jointly prepared for him to send Grey a mistake. We should have known that it would not bring the response we desired. I am not sure that we did not make a greater mistake in not going ahead and calling for a peace conference rather than leaving it to the Allies to be the judges. That is why I

'Mrs. Wilson said the President felt somewhat less disturbed over the foreign situation, now that he had practically made up his mind. This is as I thought; it was the indecision which was giving him the worry. . . .

'When the President left, Lansing and I had a few minutes' conversation alone. After he left, I drove for an hour with the Secretary of War. . . . I wished . . . to tell him just how critical our relations with Germany are, and to suggest that he find out at once what troops would be available for the protection of New York, Chicago, and the larger centres, and whether we had sufficient without withdrawing troops from Mexico. If there were not sufficient, I thought the pursuit of Villa should be abandoned and our forces be properly distributed.

'I asked him to please treat my information as confidential, and to use it merely in the way indicated. After some discussion, he decided he would go to New York to-morrow and confer with General Wood, and later have the Commanding General in Chicago meet him at Cleveland so as to get the situation in the West. I urged Baker to use a firm hand in the event trouble should manifest itself in any way. I thought it was mistaken mercy to temporize with troubles of this sort; that such a policy would merely cause it to grow and in the end much suffering would ensue. . . .

'I thought in this crisis Wood should be used conspicuously, for he was known to be unfriendly to the Administration and close to Roosevelt and Republican leaders; and if the President passed him by and trouble followed, it would invite criticism of the Administration. Baker said it was his purpose to put pronounced Roosevelt men to the front.¹

wanted a large army and navy. If we had had them, or if they had been well in the making in 1916, it would have been the part of wisdom to have gone ahead regardless of the wishes of the Germans or Allies and demanded the cessation of the war along the lines we had in mind.'

¹ A laudable intention, but one which later could not be carried into effect because of the objections of the General Staff. In this matter Wilson and Baker followed the advice of their military experts.

We went over every phase of the situation from a military viewpoint, including the militia, the police forces of different cities, etc., etc.'

v

As might have been expected, nothing came of the cable to Sir Edward Grey. The Allies evidently reasoned in this fashion: If Wilson did not take a strong tone with Germany, they were not interested in his proffered intervention, for there would be proof conclusive of his unbreakable pacifism; if he took a strong tone and a break resulted, the entrance of the United States as a belligerent, with a quarrel of its own with Germany, would be worth more to them than any sort of mediation.

In the meantime, Colonel House impressed upon von Bernstorff the full character of the situation.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, April 8, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Bernstorff was with me for an hour this morning. I outlined the situation to him just as we had planned. He expressed his inability to understand matters any better than we do.

He said a break must not occur and that he would immediately get busy. Asked for suggestions, I thought he should cable his Government that you felt completely discouraged; that it had been only by the grace of God that American lives had not been lost upon ships torpedoed without warning; that it might happen to-day, to-morrow, or next week, but it would surely come unless they renounced their submarine policy. . . .

Bernstorff admitted that if passenger-ships were torpedoed without warning and American lives lost, you had no alternative excepting the severance of relations with Germany.

He said he had communicated this to his Government, but that he had cried wolf so many times, perhaps it did not have as much effect as it should.

I let him know that the most distressing feature of the break was our inability to lead the belligerents out. He said he had hoped you were ready to do this now and wished to know when I thought the time would be opportune. I explained that it seemed necessary to let them try out their offensive plans on both sides during the spring and early summer; that Germany had begun with Verdun and had seemingly failed; that when she had finished, the Allies would probably make their attempt, and, if they were no more successful, it would be evident then to everybody that the deadlock was unbreakable; and you could then intervene with success. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

‘Bernstorff keeps his temper and his courage,’ added House in his journal, ‘and it is impossible not to admire these qualities in him.’ He showed always, however, like many Germans, a complete inability to understand Wilson’s attitude toward the war.

‘Bernstorff asked me [noted the Colonel] whether the President desired to break with Germany. It had been suggested that political exigencies made it desirable for the President to do this, and he wondered if that would have any influence. I replied that I had been the adviser of many public men and I always insisted, as I was insisting now, that politics should have no part in decisions about public affairs. If one’s personal fortune becomes entangled with one’s duty, disaster is certain to result. The best politics is to serve the public best. . . .

‘April 9, 1916: Sidney Brooks called and remained an hour



COLONEL HOUSE'S STUDY AT NO. 115 EAST 53D STREET

and a half. He got some material from me for a cable, and we discussed the foreign situation pretty thoroughly. . . . He urged me to try to steer the President in what he said, believing he might do the right thing in the wrong way. Brooks seems anxious to serve the President and to be his friend, although he is impatient with his slowness of decision. He forgets, as do others, that the President has the responsibility and the welfare and happiness of a hundred million people are largely in his hands. It is easy enough for one without responsibility to sit down over a cigar and a glass of wine and decide what is best to be done. . . .'

At the end of the week, House was again called to Washington to discuss with Mr. Wilson the note which the President had drafted.

'*April 11, 1916*: He had discarded Lansing's note entirely [recorded the Colonel], and had written a much abler one, covering all the facts from the beginning and arguing against the use of submarines on merchantmen. I could see that the data I brought back from England, which included a very able presentation of the case by A. H. Pollen and also one from Sir Horace Plunkett, had had their effect.

'I objected to the last page of the note, as being inconclusive and as opening up the entire question for more argument. . . . He patiently argued the matter . . . but refused to admit any sort of weakness in it.

'His contention was that, if he did as we advised, it would mean a declaration of war, and he could not declare war without the consent of Congress. I thought if he left it as it was, it would place him in a bad position for the reason that it would give Germany a chance to come back with another note asserting she was willing to make the concessions he demanded, provided Great Britain obeyed the letter of the law as well. The President did not agree with me, but, at my

suggestion, cut out the last paragraph, which strengthened the note somewhat. He also inserted the word "immediately," which strengthened it further.

'I urged him to say if Germany declined to agree immediately to cease her submarine warfare that Ambassador Gerard was instructed to ask for his passports. This, I told the President, would come nearer preserving the peace than his plan, because the alternative of peace or war would be placed directly up to Germany in this single note, whereas the other wording would still leave room for argument and in the end war would probably follow anyway. . . .

'What I should like is for him to go before Congress after the break is made, and deliver a philippic against Germany — not, indeed, against the German people, but against the cult that has made this calamity possible. No one as yet has brought the indictment of civilization against them as strongly as it might be done, and I would like the President to do this in a masterly way.

'We were in conference for two hours or, indeed, until the President had to leave for an eleven o'clock Cabinet meeting. He was undecided whether to read the note to the Cabinet. . . . He finally decided to read them the note almost in its entirety, but as an argument he had in his own mind against submarine warfare and not as a note which he had prepared to present to Germany.'

Soon after his return to New York, Colonel House received from the German Ambassador a letter insisting that the break must not be allowed to come, since he was certain that Germany was absolutely sincere in her determination to make good the pledges she had given. The Colonel, who knew of the dispute then raging in German official circles, evidently put less faith in Bernstorff's information than in his good intentions.

Ambassador von Bernstorff to Colonel House

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1916

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

. . . My Government is willing to conduct the submarine warfare with due regard to neutral rights. It stands by our assurance given to the United States and has issued such precise instructions regarding this matter that, according to human foresight, errors are excluded.

If contrary to expectation any mistakes should happen, my Government is willing to remedy them in every way. Germany, in face of daily increasing violations of International Law by England, cannot give up our submarine war altogether and regrets that England apparently succeeds in hiring a few American citizens for freight ships in the war zone and thus tries to cause a break between Germany and the United States.

There can be no doubt in the *bona fides* of my Government, since the Chancellor for the second time announced before the whole world that Germany is ready to conclude peace and pointed out that we have only defensive aims. Our enemies, however, sneeringly refused our outstretched hand and are still preaching Germany's everlasting military and economic annihilation. My Government entirely shares your wish to bring about peace and hopes that the relations between the United States and Germany will remain so friendly that both Governments can work together for the purpose of achieving this object so desirable in the interest of humanity and of all nations.

The foregoing statements as I said before are entirely based upon instructions from my Government. For my own part, I venture to suggest that it might be advisable to refrain from a further exchange of official notes, the publication of which always causes irritation. . . .

We always obtain better results if I take up matters confidentially with my Government. Otherwise they do not,

in Berlin, get the right impression of the state of affairs in this country.

I remain, my dear Colonel House,

Yours very sincerely

J. BERNSTORFF

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, April 15, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I herewith enclose for your information a copy of a letter which has just come from Bernstorff.

I do not believe we can get anywhere through him, for he does not seem to know much more about what is in the mind of his Government than we do.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

VI

On April 18, Wilson sent his note to Germany. Its tone was sober, but its conclusions definite, for the President had finally accepted House's advice and eliminated the paragraph which had seemed to leave room for argument. 'Unless the Imperial Government,' said Wilson, 'should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether.'

Thus the choice of alternatives was put squarely up to Germany: either a break with America or rigid restriction of submarine activities. In Berlin the navy and army chiefs were not inclined to yield. Von Bernstorff stretched every nerve to impress upon the Germans that Wilson was serious.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, April 25, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Bernstorff has just left me. He has a cable from his Government saying in substance:

‘We wish to avoid war. Please suggest how this may be done. What is meant in the Note by “illegal submarine warfare”? If we accede to their demands, will they bring pressure upon Great Britain in regard to the blockade?’ . . .

I advised his sending another despatch warning them not to suggest any compromise; that if they really desired to avoid a break, it was essential for them to discontinue their submarine warfare entirely and immediately. . . .

He asked if he could say to his Government that I thought acquiescence in your demands would bring peace nearer. I told him he could. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

For a fortnight the struggle in German official circles continued, the military and naval chiefs refusing to yield, the civil officials demanding that the break with America must be avoided. President Wilson, having made his decision, had no mind for further negotiation, and this fact House constantly impressed upon Bernstorff.

‘I find the President [recorded Colonel House on May 3] set in his determination to make Germany recede from her position regarding submarines. He spoke with much feeling concerning Germany’s responsibility for this world-wide calamity, and thought those guilty should have personal punishment. . . .

‘The last time I was here [in Washington] he was so disinclined to be firm with Germany that I feared he might destroy his influence. I therefore did all I could to make him

stand firm. I evidently overdid it, for I now find him unyielding and belligerent, and not caring as much as he ought to avert war. . . .

‘I wish again to pay a tribute to Bernstorff. . . . He has represented his Government well, better indeed than they have been able to represent themselves at Berlin; and if his advice had been listened to from the beginning, our relations with Germany would never have come to such a pass.’

Divided counsels in Germany were reflected in the reply to Wilson’s note which was sent on May 4. The tone and content were so inconsistent that it might almost be assumed that an original draft had been made, refusing Wilson’s demand, which was hastily corrected in certain details so as to accept it. The note took issue with assertions in the American note and made ironic complaint of our failure to compel Great Britain to modify her food blockade:

‘The German Government cannot but reiterate its regret that the sentiments of humanity which the Government of the United States extends with such fervor to the unhappy victims of submarine warfare are not extended with the same warmth of feeling to the many millions of men and children who, according to the avowed intentions of the British Government, shall be starved. . . . The German Government, in agreement with the German people, fails to understand this discrimination. . . .’

No argument was so dear to the German Government as that which attempted to justify the submarine campaign as fair retaliation for the Allied food blockade; Berlin utilized it consistently through the war and afterwards. Never was argument less warranted by the facts. For in the spring of 1915, Germany had herself refused to consider the suggestion

that the food blockade be relaxed provided the submarine warfare were abandoned.¹

But, although the Germans thus displayed bad temper and worse logic in their reply to the demands laid down by President Wilson, they accepted the essence of those demands, announced that the Government had issued new orders for its submarine commanders and 'is prepared to do its utmost to confine the operations of war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents.' No more merchant ships would be sunk 'without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.'

It was all that the United States asked.

Germany, however, tried to make her promise conditional upon the cessation by Great Britain of the trade restrictions which the Germans contended were illegal, and inserted a clause that implied that the pledge might be withdrawn if the United States failed to secure from the British what Germany asked.

'Should the steps taken by the Government of the United States not attain the object it desires to have the laws of humanity followed by all the belligerent nations, the German Government would then be facing a new situation in which it must reserve itself complete liberty of decision.'

The first summary of the German reply, sent by Ambassador Gerard, emphasized its unfriendly tone and seemed to indicate that it would not be acceptable to the President.

'Frank Polk telephoned from Washington [Colonel House recorded on May 4] to say that he would be here at nine o'clock and would get in touch with me. At that time he had nothing of importance from Berlin to communicate. He

¹ See preceding volume, pp. 450-53.

rang me up again upon reaching New York and said the State Department had received a message from Gerard giving a summary of the German note, which is to be sent tomorrow. It will not be satisfactory, if Gerard's interpretation is correct, and a break seems inevitable. . . .

'May 5, 1916: The German note is coming in over the wires and the United Press is sending it up to me in instalments. Gerard told us it would be sent this way first and communicated by him through cypher in the regular way. It is being sent by wireless. . . .

'I have had so many telephone calls and requests for interviews this morning that everything has been in confusion. They all wish to know about the German note, and what I think our Government should do in the circumstances.

'The German Ambassador telephoned me first, and I asked him to come at half-past four o'clock. . . .'

Late in the afternoon came a telegram from the President, asking House what he thought of the German reply and what attitude and action Wilson ought to take. Colonel House believed that, since Germany had accepted the conditions laid down by the President, there was no adequate excuse for a break. The American contention had triumphed, always provided Germany kept her promises, which in this case were more far-reaching than in the *Arabic* case, where she had agreed merely not to attack passenger liners. He insisted that no attention should be paid to the later paragraphs of the note, which raised the question of the British blockade. The important point was to cut short all discussion.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, May 6, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . There is one thing I feel quite certain about, and that is, no formal reply should be made to the German note. I believe, too, it would be better for you to let Lansing make any statement to the public that is considered proper.

None of the papers have brought out the real concessions that the Germans have made. This, I think, should be done, and then I believe a rather curt statement should be made to the effect that we will deal with the other belligerents who violate international law as we see fit.

I do not see how we can break with Germany on this note. However, I would make it very clear to the German Government, through both Gerard and Bernstorff, that the least infraction would entail an immediate severance of diplomatic relations; and I would let the public know unofficially that this had been done. We will then have to wait and hope for the best.

At my conference with Bernstorff yesterday, I suggested that he caution his Government against any further transgression. He said he would, but he did not believe any would occur. The disagreeable parts of the note, he told me, were necessary because of German public opinion; but he confessed that he knew it would be impossible for us to make Great Britain conform to international law in regard to the blockade. He thought you could make peace easier than you could do this. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Ambassador von Bernstorff regarded the note as a triumph of his own, and to him in truth should go much of the credit for bringing the Berlin Government to surrender. Characteristically, the Germans had refused to follow his advice as to

manner; he had urged the Chancellor that, if Germany yielded, it should do so gracefully and 'handsomely.' House discussed the matter with him at length on May 5, and also with the British Naval Attaché, Captain Guy Gaunt, with whom he was on terms of close intimacy.

'Bernstorff [he wrote] was visibly pleased over the note, although he regretted its nasty tone and was sorry they had not adopted his suggestion, which would have placed them in a much better position.

'*May 6, 1916:* Captain Gaunt called and I frankly told him what I advised the President. He said he was sorry that he was compelled to agree with me. . . . I told Gaunt that he reminded me of Bernstorff, inasmuch as he had courage and good temper and viewed matters like a sportsman. I wish Gaunt was British Ambassador and that Bernstorff was Minister for Foreign Affairs in Berlin. It is my intention to suggest to the British Government that they handsomely recognize Gaunt's services during the war. . . .'

Secretary Lansing, who following his proposals for disarming merchantmen had received much unjustified criticism for his supposed anti-British attitude, did not regard the German reply as satisfactory.

'Polk telephoned [wrote the Colonel on May 6] to say that Lansing disagreed with my opinion. His first reading of the note was that it would not do; his second reading was that it would; and his third brought him back to his first opinion and he believes we should send Bernstorff home. The President will therefore have Lansing advising him in one direction and me in the other.'

Mr. Wilson accepted the Colonel's opinion in this matter, but he decided to reply himself, and formally, to the German note, which House regretted.

'*May 8, 1916: The President wrote a note [recorded House] and Lansing wrote one, with the result that the President took all of Lansing's except the last paragraph, which he wrote himself and which has most of the 'punch' in it. The composite note is admirable in every way, and my only objection is that it is sent in that form. In my opinion, it would have been better if Lansing had made the statement unofficially and given it to the public in that way. It would have answered the same purpose and Germany could not have replied. As it is, we still run the danger of a break, and the further danger of continued argument, all of which seems to me unnecessary. If we can get away with it, it will be a success. If it reopens the matter and causes a break, it will be a failure.*'

The final paragraph, with the 'punch' which House admired especially, contained the definite notification that the United States 'cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative.'

The pacific outcome of the crisis was regarded by those most closely concerned as miraculous. Only a few days before the German surrender, House had written to Grey that Bernstorff's passports were being prepared, and to Gerard that he expected soon to see him. He had spent as much time with the Secretary of War and Police Commissioners and Secret Service agents, discussing steps to be taken in case of war, as he had with Bernstorff discussing means to preserve peace.

The impossible had been accomplished, for Wilson had

avoided war and yet maintained American prestige. Even the Allied newspapers had applauded the stand he took. How long the German pledge would be maintained, no one could guess. German public opinion was bitter against America, but yet feared to engage it in war. 'Every night,' wrote Ambassador Gerard, on April 5, 'fifty million Germans cry themselves to sleep because all Mexico has not risen against us.' A week later: 'I think Germany is now determined to keep peace with America, as the plain people are convinced that otherwise the war will be lengthened.' The Ambassador had made every effort to prevent war, but he insisted that sooner or later Germany must be reckoned with.

Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House

BERLIN, May 10, 1916

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

First of all, great congratulations to the President on the strength of his backbone.

In spite of your prediction in your last letter we are still here.

I do not know whether it was wanted, but I worked hard for peace — but I hope for preparedness at home, for unless these people are made pretty sick of war, they will attack us later, probably by way of an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine in Brazil or Mexico.

I wish the State Department would keep me better informed. . . .

When I am getting *Sussex* admissions and changes in submarine war and keeping the peace, and cannot get even a pat on the head, while ——'s press agents advertise that all other Ambassadors are lobsters, I might at least be kept up to date on information vitally affecting my work. This is a very small kick. . . .

Yours ever

J. W. G.

The firmness which Wilson finally displayed in the *Sussex* crisis was sufficient to impress Germany for a period of some eight months. The surrender to his ultimatum indicated that at least the civil officials in Berlin were anxious to avoid war with America. This was the moment, House insisted, for the Allies to take up the offer he had made in February. It was better for them to accept the peace terms which House had outlined, and for which the United States would fight if Germany refused them, rather than to pay the price which the complete victory they talked about must cost them and the world, a victory which in the end could scarcely have been achieved without American assistance.

For as the spring and summer of 1916 passed, Colonel House guessed what the historian now realizes: that the war had reached a state of deadlock which could be broken only by the injection of some force from outside.

CHAPTER IX

THE ALLIES REFUSE HELP

Victory was to be bought so dear as to be almost indistinguishable from defeat. It was not to give security even to the victors.

Winston Churchill, in '*The World Crisis*'

I

As the historian reviews the military events of 1915 and 1916, he is oppressed by an acute sense of nightmare. The war of movement had given way on the Western Front to the deadlock of the trenches, an intense and never-ending strain with no appreciable result. Each side launched gigantic and fruitless offensives. The Germans made their great effort at Verdun — in vain. The *riposte* of the Allies on the Somme proved equally indecisive.

And if, by the mere fact of holding their own in France, the Allies threatened to exhaust German resources, outside of France the advantage continued with their adversaries during the course of 1916. In the early summer the Russians made a temporarily successful drive under Brusilov, as the result of which and of the promise of broad annexations Rumania entered the war. But the Russians were thrown back, Rumanian armies overwhelmed, and Rumania itself invaded. The Italians were able to repel with some difficulty the Austrian drive from the Trentino, but their advance toward Trieste was imperceptible except upon the largest scale map. The Allied armed camp at Saloniki compelled the violation of Greek neutrality without bringing military results. The German fleet lay safely protected in its fortified harbors. Upon the single occasion when it emerged, the clash with the British fleet was sufficiently indecisive to permit naval experts ten years later to discuss whether the battle was won by British or Germans.

The hope of the Allies lay in the blockade of Germany, which as the months passed might gradually restrict the materials available for making war; it lay also in the whittling away of German man-power on the western battle front, where the process of mutual slaughter without essential change of position continued without cessation. In materials and men the Allies believed that they would become increasingly superior. Accordingly, the sole method of achieving victory that Allied military ingenuity could suggest was the *guerre d'usure*, the war of exhaustion.

'No war is so sanguinary as the war of exhaustion [writes Winston Churchill]. . . . It will appear not only horrible but incredible to future generations that such doctrines should have been imposed by the military profession upon the ardent and heroic populations who yielded themselves to their orders. It is a tale of the torture, mutilation or extinction of millions of men, and of the sacrifice of all that was best and noblest in an entire generation. The crippled, broken world in which we dwell to-day is the inheritor of these awful events.'¹

From such a deadlock and such a future, Colonel House felt that Europe could be rescued only by American aid. Europe was too evenly divided against itself, and in its impotence to end the struggle was committing suicide. The weight of America thrown into the balance would prove decisive. He did not plan intervention in order to save the German military system from the consequences of defeat. He detested all that the German Imperial Government stood for politically, and he was appalled by German war methods. If Germany refused terms that proved to the people the practical futility of militarism and guaranteed protection against a future attack by Germany, he would utilize the strength of America to enforce those terms.

¹ *The World Crisis* (Charles Scribner's Sons), II, 4-5.

On the other hand, he agreed with Wilson that there was no justification for offering American assistance to the Allies merely to enable them to satisfy their national aspirations — to destroy Germany politically and economically, so that France and Russia might divide the dictatorship of the Continent and Great Britain be rid of German naval and commercial competition. He wanted the United States to serve the cause of civilization, but he was not interested in assigning to her the rôle of pulling chestnuts from the fire.

President Wilson seems to have been willing to make of House's plan the basis of his policy and to have been in accord with his reasoning, except for this difference: Wilson was more suspicious of selfish elements among the Allies, not so fully convinced as House of the necessity of standing by the Allies if Germany refused reasonable terms. Nevertheless he had given his assurance, and the Colonel, at least, was certain that a refusal by Germany would bring American help to the Allies, if only they would accept it under the conditions laid down.

Neither side wanted American intervention if it meant interference with their national aspirations. The Germans had submitted to Wilson's ultimatum in the *Sussex* case and they hated him the more. In the United States, German-Americans looked upon him as the satellite of the British Foreign Office, because he permitted the export of munitions to the Allies and merely protested, without taking action, against the paper blockade of Germany.

'Paul F. Mueller, of the *Abendpost*, Chicago, was another caller [recorded Colonel House on May 2]. He travelled all the way from Chicago to see me for the scant thirty minutes I was able to give him, in order to tell how unneutral German-Americans considered the President. I was interested in Mueller's story. His father left Germany in '48 to escape arrest and death; went to England; arose to distinction

there. . . . Still Mueller sees little good in England, or the British Government, and is so pro-German that he cannot well be called an American, although he has lived here all his life. I did not argue any of the questions he brought up, because I saw it was worse than useless to waste time doing so.'

From Austria, Ambassador Penfield wrote of cartoons depicting Wilson as taking orders from Sir Edward Grey, superintending the manufacture of American dum-dum bullets, and permitting the women and children of Germany to starve.

Official Germans, as von Jagow on June 7, complained of the rôle Wilson had assumed, 'to wit, that of a Lord Protector designated to uphold everything which, in his opinion, constituted right and justice.'¹ They were perfectly willing that Wilson should talk of peace in vague phrases, in order to buoy up the courage of the German people and keep the Chancellor in office; there might come a time when they would like his help in starting negotiations, so that they might capitalize their military victories, but they did not want him laying down terms. Furthermore, the Austrians and Germans were by no means convinced that they were not going to win the war and dictate terms.

Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House

BERLIN, May 17, 1916

MY DEAR COLONEL:

. . . We are rather in a calm after the last crisis. The Chancellor sent for me and said he hoped we would do something to England or propose a general peace; otherwise his position will become, he thinks, rather hard. Delbrück, Vice-Chancellor, a Prussian woodenhead, very hostile to

¹ Von Jagow to Bernstorff, *Official German Documents Relating to the World War*, 978.

America, is out — failure as Minister of the Interior to organize food supply is the real reason. Chancellor asked my advice about answering our last note, and I advised that it was best to let matters settle down without further notes.

I should advise not stirring the animals here for the present, such as with questions as to how Commander of the submarine which sank the *Sussex* was punished, etc. . . .

Yours ever

J. W. G.

BERLIN, May 24, 1916

MY DEAR COLONEL:

. . . Mrs. Gerard has just returned from a week in Budapest with her sister. The Hungarians are once more gay and confident. The Italians, their hereditary foes, are being driven back, and on the Russian front there seems to be a sort of tacit truce of God — no fighting and visiting in the trenches, etc. — on terms of great friendliness. Food is plentiful.

At the races here last Sunday there was an absolutely record crowd and more money bet than on any previous day in German racing history. The cheaper field and stands were so full of soldiers that the crowd seemed gray, which goes to show that the last man is not at the front. . . .

On the *Sussex* question — I got my Spanish colleague, who has orders to ask about the punishment of the Commander, to say at the Foreign Office, after he had once been refused any information, that I had heard that the people at large in America believed the Commander has received 'Pour le Mérite.' Von Jagow said that he was sure this was not so, but that he did not know the name of the Commander and that it was not 'usual' to tell what punishment had been given. So that I suppose the matter will rest, unless I get orders to formally ask about the punishment. . . .

Hope to hear you are starting soon for Europe with a mouth full of olive branches.

Yours ever

J. W. G.

BERLIN, June 7, 1916

MY DEAR COLONEL:

I do not think that either Austria or Germany wishes President Wilson to lay down any peace conditions — there may possibly be a Congress after the Peace Congress, but meanwhile all parties here feel that America has nothing to do with peace conditions. America can bring the parties together, but that is all. The speech about the rights of small peoples ¹ has, I hear, made the Austrians furious, as Austria is made up of many nationalities; and the Germans say that if the rights of small peoples and peoples choosing their own sovereignty is to be discussed, the Irish question, the Indian question, and the Boer question, the Egyptian question, and many others involving the Allies must be discussed. . . .

Yours ever

J. W. G.

Ambassador Penfield to Colonel House

VIENNA, June 5, 1916

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

. . . Day by day I have seen the [peace] idea contract, until the Austrian official now is far from certain that he wants the war to end before some of the issues of the struggle have been settled in a way making a recurrence of strife next to impossible.

There seem four reasons for this reaction of judgment:

Firstly, the recent War Loan succeeded beyond expectation, giving encouragement for further borrowing.

¹ Delivered by President Wilson on May 27, before the League to Enforce Peace.

Secondly, the forces of the Monarchy are having such success on the Italian front and on Italian soil that many want to go on until the armies are in Verona and hated Italy is humbled.

Thirdly, the triumph of Germany over the British fleet in the North Sea gives belief that the Central Powers in the not distant future may dictate terms of peace without mediation.

Fourthly, there is growing fear that our President may not be the best mediator to bring benefit to a Monarchy peopled by a *congeries* of nationalities as is Austria-Hungary with its nine or ten different races. It is understood that more than once President Wilson has stated his belief that it was the right of every race to govern itself, and Austrians profess to fear that this belief might conflict with the interests of a Monarch ruling Austrians, Hungarians, Bohemians, Slavs, Croats, and other races. Some debaters of the peace proposal pretend that the King of Spain, half Hapsburg and a Roman Catholic, might give the Monarchy a larger measure of advantage than the well-intentioned American President. . . .

It is widely published here that the President told the Peace League that all people should have the right to choose the form of its constitution; and that small States, like Great Powers, should be entitled to have their sovereignty and integrity respected. There is a possibility that this may not be pleasing reading to a people who have conquered Montenegro, Albania, and a portion of Serbia in the present war. . .

Sincerely yours

FREDERIC C. PENFIELD

It is true that a week later Gerard again raised the question of peace and wrote to House: 'Von Jagow told me that the President and you must not think because of debates in the Reichstag, the President is not welcome as mediator.' But at

almost the same moment, the German Government telegraphed instructions to Bernstorff which carried exactly the opposite sense: 'As soon as Mr. Wilson's mediation plans threaten to assume a more concrete form,' said von Jagow, 'and an inclination on the part of England to meet him begins to manifest itself, it will be the duty of Your Excellency to prevent President Wilson from approaching us with a positive proposal to mediate.'

To Colonel House the stupidity of German policy was apparent. If they really wanted peace, it would be much better for them to remain inarticulate until a definite proposal should be made. Their public protestations, belied by their secret instructions, merely encouraged the Allies to believe that the war was entering on its last stage. House spoke very frankly to Count von Bernstorff, who was one of the few Germans who then and always was willing to make real sacrifices for peace.

'May 15, 1916: I cannot understand the German mind [wrote the Colonel]. They have convinced the entire world that they are eager for peace, and the Allies have acquired new confidence and a disinclination to do anything in the direction of peace because of this attitude. If the Germans will keep quiet for a while, we may be able to initiate a peace movement. . . .

'May 22, 1916: The German Ambassador called. I again impressed upon him the folly of Germany talking peace. I advised them to do nothing, say nothing, and to be absolutely quiet for a period. I asked why they made such an outcry concerning food shortage. I supposed it was for the purpose of exciting the sympathy of neutrals. It failed, however, to have this effect. It served only to make the Allies believe Germany was in a sinking condition, and hardened them to all suggestions looking to peace. I thought it entirely legitimate for the Allies to starve Germany into

peace if they could do so, and whatever action we took would be for the purpose of enforcing our legal rights. . . .’

II

From the Allies Colonel House had constant word of their determination to fight until the utter collapse of Germany. It might be a long struggle, but they were confident of ultimate victory, and Germany’s peace feelers encouraged them.

Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House

LONDON, May 23, 1916

DEAR HOUSE:

. . . The English do not see how there can be any mediation, nor (I confess) do I see. German militarism must be put down. I don’t mean that the German people should be thrashed to a frazzle nor thrashed at all. I find no spirit of revenge in the English. But this German military caste caused all the trouble and there can be no security in Europe as long as it lives in authority. That’s the English view. It raped nuns in Belgium, it took food from the people, it even now levies indemnities on all towns, it planned the destruction of the *Lusitania*, and it now coos like a sucking dove in the United States. It’ll do anything. Now, since it has become evident that it is going to be beaten, it wants peace — on terms which will give it a continued lease of life. . . . In another year or two the German military caste will be broken as the rulers of that country. And that caste will not be trusted in Europe with any professions of repentance that it will make. That’s the long and short of it. . . .

Yours very heartily

W. H. P.

LONDON, *May* 30, 1916

DEAR HOUSE:

All this peace talk from Germany causes amusement here and is construed as a confession that Germans know they have lost the war. All the peace talk that comes from the U.S. causes surprise and is taken to confirm the old opinion that the people in the U.S. do not yet know anything about the war. . . .

There isn't any early peace in sight here, and any discussion of the subject at all puts the British and the French on edge. . . .

Heartily yours

W. H. P.

LONDON, *June* 16, 1916

DEAR HOUSE:

. . . I say *after the war*, we'll have an interesting part to play; for I see no possibility of our having any hand in ending it — except, perhaps, to transmit a preliminary note from one belligerent to the other, as I transmit a dozen every day about lesser subjects. The Allies are going to win a real victory; that becomes more and more certain. The British fleet's victory (so stupidly managed in the press — incredibly stupid!), the death of Kitchener, the battle of Verdun, the drive of the Russians — everything now spurs the Allies on. A complete change has taken place in the English resolution. Your bulldog has taken his grip and he'll hold on. And they won't hear the word 'peace.' They're out not for revenge nor for annihilation nor any other nonsense, but for a real victory, a victory which will, somehow or other, permanently discourage a military dictatorship. If they win that, they'll make peace. Then, that done, the task of organizing the world on a securer basis will follow. Then, but not till then, as I see it, will our inning come. . . .

Heartily yours

W. H. P.

Colonel House did not agree with Mr. Page. He felt that if the world were to be saved from political and economic collapse, the United States must take a hand in ending the war. Even if Russia remained faithful to the Allies — and he always questioned the danger of a separate peace — the long-drawn-out struggle would involve Europe in such an expenditure of men and materials, such complete disruption of industrial organization, that civilization would be threatened.

The war had become a conflagration which neither statesmen nor generals could handle. The statesmen had stupidly permitted it to blaze forth; the generals, as Winston Churchill writing in retrospect four years later insisted, were incapable of confining it 'within limits which though enormous were not uncontrolled. Thereafter the fire roared on till it burnt itself out. Thereafter events passed very largely outside the scope of conscious choice. Governments and individuals conformed to the rhythm of the tragedy, and swayed and staggered forward in helpless violence, slaughtering and squandering on ever-increasing scales, till injuries were wrought to the structure of human society which a century will not efface, and which may conceivably prove fatal to the present civilization. . . . Victory was to be bought so dear as to be almost indistinguishable from defeat. It was not to give even security to the victors. . . . The most complete victory ever gained in arms has failed to solve the European problem or remove the dangers which produced the war.' ¹

Such a catastrophe House obviously feared in 1916 when he argued that in their effort to smash Germany the Allies ran the risk of exhausting civilization both of its man-power and its industrial life. There was the further risk incurred by them, which was that no matter how immense their efforts, the Allies might not be able to defeat the Central

¹ *The World Crisis* (Charles Scribner's Sons), II, 1-2.

Powers without assistance from outside. House feared the defection of Russia, which would enable Germany to concentrate superior forces on the decisive battle front in France. It was a fear justified two years later by the appeal which the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy telegraphed to President Wilson: 'There is great danger of the war being lost unless the numerical inferiority of the Allies can be remedied as rapidly as possible by the advent of American troops.'

Dominant British opinion in 1916, however, was determined to repeal all suggestions of peace, no matter how attractive, and regardless of what the struggle might cost. There were other currents of opinion afloat, but they were quite powerless to affect policy. Even so sincere a lover of peace and so experienced a statesman as Lord Bryce, believed that the safety of the world demanded pure concentration on the military effort.

On May 31 Bryce wrote to House that the British were convinced that the German Government would not make peace on any terms the Allies could accept; that was perfectly clear from the language of Berlin. The British were therefore resolved to prosecute the war until it was plain that Germany, recognizing her failure, was prepared to accept the terms the Allies thought necessary for their own security. Bryce feared this moment was still 'some way off.' Great as were the sufferings caused by the war, the general feeling was that a peace on the basis which the Germans indicated would leave the British in a position of insecurity, with the dread of another war hanging over them and with the need of continuing to maintain huge armaments. He insisted that there was no wish to break up Germany or injure her, but the British were convinced that no promise she might make would be worth the paper it was written on and that the securities for future peace must therefore be of a tangible nature.

Colonel House believed that the very clear-cut and apparently reasonable attitude, expressed in these letters of Page and Bryce, rested upon a triple misconception, induced by the emotions of war: In the first place, upon a confidence in Allied ability to defeat Germany without outside help, which later events proved to be exaggerated. In the second place, it was futile to argue that there was no use accepting American mediation since 'the German Government would not make peace on any terms the Allies could accept.' Under the conditions of the American offer, one of two things must happen. Either Germany would accept the terms and the Allies would have what they contended they were fighting for, or Germany would refuse those terms, as the British anticipated, and the United States would enter the war to enforce them. The attempt at mediation would have disproved German sincerity and would have brought American help. In the third place, the British attitude was colored by an unjustified suspicion of President Wilson, a belief that he would never take decided action and that American aid would in no circumstances be forthcoming.

This suspicion of Wilson, gradually developing into contempt, had been progressive. In 1914 there had been no serious suggestion that the United States should enter the war to protect Belgian neutrality. In 1915 Sir Edward Grey had expressed entire satisfaction with Wilson's first *Lusitania* note. But in 1916 Wilson was generally abused on these two scores for his 'spineless' policy. So warm an admirer as Sir Horace Plunkett, in March, 1916, wrote of the need of dispelling 'the misunderstandings of his policy in respect of Belgium and the *Lusitania* which has unquestionably lowered the United States in the estimation of Europe.'

Allied public opinion was forgetful of the assistance brought to the cause of the Entente by the United States which, by a slightly stricter interpretation of the rôle of a

neutral, President Wilson could have prevented: the enormous loans, the shipment of munitions. The President had, it is true, displayed a patience which endured long under the affronts of the German submarine attacks. But he had none the less compelled the Berlin Government to submit to his point of view and thereby had incidentally protected Allied shipping. He had dragged from Germany, after the sinking of the *Arabic*, the promise that they would not attack passenger liners without warning; he had disallowed their contention that armed merchant vessels were in effect war-ships; he had finally, after the attack on the *Sussex*, forced the pledge that no merchant vessel whatever should be attacked without warning. This was at a moment when von Tirpitz promised that if the submarines should be given full freedom, Great Britain would be isolated and the war ended. Wilson's insistence saved the British merchant fleet from the intensive submarine attack, the danger of which became apparent a year later, and for which German naval leaders already clamored.¹

The President's determination in the defence of American rights against Germany received scant appreciation from the Allies, despite the service which it rendered their cause. Nor did they appear to realize the degree of consideration which he displayed in the dispute raised by Allied interference with American trade on the high seas. It is true that our State Department sent many sharp, perhaps uselessly sharp, protests. But the President never yielded to the constant pressure upon him to take action that might give effect to such protests. It would have been easy for him to ask for retaliatory measures, which would have been im-

¹ The student must, however, take into account the argument that it was not Wilson's protests but German unreadiness which led Berlin to postpone an unrestricted submarine campaign. This argument is weakened by the insistence of German naval leaders that they were fully prepared in the spring of 1916, a contention which, according to Ambassador Gerard, rested upon established fact.

mediately approved by a Congress that was in no degree inspired by pro-Entente sentiments. An embargo upon munitions was urged again and again. Wilson, however, did not ask for power to use retaliation until the summer of 1916, and he never permitted an embargo, thus allowing the Allies to draw richly upon our munitions factories.

All this was unnoticed or forgotten by Allied opinion, even in responsible quarters. Because he refused, even in his friendliness to the Allies, to adopt their point of view, but persisted in an American point of view, they regarded him with suspicion. While the British press congratulated their own country upon British magnanimity in entering the war to save Belgium and upon its protection of the rights of small states (at the moment of Allied violation of Greek neutrality), it jeered at Wilson for remaining aloof. A former Governor-General of Canada, Lord Grey (a cousin of Sir Edward Grey), announced for publication in an American newspaper: 'In this supreme crisis in which the best hopes of humanity are involved, it appears to me you have failed. . . . Belgium has lost everything but her soul. What shall be said of America?' ¹

In these circumstances, Allied public opinion was not likely to view with approval any suggestion of mediation by President Wilson. The British and French would have been glad of help in the defeating of Germany, but they were less interested in idealistic phrases regarding a future world settlement. Colonel House received many letters to this effect.

¹ New York *Sun*, June 4, 1916.

Mr. George Sale to Colonel House

5 WEST CLIFF
ST. JOHN'S ROAD, EASTBOURNE
February 2, 1916

SIR:

I read to-day's report of President Wilson's speech, assuming for his policy that it represents the view of idealists, who claim to be trustees of the moral judgments of the world that righteousness cannot be a standard in the midst of arms, and that back of the energies of Americans is a readiness to lay down life for thought rather than for dollars.

Will you allow a private person of English birth to comment on this utterance; first, to contest the right of America to take first place as trustee of the moral judgments of the world, a position that demands *action* when the trust funds are endangered. Great Britain has taken that action, America has not. True, Britain's direct interests are at stake, but that does not vitiate her action in the general interests of the world.

And if righteousness cannot be maintained as a standard in the midst of arms, what am I to think of Lincoln, to my mind the world's greatest leader since history began, if purity of motive in the conduct of war be any standard at all.

As to idealism in foreign politics and international life, the President and you, Sir, should remember that American policy is as calculatingly selfish as that of Germany. Your coasting trade is sealed even from routes like New York-San Francisco. Ours open to the world. Your goods and all the world's enter free of duty at Singapore and Hong Kong, and on equal terms in India, at nominal rates of duty. What of the discriminating duties in the Philippines and Cuba? What part plays idealism there?

Yours faithfully

GEORGE SALE

'Elmer Roberts is just from Paris [recorded House on April 30] and has lived there so long that he is thoroughly imbued with the French outlook. In speaking of French feeling for the United States he said: "There is a feeling of sadness that the United States has not risen to the high ideals which the French people thought actuated the American people, etc., etc." It is the old story. As a matter of fact, the French people as a whole do not believe we have any ideals further than that represented by a dollar mark. What the Allies want is to dip their hands into our treasure chest. While the war has become a war of democracy against autocracy, not one of the democracies entered it to fight for democracy, but merely because of the necessity of self-preservation. If we go in, it will be because we believe in democracy and do not desire our institutions and the character of our civilization changed. . . .

'*May 22, 1916*: Captain Gaunt, Miss Elizabeth Robins, the authoress, and Mrs. Devereaux came to dinner. I invited only one man, as I wished to talk alone with Gaunt. He said Australia had always looked upon the United States as her ideal, but she now bitterly resents our not entering the war. He had a letter from a friend stating that in future Australia would purchase from Germany rather than the United States. He told of the deep undercurrent of feeling the French hold against us for the same reason. He believes all the Allies are resolved that we shall have no part in the peace conference. . . .

'*May 24, 1916*: It is evident that unless the United States is willing to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of treasure, we are not to be on good terms with the Allies. . . .'

So distinguished a statesman as Lord Cromer, whose public influence was such that he might be supposed carefully to have weighed his thoughts, did not hesitate to ex-

press publicly the critical attitude of the British toward President Wilson:

‘We may all recognize President Wilson’s good intentions and his lofty aims, we may assume he is impartial, but it is more than doubtful in spite of the very friendly feelings entertained toward America and Americans generally that the people of this country would under any circumstances welcome the idea that President Wilson should assume the rôle of mediator. . . . Confidence in President Wilson’s statesmanship has been rudely shaken.’¹

Even Colonel House, pro-Ally as he was, could not conceal his vexation at the degree to which the emotions of war had blinded the Entente to the aid which, as a lawful neutral, America had given.

‘When Noel Buxton was here [the Colonel wrote, June 29], I told him how impossible it was to satisfy the Allies. It is always something more. I thought if we went into the war, the Allies, after welcoming us warmly and praising us beyond our deserts, would later, when they found we were not furnishing as many men (or any men, for that matter, for we have none), would begin to chide us just as the French did the English, and say we were not spilling our blood, that we were shirkers, etc., etc. Nothing which it would be possible to do within a year after we entered the war could please them.

‘It was tiresome, I told Buxton, to hear the English declare they were fighting for Belgium and that they entered the war for that purpose. I asked if in his opinion Great Britain would have entered the war against France if she had violated Belgium or, indeed, whether Great Britain would not have gone into the war on the side of the Allies

¹ *Current History*, July, 1916.

even if France had violated Belgium. In my opinion, the purpose of Great Britain's entrance into the war was quite different from that. The stress of the situation compelled her to side with France and Russia and against the Central Powers. Primarily it was because Germany insisted upon having a dominant army and a dominant navy, something Great Britain could not tolerate in safety to herself.'

III

Much, if not all, of the anti-Wilson feeling abroad resulted from misunderstanding, and in the circumstances the regular diplomatic representatives of Great Britain and the United States did not seem able to dispel it. The British public and many of their public men had come to look upon Wilson as pacifist beyond remedy and willing to shift in any direction to avoid decisive action. It was the duty of the British Ambassador in Washington to give his Government a more accurate picture of the President, but unfortunately Sir Cecil himself was quite out of sympathy with Mr. Wilson and doubtless affected by his close personal relations with Republican leaders whose estimate of the President was perhaps not entirely without bias.

Colonel House to the President

NEW LONDON, NEW HAMPSHIRE
July 12, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... Arthur Bullard is just back from Europe. He tells me that while he was in London Sir Horace Plunkett said he had seen a cable from Spring-Rice to the Foreign Office, saying that in no event would this country go to war with Germany. This was at the most acute stage of our last crisis with Germany.

What a lot of unfortunate circumstances and people we have to contend with! Spring-Rice goes only with your

enemies like X and Y and gets their point of view and conveys it to his Government. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

House was further disturbed by the inadequate reports of Wilson's speeches abroad and the failure of our own Ambassadors to emphasize the value to the Entente of the restriction of German submarine warfare, as well as the true character of Wilson's policy as shown in his speeches.

Colonel House to the President

NEW LONDON, NEW HAMPSHIRE
June 14, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . Our representatives abroad should bring these speeches not only to the attention of the Government to which they are accredited, but to the public through the press. . . .

I have another letter from Arthur Bullard, in which he complains that the press of both England and France publish garbled reports of your utterances and do not give your true meaning.

If you approve, I will get Frank Polk to have letters sent to our representatives in Europe, asking them to see that your views are brought properly before the Governments and the public. Those parts of your speeches relating to international affairs should be cabled to them and they, in turn, should be instructed to make them public. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

NEW LONDON, NEW HAMPSHIRE
June 23, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I am enclosing you a copy of a letter which has just come from Lord Bryce. It bears out what I told you concerning the French and English press misrepresenting you by publishing only parts of your speeches.

If Page would think more about presenting your views favorably to the English people and less about our mistreatment of them, it would go a long way towards helping to accomplish the purposes you have in mind.

Jusserand is constantly after his Government not to permit the French press to be discourteous.

I have a letter from Penfield in which he says: 'On May 15th a low-class journal printed the enclosed cartoon against the President. I demanded an immediate interview with Baron Burian and protested vigorously against the publication of such attacks against a sovereign ruler of a land with which Austria was not at war. Within twenty-four hours I had a written apology and the assurance of the Government that the unfriendly attitude of the papers would cease at once.'

If Penfield can do it in Austria, Page and Sharp can do it in England and France. We cannot hope to make much headway with the Allies if their press and music-halls are permitted to show disrespect to you and your Government. In times of peace it is impossible to do what can easily be done in times of war when there is a censorship.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

At London, Mr. Page was on the most intimate terms with Sir Edward Grey and through him could reach the other members of the Cabinet. Unfortunately, as the Ambassador's letters indicate, he himself did not sympathize with Wilson's

policy. While he did not advocate entering the war as a belligerent, he insisted that diplomatic relations with Germany should be broken, so as to indicate plainly that our sympathy lay with the Allies.¹ Feeling thus and with intensity, himself inclined to regard Wilson as pursuing the wrong course both in remaining friendly with Germany and in bothering the Allies about trade questions, he found it difficult to explain the President's policy to the British. Wilson had long supported Page against those who insisted that the Ambassador took the British rather than the American view of the war, but his patience began to ebb. On May 17, he wrote House that the Secretary of State was so dissatisfied with Page's whole conduct of American dealings with the Foreign Office that he wanted to bring him back for a vacation, 'to get some American atmosphere into him again.'²

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, May 18, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I do not think we need worry about Page. If he comes home at once, I believe we can straighten him out. You will remember I have urged his coming for more than a year.

I do not believe he is of any service there at present, and the staff are able to carry on the work. They have just added Hugh Gibson from Brussels, who is a good man. . . .

No one who has not lived in the atmosphere that has surrounded Page for three years can have an idea of its subtle influence; therefore he is not to be blamed as much as one would think. . . .

¹ This suggestion, often mooted in England by those who did not like to ask the United States to enter the war, was never regarded as practical policy by Wilson or House. A diplomatic rupture would almost certainly lead to war, as in 1917, and ought not to come unless entrance into the war was clearly foreseen and prepared for.

² The phrase is quoted from Colonel House's diary, but evidently represents what was in Wilson's mind.

He would have done admirably in times of peace, but his mind has become warped by the war.

He may wish to remain after he comes home, for private reasons; and if he does, I would not dissuade him. On the other hand, if he remains here for the ordinary sixty days' leave, he will probably recover his equilibrium and there will be no further trouble with him. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

IV

It was natural, perhaps, that President Wilson's offer to help the Allies, if Germany refused reasonable terms, should not receive immediate response. They were confident of their ability to crush Germany and dictate their own terms; they feared the words 'peace conference,' and they were suspicious of Wilson. House none the less believed that they would not be so foolish as to refuse what amounted to an assurance of victory, even though controlled by American conditions. He was encouraged by Grey's enthusiasm in London, by a hint from Balfour after he left that the offer might be taken up, and by Wilson's victory in the Gore-McLemore affair.

Mr. A. J. Balfour to Colonel House

THE ADMIRALTY, WHITEHALL
LONDON, *March 2, 1916*

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

I was sorry not to be able personally to say 'good-bye' to you and Mrs. House, as I shall always regard our intercourse during your two visits as among my most interesting recollections. Unless, however, I am making a mistake, it will not be very long before I have again the pleasure of meeting you, and discussing with an open heart some of the great problems raised by the world crisis through which we are living. . . .



Here I come without one plea,
Except that the thing does look like me

W.H.P.

London
1913

WALTER HINES PAGE

If anything interesting occurs which I think you will not hear through any other channel, I will make a point of letting you know.

Please remember me to Mrs. House.

And believe me

Yours sincerely

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

Sir Horace Plunkett to Colonel House

LONDON, March 7, 1916

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

I think I ought to let you know by this mail that the stand that the President is taking upon the right of Americans to the benefit of the humane provisions of International Law when they travel on British ships, has moved opinion profoundly in this country. At the time of writing I do not know what the attitude of the House of Representatives will be towards him, but his friends here have every confidence that they will behave as did the Senate. Whatever way the vote there may go, you may rely upon it that he stands higher in the regard of the British people than he did when his policy was even less understood over here than it seems to have been in some portions of his own country. . . .

Yours very sincerely

HORACE PLUNKETT

But the flurry in Wilson's favor was short-lived, and as the weeks passed Sir Edward Grey showed no indication of agitating Wilson's suggestion of conditional assistance. So long as Allied leaders remained under the anxiety of the initial German attacks upon Verdun, they were perhaps more open to the idea of Wilson's offer. But as the French defence stiffened, their military hopes soared and they reverted to the thought that they could handle the enemy without outside aid.

The French were naturally less inclined than the British to utilize the American offer, for they regarded the enmity of Germany as a permanent factor. No terms would really satisfy them except the political disruption of Germany following a complete military victory. Never, perhaps, would France find herself with such an opportunity for annihilating her secular foe, since it was unlikely that such a formidably anti-German coalition could again be formed. Now was the time to finish the job. Better to go on without American help, if the help were given on conditions that would interfere with France's freedom to deal with Germany as she chose.

The British by no means sympathized with all the French aspirations. They were later destined to oppose some of them with vigor. But at this time they were not minded to risk the solidarity of the Entente by hinting that if France would yield her claims, the war might be shortened. After all, the French had borne the brunt of the German attack and had thereby acquired a certain right to decide how long the struggle should continue. Furthermore, the British had signed, in September, 1914, the Pact of London, which stipulated that peace should be made in common by all the Allies. Obviously they could take no step toward American mediation without the full approval of the French.

Sir Edward Grey was the most scrupulous statesman in Europe. It was certain that he would make no move which might in any fashion be interpreted as an evasion of Britain's obligations to her allies. It is comprehensible, therefore, that he was unwilling to press House's plan upon them, for it contained the idea of a peace conference, and as he later said, 'I was afraid if I mentioned peace, the French would think we were going to *lâcher* them.' What is more difficult to understand is that he did not think it worth while to emphasize the second half of the offer; namely, that America would enter the war if Germany refused reasonable terms.

As Grey himself wrote in his memoirs, 'If Germany had refused the Conference, or refused to settle on the terms foreshadowed, the United States would have joined the Allies some months sooner than she did. This would have been a gain to the Allies.'¹

Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House

LONDON, March 24, 1916

DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

After receiving your telegram, I told those colleagues of it who had already seen the report of our conversation to which your telegram referred.

We all feel that we cannot at this moment take the initiative in asking the French to consider a conference.

I have had no indication since I gave M. Cambon the record, that the French are more prepared to consider a conference now than they were then. The fighting for Verdun is still in doubt (though the French are said to be very confident) and I do not suppose the French could take any important decision until that is settled.

My own feeling is that the moment they express any desire to bring this struggle to an end by a conference, we should and must defer to their views. Owing to the occupation of their territory and the treatment of their population in it by the Germans, their sufferings, like those of Belgium, have been greater than ours (though our material contributions to the war all told may be greater) and we cannot urge them to make greater sacrifices than they are themselves prepared to make.

On the other hand, to urge a conference on them before they desire it, would lead them to suppose that we were not prepared to support them when they wished to go on. To

¹ *Twenty-Five Years* (Frederick A. Stokes Company), II, 136. Prince Bismarck told House in 1925 that the German Government would not have considered these terms for a moment.

give such an impression would be most repugnant to our views or feelings, besides having a disastrous political effect.

I propose therefore (1st) to let M. Briand know that since you left I have heard if France and England were willing, President Wilson would on his own initiative summon a conference to end the war on the terms and in the spirit indicated by you at Paris and London.

I will say (2) that we could not put the matter before any of the other Allies unless after consultation with and in concert with the French Government and do not therefore purpose to mention this subject at the Conference of Allies in Paris this week.

(3) That if M. Briand has any views to express on the subject he will no doubt let me know them either himself or through M. Jules Cambon, while we are in Paris.

The Prime Minister and I go there on Thursday evening. Of course there is nothing in this to prevent your making any communication to the French that you think opportune.

Yours sincerely

E. GREY

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, April 8, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Here are two letters from Sir Edward Grey which have just come.

I think I see quite clearly his desire to have us communicate directly with the French. He has some hesitation in doing so himself. While I was in London, he expressed particular satisfaction that I had approached the French directly when I was in Paris. He said it had relieved him of some embarrassment.

His Government feel that the suffering in England has been so small in comparison with that in France that they dislike to be the first to suggest a halt. It is this thought

that runs through his letter, and it was continually present in all our conversations.

What do you think of my talking to Jusserand when I am in Washington Tuesday and letting him communicate with his Government practically what we cabled Sir Edward?

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Unfortunately House had not arranged with the French Government any means of direct communication such as he had with Grey, and Ambassador Jusserand proved quite unwilling to take up with Paris the question of American mediation. A cable direct from the President to Briand would doubtless have had some influence with the French, but there was too much danger of its appearing like a formal and official offer of mediation, which in the circumstances might have precipitated a crisis with the Allies.

Sir Edward, indeed, sent to Briand a reference to the American offer, but he steadfastly refused to mention it orally to the French unless they first raised the topic, and they were evidently careful to avoid it. Curious irony, that at the Allied Conference this opportunity of bringing the United States into the war should have been passed over without a word, in the midst of the oratorical floods that failed to achieve Allied coöperation! Perhaps they hoped the German submarines would drive the United States into the war without conditions.

Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House

LONDON, April 7, 1916

DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

I sent to M. Briand, through the French Embassy here before I went to Paris, the message proposed in my letter of the 24th of March to you.

The conference itself was a huge affair confined to general-

ities, but the Prime Minister and I discussed some matters separately with M. Briand and M. Cambon and neither of them mentioned the subject.

The French press was full of the German failure at Verdun and the sinking of the *Sussex* and it was very clear from the whole feeling at Paris that the French Government could not take up the idea of a conference then.

I am bound to say that I think feeling here is the same. Everybody feels there must be more German failure and some Allied success before anything but an inconclusive peace could be obtained. The German Chancellor's speech reported to-day will harden that feeling.

I cannot think that the entry of the United States into the war would prolong it, whether it came about over the *Sussex* or over a conference and conditions of peace — indeed, I feel it must shorten it; but I remember you expressed the apprehension that Germany would force a rupture by some violent act and you preferred that it should not come about that way.

I understood and understand that, but there is no doubt that this case of the *Sussex* and the ruthless torpedoing of neutral ships, Norwegian, Dutch, and Spanish (though I do not know all the circumstances), has created a dilemma.

If the United States Government takes a strong line about these acts, it must, I suppose, become more difficult for it to propose a conference to Germany; if on the other hand, it passes them over, the Allies will not believe that the United States Government will at the conference take a line strong enough to ensure more than a patched up and insecure peace.

My personal touch with you and through you with the President makes me more hopeful, but amid such tremendous forces an individual opinion formed in private knowledge can count for little.

Yours sincerely

E. GREY

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, April 19, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I have just received another autograph letter from Sir Edward, a copy of which I enclose.

You will notice that he makes the point that we saw was inevitable: that is, if Germany is permitted to continue her submarine policy unrebuked, we would lose the friendship and respect of the Allies to such an extent that they would not have confidence in our acting with a sufficiently strong hand in the peace councils.

Your action to-day,¹ I believe, will meet with the approval of the best opinion in this country and in Europe. It marks an epoch in American history.

With deep affection

E. M. HOUSE

v

The settlement of the *Sussex* crisis by Germany's acceptance of Wilson's demands led Colonel House to feel that a new and more definite effort must be made to induce the Allies to take up his proposal. Another slight reaction in Wilson's favor set in among the Allies. 'We're getting on pretty well with this Government,' wrote Page. 'The President's note that bagged the Germans helped mightily. If he stands no more foolishness, I'll probably live to see the war through.' House realized, none the less, that Berlin, having yielded on the submarine issue, would insist that the United States take some action to meet British interference with neutral trade, and that unless this were done the navy group in Germany would demand the resumption of ruthless submarine warfare. In view of the German setbacks at Verdun, the moment was opportune for the Allies to express their willingness to accept reasonable peace terms; if Germany re-

¹ The despatch of the ultimatum to Germany on the *Sussex*.

fused, the emptiness of her peace protestations would be clearly displayed.

With this in mind, Colonel House drafted a new appeal to Grey, emphasizing these facts and suggesting that the President, in calling for a conference, might publicly announce the willingness of the United States to take part actively in world affairs. At the same time he warned Sir Edward that if the German submarine war was really ended, anti-British feeling in the United States would rapidly develop as a result of trade restrictions and interference with mails. Wilson approved the venture heartily and gave his sanction to the message.

Colonel House to Sir Edward Grey

[Telegram]

NEW YORK, May 10, 1916

There is an increasingly insistent demand here that the President take some action towards bringing the war to a close. The impression grows that the Allies are more determined upon the punishment of Germany than upon exacting terms that neutral opinion would consider just. This feeling will increase if Germany discontinues her illegal submarine activities.

I believe the President would now be willing publicly to commit the United States to joining with the other Powers in a convention looking to the maintenance of peace after the war, provided he announced at the same time that if the war continued much longer he purposed calling a conference to discuss peace.

If the President is to serve humanity in a large way, steps should be taken now rather than wait until the opportunity becomes less fortunate. His statement would be along the lines you and I have so often discussed and which you expressed in your letter to me of September 22, 1915; that is, the nations subscribing to this agreement should pledge themselves

to side against any Power breaking a treaty. The convention should formulate rules for the purpose of limiting armaments both on land and sea and for the purpose of making warfare more humane to those actually engaged in safeguarding the lives and property of neutrals and non-combatants.

The convention should bind the signatory Powers to side against any nation refusing in case of dispute to adopt some other method of settlement than that of war.¹

I am sure this is the psychological moment for this statement to be made, and I would appreciate your cabling me your opinion as to the advisability of such a move. If it is not done now, the opportunity may be forever lost.

EDWARD HOUSE

The cable was emphasized by a letter which the Colonel sent on the following day. In it he set forth with something of prophetic insight the results of the complete crushing of Germany.

Colonel House to Sir Edward Grey

NEW YORK, May 11, 1916

DEAR SIR EDWARD:

... We have been on the eve of a break with Germany so long that I have not written, as it seemed it would come each day. For the moment matters are quiet again and, unless Germany transgresses further, there will probably be no break.

If we should get into the war, I feel sure it would not be a good thing for England. It would probably lead to the complete crushing of Germany and Austria; Italy and France

¹ The historian will note that this paragraph contains the essence of the principle of compulsory arbitration which underlay the Bliss-Shotwell-Miller plan to guarantee peace eight years later, was translated into the Protocol, affirmed by the Assembly of the League of Nations, and formed the gist of the Locarno Pacts. House here suggests the method, ultimately adopted, of determining which is the aggressor state.

would then be more concerned as to the division of the spoils than they would for any far-reaching agreement that might be brought about looking to the maintenance of peace in the future and the amelioration of the horrors of war.

The wearing-down process, as far as Germany is concerned, has gone far enough to make her sensible of the power we can wield. This is an enormous gain and will help in the final settlement. A year ago we could not have made her come to the terms to which she has just agreed, and it seems certain that at a peace conference she would yield again and again rather than appeal to the sword.

From my cable you will see how far the President has gone within the year. Public opinion, we feel sure, will uphold him in his purpose to insist that the United States should do her part in the maintenance of peace.

I am sure, too, that this is the psychological moment to strike for those things which the President and you have so near at heart. Delay is dangerous and may defeat our ends.

While the programme we have outlined means as much to the other nations, yet they will not see it clearly now as England and the United States see it. Therefore, England should be immediately responsive to our call. Her statesmen will take a great responsibility upon themselves if they hesitate or delay; and in the event of failure because they refuse to act quickly, history will bring a grave indictment against them.

All the things that you and I have wished to bring about seem ready now of accomplishment, and I earnestly hope you may bring your Government to a realization of the opportunity that is seeking fulfilment.

Sincerely yours

E. M. HOUSE

But Sir Edward Grey, faced with the necessity of returning a definite answer, was apparently compelled to let the

opportunity pass. He was himself not in a position to exercise his independent judgment; he realized that neither his own colleagues nor the Allied Ministers were ready to consider House's proposition, and he did not believe that it was worth while to press it upon them.

A curious inertia seemed to have fallen upon the Allied diplomats, as if they were bound by fate and could not hope to influence events. In his memoirs, written after the war, Grey states that 'diplomacy could do little in Europe to win the war.' And yet here was an occasion which the Allies could utilize to bring the United States into the war on their side, surely a long step toward victory. A few sentences further on, Grey explains this inaction, when he outlines the main purpose of Allied diplomacy: 'The first object undoubtedly was to preserve solidarity among the great Allies.' If this purely passive purpose was the first end to be achieved, he could not press House's plan because in so doing he would arouse the distrust of the French. All that the French and the majority of the British Cabinet were willing to do was to fight — the war of exhaustion.

To Colonel House Grey explained Allied unwillingness to consider the American offer, in terms which indicate his embarrassment. The Allies felt that mediation was 'premature' and they 'resented' Germany's contention that the war was one of defence, entirely disregarding the American offer to enter the struggle if Germany were unreasonable. They feared the effect of Wilson's mediation on public opinion and apparently forgot that the President through House had suggested terms by no means unfavorable to the Allies. Grey's cable to House did credit to British sense of obligation to the French and Russians, but their failure to have canvassed thoroughly the American proposition suggested a tendency to drift upon military events or a curious blindness to the opportunities it opened.

Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House

[Telegram]

LONDON, May 12, 1916

I have received your telegram. My opinion without consulting colleagues and Allies is of little value, and for me to consult them now as to a peace conference would, I think, at best lead to a reply that mediation or a conference was premature, especially after the German Chancellor's last speech of which both the terms and tone were resented by the Allies.¹

The President's suggestion of summoning a peace conference without any indication of a basis on which peace might be made, would be construed as instigated by Germany to secure peace on terms unfavourable to the Allies while her existing military position is still satisfactory to her.²

The difficulty of avoiding this impression, without offence to Germany, is one which you can estimate perhaps better than I; but the danger of making the undesirable impression on the Allies is very real, for there is a belief, widespread through perhaps overconfidence, that Germany is in grave difficulties which may lead to her collapse, especially if failure to take Verdun becomes final.

For the rest, my letter of September 22 contemplated dim-

¹ A speech delivered in the Reichstag, April 5. Bethmann insisted that the war was one of defence for Germany and that the peace must bring guaranties that Belgium would not be under Anglo-French control. It is easy to see that Allied leaders would 'resent' its tone, but it is more difficult to understand why they should permit such emotion to affect a decision of high policy.

² This sentence is difficult to understand. Grey already had in his possession the memorandum drafted in February which gave clear 'indication of a basis on which peace might be made' and in terms by no means 'unfavourable to the Allies.' Assuming that the Allied leaders knew of the memorandum, they could not possibly construe Wilson's suggestion as instigated by Germany. Perhaps Grey referred merely to the effect upon public opinion, which was not informed of the memorandum.

inution of arms as the result of a league of nations binding themselves to side against any Power which broke a treaty or certain rules of war on sea or land.

I hesitated to advocate rules for directly limiting armaments, not on the ground of principle, but because of the practical difficulty in drawing up such rules.

Otherwise my personal view is in favour of agreement between nations such as you suggest; though I cannot guarantee how others would receive it. I believe it would secure a reduction of armaments. I sympathize with the President's aspirations and feel that his proposal as regards a league of nations may be of the greatest service to humanity; but as to the desirability of it now and with a summoning of a peace conference, I cannot express an opinion beyond what I have stated above. . . .

E. GREY

VI

Colonel House was naturally and bitterly disappointed. He had conceived a plan of boldness and one involving a revolution in America's foreign relations, in answer to the appeals that came from the British and French that America carry her share of the burdens of humanity. But the offer seemed to them of no value. Apparently they wanted American assistance without any conditions, not so much to secure a permanent and a just peace as to crush Germany. House did not feel that the two aims were synonymous and he knew that Grey agreed with him.

'I am disappointed [he wrote on May 13, after receiving Sir Edward's cable] that he does not rise to the occasion. For two years he has been telling me that the solution of the problem of international well-being depended upon the United States being willing to take her part in world affairs. . . . I am distinctly disappointed. We are running up against the

lack of cohesion in the British Government. Every member speaks for himself and seems to have no knowledge of what his colleagues have in mind. I can see, too, a distinct feeling of cock-sureness in the Allies since Verdun. This will grow in the event they have any success themselves, and I can foresee trouble with them. An international situation can change as quickly as relationships between individuals; that is, over-night. A situation may arise, if the Allies defeat Germany, where they may attempt to be dictatorial in Europe and elsewhere. I can see quite clearly where they might change their views on militarism and navalism. It depends entirely upon what nation uses it, whether it is considered good or bad.'

Colonel House felt it important that Grey should understand, not merely that the Allies were losing an opportunity, but also that the cold reception they gave to the President's offer might arouse some question of Allied motives. As he had warned them in February, if they did not choose to accept American help they must be prepared to see the United States insist rigidly upon their neutral rights, and to meet increasing friction over the restraints placed upon American trade. President Wilson agreed that Grey ought to understand fully the consequences of the position taken by the Allies. If they refused American mediation, even though accompanied by a contingent offer of help, they must face the effects of a continuation of the war; one of those effects was the dispute with the United States and they must expect us to maintain our rights with vigor.

On May 16, the President wrote House that it was time to get down to 'hard pan.' America, he said, must either make a decided move for peace on some basis likely to be permanent, or else must insist upon her rights against Great Britain as firmly as she had against Germany. To do nothing, he insisted, was impossible. He asked House accordingly to

prepare a cable to this effect to Grey, putting the whole matter up to him in friendly spirit, but with firmness of tone.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, May 17, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Your letter of yesterday came last night too late to answer.

I am enclosing you a suggestion for a cable to Sir Edward Grey. Please make the necessary changes and I will code and send it immediately.

It has been apparent that when our difficulties with Germany were settled, our difficulties with the Allies would begin; and the solution has disturbed me greatly.

The more I see of the dealings of Governments among themselves, the more I am impressed with the utter selfishness of their outlook. Gratitude is a thing unknown, and all we have done for the Allies will be forgotten overnight if we antagonize them now. Nevertheless, I am convinced that it is your duty to press for a peace conference with all the power at your command — for, whether they like it or whether they do not, I believe you can bring it about. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Once more House cabled Grey, warning him that, if the Allies refused the American offer, the United States would have to protect their neutrality and that trouble with Great Britain must threaten. He did not insist that a conference should be called at once, if the Allies believed the deadlock could be broken by military success during the summer. He did insist that the refusal of American coöperation, designed to secure the kind of settlement which Allied leaders publicly declared to be their purpose, would compel the United States to follow their own interests. The Allies could do as they chose, but they must carry the responsibility themselves and

henceforth not blame America for its indifference. And he supplemented the cable by letters, reminding Grey that under his plan Germany would have to yield or go to war with the United States.

Wilson approved the cable. He felt he had gone a long way in agreeing to help if Germany were stubborn, and he began to display some signs of emotional reaction against those who spurned his offer.

Colonel House to Sir Edward Grey

[Telegram]

NEW YORK, May 19, 1916

My cables and letters of the past few days have not been sent with any desire to force the hands of the Allies or to urge upon them something for which they are not ready, but rather to put before them a situation that arose immediately Germany agreed to discontinue her illegal submarine warfare.

America has reached the crossroads, and if we cannot soon inaugurate some sort of peace discussion there will come a demand from our people, in which all neutrals will probably join, that we assert our undeniable rights against the Allies with the same insistence we have used towards the Central Powers. . . .

There is a feeling here, which is said to exist in other neutral countries, that the war should end, and any nation that rejects peace discussions will bring upon themselves a heavy responsibility.

If we begin to push the Allies as hard as we needs must, friction is certain to arise. . . .

I am speaking in all frankness, as I have always done with you, without reservation or any motive other than that the relations between our countries may become what we have so earnestly desired. The time is critical and delay is dangerous.

If England is indeed fighting for the emancipation of Europe, we are ready to join her in order that the nations of the earth, be they large or small, may live their lives as they may order them and be free from the shadow of autocracy and the spectre of war. If we are to link shields in this mighty cause, then England must recognize the conditions under which alone this can become possible and which we are unable to ignore.

Germany has made no overtures to us looking to a peace conference, but, on the contrary, the German Ambassador gave me a message from his Government yesterday that German public opinion would not at present tolerate the President as a mediator.

It is not the President's thought that a peace conference could be immediately called, and the Allies would have ample time to demonstrate whether or not Germany is indeed in a sinking condition and the deadlock can be broken.

I would suggest that you talk with the three of your colleagues with whom we discussed these matters, for it is something that will not bear delay.

E. M. HOUSE

NEW YORK, *May 23, 1916*

DEAR SIR EDWARD:

... We believe that the war may be ended upon terms that will make its recurrence nearly impossible, if not entirely so. Militarism is, I think, already broken, and any further prosecution of the war will not add to a desirable settlement, but rather prevent it.

We are much more able to influence a just settlement now than we would be if the war continued very much longer, or if we should be drawn into it. The favorable position which the Allies have made for themselves in this country can be used to their advantage, but it is evident that as the war goes on this advantage may lessen day by day.

I am sorry that England does not realize this. England and France seem to think that the coöperation America is willing to give them in a just settlement of the vexatious questions that are sure to follow peace, does not outweigh the doubtful advantage they would gain if Germany were completely crushed. It seems certain if this happens a new set of problems will arise to vex us all.

Your seeming lack of desire to coöperate with us will chill the enthusiasm here — never, I am afraid, to come again, at least in our day. There is a fortunate conjunction of circumstances which makes it possible to bring about the advancement and maintenance of world-wide peace and security, and it is to be hoped that the advantage may not be lost. If it is, the fault will not lie with us.

I am, my dear Sir Edward, with all good wishes,

Sincerely yours

E. M. HOUSE

NEW YORK, *May* 27, 1916

DEAR SIR EDWARD:

... There is one thing to which I wish to call your attention, and that is the German Chancellor's statement that Germany would make peace on the basis of the map as it stands to-day. This cannot mean anything except a victorious peace for Germany. If England and France, under our invitation, should go into a peace conference now, it would probably lead either to Germany's abandonment of this position or war with us.¹

I thought I would call your attention to this, although I take it you have considered it.

Sincerely yours

E. M. HOUSE

Sir Edward's response was a repetition of his earlier reply;

¹ Meaning war between the United States and Germany.

to wit, that he could not act without the consent of France. Until France raised the topic, the British must remain immobile. As he wrote a few weeks later to House, 'No Englishman would at this moment say to France, after Poincaré's and Briand's speeches made in the face of the Verdun struggle, "Hasn't the time come to make peace?"' What mystified the Colonel, however, was England's unwillingness to say to France: 'Here is a chance to get the United States into the war and to show up Germany by accepting Wilson's offer.' It seemed almost as though the British thought that, in offering to help them, Wilson was asking a favor.

Colonel House approached Jusserand once more. The French Ambassador made it plain that the French would listen to no scheme that harbored the word 'peace.' Was it because they distrusted Wilson? Cambon, one remembers, had suggested to Grey that perhaps the President's offer was not serious and had merely been intended as a gesture to conciliate the Allies before the beginning of the presidential campaign. And in Sir Edward's cable there was an intimation that Wilson should negotiate directly with France in order that the French Government 'in this way be sufficiently impressed with his real intentions and good will.'

The French quite conceivably did not place a high value upon American assistance. They appreciated keenly the length of time it had taken the British to put a large army in the field, they knew that we were far less prepared than the British had been, and doubtless felt that the United States could bring no material aid before the issue of the war was decided.¹ Furthermore, American participation might prove

¹ Writing nine years later, House said: 'I have no doubt that when we sent the last word to Grey concerning intervention, the Allies came to much the same opinion as the Germans had come to; that is, we were totally unprepared to help or hurt further than we were doing. The Allies were getting money, foodstuffs, and arms and keeping our ships from going into neutral ports. They probably concluded, as Germany

embarrassing to them if it meant interference with the secret treaties, of which Wilson at this time had no knowledge. Russia had agreed with France that the latter should have a free hand in annexing the Rhineland with its millions of Germans, and Great Britain had agreed to a new French empire in Syria. Such aspirations France might be compelled to renounce under House's plan.

The simplest explanation of the French attitude, however, was that the continuation of the war offered the best and the last chance of eliminating Germany as a dangerous political rival. House evidently inclined to this hypothesis.

'I explained [he recorded of a conference with President Wilson on May 24] France's real feeling; that is, she had best stick to this war until Germany is crushed, for she could never again hope to have Great Britain, Russia, Italy, and Belgium fighting by her side.'

At all events, Jusserand saw no attraction in House's proposition, and the Colonel accepted the Allied refusal regretfully but philosophically.

Colonel House to Sir Edward Grey

NEW YORK, *June 8, 1916*

DEAR SIR EDWARD:

... I had a long conference with the French Ambassador, who came to New York for that purpose. I did not show him the cables sent you nor your replies, but told him in sub-

concluded, that we were doing about as much as we would do if in the war. In addition they probably considered that they would rather have this condition continue than to have our intervention and interference with the terms of peace.

'I do not believe the Allies thought we would make any such effort as we later did, and I believe they were as much surprised as the Germans. ... I believe our big mistake was that we were not in a position to intervene in spite of Allied or German protests.' — Letter to the author, dated April 6, 1925.

stance what was said to you without mentioning your Government.

He thinks France will not consider peace proposals of any sort at this time, no matter how far we might be willing to go towards preventing aggressive wars in the future. The feeling of France is that never again can they ever have as strong a combination fighting with them as now, and they desire to defeat Germany decisively.

I am afraid another year will go by leaving the lines much as they are to-day. I am told, on high authority, that Lord Kitchener thought just this.

What France could probably get out of it now, is peace largely upon the basis of the *status quo ante*, with perhaps Alsace and Lorraine added and Germany given compensation elsewhere, perhaps in Asia Minor.¹ Russia could get a warm seaport and Italy what she is entitled to.² The world at large could have something akin to permanent peace.

The President has gone a long way towards placing upon this country its share of the responsibility for the future. I sometimes feel discouraged when the Allied Governments and press overlook the weight the President has thrown on their side at almost every turn of the war, and pick out some expression he uses, giving it a meaning and importance he never meant. . . .

Unless you have better means of knowing the situation than we have, there does not seem to be much reason for the optimism of the Allies. It is true that the blockade is gnawing Germany and giving her much concern, but our reports are that she can hold out indefinitely as far as the food supply goes.

Your belief that the President's proposal for permanent

¹ This would not suit the Entente diplomats, who had already carved up Asia Minor for the benefit of Russia, France, and Great Britain, and had promised a share to Italy.

² That is, Italian-speaking districts of the Tyrol and Gorizia. Whether Trieste, the population of which was two thirds Italian, and the western coast of Istria ought to go to Italy, Colonel House did not make clear at this time.

peace cannot be successful with a victorious Germany, does not seem to us to enter into the matter, for what is proposed would surely be anything but that.¹ Looking at the situation from this distance, it seems that England might easily be in a worse position later, even though the fortunes of Germany recede. I think it must be looked at not only from the present viewpoint, but from what is likely to come later. In getting rid of the German peril, another might easily be created. The matter requires a dispassionate outlook free from all present prejudices. . . .

As far as I can see, there is nothing to add or to do for the moment; and if the Allies are willing to take the gamble which the future may hold, we must rest content. . . .

Sincerely yours

E. M. HOUSE

In the light of the German documents published after the war, the historian may assert with some dogmatism that in 1916 those in control at Berlin would not have considered for a moment the terms suggested by Colonel House. The yielding of Alsace-Lorraine was farthest from their intentions; their most generous conditions included, on the contrary, broad concessions by France and Belgium. If the Allies accepted the opportunity provided by the American proposal, they might thus, according to its terms, have secured the active assistance of the United States. The student may ask whether they would not thereby have prevented the Russian Revolution. He may further ponder the tremendous saving they might have effected for themselves and the world, both in treasure and in human lives.

¹ As House wrote on June 23: 'It is stupid to refuse our proffered intervention on the terms I proposed in Paris and London. I made it clear to both Governments that in the event of intervention we would not countenance a peace that did not bring with it a plan for permanent peace, as far as human foresight could do. If Germany refused to acquiesce in such a settlement, I promised we would take the part of the Allies and try to force it.'

CHAPTER X

WAR NERVES

They get more and more on edge as the strain becomes severer. There'll soon be very few sane people left in the world.

Ambassador Page to House, June 2, 1916, from London

You cannot conceive of the general breakdown of nerves among this people.

Ambassador Gerard to House, August 30, 1916, from Berlin

I

By refusing the plan which Wilson had offered through House, the Allies postponed the advent of American aid to Europe for the best part of a year. The plan, however, was not without its historical importance, for it led President Wilson to crystallize his ideas as to America's rôle in world affairs and to announce publicly, on May 27, 1916, that henceforth the United States must take active part in world politics. At the same time he advocated the creation of a League of Nations as the mainspring of a reorganized international system.

Wilson had been moving gradually in this direction during the two preceding years. He had cautiously approved House's Great Adventure of 1914, the purpose of which was to establish an understanding between Great Britain, Germany, and the United States in order to tide over the war crisis that threatened. He had accepted with enthusiasm the plan for the Pan-American Pact, which provided for a mutual guaranty of political independence and territorial integrity for all American States. At the beginning of 1916 he had cabled House, for the information of Grey and Balfour, that he was willing to enter a world pact of the same nature. Now he publicly announced the fact, extending to all the world the principles of the proposed Pan-American covenant.

Since the announcement would involve an obvious revolution in American foreign policy, the end of the traditional policy of isolation, House cast about for a suitable occasion upon which such a momentous step might be taken. 'It occurred to me,' he wrote on May 9, 'that the 27th of May, when the League to Enforce Peace meets in Washington, would be the right time to make this proposal, and I am so suggesting to the President. I have arranged with the Secretary of the League to have ex-President Taft, who is President of the League, send another invitation to the President.' The next day a letter from Mr. Taft to Colonel House brought the message inviting Wilson to make the chief speech.

It might have become an even more significant occasion than it proved to be, for as originally planned it was designed to serve a double purpose. In his speech the President would demand the calling of a conference that might end the war, at the same time that he laid down the principles upon which a durable peace must be based. Through all the speech was to run the thesis that henceforth the United States was ready to share with the other nations of the world the responsibilities of mankind for the maintenance of peace and justice.

The discouraging attitude assumed by the Allies, however, convinced Wilson and House that more harm than good would be accomplished by making the demand for an immediate conference. On the eve of delivery, accordingly, they decided to utilize the occasion simply for a general exposition of American foreign policy and American willingness to coöperate in an association of nations.

'We agreed [noted Colonel House on May 24, after a conference with Mr. Wilson] it would be wise in the circumstances to modify greatly the speech he is to make next Saturday before the League to Enforce Peace. He is to treat the subject as we have outlined it, with the exception that he is not to do more than hint at peace. He asked for a pad and

made a memorandum. We divided the subject into four parts, and indicated just how far he should go.'

House recognized fully the extent of the revolution in American policy that was indicated by the terms and the implications of the address. For Wilson threw completely to one side the doctrine of isolation. 'We are participants,' said the President, 'whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia.'

It was therefore with a full consciousness of the seriousness of the step about to be taken that the Colonel worked out the details of the speech with Mr. Wilson. He was confident that the President could capture the moral leadership of mankind through the decisive step he was taking — 'a decision,' House wrote, 'that marks the turning-point in our international relations and in our old-time non-interference policy.'

'I feel sure, if he will follow our present plans all the way through, history will give him one of the highest places among the statesmen of the world. It does not matter whether he mediates or not; but what does matter is for him to strike the high note, the right note, and hold to it regardless of consequences to himself. He can and will become the dominant factor in the situation, because he, of all the statesmen now living, is the only one in a position of power necessary to accomplish the task.'

On May 18 the President had written to House, thanking him for suggestions and asking for more. What would House say if he were going to make the speech and base it upon the understanding he had with Grey as to future guaranties of

peace? Wilson asked also for a copy of a letter he had written him regarding those guaranties, indicating the rather surprising fact that the President did not keep copies of some of his most important letters.

Wilson obviously planned to use the Grey-House understanding as to guaranties as the groundwork of his speech, and to Grey Wilson was largely indebted for the basic idea that underlay his speech: that the World War would not have come if there had been some organized system by which nations could be brought in conference when the crisis arose. Colonel House, it is interesting to note, urged Wilson to avoid the advocacy of a complicated mechanism at this stage — such as the League to Enforce Peace put forward — and to confine himself to generalities until the nations accepted the idea of association. Then, as later in the contest with the Senate, House did not want the principle to be endangered by a dispute over details.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, May 19, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I am sending you some data to look over which may be of service to you in formulating your speech.

Norman Angell gave me the quotations from the speeches of Asquith, Grey, Balfour, and others, and Bryce's article in *The New Republic* has a direct bearing upon the same subject.

My reason for thinking the programme of the League to Enforce Peace impracticable at this time is that I believe the first thing to do is to get the Governments to agree to stand together for the things which you have so admirably outlined in your letter to me and which I in substance cabled to Grey.¹

¹ A letter of May 16, in which Wilson summarizes his proposal in a sentence which, with slight alterations, became the chief sentence of his

When there is a committal upon these points, then the question of putting them into practical use will arise and some such tribunal as they suggest may be worked out. . . .

As soon as you begin to discuss details, you will find differences arising that might obscure the real issue.

I shall write you further Sunday.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

NEW YORK, May 21, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I am sending you my thoughts on the speech you have in hand. It is roughly and quickly done and is no more than a suggestion. . . .

I hope you will show Lansing the speech before it is delivered. He might be useful and he would surely be offended if he did not know of this important step.

I am writing hastily but with deep affection.

Your devoted

E. M. HOUSE

The draft which Colonel House enclosed in his letter of May 21 is of historical interest because of the extent to which the President utilized it in the address of May 27, an address which sums up the gist of his international aims during the following years.¹ Wilson's later speeches were merely a

speech: 'An universal alliance to maintain freedom of the seas and to prevent any war begun either (a) contrary to treaty covenants or (b) without full warning and full inquiry — a virtual guaranty of territorial integrity and political independence.' (Quoted in Diary of Colonel House, May 17, 1916.) In the speech Wilson changed *alliance* to read *association of the nations*; *freedom of the seas* to read *the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world*, (in order to assure the British that the suggestion was not directed against their restrictions on trade as much as against the submarine); *full inquiry* to read *full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world*.

¹ See Appendix to chapter, for a comparison of House's draft and the final text of Wilson's address.

refinement of details and a development of the ideas contained in this address.

Underlying the entire address ran the thought of the failure of diplomacy and the impotence of Europe as manifested in the outbreak and the prolongation of the war. A new system was essential to safeguard the principles which, Wilson insisted, must serve as the basis of international relations. Those principles he underlined carefully:

‘First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. . . .

‘Second, that the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon.

‘And, third, that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations.’

These were the principles which Wilson had already emphasized in his Mobile address, but he now carried his policy from a negative and abstract to a positive and concrete position, by indicating a definite mechanism to enforce them. In order to maintain those principles, international coöperation must be substituted for anarchy and conflict through ‘an universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world — a virtual guaranty of territorial integrity and political independence.’ Thus was the verbiage of the Pan-American Pact extended to cover a projected world pact; it was to become of increasing importance, until, as Article X of the League of Nations Covenant, it seemed to Wilson the heart of the entire settlement.

II

There were some who at the time realized the significance of this address which promised to the rest of the world the help of the United States in maintaining security, peace, and justice. Mr. Brand Whitlock wrote from Brussels to Colonel House: 'It is the most important announcement concerning our foreign policy since the announcement of the Monroe Doctrine, although it will take many years before this fact is brought into relief and fully understood.'

Colonel House himself felt that Wilson was creating a great opportunity by his public exposition of the ideas over which the two had worked together, and which House believed to be fully in consonance with those of British liberals. Characteristically, after giving all the help in his power, he had not gone to hear the address and had not seen Wilson's final draft. This was perhaps unfortunate, for the President introduced a brief phrase, entirely unconnected with the body of his address and entirely unnecessary, which might be interpreted to indicate indifference to the meaning of the war. It was a fatal habit with the President, who vitiated the effect of his most important utterances, on at least four occasions, by the use of phrases subject to misinterpretation.¹

'I am delighted with the President's speech [noted the Colonel on May 28]. He has followed the suggestions I made more closely than I thought he would. . . . I hope the country and the world will rise to his call. There was one unfortunate phrase about the war; i.e., when he says, "with its causes and objects we are not concerned." The Allies will overlook all the good in it and accentuate this. It is a great speech, and, as I wrote the President, will be a landmark in history. It marks a beginning of the new and the decline of the old order

¹ 'Too proud to fight.' 'With its causes and objects we are not concerned.' 'The objects on both sides . . . are virtually the same as stated in general terms to their own people and the world.' 'Peace without victory.'

of statesmanship. It is in line with the President's Inaugural Address and his Mobile speech.'

As House had foreseen, the real significance of Wilson's announcement was lost upon the Allies, who passed over the whole address to criticize a single phrase. It is possible that in the state of Europe's mind, nothing could have pleased them, for the war was beginning to touch the belligerents' nerves and to create an irritability that destroyed perspective. A few of the British liberals responded cordially. 'It is a great thing,' wrote Lord Loreburn to House, 'that men should uphold ideals when in the seat of power. I am profoundly convinced that this frightful materialism and the bestial views of life which it breeds will be overthrown, not by arms but by the inevitable predominance of moral forces, when this horrible war is over. Meanwhile Europe is steadily committing suicide and that will bring disaster to the other continents of the world as well.'

Lord Bryce also wrote to House more than once of the encouragement which Wilson's speech brought to those in England who were working for a plan to prevent aggression and wanton breaches of the peace of the world. Without America, Bryce insisted, there would be small hope of progress; with America much might be done. He promised that he would do his best to make the President's declaration better known and that, so soon as the end of the war came in sight, prominence would be given to the League of Nations, with emphasis upon the importance of American approval of the idea.

But the general impression of the President's speech among the Allies was that he was placing France and England on the same plane as Germany; that if Wilson did not know that the Kaiser started the war and that the Allies were fighting to protect the rights of small nations, he ought

not to make speeches; and in any case, Bernstorff had fooled him and the speech was merely a lever to start a German peace drive and the Allies had better not pay any attention to it.

Sir Horace Plunkett to Colonel House

DUBLIN, June 7, 1916

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

... Unquestionably, the misunderstanding of the President's Peace League speech has done immense harm to the popular feeling in England. . . . I took the words 'With its causes and objects we are not concerned' to mean that the United States had absolutely no part or responsibility in the outbreak of the war, that the immediate issues were restricted to the international relations in Europe and that, whatever objects were sought by the belligerents, whether in Europe, in Asia or in Africa, were equally no concern to your country. On the other hand, principles which vitally concerned the whole of western civilization were at stake and the neutral rights which had been prejudiced were largely American.

All this, of course, is perfectly true, but you cannot prevent people in these stirring times seizing upon some sentence — the shorter the better, because the easier remembered — and putting their own interpretation upon it. . . .

Very sincerely yours

HORACE PLUNKETT

Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House

LONDON, May 30, 1916

DEAR HOUSE:

... The President's peace speech before the League for the Enforcement of Peace has created confusion. Some things in it were so admirably said that the British see that he does understand, and some things in it seem to them to imply that

he doesn't in the least understand the war and show, as they think, that he was speaking only to the gallery filled with peace cranks . . . They are therefore skittish about the President. . . .

They can't quite see what the President is driving at. Hence they say, as you will observe from the enclosed clippings, that he is merely playing politics.

To that extent, therefore, the waters are somewhat muddied again. The peace racket doesn't assuage anybody: it raises doubts and fears — fears that we won't understand the war at all. . . .

But you can read these few clippings (I do not send you a lot of scurrilous ones, as I might) as well as I can. . . .

Heartily yours

W. H. P.

P.S. *June 2, 1916.* The confounded flurry gets worse. There is just now more talk in London about the American (and the President's) 'inability to understand the war' and about our falling into the German peace-talk trap than there is about the war itself. The President's sentence about our not being concerned with the *objects* of the war is another too-proud-to-fight, as the English view it. I have moods in which I lose my patience with them and I have to put on two muzzles and a tight corset to hold myself in.

But peace-talk doesn't go down here now, and the less we indulge in it, the better. The German peace-talk game has made the very word offensive to Englishmen.

Then, too, they get more and more on edge as the strain becomes severer. There'll soon be very few sane people left in the world.

W. H. P.

What troubled House chiefly was that Sir Edward Grey himself, although he approved naturally the main thought of the speech and wrote to House, 'I read the speech in the light

of my talks with you and welcomed it,' seemed to share somewhat the generally critical attitude. He complained that Wilson had introduced 'mention of the security of the highway of the seas . . . without any definition of what is meant,' which made the British press suspicious.¹ Grey also noted the chilling effect of the phrase relating to the causes and objects of the war.

House admitted fully Wilson's mistake in phraseology, as useless as it was harmful, and attributed it to the President's failure to study European opinion.

'I wish the President [he noted on June 23] would pay more attention to foreign affairs. He seems to be interested mainly in domestic matters, which bears out his own assertion that he has "a one-track mind." I do not believe he reads Gerard's or Penfield's letters, which come to me through him and are sent in that way for his information as well as mine. If he would keep himself informed, he would not destroy his influence abroad as he does from time to time by things he says in his speeches.'

Even so, Colonel House could not entirely repress an exclamation of impatience at the inability of Europe to appreciate the significance of Wilson's proposal. Her statesmen had complained of American aloofness and had insisted to House that nothing could be secure in the world without American help. But they evinced little interest and no enthusiasm when the President made his declaration.

'The President's proposal for permanent peace [wrote House on June 23] has had no response whatever from official Great Britain or France. The only murmur we have

¹ Obviously what the President meant was that neutral trade should be free alike from the vexatious restrictions of the British Admiralty as well as from the murderous attacks of German submarines.

had has been of criticism; in France because of some expression of no consequence, and in Great Britain because of the proposal for a measurable freedom of the seas. It is not the people who speak, but their masters, and some day, I pray, the voice of the people may have direct expression in international affairs as they are beginning to have it in national affairs.’¹

‘I have come to feel [wrote House to Page] that if the Allies cannot see more clearly in the future than they have in the past, it is hardly worth while for us to bother as much as we have.’

III

Unquestionably, Mr. Wilson was emotionally affected by the unresponsive attitude of the Allies, and the more so that Germany, yielding to his insistence upon the submarine issue, was furnishing no further trouble. France and England had disregarded his offer of immediate help to force reasonable peace terms on the Germans, and they paid no attention to his offer of future help to ensure the settlement. And yet the Allied press complained that the President was blind to the issues of the war and that the American people thought only of their dollars. A less sensitive man than Wilson would have been irritated and, like the belligerents, the President showed signs of nerves that were rasped. From this period dates his suspicion of Allied motives in the war, which was not entirely dissipated by co-partnership against Germany after 1917 and was intensified during the Peace Conference.

The British did not help the situation by increasing the restrictions on neutral trade during the summer of 1916. After some weeks of the Allied attack upon the Somme, it

¹ On the other hand, one may ask whether the difficulty lay so much in the repression of popular sentiment as in the irritating effect exercised by war emotions upon the public mind which prevented reasoning judgment.

became obvious that this offensive, like the German onslaught on Verdun, would prove impotent to end the war. British General Headquarters expressed satisfaction because Germans were being killed in great numbers; their losses were perhaps almost as great as those of the Allies. But British politicians felt that progress was slow, and public opinion demanded that the blockade be further tightened.

After long delay the British and French had replied to the American note of protest of the previous autumn. It did not make for a cordial understanding. An American correspondent of Sir Horace Plunkett, who was a stalwart advocate of Anglo-American friendship, criticized the note in a letter to Sir Horace in almost the same terms as those applied by Ambassador Page to the State Department protests:

‘Having just re-read Sir Edward Grey’s recent reply to the American note of last November, I have lost heart. As he has taken six months to consider the matter, I suppose the reply is definitive.

‘Its tone is that of a clever debater who dodges essentials (he ignores the Zamora decision) and who tries to “score points” off his opponent on details. There is no suggestion of a desire towards conciliation, to meet and smooth out difficulties, no effort to lay the foundations of a real accord.

‘You know how anxious I am to see a real Entente arrived at. I am convinced that there is no serious conflict of interest and ideals. But this reply is utterly discouraging. . . .

‘We who are friendly to Britain and want a feeling of friendship to supersede the present distrust, can do nothing without your help. I cannot, for instance, see any immediate gain to Britain in taking half a hundred suspects off the American ship *China* which can compensate for the hard feeling such an incident arouses. And then to add jeers to outrage, Sir Edward says he did it to save us trouble. Our police might have been bothered by the unneutral acts these

passengers might have committed!... If Sir Edward had tried hard, he could scarcely have contrived anything which would more surely be a damp on the pro-English ardor of such Americans as myself. . . .

'We cannot persuade ourselves that all the errors are on our side. We are ready to make large concessions in the cause of friendliness, but we cannot give up our claim to have a right to an opinion of our own in matters which seem as vital to us as this question of International Law at sea. . . . I do not see any hope of more cordial relations until it is generally recognized in England that all the neutrals feel that they have a real grievance against Britain. I do not want to argue over the right or wrong of the neutral attitude — the important thing is an understanding of how they actually do feel about it.

"'Blood is thicker than water,'" "We are fighting your fight," "We have drawn the sword on behalf of International Law," "We are defending the rights of small nations," such assertions have little effect in America, when every letter from a European neutral which slips past your censor to us, tells of real or fancied wrongs suffered at your hands, when every effort of ours to reach an accord is met by scornful rebuffs.'

The effect of the Anglo-French reply to American protests was the more unfortunate in that it was received in the midst of the *Sussex* crisis, at the moment when the entire attention of the State Department was concentrated on relations with Germany. No one who knew the officials of the British Foreign Office believed that it was their intention to utilize the crisis so 'as to slip across an unsatisfactory answer unnoticed.'¹ But the British Ambassador himself recognized that the occasion was not entirely auspicious and Colonel House, who was usually charitable and always objective, described the sending of the reply at that time as stupid.

¹ This suggestion was actually made.

'April 19, 1916: Gaunt came after Morgenthau left [recorded the Colonel] to deliver a message he had received in cypher from the British Ambassador, asking my advice as to whether the Anglo-French note just received should be delivered to the State Department or withheld. I advised withholding for the present, in order that it might not become entangled with our controversy with Germany.

'April 21, 1916: The lack of intelligence displayed by diplomatists among the belligerents is past understanding. The stupid things each of the Governments do from time to time makes one skeptical of the final outcome of a peace settlement. . . . The sending of their answer to our notes at this time is an incredible performance.

'A small illustration of their methods may be seen in having Lord X bring an important letter from Sir Edward Grey, which X later casually sends to me in New York, instead of delivering it himself. When I mentioned this to Captain Gaunt, he was dumbfounded.

'April 22, 1916: Captain Gaunt called at dinner time. He had a letter from the British Ambassador, asking him to get my opinion as to whether the Anglo-French note should be delivered Monday and whether certain passages which he pointed out should be emphasized and given to the press. I gave an affirmative answer to each question. . . . Since it is here and since it is known that it has come, it might as well go in.'

A month later another upset of nerves threatened and over an equally small detail, when the American counter-protest, in answer to the Allied explanation of mail seizures, was sent to the British without a duplicate to the French. The control of trade restrictions had naturally been taken by the British, and the participation of the French was largely a matter of form. House had pointed out to Grey the danger of not sharing with the French the opprobrium of the blockade

and the Allied note was sent jointly by both Powers. This seemed to escape the notice of our State Department, which in matters of trade thought only of the British. Fortunately there was time to remedy the omission, naturally disturbing to Grey, who evidently feared that some sinister influence was at work in Washington.

Sir Edward Grey to Ambassador Spring-Rice

[Telegram]

LONDON, May 23, 1916

It was not due in the first instance to the special initiative of His Majesty's Government that action was taken in regard to the mails. His Majesty's Government have acted in common with the French Government, and some, at any rate, of the complaints in regard to seizure and delay are not due to the action of the British authorities at all.

The British Government entirely concurred in the ground on which we are acting, but it was, as a matter of fact, adopted by them on a note drawn up by the French Government which was therefore presented by the two Governments jointly in French.

The two Governments carry out all blockade operations jointly and French cruisers take part in our patrols. The assent and coöperation of the French Government are obtained for the carrying out of every modification of the blockade policy of His Majesty's Government, modifications sometimes being instigated by the French.

The selection of cases for which the British Government are alone believed to be responsible to the exclusion of all others, and the sending of a separate note to us, would in the circumstances be felt in the United Kingdom to be unfair and unfriendly.

It is very well known to the State Department that we cannot reply to their note or alter our procedure in this matter except in agreement with the French Government,

and that for us to reply without consulting them would be equivalent to a breach of the alliance with France. We are accustomed to attempts made by Germany to discriminate between the Allies with a view to separating them and to put one in an invidious position with regard to the other, but an analogous procedure by the United States Government was not expected.

The note not having yet arrived, this must not be understood as making any complaint of its contents before receipt; but you should point out to the Secretary of State unofficially and verbally in advance the considerations urged above as to the presentation of a note to all on this subject separately to His Majesty's Government.

I shall also tell the American Ambassador to-morrow what my feelings are. The procedure which the State Department is adopting is the one most calculated to make the feeling in the United States yet stronger and beyond control.

E. GREY

'May 23, 1916: Gaunt has just returned from Washington [recorded Colonel House], and gave me a copy of a despatch which the British Ambassador had received from Sir Edward Grey. . . .

'Gaunt was much disturbed, and so, it seems, is Grey. They wish us to send a duplicate note to France regarding mail seizures. They appear to have just waked up to the fact that it is not a good thing for Great Britain to take all the burden of responsibility. . . .

'May 24, 1916 [conference with President Wilson in New York]: I showed him Sir Edward Grey's note to the British Ambassador, and was surprised to hear him say that our note had already gone to the British Government. I asked him to send at once a duplicate to France, which he agreed to do. He thought it would be wise for me to cable Grey that this was being done. I handed him a pad and asked him to write what he thought should be sent. . . .

'Miss Denton coded it at once. The President seems entirely satisfied to accept my judgment of her discretion, and he knows that no one excepting himself, myself, and Miss Denton have knowledge of these confidential negotiations. . . .

'Gaunt said the British Ambassador was much exercised at the harshness of our note on mail seizures sent to the British and French Governments. He thought the same object might be accomplished by a softer tone. I am not sure he is right. It looks as if a club was necessary before they take any notice.'

Colonel House to Sir Edward Grey

[Telegram]

NEW YORK, May 24, 1916

I can assure you, on the authority of the President, that no thought of putting separate responsibility on Great Britain has ever been entertained here and that no influences to that end are at work in the State Department.

The cases complained of with regard to the mails have all arisen out of the action of British authorities, but a duplicate note will be sent to the French Government.

EDWARD HOUSE

Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House

[Telegram]

LONDON, May 26, 1916

Much relieved note about mails is to be addressed both to France and ourselves. . . .

E. GREY

The incident illustrates the value of the informal relations which House had developed with Grey and which enabled him to settle a matter of detail and yet of importance smoothly and expeditiously. Unfortunately, no amount of diplomacy could remove the basic opposition of the two

countries, which led House later to affirm that but for the murderous and the equally illegal maritime methods of Germany, it would have been next to impossible to avoid war with Great Britain. Neither the British nor the Americans could yield; they were controlled by their material interests and by the force of public opinion, which on both sides gave indication of increasing incapacity to look at the problem without irritability.

Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House

LONDON, June 16, 1916

DEAR HOUSE:

... Sir Edward (and other men in high position) are a good deal disturbed lest the American Government continue to harp on the blockade. They won't relax it; they can't. Public opinion wouldn't stand it an hour. As things are now, an Admiral has said in a public speech in London that it is necessary to hang Grey if they're going to win the war. We've planted ourselves firmly on (1) we've stated our position on the international law involved; our record on that score stands; and (2) we've cleared the ground for claims for damages. As I see it, that's all we can do — unless we are prepared to break off relations with Great Britain and get ready for war, after arbitrators have failed.

The greatest damage done has been done by the tone and content of the Trade Department's instructions. . . .

Heartily yours

W. H. P.

Colonel House to Ambassador W. H. Page

NEW LONDON, NEW HAMPSHIRE
June 30, 1916

DEAR PAGE:

... I am sorry to hear you say that the British are inflexible concerning the blockade, for I am afraid before Con-

gress adjourns trouble will develop there. They tell me so in Washington. The people feel particularly irritated over the mails. . . .

Sincerely yours

E. M. HOUSE

The situation was not improved when, on July 18, the British Government made public a list of more than eighty business firms in the United States with whom British subjects were forbidden to trade because of their commercial relations with enemies of the Allies. The total number of boycotted firms in neutral countries amounted to about fifteen hundred.

To many Americans it appeared obvious that the scope and effect of such a blacklist must necessarily be harsh and unfair. It added little to the effectiveness of the blockade of Germany, for already the trade of suspect American firms had been closely restricted and the number of American firms listed, in view of the total, was small. But the wording of the blacklisting order achieved in the United States a maximum of discontent. British steamship companies were warned not to receive cargoes from proscribed firms, and neutral lines understood that if they accepted freight from them they were likely to be denied coal at British ports. Neutral bankers feared to grant loans to blacklisted firms, and neutral merchants hesitated to contract for their goods. Other firms were given to understand that they might be placed upon the blacklist at any time and without notice.

Counsellor Polk to Colonel House

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1916

DEAR COLONEL:

. . . This blacklisting order of the English, which has just come out, is causing tremendous irritation and we will have to do something. It is nothing new and if the British Government would only keep quiet it could have been handled

comparatively easily, but . . . they did it, of course, in a wrong way. . . .

Yours faithfully

FRANK H. POLK

President Wilson was still more disturbed. On July 23, he wrote to House that Page had been called back from London, and expressed the hope that he might thereby get something of the American point of view. As to the British and the Allies, Wilson confessed that he was near the end of his patience and felt that the blacklist was the last straw. He had spoken frankly to the British Ambassador about it, and both Spring-Rice and Jusserand regarded it as a blunder. The President had at last reached the point where he considered asking Congress to authorize him to prohibit loans and restrict exportation to the Allies. He reported that he was concocting a very sharp note to Germany on the submarine. He wanted House's judgment.

Colonel House had taken to the woods in a double sense, after the Allied refusal of the American offer of assistance; for he expected no important developments during the summer and he sought to avoid the thousand and one questions that were brought to his consideration, and the innumerable personal visits which formed his daily routine when he was on the North Shore. He spent the summer in New Hampshire.

'*May 31, 1916: Sunapee is nine miles from a railroad and four miles from a post-office. I purposely selected this isolated spot in order to be free from interruptions. At our usual abiding place on the North Shore of Massachusetts, I should have been disturbed every hour. At Sunapee I can rest and read and think. It is so remote from the beaten path that some one has said, "It is one of those places you start for but never reach."*

From his retreat, Colonel House advised Washington to act with circumspection in dealing with the Allies. They were perhaps ill-advised in their methods and blind to their opportunities, but ultimate coöperation between them and the United States he believed to be inevitable. In the meantime the dispute should be smoothed over wherever possible. Their attitude resulted largely from a failure to grasp the strength of the American determination to maintain trade rights and a sort of instinctive feeling, perhaps, that the high seas were British property. The sensible solution of the difficulty was a clear but confidential reiteration of the American point of view.

Colonel House to Counsellor Polk

NEW LONDON, NEW HAMPSHIRE
July 25, 1916

MY DEAR FRIEND:

Your letter of July 22 comes to me along with one from the President.

He seems very much disturbed and inclined to take drastic measures. . . .

It would be better if we could get what we are after without taking such a positive stand publicly. It is the publicity of these things that always does the harm and to which they object. They have told me repeatedly that if we would tell them confidentially our position, they would try to meet it. I think you would get the same effect on the American public in this way, for they would understand what had happened. Anyway, the record would show. . . .

I am delighted that you have succeeded in bringing Page home. . . . As a matter of fact, if he had said to the British Government what the President and you have said to Spring-Rice, this blacklist order would never have been published.

When he comes, I hope too that he may be sent west to get a complete bath of American opinion. . . .

Sincerely yours

E. M. HOUSE

Colonel House to the President

NEW LONDON, NEW HAMPSHIRE
July 25, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . I am sorry that a crisis has arisen with Great Britain and the Allies. . . . Before asking Congress for authority to prohibit loans and restrict exportations, I would suggest that you let Jusserand and Spring-Rice inform their Governments that you intend to do this unless they immediately change their method of procedure. I would explain to them that you did not have much leeway, because of the probable early adjournment of Congress, and therefore had to ask them to move with celerity.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

In August, Mr. Polk wrote again to House that the seizure of American mails by the Allies was still irritating the situation, and that it was impossible apparently to extract from them any reply to the American note of protest. He saw nothing for it but to give the President power to restrict American exportations and loans at his discretion, as a form of reprisal. 'I know it is a dangerous subject to touch,' he said, 'but I feel that it would be a good idea for the President to get some powers from Congress, to be used as a club for Great Britain if they do not give some real relief on trade interference. Their position has been most unsatisfactory.'

Polk's advice was followed, and in September, just before the adjournment of Congress, that body voted to the

President power to take drastic retaliatory measures. On September 8, Congress also proceeded to vote the largest naval appropriation ever passed by any legislative body of a state not at war. The bill provided for the construction of 137 new vessels of all classes, and would place the United States a close second among the world naval powers.¹

Those two steps, coming so closely together, raised the question as to whether the United States Government was preparing actually to dispute by force the mastery of the seas held by the British. House, who had returned from his retreat in the woods, warned the President of the danger of creating such an impression, and of the difficult position the United States would be in if, at the end of the war, the friendship of a victorious Allied group had been completely alienated. Wilson, who felt less sympathy with the Allies at this period than at any other, seemed indifferent and willing to take the consequences.

'The President came to my sitting-room in the morning [noted Colonel House on September 24], and we spent several hours going over foreign affairs, principally our differences with Great Britain. Page had left a mass of memoranda, which the President read aloud. I also gave him my last letters from Sir Edward Grey, Lord Bryce, Noel Buxton, and others. It was my opinion that the real difference with Great Britain now was that the United States had undertaken to build a great navy; that our commerce was expanding beyond all belief; and we were rapidly taking the position Germany occupied before the war. No one in England would probably admit that the things I mentioned were causing the growing irritation against us, but it was a fact nevertheless. The President replied: "Let us build a navy

¹ Writing on March 14, 1925, Colonel House says: 'I threshed this out thoroughly in Paris at the armistice proceedings and later at the Peace Conference, and many of the British and American authorities thought the bill would make us not equal but superior to any navy in the world.'

bigger than hers and do what we please." I reminded him that Germany had undertaken to do that and Great Britain had checked her before she could accomplish her purpose, and in the spring of 1914 I had predicted that she would. I thought it unlikely the British would be willing to permit us to build a navy equal to theirs if they could prevent it.'

Grey was worrying about more immediate contingencies. He has since confessed that his chief fear was that the United States would decide to convoy American merchant boats with warships. In such an event the blockaders either would have to permit passage, which would mean the end of the blockade, or would attempt to stop the convoy by force, which would mean war.

Feelings were further ruffled by the suspicion in England that the American attitude was based less upon principle than upon anti-British sentiment, which unquestionably had been stimulated by the treatment of the Irish problem following the Easter rebellion. Sir Horace Plunkett wrote to House: 'The Irish situation has been mishandled in a way which beats even the record of British blundering in my unfortunate country.' American sympathy blindly concentrated upon the treatment of the Irish prisoners, which was probably not the mishandling to which Plunkett referred, and found expression in a Senate resolution. This did not ease official relations with Great Britain.

Lord Grey¹ to Colonel House

LONDON, August 28, 1916

DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

... I hope the United States will make it clear that in all questions of international law taken up by them, it is the merits of the question and not the unpopularity of Great Britain or anti-British feeling that is the motive force.

¹ Grey had been raised to the peerage as Viscount Grey of Fallodon.

We are not favourably impressed by the action of the Senate in having passed a resolution about the Irish prisoners, though they have taken no notice of outrages in Belgium and massacres of Armenians. These latter were outrageous and unprovoked, whereas the only unprovoked thing in recent Irish affairs was the rising itself which for a few days was a formidable danger. I enclose a short summary that was drawn up here as relevant to the Senate resolution, though we have not yet sent it to the President. The natural question on the action of the Senate is, 'Why if humanity is their motive do they ignore the real outrages in Belgium, etc.? . . .'

Yours sincerely

GREY OF FALLODON

IV

With Ambassador Page, who had been called to the United States on leave, House discussed the problem of friendly relations with Great Britain; but the two were unable to discover any solution. Page felt strongly that the United States, having made its protests, should leave the whole question for arbitration after the war. House did not regard this as practicable, inasmuch as there was no indication how long the war would last, and in the meantime injury might be done to American trade which no arbitral decision or indemnity could repair.

'*September 25, 1916:* Walter Page called this afternoon [he wrote] and we had a two-hour conference. I cannot see that his frame of mind has altered. He is as pro-British as ever and cannot see the American point of view. He hit Lansing wherever he could, but expressed profound regard for the President — a feeling I am afraid he exaggerates. He complained that Lansing discusses matters with the British Ambassador without informing him. At the same

time he told me with some satisfaction that Lansing said the British Ambassador was totally unfit for his duties, and should be replaced by some one with a more equable temperament and one who had a better understanding of the situation. Page does not know that Lansing's opinion of the British Ambassador is perhaps a shade higher than his opinion of Page himself.

'He said the British resent our trying to bring about peace. . . . I did not think this was as ignoble an effort as it seemed to Page. He declares none of us understand the situation or the high purposes of the British in this war. I replied that we resented some of the cant and hypocrisy indulged in by the British; for instance, as to Belgium. Page admitted that the British would have been found fighting with France even if France had violated Belgium in order to reach German territory more effectively.

'I asked Page if he thought the irritation apparent in Great Britain had increased because of our naval programme, and whether we were not getting in the same position, from the British viewpoint, as Germany. I spoke of the traditional friendship between Germany and Great Britain, which existed until Germany began to cut into British trade and to plan a navy large enough to become formidable; and I wondered whether they did not see us as a similar menace both as to their trade and supremacy of the seas.

'Page thought not, and yet he said Great Britain would never allow us to have a navy equal or superior to theirs. If we built, they would build more, although they would do it in a friendly spirit.

'Page thought good relations might have been brought about with Great Britain had we acted differently. This irritated me, and I told of the number of ways in which the United States had shown friendship and partiality for the Allies, only to find our relations worse now than at the beginning of the war. I ventured the opinion if we sent Bernstorff

home and entered the war, we would be applauded for a few weeks and then they would demand money. If the money was forthcoming, they would be satisfied for a period, but later would demand an unlimited number of men. If we did it all, they would finally accuse us of trying to force them to give better terms to Germany than were warranted.'

House's prognostications were to be justified with curious correctness during the course of the next two years; and his foresight as to the character of Allied demands and his understanding of the European attitude toward America explain much of the service he later was to render the cause of inter-Allied coöperation. He confessed his discouragement at the prospect, as news came to him from all directions of the friction developing between English and Americans in the early autumn of 1916.

'This has been an interesting day [he recorded on September 20]. Frederick Dixon, of the *Christian Science Monitor*, called at the instance of the British Ambassador to acquaint me with the feeling in Great Britain and France regarding the retaliatory measures passed by the last Congress. Dixon believes the tension is greater than we realize. He had long talks, when he was in England, with both Grey and Cecil, and, while Grey was moderate as usual, Cecil said if we attempted to put such measures into effect it would probably mean breaking off diplomatic relations and the withdrawing of all trade. That I look upon as in the nature of a bluff. . . .

'X [of the State Department] expressed much concern over our strained relations with Great Britain, which are growing worse rather than better. He attributes it to the two Ambassadors, Page and Spring-Rice. Of the two Spring-Rice is more to blame, because Page is *persona grata* in London and creates no irritation, since he wholly agrees with the British point of view. Spring-Rice, on the other

hand, irritates and is himself irritable. Phillips thinks Spring-Rice constantly sends word to London leading them to believe we are anxious to have a row with them.'

Following his principles and habits, Colonel House set himself to smooth out the irritation by frank and friendly discussion. The greater the difficulties with any Power, the more important it was to keep in close touch with its representatives. Thus on the day after his conversation with Phillips, the Colonel noted:

'Ambassador Spring-Rice and Captain Gaunt took lunch with me. Sir Cecil was at his best, and no man can be more charming than he. We spent a delightful two hours together and ironed out several matters of an irritating nature. I telephoned Polk at Washington and asked him about one matter in controversy, and received an explanation which was entirely satisfactory to the Ambassador. When Polk began to explain, what he said was so lucid that I turned the receiver toward Sir Cecil so that he might hear just what Polk was saying. . . .

'The Ambassador and I arranged to keep in closer touch, and he asked if he might let me know in advance when he saw breakers ahead, so I might take a hand in averting trouble. We parted in great good humor, as we always do when he is in an amiable mood.'

With Jusserand also, House maintained intimate relations. Upon him he impressed very frankly his criticism of Allied conduct of the war, for House did not believe in the war of exhaustion. It might indeed bring final victory to the Allies, but at a cost far beyond the value of the ultimate gain. Peace purchased at such a price would leave Europe helpless — as, indeed, she already was — to solve her problems without assistance from outside.

'October 10, 1916: The French Ambassador called at ten o'clock [recorded House] and remained for an hour. I found him less aggressive and not quite so firm in his assertion that France would fight until complete victory crowned her efforts. I called attention to what I considered the mistakes of the Allies. It was reiteration, but I wish to reiterate until I impress my point of view upon him. He admitted I had been right in many of my forecasts. I again predicted that the Allies would not make material advances on the western front, and, if victory should come, it would be by putting Austria out of commission in Southeastern Europe. . . .

'I insisted that the Allies made a mistake in not carrying out the tentative agreement we made in Paris and London last February, which would have brought the war to a close in all probability and would have given France a favorable peace. If not, it would have involved us in the struggle.'

A new crisis threatened in early October, when a German submarine, the U-53, entered Newport Harbor and, after remaining a few hours, put out to sea and, close to Nantucket (but outside territorial waters), proceeded to sink a number of boats. The whole affair was conducted according to the rules of cruiser warfare, for warning was given in each case, and in visiting Newport the submarine observed all conventions limiting duration of stay. The British, however, were appalled by the vision of the extending radius of submarine activity and, in their vexation, did not hesitate to criticize the United States. Mr. Polk felt that British suspicion of American negligence in its treatment of the submarine was due largely to the nervous irritability that daily became more manifest and to their misunderstanding of the circumstances. Fortunately, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice viewed the matter calmly, and Mr. Polk himself handled the crisis with diplomatic skill.

‘October 9, 1916: Captain Gaunt came at four o’clock [noted House]. I have never seen him quite so perturbed. The sinking of six vessels by U-53, just off our coast, was a little too much for even his staunch nerves. I counselled calmness until we could see where we stood. I am always afraid some one will precipitate trouble when a moment’s quiet will carry one over a crisis.’

Ambassador W. H. Page to Secretary Lansing

[Telegram]

LONDON, October 18, 1916

Lord Grey in a purely private conversation informs me that his speech last night in the House of Lords was an effort to hold back the almost fierce public feeling here against our Government till we shall officially make known the facts about the German U-53 submarine. He expressed the hope that we may very soon publish the facts.

The newspapers have reported that the submarine was given an opportunity at Newport to ascertain the movements and whereabouts of British and neutral ships, and went forth at once and sunk them. Lord Grey said to me: ‘I do not know whether that be true or not, but, if it is true, let me put this question to you: Suppose a British cruiser had gone into Newport and got similar information and had gone out and stopped neutral ships and searched them for contraband in these same waters, would we not have received a protest immediately?’

Then he added: ‘If a German submarine be allowed by the American Government to sink neutral ships so near to American waters, the British Prime Minister will push the British Government to search neutral ships for contraband in the same waters.’

While he confessed to strong feeling about the matter himself, he declared he would not make any judgment till the official facts were made known, but that he could not

prevent premature judgment by others and that a very strong public feeling was fast rising because of our Government's silence.

There is abundant confirmation of this fierce public feeling. The subject is the prevailing topic of conversation everywhere. The public discussed the phase of the subject mentioned by Lord Grey, but they are asking particularly whether it be true that our destroyers obeyed the German Commander's order to get out of his way so that he might sink neutral ships. On this phase of the subject, Earl (not Viscount) Grey made a speech in the House of Lords last night, contrasting with the reported action of the Commander of our destroyer the conduct of the British Commander at Manila as Admiral Dewey himself explained it to Grey. They also talked of Bernstorff's reported declaration that Germany was keeping her pledge to us while her submarines are constantly sinking merchant ships without warning and with loss of life in the far North Sea and the Mediterranean.

The British public are disposed to construe our longer silence as an unwillingness even to protest to Germany about the exploits of the U-53.

PAGE

The natural tendency of a belligerent nation to accept rumor for truth, thus resulted in strong anti-American feeling in Great Britain, where it was not understood that the actions of the U-53 were entirely in accord with the usages of naval warfare and that the accusations levelled against the American destroyers were without foundation. Mr. Polk very properly took the position that the State Department was quite willing to answer questions, but certainly would not volunteer any explanation or put itself in the position of explaining anything.

Counsellor Polk to Colonel House

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1916

MY DEAR COLONEL:

. . . To my mind, it is up to the British to discuss this thing with us, if they wish any information. They could do it in a friendly spirit that would not be offensive. Spring-Rice invited me to luncheon to-day. He was most cordial and said he kept away from the Department, as he felt that it would cause too much gossip in the papers if he called. He asked no questions at first; but I rather encouraged him to talk and he, Barclay, and I had a pleasant but, in some spots, guarded conversation. . . .

I told him there was no reason why we could not frankly discuss these matters in confidence and I thought frankness always paid. My own feeling is that they are sore and upset and do not know exactly what to take hold of. . . .

My personal feeling is that we should tell Page to tell Grey informally that there was no evidence that the submarine secured any information, and every one knew that all the submarine had to do was to wait off the Nantucket Lightship and she was bound to get plenty of ships; that we were taking every precaution to prevent our coast from being made a base, and we were considering what steps, if any, we should take in regard to controlling the arrival and departure of all warships, whether submarine or surface; that Great Britain had been maintaining, and still was maintaining, a patrol of our coast; that we were quite willing to discuss the matter informally, but, of course, it was our intention to be guided in making our decision by the present and future interests of *this* country. It might be well also to intimate that the President had expressed himself on the general subject of torpedoing ships off our coast, to the German Ambassador. We can then repeat, in closing, that this information is merely given to make our position clear and in no case did we feel that

the British Government had any right officially to question us as to our intentions.

Yours faithfully

FRANK L. POLK

Mr. Polk was able to smooth the incident over. He persuaded the American Navy officials to take out of the secret archives the report of the activities of the Destroyer Division which went out to sea when the U-53 was operating off Newport, and to put its substance into a personal letter to himself. He then forwarded this to the American Ambassador in London, suggesting that it might be shown to the British. This was done and Lord Charles Beresford in Parliament made a handsome apology for British misunderstanding. But the affair left a bad taste and official relations continued none too cordial. Unofficially, House maintained his close intimacy with both the British and the State Department, and was able to pour oil when the occasion demanded. But he admitted discouragement. If the British were rendered irritable by the strain of the war, the Americans did much that was unnecessary to increase their irritation.

'October 26 [conference with Captain Gaunt, British Naval Attaché]: I talked to Gaunt frankly, and he admitted it would be best for Great Britain and the Allies for the United States to continue her benevolent neutrality for the present. He also admitted that if the Germans turned loose their full power upon British commerce, a very serious situation would arise, and the help America might give by coming in would not compensate them for an unbridled submarine warfare. . . .

'I told him it was very difficult for the United States to play the part of a benevolent neutral when there was so much hostile sentiment against us in the Allied countries, and when they accepted as true every foolish rumor started. He asked

me to remember that when people were at war they did not reason calmly. . . .

'November 17, 1916: Captain Gaunt says the feeling in Great Britain against the United States grows apace. The working people feel it, and in the trenches every shell that goes over and does not explode is called "a Wilson." Gaunt deprecates this feeling and says he does everything he can to quiet it. His explanation is that his people have lost all sense of proportion. He considers it a dangerous situation. He sails secretly for England the last of next week. No one is to know of his departure excepting the British Ambassador, whom he has not yet told. I am planning to send some letters and confidential messages over by him. With their state of feeling and with the President's distaste of their methods, I regard the situation as serious.

'I had a long conference with Polk. He agrees with me that we are in deep and troublous waters. I urged him to have Lansing keep in close touch with me until the skies are clear. We must do team-work and keep our wits about us. We not only have foreign countries to deal with, but the President must be guided. . . . He has always been more interested in domestic problems than in foreign affairs. . . . This gives me much concern. His tendency to offend the Allies . . . is likely to lead us into trouble with them. If we are to have war, let it be with Germany by all means. She has forfeited every right to consideration, and the situation demands, for our own protection, that we hold with the Allies as long as we can possibly do so with dignity.

'I will confess that the Allies are irritating almost beyond endurance.'

v

The tenseness of the situation illustrated forcibly the conviction which House always impressed upon his British friends, that only one danger could ever threaten Anglo-

American relations, but that single danger was so real that everything should be subordinated to its elimination: some arrangement must be found by which American commerce could go free and unobstructed when Great Britain was at war with a Continental enemy. It was British interference with American trade which caused the War of 1812. The same difficulty was again manifest. It would happen in the future, so long as maritime law remained unreformed. To meet it House had suggested the principle of the freedom of the seas — the inviolability of merchant shipping in time of war. Then and always he insisted that until some such reform were introduced, there would always be a cloud on the horizon of Anglo-American relations.

Germany, however, could invariably be counted upon to make a mistake in political psychology at the critical moment, and was already preparing a step which caused all Anglo-American disputes to be forgotten.

During the summer and early autumn, the general tenor of relations with Berlin had remained even. The German Government had followed Bernstorff's advice, which in turn had been passed on to him by House, and made no further demands that the United States break the British blockade. 'I myself am doing everything to be forgotten as much as possible,' wrote Bernstorff to House on June 16. The German submarine campaign, so far as reported to the State Department, was conducted according to cruiser rules and the pledges given by Berlin.

But it was certain that unless the military deadlock in Europe could be broken, the pressure of the navalists on the Government would result in the launching of an unrestricted submarine campaign. Bernstorff warned House of the danger in June, and every letter from Ambassador Gerard bore out his fears. The civil officials, Chancellor and Foreign Secretary, were clearly threatened. 'Although von Jagow is a Junker of the Junkers,' wrote Gerard, 'the Junkers are against

him and claim he is too weak. He may be bounced.' On June 7 and July 12: 'The U-boat question may break loose again any day.' — 'Much underground work for a resumption of reckless submarine war going on, all part of a campaign to upset the Chancellor.'

Ambassador Bernstorff to Colonel House

NEW YORK, *July 14, 1916*

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

... I am happy to say, the improvement in all American and German relations has continued. ...

Nevertheless, however, as you will have seen yourself by the newspapers, my Government is having a hard time and has been strongly attacked for having given up the U-boat war at the request of the United States. You know the situation in Berlin so well that I need not discuss it at any length. I will only mention that there seems to be danger of the Chancellor being forced to retire on account of these attacks. That would, of course, mean the resumption of the U-boat war and the renewal of all our troubles.

The chief argument which is being brought to bear against the Chancellor is that he gave in to the United States Government, although he knew that this Government was no neutral and was bringing pressure on Germany only, whilst it willingly permitted violations of International Law by England. There is certainly some truth in these attacks, as the British violations of International Law are increasing daily — cfg. for instance, the latest Order in Council which abolished the Declaration of London. ...

If you wish to talk matters over with me and think that any good may come of such a confidential conversation, I am, as you know, always ready to pay you a visit from Dublin, as I suggested to you before you left New York.

My present address is, Hotel Ritz-Carlton.

Yours very sincerely

J. BERNSTORFF

Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House

BERLIN, August 16, 1916

MY DEAR COLONEL:

... The bitter attacks on the Chancellor continue. At a recent meeting in Bavaria resolutions were passed that the first objective of the war was to get rid of the Chancellor and the second was to 'clean out the Anglophile Foreign Office,' which prevented Germany from 'reckless methods for the swift winning of the war.'

As a son-in-law of a high official told me to-day, the break between the military and navy on one side and the civil Government on the other has widened into almost civil war. The same man told me that the K. had lately become quite apathetic and lets events take their course. . . .

Yours ever

J. W. G.

BERLIN, August 30, 1916

MY DEAR COLONEL:

... To-day Hindenburg is named Chief of the General Staff, and his Chief of Staff, Ludendorff, is made Quartermaster-General. Falkenhayn, former Chief of Staff, is bounced without even the excuse of a diplomatic illness. This is all a great concession to popular opinion. I do not know where Hindenburg stands with reference to America, but have heard that he is a reasonable man. Of course, here the army has as much to say in foreign affairs as the Foreign Office, if not more. When I was at the General Headquarters, Falkenhayn, although I know him, did not call on me and dodged me, even not appearing at the Kaiser's table when I lunched there. From all this I judge he was against America on the submarine question. I have also heard that at this time, when Helfferich was talking before the Kaiser in favor of peace with America, Falkenhayn interrupted him, but

was told by the Kaiser to 'stick to his last' or words to that effect.

These people here are now nervous and unstrung and actually believe that America will now enter the war against them. You cannot conceive of the general breakdown of nerves among this people. . . .

Zimmermann has now gone on a vacation, his place being temporarily taken by von Treutler, Prussian Minister to Bavaria, who since the commencement of the war has been with the Kaiser. I judge this means the Kaiser is looking personally into matters at the Foreign Office. Von Treutler is, I think, against the resumption of reckless submarine war; he is lunching with me to-day. He is rather the type of the intelligent man of the world and sportsman, and has little of the Prussian desire to 'imponieren' by putting his voice two octaves lower and glaring at one like an enraged bullfrog. . . .

Yours ever

J. W. G.

House was at first pleased by the news of Hindenburg's formal accession to power, for he counted upon him to exercise a moderating influence and to support the Chancellor. He knew that he had been opposed to the reckless submarine warfare, and he supposed that he understood the impossibility of breaking the European deadlock and would approve reasonable peace terms which the Allies could hardly refuse. The Colonel talked the whole question over with Bernstorff in early September.

'September 3, 1916: Count von Bernstorff telephoned last night, asking if he might come to see me to-day. I invited him and the Countess, who has just arrived from Germany, to lunch.

'We had an interesting two hours together. . . .

'In talking to Bernstorff about the recent appointment of

Field Marshal von Hindenburg as Chief of Staff in place of von Falkenhayn, I considered it a move directly in favor of the Chancellor. When I was in Germany, the Chancellor in talking of peace measures said that von Hindenburg was willing to throw the weight of his influence on the side of peace terms which would not be popular in Germany, but which would probably be acceptable to the Allies. Bernstorff had no intimation of this, and the information caused him to give me some inside confidence. The Chancellor told Countess von Bernstorff as she was leaving Germany to tell the Ambassador that he did not know how long he could hold Germany from unbridled submarine warfare, and to be prepared to leave the United States at a moment's notice. While the Countess was *en route*, and after von Hindenburg had been appointed Chief of Staff, the Chancellor cabled Bernstorff to disregard the message he had sent by the Countess. Until I told him of the relations between the Chancellor and von Hindenburg, he did not understand the reason for the cablegram.

'Bernstorff said from the beginning he had tried to impress upon his Government the seriousness of their submarine warfare policy. They only partially realized it after the *Lusitania* and *Arabic* were sunk, and they censured Bernstorff for going beyond his instructions in the *Arabic* settlement. It was not until the *Sussex* was sunk that they fully realized how near they were to war with us. This brought forth our ultimatum, and in their reply they were compelled to go far beyond what Bernstorff had agreed to in the *Arabic* case.

'I asked why Germany got into war with both Great Britain and Russia at the same time. War with either was bad enough, but to have them both against her showed a lack of judgment which seemed to me appalling. Bernstorff said that in his opinion war would not have happened if a man of the first class had been in charge of the destinies of any of the

Great Powers in Europe — such a man, for instance, as Bismarck. When I suggested that Germany should have brought Great Britain to her side as soon as it became evident that France and Russia had become allies, he agreed with enthusiasm. In this event Great Britain, I thought, would have been glad to have Germany's militarism grow to an even greater perfection than it has.

'Bernstorff thought that Prince Lichnowski was such a pacifist that he misled Sir Edward Grey and the British Government into the belief that there would be no war. If a strong man had been there, he thought matters might have shaped themselves differently.

'In explanation of the German foreign policy and of the difficulties in which she has finally found herself, he said it was thought wise to balance Great Britain and Russia against one another. The German Foreign Office had not believed since Bismarck's time that Great Britain and Russia could ever be brought into an active alliance, and it was to Germany's advantage to keep them apart and not link up with either the one or the other.

'As to the war, he believes von Hindenburg may even yet stem the tide in Southeastern Europe,¹ and when winter closes in there may be a deadlock. He thought it was clearly to the interests of the United States that there should be a deadlock between the belligerents. . . .

'I told him I had tentacles reaching into each of the belligerent countries, and that opinion immediately hardened against the United States in Germany when they were more or less successful, and the same thing happened in the Entente countries when they were successful. I said I was in Sunapee quietly resting, but I was in close touch with affairs. He smiled and answered, "It is not necessary to tell me that; and the reason I have not communicated with you oftener

¹ Rumania had just entered the war on the side of the Allies, but her armies were rapidly defeated and her southern provinces overrun.

during the summer, or have not seen you before, is proof that relations between our two countries are satisfactory."

'Bernstorff is the only one of the Ambassadors among the belligerents who has retained his equilibrium and has been able to smile upon the present and philosophize as to the future.

'*October 11, 1916:* My first caller was the German Ambassador. He wished to tell me of his interview with the President yesterday. The President was unusually pleasant to him, and Bernstorff commented upon it. The President asked him to send a cable to his Government, warning them of the danger of submarine activity along our coast. He made it clear to Bernstorff that if the practice continued, trouble would ensue, and he hoped in behalf of good relations they would heed his warning. . . . I expressed the hope that U-boat 53 had returned home and would cease depredations along our seaboard. He fervently echoed my hope, as he sees only too clearly the risk of such activities.'

VI

From a clear sky fell suddenly the plainest of portents. Evidently Hindenburg's accession to power was to bring decisive action in Berlin and end the long contest between Chancellor and navalists. If Allied nerves were frazzled and led to errors of judgment, German nerves showed signs of collapse by throwing all judgment to the winds and seeking counsel of desperation. They could not stand the deadlock, which must be ended or broken. If Gerard, who had returned on leave to the United States, should find Wilson able to initiate peace negotiations, well and good. Otherwise Germany would break the deadlock by a submarine campaign without any restrictions. It was left to Bernstorff to decide whether the President should be informed of the direction German policy was taking, and Bernstorff passed the decision on to House.

Ambassador von Bernstorff to Colonel House

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1916

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

I received the enclosed memorandum from Berlin. My Government wishes me to give it to Mr. Gerard before he sees the President. I am, however, at liberty not to deliver the memorandum, if I consider it wiser not to do so. Of course the memorandum is strictly confidential and is not intended as a threat of more drastic U-boat warfare on our part.

In view, however, of the methods of our enemies, which become more ruthless every day — Greece, blockade, illegal pressure on neutrals — my Government wishes to remind Mr. Gerard of the confidential negotiations which were carried on last spring.

I do not know where Mr. Gerard is now and do not like to risk sending this letter to the Ritz-Carlton Hotel. You will certainly see him before he goes to Shadow Lawn, and in view of our continuous confidential relations I gladly leave it entirely to you whether you will give Mr. Gerard the memorandum or speak to him about it. This way I am sure that the matter will be dealt with quite confidentially and in accordance with the wishes of my Government.

Should you wish to speak to me about this matter or any other, I am, as you know, always at your disposal and prepared to go to New York at any time.

With many thanks in advance,

Very sincerely yours

J. BERNSTORFF

[Enclosure]

Your Excellency ¹ hinted to His Majesty in your last conversation at Charleville in April that President Wilson possibly would try towards the end of the summer to offer his

¹ Ambassador Gerard.

good services to the belligerents for the promotion of peace.

The German Government has no information as to whether the President adheres to this idea and as to the eventual date at which this step would take place. Meanwhile the constellation of war has taken such a form that the German Government foresees the time at which it will be forced to regain the freedom of action that it has reserved to itself in the note of May 4th last and thus the President's steps may be jeopardized. The German Government thinks it its duty to communicate this fact to Your Excellency in case you should find that the date of the intended action of the President should be far advanced towards the end of this year.

Despite Bernstorff's disclaimer, the letter was, as House noted, 'clearly a threat to resume submarine warfare, in the event the President does not immediately intervene in the European war.'

Thus, at the moment when the Allies, by their refusal to admit the desirability of American mediation and their disregard of Wilson's offer of American coöperation in world affairs, seemed to be pushing America back into a policy of isolation, Germany threatened to drag us into active belligerency by the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. As yet, no one could foresee what course American policy would follow, for in November came the presidential election and until the final moment the reëlection of Mr. Wilson remained a matter of doubt.

APPENDIX

COMPARISON OF THE HOUSE DRAFT AND WILSON'S
SPEECH OF MAY 27, 1916HOUSE DRAFT, *May 21, 1916:*

One reason this war has come — one reason why other wars will come — is because nations are secretive as to their intentions toward one another and do not in advance outline their thoughts and purposes.

If Great Britain had said before the war, 'if France is attacked by the Central Powers we will join her,' Germany would in all human probability have consented to a conference as proposed by Grey.

... If we had said before this war, what I shall say to-night, the war in all human probability would not have occurred. It would have been notice to each of the belligerents that we are fundamentally opposed to certain policies and that we would use all our moral and economic strength, and, under certain circumstances, even our physical strength, against the nation or nations violating these principles....

It is clear the world must come to this new and more wholesome diplomacy. If an agreement can be reached by the Great Powers as to what fundamentals they hold to be to their common interest, and agree to act in concert when any nation or nations violate these funda-

WILSON'S SPEECH, *May 27, 1916:*

It is plain that this war could have come only as it did, suddenly and out of secret counsels, without warning to the world, without discussion, without any of the deliberate movements of counsel with which it would seem natural to approach so stupendous a contest.

It is probable that if it had been foreseen just what would happen, just what alliances would be formed, just what forces arrayed against one another, those who brought the great contest on would have been glad to substitute conference for force.

If we ourselves had been afforded some opportunity to apprise the belligerents of the attitude which it would be our duty to take, of the policies and practices against which we would feel bound to use all our moral and economic strength, and in certain circumstances even our physical strength also, our own contribution to the counsel which might have averted the struggle would have been considered worth weighing and regarding....

...the peace of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy.

Only when the great nations of the world have reached some sort of agreement as to what they hold to be fundamental to their common interest, and as to some feasible

mentals, then we can feel that our civilization has begun to justify its being.

Nations in the future must be governed by the same high code of honor as we demand of individuals. It must be said in some humiliation that the United States has not always maintained so high a level, but the lapses have been few and have constituted the exception and not the rule.

If we may take the utterances of the spokesmen in other nations — belligerent as well as neutral — we must believe that this feeling lies as deep and strong with them as it does with us. . . . If its voice is clearer and more definite in the Americas, it is perhaps because we are under less restraint than the other continents and can express ourselves without the fear of being misunderstood.

We have Mr. Asquith at Dublin, September 28, 1914, repeating what Mr. Gladstone had said nearly a half-century ago: 'The greatest triumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics'; and he added that it seemed to him to be now, at this moment, as good a definition as we can have of our European policy. . . .

We have all become neighbors now

method of acting in concert when any nation or group of nations seeks to disturb those fundamental things, can we feel that civilization is at last in a way of justifying its existence and claiming to be finally established.

It is clear that nations must in the future be governed by the same high code of honor that we demand of individuals.

We must, indeed, in the very same breath with which we avow this conviction admit that we have ourselves upon occasion in the past been offenders against the law of diplomacy which we thus forecast; but our conviction is not the less clear, but rather the more clear, on that account.

If this war has accomplished nothing else for the benefit of the world, it has at least disclosed a great moral necessity and set forward the thinking of the statesmen of the world by a whole age.

Repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the great nations now engaged in war have made it plain that their thought has come to this, that the principle of public right must henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations. . . .

The nations of the world have become each other's neighbors. . . .

CHAPTER XI

THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

If the campaign is properly organized — and it must be — we will win.
House to Wilson, June 15, 1916

I

‘THE life I am leading transcends in interest and excitement any romance. I cannot begin to outline here what happens from day to day, how information from every quarter pours into this little, unobtrusive study.’

Thus wrote House, on March 10, 1916, in the midst of the diplomatic projects which he and Wilson planned, projects designed to end the war or to bring America into the struggle on the side of the Allies; in the midst, also, of the thousand and one minor details which fell upon the shoulders of the man who was known to be nearest to Wilson. Not even the importance of his diplomatic preoccupations saved him from the letters and visits of those who wanted advice and assistance. Cabinet members in search of candidates, candidates in search of positions, made of his study on Fifty-Third Street a clearing-house. Editors and journalists sought his opinions, and despatches to the foreign press were framed almost at his dictation. United States Treasury officials, British diplomats, Southern cotton planters, and metropolitan financiers came to his study to discuss their plans for the purchase of the surplus cotton crop, threatened by the British blockade. To House were brought the documents proving the questionable character of German propaganda, which Dr. Albert carelessly permitted a secret service agent to pick up, as he left an elevated train. To him also came Paderewski with his plans for the resuscitation of Poland, which with the Colonel’s assistance developed to such an extent

that the great virtuoso-statesman wrote to him: 'It has been the dream of my life to find a providential man for my country. I am now sure that I have not been dreaming vain dreams.'

This mass of business — personal, national, and international — he transacted with no help except that of his secretary, Miss Denton, who, like the Colonel, doubtless survived in a physical sense only because of an amplitude of poise, humor, and common sense. To return to the New York apartment after an absence must have required an excess of courage on the part of both. 'I find my desk,' wrote the Colonel on September 16, 1916, 'piled high with accumulated mail, foreign and domestic. I am getting this out of my way before attempting to get in touch with any one. I changed my telephone number so no one can reach me until I am ready.'

So far as the questions that came to him touched domestic politics, House was frankly impatient. He who had worked so assiduously to help the President in his appointments during the first year of the Administration, now regarded the problems of administrative politics as so many vexatious trivialities.

'The President [he wrote on March 29, 1916] appeared almost more interested and absorbed in these local situations than in the foreign crisis. I myself am so little interested in them that I talk of them with reluctance, and it is immaterial to me whom he appoints. Ordinarily, I should insist that he should not appoint one of X's henchmen, but it seems so insignificant compared with the vital questions now on the boards, that I find myself not caring what he does, so he drops it from our discussions.'

But in 1916 domestic problems could not be dropped from discussion, since in the autumn would come the presidential

election. Interest in the contest was abnormally slow in development, because of the foreign situation. As late as April 14, House wrote to Gerard: 'Our relations with Germany and the Mexican expedition have crowded politics to the rear, and only professionals are taking an interest.' None the less, it was impossible that House should not become absorbed in this election, inasmuch as the failure of Wilson would mean the end of the plans for American coöperation with Europe. As political artist, furthermore, House could not resist the lure which the technical problems of organizing an electoral campaign presented.

That Wilson would be renominated was a foregone conclusion. He dominated his party in the country and in Congress, and at no time was there serious question of another candidate. But House realized that the President's reelection was a matter of extreme doubt. He had been the choice of a minority in 1912, and a complete reunion between Progressives and Republicans would mean certain defeat in 1916. His sole chance lay in holding what he had in 1912 and in securing sufficient of the independent and Progressive vote to overcome the normal Republican majority.

In the East it was undeniable that the trend of popular opinion seemed against the President. His handling of the Mexican problem was criticized as anæmic, and the pro-Ally elements, which controlled opinion, anathematized the patience he had exhibited in his dealing with Germany. His friendly attitude toward labor aroused the distrust of the capitalists, who formed the backbone of political conservatism. Business men in the Northeast disliked his policies, complained that their interests had not been given a hearing, and that the men who surrounded him were incapable or untrustworthy. House was made keenly aware of such criticism and appreciated its political effect, although he regarded it as unmerited.

'Frank Trumbull called [recorded House on March 23, 1916] to recite the grievance of Wall Street against the President. He claims to be a defendant of the President, and I believe he is. He says the quarrel is not with the President personally, but with his Cabinet, especially McAdoo, Williams, Daniels, and Burleson. . . .

'*March 26, 1916:* S. R. Bertron was full of the mistakes of the Administration, not so much of the President as of those near him. I have come to the conclusion that it is practically impossible for any Administration to deal fairly with the Wall Street group and not come under the ban of their displeasure. The Banking and Currency Act is the most beneficent measure for the relief of business that has ever been enacted in this country, and yet no appreciation is coming to the President because of it. His effort to place the railroads upon some such broad basis as the banking interests are, is also forgotten. No President within my memory has done so much in a legitimate and wholesome way for business, and yet the eternal cry is for "more." . . .'

On the other hand, the President had a mass of accomplishment upon which to base an appeal for reëlection, especially in the regions west of the Mississippi, where anti-Administration business interests did not exercise so much political influence. It would have been easy for him to defend his foreign policy if he could have disclosed his offer to the Allies. Those who complained of his lack of interest in the cause of civilization would have been silenced. But even with his lips sealed as to this positive attempt, he could point to a steady maintenance of American rights which compelled Germany's acquiescence in his insistence that the unrestricted submarine war must stop, and to an emphasis upon moral factors in international affairs which was to give America, for a season, the leadership in world politics.

It was not difficult to excoriate the President's mistakes

after they were committed, but for an opposing candidate to criticize his policy constructively, and to promise a superior policy, would require exceptional statesmanship, tact, and courage. Could the Republicans produce such a candidate? Mr. Page, who disapproved of Wilson's treatment of the foreign problem, none the less recognized the strength of his position.

Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House

BOURNEMOUTH, May 23, 1916

DEAR HOUSE:

... We wonder here much about the campaign, but we can't do much more than wonder whom the Republicans will nominate. They seem, by a million miles or so, to lack the ideal man. Nor do I see what winning war platform they can put together. They dare not favor war. They dare not favor an ignominious peace. The President seems to me to hold a handful of trumps, and unless somebody throws 'em away, I can't see how he can lose — unless he lose thro' the weakness of many men he has about him. Nobody's big enough for the great places in our Government; but I sometimes feel that there must be a good many available men bigger than some that hold these great places. That, it seems to me, is the one visible danger to the President and to the party. . . .

Yours very heartily

W. H. P.

A far more vital factor in Wilson's strength lay in his legislative accomplishment. Americans may become excited by foreign affairs, but their votes are cast in accordance with domestic interests. The President had pushed through with rapidity and success a series of legislative reforms which proved the sincerity of his liberalism as well as his powers of leadership. The Democratic Party was not a liberal party, but Wilson, in the words of a prominent Progressive, 'had

hammered the Democratic Congress into a constructive body. To do so he had to lead his party away from the Democratic traditions of half a century.' ¹ The Rural Credits Bill, the Child Labor Bill, the Workman's Compensation Act, the Inheritance Tax, the Federal Reserve Act — these, as the same Progressive insisted, 'and a series of small wedges which the Democrats have driven into the trunk of iniquity, will finally help to split the trunk. And the Progressives, who are watching these wedges take hold, are of course pleased.'

The moral strength of Wilson, Colonel House believed, must lie in his willingness to transform the Democratic Party into a truly liberal party. House looked for the help of the Progressives, even at the risk of offending the conservative Democrats, and long before the election sought means to build bridges for the Progressives to cross over to the Democratic camp.

'Davies ² came over from Washington to see me [House wrote, January 28, 1915]. . . . We laid out rather a comprehensive campaign in regard to getting the Progressive forces in line for 1916. I told Davies, as I had Woolley, that I would rather have the President defeated than to have him win by deserting the progressive principles for which we had fought. The Democratic Party must change its historic character and become the progressive party in the future. . . .'

As a matter of fact, there was no hope of Democratic victory unless Wilson could attract the Progressives of the West, so thoroughly had the Northeast become anti-Wilson. If the Republicans could select a candidate capable of reuniting the Republican and Progressive elements, Wilson was doomed.

So important did the Progressives appear to House that he

¹ William Allen White, in *Collier's*, December 16, 1916.

² Joseph Davies, of the Federal Trade Commission.

not merely made every effort to win them over, but he assumed that the Republicans would nominate Roosevelt, the only man certain to hold the Progressive vote. Common sense dictated his choice, but the Republican chiefs balked at the thought of accepting the leadership, perhaps the mastery, of the man who had wrecked the party in 1912. Mr. Root would certainly alienate the Progressives. There were no younger men of distinction clearly available. But on the Supreme Court was Mr. Hughes, who had fought the bosses and might attract the Progressives, while with the conservative elements he had the reputation of being 'sane and steady.' By his seclusion on the Federal Bench, he had escaped all connection with the quarrel of 1912.

To put in nomination a member of the Supreme Court seemed to many persons a dangerous approach to bringing the judiciary within the realm of partisan politics. In the summer of 1912, Mr. Hughes had told a friend that under no circumstances would he become a candidate for the Presidency after holding a place on the Supreme Court, and was reported as stating that 'A man on the Supreme Bench who would run for political office is neither fit for the office he holds nor for the one to which he aspires.' It was a statement which the Democrats used with some effect during the campaign of 1916.

As early as the autumn of 1915, signs began to multiply that unless the Republican Old Guard would swallow their pride and their fears, accepting Roosevelt, strong pressure would be brought to bear upon Hughes to resign his judicial position and make the race.

'John R. Rathom ¹ called [recorded House, September 28] . . . to tell . . . of the political situation in New England in its bearings on the Republican presidential nomination. He believes New England will finally be for Justice Hughes, and

¹ Editor of the *Providence Journal*.

he believes Hughes will accept the nomination. He has just been on a fishing trip with Hughes in Maine. I hope this is not true, for I believe the Supreme Court should be kept out of politics. When a man accepts a position upon that great Court, he should forswear further political ambition; otherwise the Court will fall in the estimation of the people and their decisions will be looked upon with suspicion.'

In the early spring of 1916, House felt that, whatever their prejudices, the Republicans would seize upon the one big figure capable of attracting the Western vote. 'It looks like Roosevelt for Republican nominee,' he wrote Gerard on March 24, 'though Hughes may be.' But on May 11, he wrote to Penfield: 'The Roosevelt tide has receded and that of Hughes is advancing. Roosevelt has over-played his hand and the reaction has set in. He may be nominated, but it does not look like him to-day.' When the Republicans held their convention, it became obvious that, as a compromise candidate between Root and Roosevelt, Hughes was a necessity. Root was the choice of the regulars, but he could not carry the West. Roosevelt was still anathema to the party leaders. On June 10, Hughes was nominated. Three days previous, Roosevelt had been offered the Progressive nomination, but, eager for the defeat of Wilson and realizing that the reunion of Republicans and Progressives was necessary to effect it, he refused the nomination and urged his followers to work and vote for Hughes. Thus he destroyed the organization he had himself created.

Colonel House to the President

SUNAPEE, NEW HAMPSHIRE
June 10, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... The news of the nominations at Chicago has just reached me. ... Now that Hughes is the candidate, it is all

the more necessary for us to gather in the Progressive vote. I think we can show Hughes up as a thorough conservative who obtained the name of progressive because of his refusal to let the bosses dictate to him. His veto of the income tax and the support which the Germans have and will give him, will, I think, ensure his defeat.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

II

From the beginning to the end of the campaign, House insisted that the Democrats must work to capture the independent voter and the Progressives of the West. The entire strategy of the campaign was to be founded upon the principle of permitting the Republicans to spend their efforts and money on the anti-Wilson States east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio, while the Democrats would hope to win the West — which, with the solid South, might give a bare majority in the electoral college. It seemed risky, this disregard of the great States of the Northeast, but it offered the only chance of success. Upon this idea was based the choice of a Democratic campaign manager and also the decision as to which States should be the centres of Democratic campaign activity.

If the Progressive vote was to be won, the Democrats must secure a campaign manager with markedly liberal tendencies and willing to accept the bold plan which was being mapped out. He must have courage and imagination and, preferably, should not be too closely connected with the old-style party managers, whom the Progressives distrusted. On various counts the Democratic Chairman of the 1912 campaign, W. F. McCombs, was obviously not fitted for the work. House had always befriended McCombs, but he was not willing to permit sentimental factors to interfere with the chances of Democratic success. Fortunately McCombs him-

self, and his advisers, realized that he could not take charge of Wilson's campaign.

'B. M. Baruch was with me this afternoon [wrote House, on April 18, 1916] to discuss the McCombs matter. He believes he has gotten McCombs to a point where he is willing to write the President declining to serve again as National Democratic Chairman. I promised Baruch if he would get the letter, I would undertake to get from the President a letter equally courteous and complimentary, or would return McCombs' to him. . . .

'Baruch expressed the sincerest sympathy for McCombs, because he realizes he is in no position to aid the President or to maintain himself in a directing capacity. He therefore wishes everything done, as indeed I do, to save his feelings.'

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, April 21, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

After wrestling with McCombs two days, Baruch got the letter from him. Here is a copy of it.

Baruch is holding the original, expecting me to go to Washington and take it in person. We both regard it as important that you clinch the matter by accepting his offer to eliminate himself from the situation. If you will write McCombs upon receipt of this and send the letter to me, I will make the exchange. . . .

Baruch is anxious for you to write as cordially to McCombs as you feel that you can, believing that it will have a good effect all round.

Will you not write the letter to-morrow and send it by special delivery, so the McCombs incident may be closed for good and all on Sunday? This will give him time to make his announcement on Monday.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Wilson responded with a letter which is an excellent example of the grace and charm which he could, when necessity demanded, inject into a delicate operation. 'I hope that what I have written,' he said rather timorously to House, 'will seem the right thing.'

*The President to Mr. William F. McCombs*¹

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1916

MY DEAR MCCOMBS:

I have your letter apprising me of your inability to retain the chairmanship of the Democratic National Committee for the approaching campaign.

I fully appreciate the necessity you feel yourself to be under to resign after the convention shall have been held in June; I know you would not have reached such a decision had not your new business obligations made it unavoidable. I do not feel at liberty, therefore, to urge you to make the sacrifice that a retention of the chairmanship would in the circumstances involve.

You have made many and great sacrifices already for the Party, and I know I am speaking the sentiment of all loyal Democrats when I express the very deep appreciation I have felt of the great services you have ungrudgingly rendered.

I am sure that the greatest regrets will be felt at your retirement, and that a host of friends will join me in the hope that your new business connections will bring you continued abundant success. With best wishes

Sincerely yours

WOODROW WILSON

More difficult was the positive problem of selecting McCombs' successor. For a time, the President and Colonel House seem to have agreed upon Frank Polk, Counsellor of the Department of State. Later, the Colonel began to feel

¹ McCombs, *Making Woodrow Wilson President*, 271.

that Polk could not be utilized, as Mr. Lansing, whose health was poor at this time, counted upon his assistance in the Department; but he found difficulty in changing Wilson's mind.

'I have gotten the President so thoroughly imbued with the idea that Frank Polk is the right man for Chairman [he recorded on May 3] that I cannot shake him loose.

'Polk mentioned several men who he thought might do. I told him the President would not take any of them, because he knew them. Polk asked why the President was willing to take him, and added, "I have only seen the President two or three times to talk with him." I smilingly replied, "If you had seen more of him, he would probably not want you any more than the others." . . . Polk took this as good-naturedly as it was meant. . . .

'The President and I lunched alone, and I took up with him several of the names of men Polk and I thought might do for National Chairman. None of them suited him. I told him it would inconvenience Lansing too much to lose Polk. He thought the contrary. Lansing's convenience was not as important as it was to have a proper man for National Chairman. He declared he did not desire to be President any longer, and it would be a delightful relief if he could conscientiously retire. He said he felt it his duty toward his country and his party to continue. He believes a second term may be an anti-climax.

'The reason I had wanted Polk as National Chairman and the arguments I gave the President for wishing him, are that he has good judgment and is absolutely clean in purpose and thought. He would never "go to sleep at the switch," and the President never need have a moment's worry concerning the manner in which the campaign was being conducted. There could be no scandal or anything approaching one with Polk at the helm.'

Ten days later, however, House wrote to Wilson: 'I wish some one could be found other than Polk, for it seems a pity to disorganize the State Department — as I am afraid it will, even if he leaves only temporarily.'

Then, on May 15, in a postscript to a letter discussing the keynote speech at the convention: 'What do you think of Vance McCormick as a substitute for Polk as National Chairman? I do not know him, but I am to see him on Wednesday.'

The President agreed that McCormick might do admirably, and told House to pursue his inquiries.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, May 19, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... Vance McCormick is to be here to-day. I am having him to both lunch and dinner, in order to get a thorough view of him. I will let you know about it later.

Frank Polk, Dudley, Woolley, Newton Baker, Daniels, Morgenthau, and others think he is the man you want for Chairman. The fact that he comes from Pennsylvania¹ is not altogether against him, for the reason that he will not be involved in any of the factional quarrels that seem to prevail in the doubtful States. Every faction would feel with such a man that they would have a hearing without prejudice. . . .

Since dictating the above, I have spent some time with Vance McCormick. Unless something develops that is not apparent, I believe he is the man you want. He reminds me very much of Frank Polk. He seems to be of the same high type. He appears to have poise and good judgment. I cannot judge on so short an acquaintance of his political sagacity, but I am favorably impressed with him.

If you take Polk, you will have Lansing a sick man on your hands. Of this I am convinced, and so is Polk.

¹ Inevitably Republican.

If possible, I hope you can make a decision within the next few days, as I would like to talk freely with whomsoever you select and outline the organization as I think it should be. I can do it so much better now than later, when the real hot weather sets in. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

The President replied to this suggestion by expressing deep interest in House's opinion of McCormick's availability after his personal interview. He intimated that he would like especially to be convinced that McCormick was aggressive enough and not too 'high-brow,' and perhaps intolerant of the 'rougher elements' which Wilson felt had to be handled and dealt with.

Colonel House was able to give the required assurance and reported that McCormick seemed to him the best choice. But for various reasons the latter, who had been as a young man Mayor of Harrisburg and had become a leader of the liberal group of Pennsylvania Democrats, was slow to accept. With a modesty not too common in such circumstances, he asked to have his name withdrawn from consideration. House continued his search. 'I am combing the country for the right man,' he wrote on May 29.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, May 30, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . For two days I have done but little else than look for a suitable Chairman of the National Committee to suggest to you, but it is next to impossible to find one that is satisfactory.

In seeking I have endeavored to eliminate the three R's, Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion, and, in doing so, the best material is not available. If you get a Roman Catholic, the



Photograph by Underwood & Underwood

VANCE C. McCORMICK

religious question might become an issue. If you get a Southerner, there is the possibility of that being raised; and, of course, the liquor question in any form should be shunned.

I have not only sifted the country by States and by districts, but have gotten the help of almost every one whose opinion is of value, even including such men as Cobb of the *World* and McAneny of the *Times*.

John W. Davis, Solicitor-General, has occurred to me as being the most available one, provided you think West Virginia is not too far south. As a matter of fact, their affiliations are more Western than Southern.

I would appreciate it if you will let me know to-morrow what you think of Davis.

Polk, I believe, must be considered unavailable. Lansing is a much sicker man than even his close friends know, and to take Polk from him would be to put the finishing touch upon him. I suggested Polk to Cobb, and he thought it would not do to take a man from the State Department to use for personal or party reasons. This view is held by many others.

It will not do to get an old-time politician. He should be of the new school, able and forward-looking, and willing to play the game with all that seek to help. I have never known a national campaign to be properly organized, and organization is almost the most essential element in success. If we can get the right man, I think we can get the organization, for it is a simple matter to an intelligent man when he is told how.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

President Wilson, one notes with interest, was evidently fearful of any man untried in electoral manœuvres and, unlike House, was willing to accept a 'professional.' He was

himself so new to politics that he had a good deal of respect for the vote-getting ability of the old-timers. He wrote House that if the men in the political trenches were to be inspired to their best work, a leader must be selected who knew them, and whom they did not regard as an alien or a 'high-brow.'

House insisted, in his reply, that to trust to one of the 'regular' party managers would mean defeat. 'I am not nearly so afraid,' he wrote, 'of losing the rank and file, as I am of not getting the necessary votes from the outside to win. The regulars have nowhere to go, and if we get them all we are still in the minority, and I think we should be more concerned in bringing into the fold those that are on the outside.'

Almost up to the moment of the Democratic Convention at St. Louis, Wilson remained undecided. On June 10, he wired to the Colonel, asking if he could possibly act himself, and sent Dudley Malone to persuade him. But Colonel House insisted that his health would not stand the strain of routine. 'Even in Texas,' he wrote, 'I always had some one else who could relieve me, not only of the details, but of the constant pressure of seeing unimportant people that demand interviews of a Chairman. Of the remaining possibilities, Vance McCormick looks by far the best choice.'

Wilson agreed, and McCormick, regarding the call to duty as imperative, this time accepted. Not without some surprise, the old-timers on the National Committee received the definite order to select the Pennsylvanian; and there were moments when it required all of his geniality to prevent a sharp line being drawn between 'professionals' and 'amateurs,' which would have threatened discord. House, however, wrote Wilson that he was delighted with the choice. McCormick, who as quarterback and captain of a champion football team had learned that the best strategy is based upon the unexpected, was admirably fitted to carry out the

plan of campaign designed to catch the Progressive vote and to concentrate the main Democratic effort in a few doubtful States. He was recognized as a liberal, and he was free from commitments to local machine leaders.

III

Plans had already been drafted for the two essential features of the campaign: First, the line of argument to be followed in speeches by the President and his supporters; second, the method of discovering the regions in which a maximum effect, as counted in electoral votes, could be secured with a minimum of effort.

As to the main lines of argument to be adopted, it was easy to agree that no apologies should be made regarding either foreign or domestic affairs. Wilson must insist upon the positive character of his policy of neutrality as conceived in the interests of America and the world, and to express the willingness of America to enter into a coöperative agreement with the rest of the world to maintain peace.

The Republicans were to hold their convention a week before the Democratic Convention, and House suspected that it was because they intended to put something in their platform concerning the war and its settlement, thus forestalling the Democrats. He shared his suspicions with Wilson. 'I felt so certain of this,' he recorded on May 3, 'that I advised him to make a speech prior to the Republican Convention, outlining our policy in such a manner that they could not appropriate it.' This, as we have seen, the President agreed to give on May 27, before the League to Enforce Peace. House was delighted with the result. 'I cannot tell you how pleased I am with your speech last night,' he wrote to Wilson on May 28. 'It will be a landmark in history.' To emphasize its importance, House felt that the principles of the speech should be officially approved by the Democratic Party.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, May 29, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Do you not think that your speech before the League to Enforce Peace should be endorsed by the St. Louis Convention?

Many people with whom I have talked to-day regard it as the real Democratic platform. Some of them say it leaves the Republicans without a single issue either foreign or domestic; that Taft, Root, Choate, and most of the Republican leaders are compelled to endorse it because of their previous position.

I am delighted the way it has been accepted. I expected some criticism, and you have gotten it, but the chorus of approval makes the criticism seem very vain and partisan.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Regarding domestic policy, it was decided that Wilson should rest his case upon the mass of liberal legislation which he had extracted from a Democratic Congress, and should emphasize the degree to which the Progressive programme of 1912 had been carried into effect by the Democratic Administration. Great care was taken in arranging that the proper note should be struck at the convention, and that in the campaign the President should appear as the champion of Progressive principles.

'May 3, 1916 [conference with Wilson]: We definitely decided on Governor Glynn for Temporary Chairman of the St. Louis Convention, and the President and I will aid him in preparing the keynote speech. I agreed to take charge of it, and after the speech is finished, I am to send it to the President for criticism.'

More important still, in the belief of Colonel House, was

the question of organization, especially the determination of those districts which were absolutely certain to be for or against Wilson, and those which, by well-directed effort, might be induced to exchange hostility for friendship. 'If the campaign is properly organized—and it must be—' he wrote to Wilson on June 15, 'we will win. It is only necessary to do the thing right, for we are in the position of advantage. This must not be a slip-shod campaign, and we must definitely know by the first of October how you stand with the voters.'

'I motored into the country [he noted on May 12] with X, and took lunch at his daughter's cottage. . . . We took this occasion to discuss the coming campaign, and I gave him for the first time what I had in mind. He was much surprised and remarked that I seemed to have thought it out pretty thoroughly, and I think he wondered why I had not taken him into my confidence before. He was pleased with the entire plan, and hoped the President would accept it as a whole.

'X tells me one minute he wants nothing, only desiring to serve; in the next minute he speaks of his ambition to become a member of the Cabinet, in order to show the country how efficiently he could run a department. . . .'

The basis of House's plan was to divide the country into the smallest possible units that could be arranged for with available campaign funds. The smaller the unit, the greater efficiency. In each unit local workers must segregate the certain Republican and certain Democratic voters. 'Roughly speaking,' wrote House, 'we must assume that in a unit of 100,000 voters, eighty per cent of them will be unchangeable voters, which would leave twenty per cent that can be influenced by argument.' That twenty per cent must be worked intensively. 'We must run the President,' he told

Daniel C. Roper, who was in charge of organization, 'for Justice of the Peace and not for President; we need not consider the disposition of sixteen or seventeen million voters, but the disposition of the voters in individual precincts.'

This intensive work in the districts was carried out by Roper under the direction of McCormick, in what House later described as 'an effective manner,' despite the fact that the whole organization had to be built up hurriedly. 'What we lack,' wrote House, 'is party machinery to utilize the organization to the best advantage on the day of election. If it had not been for McCombs, we should have had this machinery in perfect working order.'

For the purpose of determining where the major effort of the Democrats should be exerted, House classified in three categories the States he regarded as important. In the first he placed such States as New York, Maryland, Missouri, Arizona, Wyoming, where, because of the number of electoral votes involved or the approximate equality of the candidates, an expenditure of effort would be worth while. In a second and a third class, the less vital States were placed, States where chances of success were less and an equally intensive effort would probably bring smaller returns. As reports came in during the campaign, the classification might be changed and activities increased in some States or lessened in others. In this way, effort would not be wasted on States which were certain to go either in favor of Wilson or of Hughes. At all times the central organization should know from local reports just how sentiment was developing in each locality, and determine the emphasis of the campaign accordingly.¹

During the summer House kept in touch with the campaign leaders, and, while he avoided the details of organization, he spent much time and thought upon the larger lines along which the campaign was to be fought. Wilson wrote to

¹ See Appendix to chapter, giving text of House's plan.

him in July, asking what he thought of the general situation as to party politics and his reelection. House was non-committal.

Colonel House to the President

NEW LONDON, NEW HAMPSHIRE
July 5, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... As to the general political situation, I think it is too early to prophesy. If the election were held to-day, I have no doubt you would win. Conditions and issues are so different from the usual, that it is idle to speculate as to the final result.

This is my reason for urging a complete organization in certain vital States. If we once get this organization, we will know where we stand, and the opposition will probably not know. If we do not get it, everything must necessarily be guesswork up to the last moment.

It looked at one time as if the 'hyphenate' issue would be the paramount one and the one upon which you could easily win. However, if Germany pursues her present course, one can imagine a radical change in feeling here. Even now, I notice a lack of interest in that question. If the Allies continue their blockade rigorously and if they push the Germans back to their boundaries, a feeling of something akin to sympathy [with Germany] may arise in this country. Germany's complete change of attitude, both here and abroad, has done much towards lessening the war spirit in America.

I believe that certain lines of attack should be agreed upon in the campaign and the fight forced in these directions. If we centre our fire, it will inevitably put the opposition upon the defensive, and that is what we want. Fortunately, we have all the arguments on our side, but they have the money.

It is the plain people that will determine the result, and we

must get the issue properly before them. The keeping the country out of war ¹ and the great measures you have enacted into law, should be our battle-cry. It will be the aim of the opposition to bring into line against you every dissatisfied element. It is their only chance for success. . . .

I am getting in great shape here, and by the first of September I shall be ready for the fray.

My heart goes out to you every day in admiration, in gratitude, and in devotion.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

NEW LONDON, NEW HAMPSHIRE
July 25, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . I hope they will not disturb you too much about the campaign. There is no need why you should be bothered with the details.

Roper was here yesterday, and I feel satisfied that we will have the only efficient organization that has ever been constructed in a Democratic national campaign. Roper seems to understand the job and appreciates its importance, and we have agreed to keep in close touch with one another.

I suggested a coördination between the organization, Publicity, and Speakers' Bureaux. The centre of this should be the organization, and Roper will be able to tell Cummings ² the kind of speakers that are needed in each particular section, and will tell Woolley ³ the kind of literature to send. I

¹ House had himself advocated a plan which under certain conditions would have brought the country into the war, and he had done so regardless of political consequences. Since the attitude of the Allies had prevented the execution of the plan, it would have been rather Quixotic to have disregarded the political advantages resulting from the Allies' refusal.

² Homer Cummings, in charge of the Speakers' Bureau.

³ Robert Woolley, in charge of Publicity.

have asked him to explain this to McCormick and let him bring about the coördination himself. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Facing a normal Republican majority in the country as a whole, unpopular in the Northeastern States with their large vote in the electoral college, equipped with inferior campaign funds, the Democrats were destined to snatch a bare victory by the exercise of consummate strategy and the development of painstaking organization.

APPENDIX

HOUSE'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN, *June 20, 1916*

In preparing the organization I would suggest that the following States be classified in this way:

Class 1. Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, West Virginia, Indiana, Missouri, Wyoming, Arizona, and New Mexico.

Class 2. Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, Illinois, Colorado, California, Oregon, and Washington.

Class 3. Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Iowa.

We should put forth our maximum effort in the States of Class 1, a strong effort in those of Class 2, and a lesser effort in those of Class 3.

There are seven States in Class 1 of prime importance, which we should and must carry. These States should be divided into units of not larger than 100,000 voters.

By having the State organizations coöperate closely with the national organization, it will not be over-difficult to have the certain Republican and certain Democratic voters of these units segregated. This can be done by writing to the precinct chairmen in those units and obtaining from them lists of the entire electorate, putting the absolutely certain Republicans and absolutely certain Democrats in one class and the fluctuating voters in another.

This independent vote should be classified as to race, religion, and former affiliations. Roughly speaking, we must assume that in a unit of 100,000 voters, eighty per cent of them will be unchangeable voters, which would leave twenty per cent that can be influenced by argument.

The size of these units must necessarily depend upon the size of our campaign fund. If it is small, a larger unit will have to be considered; if sufficient money is raised, a smaller unit can be made. The smaller the unit the more successful, of course, will be the result.

Literature, letters in sealed envelopes, and personal appeals should be made to each of these doubtful voters.

One member of the Campaign Committee should be placed in charge of the organization of these units, with nothing else to do. He, in turn, should place one man in charge of each unit. The duty of this man should be to keep in touch not only with the State Executive Committee of his particular unit, but also with each one of the doubtful voters in that unit.

The State Executive Committee should coöperate by giving to the man in charge of the unit the names of precinct chairmen, and also the names of influential citizens of Democratic persuasion in each precinct, and give information as to what things that community has a special interest in.

The influential men in these units that favor the President's policies should be invited to the National Headquarters and should be seen by the Chairman in person, by the member of the committee in charge of organization, and by the man in charge of the particular unit from which the visitor comes. The subtle flattery which an invitation of this kind carries will win the best endeavors from those to whom it is extended. In addition, it gives the manager in charge of organization and the man in charge of the unit a personal touch with the situation that he cannot get otherwise.

If the campaign is organized in this way, it will not be difficult at any time after the first of September to know just where we stand.

The man in charge of these units should ask of the local Democrats in charge, what argument we are using appeals most to the voters of his community. This enables us to soft pedal in some directions and push harder in others.

Towards the end of the campaign, the best Democratic workers in each precinct, of each unit, should be given charge of certain voters to see that they cast their votes on election day. If this is not done, a valuable percentage of the vote will be lost because of lack of interest or from a desire to do something else.

The literature of the campaign should be considered as a whole. Certain issues should be decided upon as being the ones upon which the campaign is to be fought. When these issues have been determined, the treatment of each issue should be likewise determined, and the best writers obtainable should be given the task of preparing articles, letters, or speeches upon the particular subject. These should be short, eloquent, and convincing.

Dead-beats and political hacks should not be employed by the Committee at the instance of politicians from various States, particularly those States that are unalterably Democratic or Republican. Almost every campaign organization is filled with such men. They come recommended by United States Senators, Congressmen, Governors, and leading editors of their respective localities, and are a clog to the organization.

I would suggest holding as few committee meetings as possible without

giving offence. In lieu of this, I would consult members of the organization individually. In this way, each one consulted would feel that the campaign manager and himself were running the campaign. General meetings promote friction and take a lot of time.

Instead of having members of the organization coming in at will to discuss matters, I would fix a time to see each. Some of them should be seen each day, others twice a week, and still others once a week. They should be invited to make notes of the things to be discussed and to save the discussion of them until the time allotted to them. An infinite amount of time and trouble will be saved if this plan is adopted.

I would suggest that at the beginning the Chairman should ask the co-operation of everybody in avoiding personalities and friction of any kind, within the organization, and I would state that all would have a square deal and when differences arose they should be discussed openly and with good feeling.

The Speakers' Bureau should be informed that all speeches to be made must be based upon the issues as outlined by the Campaign Committee and as indicated in the campaign literature.

Coördination between the national and State campaigns should be brought about, so that there may be no friction or misunderstandings.

CHAPTER XII

WILSON REELECTED

At daybreak the returns began to come in from the Far West. . . .
Extract from Diary of Colonel House, November 9, 1916

I

DURING the summer, while the plan of campaign was in process of development, Colonel House remained in his retreat in the woods, never losing touch, however, with McCormick and his lieutenants as they built up the organization, determined which regions demanded especial attention and sent out their campaign literature and speakers. Upon occasion they took the long trip to Sunapee for consultation on larger problems of policy.

To Wilson House sent frequent suggestions for topics that he might take up in his speeches, which the President developed with skill and vigor. Wilson left the matter of campaign strategy to McCormick and never interfered with details. He was thus an ideal candidate on the negative side, while positively he delivered a series of campaign addresses which did much to win the Progressives. He agreed with House that the Democrats must emphasize liberal principles and exploit the obvious unwillingness of the Republican candidate to commit himself upon any of the major issues.

Colonel House to the President

NEW LONDON, NEW HAMPSHIRE
August 3, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

In your speech of acceptance, I have been wondering whether or not it would not be well to speak almost wholly on foreign affairs.

There is much more involved in this election than domestic

issues, and much more involved in the world situation than our people realize. Democracy hangs in the balance, and the result of our election may determine its fate not only here but throughout the world.

We find the reactionary forces dominant in Germany and trying for dominion in the other belligerent countries. We find, too, that the same principles are involved in the Mexican upheaval.

You could make a speech along these lines that would rally the liberals of the world and cause them to look to you as their champion.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

NEW LONDON, NEW HAMPSHIRE
August 3, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

What would you think of answering Hughes' speeches as he goes along, so that the misinformation he conveys may not become fixed in the minds of anybody?

You could call in the reporters, as you formerly did, and tell them that your duties prevent you from speaking, but at this critical juncture in the affairs of the United States and the world you do not feel that it is right to let misinformation and unjust charges against America go unchallenged. . . .

Could you not say that Mr. Justice Hughes' seclusion on the Supreme Court has left him with but little information as to current events, otherwise, you were sure, he would not willingly make some of the statements that he has made in his speech of acceptance?

He criticizes you for upsetting our diplomatic corps in general, and that of South America in particular. The facts are that you retained all the Ambassadors in South America excepting in Argentina, where the incumbent did not desire reappointment.

Why not tell the country the truth about Herrick? ¹ He was retained for more than a year beyond his term, although he wished to be relieved. Mr. Hughes evidently does not know that Mr. Sharp was appointed, confirmed, and in Paris before the war began. You have letters, I think, from Herrick, thanking you for your extreme courtesy to him.

Mr. Hughes seems not to know that the Rural Credits Bill has become a law. Some one should inform him. Would it be out of place for you to do so?

He defends Huerta. Could you not say that he was well within his rights in doing so? (Is he correct in his statement that England, France, Germany, Russia, Spain, and Japan had recognized Huerta?)

He criticizes the disposition of the troops sent to Mexico. Could you not say that you were guided in this by our army officers in command, and ask him would he, under similar circumstances, disregard the advice of the General Staff and use his own military judgment?

He also criticizes ordering the militia to the Mexican Border. Here, again, you acted upon the advice of the General Staff. Would he have acted upon his own initiative?

In speaking of Mexico he says, 'To a stable government appropriately discharging its international duties we should give ungrudging support.' Is there any citizen of the United States that would not? An anxious American public would like to know how he would suggest getting such a government.

In regard to the protection of American property on the high seas, he says you have been 'too content with leisurely discussion. . . . It is entirely clear that we failed to use the resources at our command to prevent injurious action and that we suffered in consequence.' What would he do were he

¹ Ambassador to France.

President? Would he have declared war, or would he have negotiated as Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln did under similar circumstances?

The platform of the Progressive Party four years ago contained many suggestions of value, which the Democratic Party did not hesitate to use for the benefit of the country. Careful scrutiny of the Republican platform adopted at Chicago in June fails to disclose anything of value other than the things the Democrats are already writing into law.

He should be complimented, I think, because of his endorsement of your proposal for permanent peace, made at Washington May 27. He should be congratulated upon accepting your idea of the mobilization of our industrial resources; upon your idea of putting our transportation system upon a firmer basis. And last, but above all, upon your idea of making America first. . . .

What laws enacted under your Administration is Mr. Hughes in favor of repealing or amending? Would it be the Federal Reserve Act, or the Rural Credits Act? Would he be opposed to the forming of the Trades Commission, or to the Panama Tolls Bill, or to the amending of the Clayton Bill making labor no longer a commodity?

Will he not indicate what constructive legislation he will advocate should he become President? These are fateful hours, and one who aspires to the Presidency of this great Republic should offer something better than hindsight criticism.

If any one else should say these things, the papers would not carry them. You can get the entire American people for an audience, and no one else can. The Democratic papers will attack Hughes with intelligence and vigor, but these attacks will be read almost wholly by Democrats, while what you say will be read by Republicans and Progressives as well.

Anyway, I wanted to give you my opinion of the weak points in the speech, to use or not as you think best.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

II

It is obvious that Colonel House felt that chances of Democratic success were greatly enhanced by the campaign methods of the Republican Committee and candidate. On August 19, 1916, he wrote to Plunkett that the campaign was going steadily in favor of the President. 'Mr. Hughes has greatly disappointed his followers. It seems incredible that the American people will choose him unless he gives them something more than platitudes, which he seems to think are issues.' The Republicans from the beginning made the mistake of resting their case upon Wilson's unpopularity in the East, and evidently planned to avoid the declaration of any decisive policy. Previous to their convention, House wrote to the President: 'I had an advance copy of Senator Harding's keynote speech and thought to send it to you, but it was so tame that I decided it was not worth while.'

As the campaign advanced, Hughes' manner indicated either a lack of courage or else very definite orders from his campaign managers to offend no one. 'He makes a fine solemn appearance,' wrote a critic of the campaign with some rudeness, 'but the Democratic papers should immediately call on him to unmask physically and intellectually, shave his beard and expose his thoughts and his face.' The Democratic papers responded, at least with a demand for intellectual unmasking; but the Republican candidate confined his speeches to criticism of Wilson and refused to say definitely what he himself would have done or would do.

By a skilful and courageous campaign Hughes might have won the Progressives. 'When Mr. Hughes left the Supreme Court,' writes William Allen White, then an enthusiastic

Progressive, 'the West sincerely believed that a new national leader was coming. . . . The West expected courage and candor. . . . They were listening for a big man to speak important things. . . . Instead of feeding the fire which should amalgamate the parties, Mr. Hughes began playing the hose of his criticism upon the Progressive ardor which President Wilson had been able to kindle in a Democratic Congress. The Progressives . . . found nothing in the Hughes speeches in which to set their teeth. He talked tariff like Mark Hanna; he talked of industrial affairs in the McKinley tongue. . . . To get the loyalty of the Progressives, Mr. Hughes had to convince them. He took them for granted and failed. . . . Naturally they turned to Wilson. He at least had Progressive achievement; not what they had hoped for, but something upon which to build.'¹

'The Republicans [wrote House on October 16] have made a series of blunders, the principal one being to advise Hughes not to commit himself upon pending issues, but to become what might be termed the national scold. The people are not interested these critical days as to past mistakes. What they want is to be shown the road they are to travel in the future. Hughes declines to do this, believing, if he does not offend anywhere, the regular Republican vote of the country is large enough to elect him.'

An excellent example of the effect of the campaign upon Progressives was to be seen in New Hampshire, where a strong Progressive movement had been organized by John Bass and Winston Churchill. Among the leaders was George Rublee, prominent in his advocacy of liberal legislation in Congress, who, although not a Democrat, had been appointed by Wilson to the Federal Trades Commission. The

¹ William Allen White, *Woodrow Wilson* (Houghton Mifflin Company), p. 316.

appointment pleased Progressives the country over and ultimately gave New Hampshire's electoral votes to Wilson, the more surely in that the stand-pat Republicans in the Senate were bitterly opposed to it. 'The surprise of the day after the election,' wrote William Allen White in *Collier's*, 'came from New Hampshire. Yet it was the logical result of the reaction of the Republican Party and Mr. Wilson on the local situation.'

'George Rublee, of the Federal Trades Commission [recorded House, on October 27], called to ask advice as to whether he should vote for the President or Mr. Hughes. He wishes to vote for the President, because he says Hughes has converted him into a Wilson man, but he thinks it would be awkward for the President in the event he reappointed him as a Republican. Rublee votes in New Hampshire, so I advised him to stifle his conscience and vote for Hughes.'

Republican leaders were responsible for what later appeared to be expensive and quite unnecessary errors in arranging for far-flung stumping tours in behalf of Hughes, particularly a 'Golden Special' to the West, which brought many votes to Wilson. They made the mistake first of sending Hughes to California and then of refusing to coöperate with the followers of Hiram Johnson, as a result of which the Progressives decided to cast their votes against Hughes and ultimately brought the State into the Wilson column. It was the crux of the electoral contest. After the election, House discussed with Mr. X, a member of the Republican Campaign Committee, the strategy of Republican leaders.

'I expressed regret [recorded House] that the Democratic Committee's finances were in such condition that we could not offer to pay for certain undertakings of the Republicans during the campaign. I thought we were in honor bound,

for instance, to pay for the "Golden Special" which they sent to the West, and I thought it only fair we should pay for Mr. Hughes' trip to California.

'X admitted our liability for both of these ventures, and said there were other items which might properly be added to the list. He thought the entire campaign was wretchedly managed. . . . He said Hughes was stubborn and would not take advice from those like Murray Crane, who were most capable of giving it. I insisted that I must refuse to listen to criticism of Willcox or Hughes, because gratitude forbade it.'

And later House wrote the President, regarding the request of a prominent Republican for an interview with Wilson: 'I hope it will be possible for you to give him a few minutes of your time, for we had no more valuable aid in the campaign than he gave . . . [while serving on] the Republican Committee.'

Mistakes of the Republicans were intensified by the marked divergency apparent between the attitude of the candidate and that of Progressive leaders, not merely on domestic questions, but in the matter of foreign affairs. Roosevelt left no one in doubt of his attitude toward Germany and the Allies, and insisted that if he had been President he would have taken forcible measures against Berlin. Hughes was ordered to avoid the issue; when he was heckled on what he would have done after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, a wit reported, 'he cleared his throat.' The Democrats did all they could to call attention to his indecision and evasions.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, October 5, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . I am told by newspapermen that Hughes is becoming more irritable and that it is caused largely by Roosevelt's

speeches. Would it not be well to take some of Roosevelt's most violent utterances and assume that he is voicing Hughes? This would increase the schism. . . .

If this is pushed, it will bring Hughes to a point where he will either have to accept what T. R. is saying about foreign affairs or he will have to disavow it. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Colonel House was evidently not disturbed by the German-American attacks on the President. On October 3, at the end of a conference with Bernstorff on foreign problems, he noted:

'We touched upon the very delicate question of the election. He asked how things were going with us. I told him well, and that it would not surprise me if the President were overwhelmingly reëlected. He laughed and said it was utterly impossible to influence in any way the rabid German-American vote; that they were more pro-German than the Germans themselves. He said to argue with them was futile; they had conceived the idea that the President had branded them as disloyal, and they would take their revenge by voting for Hughes. Bernstorff said many traps were laid for him to express himself about the election, but he never mentioned the subject to any human being excepting to me. I replied that nearly all the Germans were Republicans anyway, and their vote against the President gave us no concern.'

III

But while House believed that the capture of many Progressive voters by Wilson and that the close organization of the Democrats combined with Republican errors would give the President his reëlection, he knew that the contest would

be close. The strategy of the campaign was based upon the uselessness of attempting to win the Northeast. Except for Ohio and Maryland, which he regarded as sure, and New York, New Hampshire, and Indiana, which were doubtful, it seemed probable that Wilson would lose everything east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio. No Democratic candidate with the exception of Madison and Buchanan had ever won a presidential election without New York, and the Democrats at National Headquarters became anxious. In an election that was bound to be close, the forty-five electoral votes of New York were likely to be decisive. Much depended upon Tammany.

‘Vance McCormick came to lunch [wrote House on September 30], and later Morgenthau and Tom Chadbourne joined us, and we discussed different phases of the campaign. We are distrustful of Tammany, and it is a question whether to read the riot act now or wait a little longer to see whether they intend to “throw us.” . . .’

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, September 30, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Roper tells me that to-day we stand to win by five per cent in Indiana. He has sent out new slips in order to get the results of the eight-hour law. These will not be in and tabulated until the end of next week. He does not know whether it will increase or lessen the percentage.¹

Our main trouble now, as it has always been, is here in New York. McCormick and I have just had a long sitting on that situation.

If Tammany plays fair, we will carry this State; otherwise we will lose it, as things stand to-day. Every one of our friends has a different opinion as to whether they will work

¹ Indiana was ultimately lost to the Republicans by one per cent.

with us or not, and all of these opinions, I think, are valueless. We are feeling our way cautiously for the present, hoping that they may clear themselves soon of all suspicion.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

P.S. Your telegraph to O'Leary is the best thing so far in the campaign, and will do more good than you can realize.¹

NEW YORK, *October 23, 1916*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I am enclosing you another report, which Roper and I have just gone over.

You will notice how close the margin is in all the States we hope to win. You will also notice how much stronger the drift has been within thirty days. . . .

I am glad to tell you that Tammany seems to be getting in full swing. I have little doubt now that they will do their utmost to give as large a majority here as is possible.

McCabe of Albany, with whom I am in constant touch, tells me that the drift to you in his county is becoming more and more pronounced. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

NEW YORK, *October 27, 1916*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I believe it is exceedingly important for you to give Tuesday and Wednesday to the up-State.

It is just this: The result may be against us if we lose New York, and we can carry New York if the interest of the voters continues to be aroused. Your staying in the State for these

¹ An anti-British agitator, Jeremiah O'Leary, had sent a letter to Wilson which both sides admitted might be termed offensive. The President had replied: 'I would feel deeply mortified to have you or anybody like you vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal Americans and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them.'

two days and coming to the city on Thursday will probably set the sentiment for you. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Wilson's visit to New York City, to which House referred, developed the most spectacular rally of the campaign, although it proved to be without influence upon the election. It was planned as a method of arousing an enthusiasm for the President which was badly needed, in view of the apparently lukewarm efforts of the Tammany magnates. Wilson, who was irritated by the hostility of the metropolis, came unwillingly, but in public acted his part graciously.

'Harris, of the State Committee [recorded House on October 11], and Senator Wagoner called to ask if I would not arrange to have the Tammany Hall rally, at Madison Square Garden on November 2, turned into a meeting at which the President would consent to speak. I advised that the entire programme be revamped and changed from a political meeting to a non-partisan welcome to the President by New York, in order to give the people an opportunity to show their gratitude. . . .

'*November 1, 1916:* Final touches were given this afternoon to the rally at Madison Square Garden. I hope everything will work out as planned, though there is danger it will not—for much must depend upon luck, as matters are supposed to happen spontaneously which are really prepared far in advance. For instance, the head of the parade must be down at Thirty-Fourth Street and Fifth Avenue at 8.30. At twenty minutes of nine, the President must come out of the Waldorf Hotel and start for the Garden, stopping at Thirty-Fourth Street and Madison Avenue for ten minutes to receive the cheers of the crowd and review the parade for that length of time. Glynn is to commence his speech at the

Garden at fifteen minutes of nine, so as to count on five minutes of applause. The speech is to take ten minutes to deliver and the President must walk on the speakers' platform just as it ends, in order to receive continuous applause of Heaven knows how many minutes. The idea is to have the applause unbroken after Glynn's speech.¹ . . .

'November 2, 1916: Everything to-day has worked according to schedule so far. The President arrived promptly at nine o'clock. McCormick and I met him and went with him to the *Mayflower*, which is anchored in East River. We talked to him for an hour and a half, and it was the most acrimonious debate I have had with him for a long while. He did not like the New York programme, he did not like the Republican expenditure of money to defeat him, as evidenced by the full-page advertisements in the morning papers. The Republicans had sixteen columns to our one and a half. He thought New York "rotten to the core," and should be wiped off the map.

'I defended Democratic newspapers for taking Republican advertisements, and so did McCormick. I thought it was much more to our advantage to be able to get into the Republican press in that way than not to be able to get in at all. I also defended New York by telling him he had as many friends here as in any other part of the Union, even if they were not among the moneyed class. He thought both McCormick and I had "New Yorkitis," and that the campaign should be run from elsewhere. He was absolutely certain of the election without New York.

'The President thought organization amounted to nothing, and that the people determined such matters themselves. If he had been in politics as long as I have, and knew it from the point of a worker rather than as a candidate, he would

¹ The programme was maintained perfectly, and the President appeared on the platform at the moment Governor Glynn finished his speech.

understand how easy it is to change the vote of a State in one way or another. To hear him talk, you would think the man in the street understood the theory and philosophy of government as he does and was actuated by the same motives.

‘To-night I went to the Garden to see how large the crowd was and whether we could count upon the crush expected. I then walked up the Avenue to Thirty-Fourth Street, to see whether the arrangements there came off as scheduled. I was gratified to find there was as much precision as could be expected in the circumstances. After the President had passed down the Avenue, I returned to the Garden to find it packed to the doors and the streets beyond. I merely looked in to hear the cheering, and to find that everything was going as planned, and then left for home. All reports say it is the biggest demonstration of the kind ever given a President or a candidate for President in the City of New York.’

IV

The manufactured ‘spontaneity’ of the rally, however, did not necessarily mean votes, and House evidently feared that New York could not be counted upon. As it finally developed, Hughes carried the State.¹ The margin of victory without New York would be slim, and the Colonel faced the situation frankly. He made out and gave the President, on November 2, a list of the States which he regarded as absolutely certain. It included the solid South, various border States, and some that were scattered.² The result found it to be absolutely correct as far as it went, assuring Wilson of 230 electoral votes. Since 266 were necessary to an election, 36 must be found in the doubtful States.

‘It is a queer list for a Democrat to make [wrote House], with any expectation of winning. Never in the history of the United States, so far as I know, has a President been

¹ By about seven per cent.

² Appendix to chapter.

elected by either party without Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Indiana, or Illinois. Some of these States have always been necessary, but in my list none of them are to be found. Then, too, the list I made was widely scattered and seemingly without purpose. Of course, it was based upon absolute figures.'

House believed that the thirty-six other electoral votes which Wilson needed, would be forthcoming, but if New York and Indiana were both lost, the danger of defeat was real. Following his habit of looking ahead at an unpleasant possibility, he pondered the situation that would arise. The foreign crisis was acute. If Hughes were elected, there would be a period of sixteen weeks, from November to March, during which Wilson, although repudiated by the nation, would still be in power. Common sense and prudence demanded that in such a case the Republicans should assume power and responsibility at once. House bethought himself of the constitutional provision that in case the offices of President and Vice-President became vacant, the Secretary of State should succeed as President. If, following his election, Hughes were made Secretary of State, the path to the Presidency could be immediately opened to him by the resignations of the President and Vice-President.

'It occurred to me yesterday [House wrote on October 19] to suggest to the President, in the event of his defeat, to ask both Marshall and Lansing to resign, and then appoint Hughes Secretary of State. He should then resign himself, making Hughes President of the United States. Times are too critical to have an interim of four months between the election and inauguration of the next President. If the submarine warfare should be reopened, the President would not wish to take any action which might embarrass the incoming Administration. It would be the brave, it would be the

patriotic and the proper procedure to allow Hughes to assume the reins of government at once.

'The defect in our government shows itself here, and its negative quality (as I pointed out in "Philip Dru") is a source of weakness at such times.'

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, *October 20, 1916*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... If Hughes is elected — which God forbid — what do you think of asking both Lansing and Marshall to resign, appoint Hughes Secretary of State, and then resign yourself? This would be a patriotic thing to do. . . .

Such a procedure would save the situation from danger and embarrassment. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

'*October 20, 1916*: Gregory took dinner with me and we went to the theatre afterward. I told him of my suggestion to the President. . . . Gregory was startled and was silent for full five minutes. He then gave the plan his unqualified approval. . . .

'*October 27, 1916*: I told Polk of my suggestion to the President. . . . He seemed as deeply impressed as Gregory, and thought it would have a good effect upon the country if it were known in advance of the election that he would resign if defeated. I told him I could not bring myself to advise injecting such a startling issue into the campaign when everything was going well with us. . . .

'*November 3, 1916*: I spoke to Lansing of my suggestion to the President about resigning in the event Hughes is elected, permitting Hughes to become President at once. Lansing was somewhat staggered at first, but recovered himself and finally expressed approval. He said he had worried con-

siderably over the thought of the interim between November 7 and March 4 in the event of the President's defeat, but the way would be immediately cleared if the President would do as I advised.

'I thought, to carry the plan out as I had in mind, it would be necessary for Hughes to reappoint him, Lansing, Secretary of State, and then take his time as to removals and the formation of a new Cabinet. . . .'

Wilson did not reply at the time to House's suggestion, but after the election the Colonel returned to the subject.

'*November 19, 1916*: I asked him the direct question whether he had made up his mind before the election to follow my suggestion about resigning. He said he had absolutely decided to do so, and that it was in line with his lifetime views upon the subject, and that he had taken the precaution to write Lansing before the election in order to put himself on record so that he could not be charged with doing something hastily from pique. I asked how soon he would have resigned, and he replied, "Immediately." By "immediately" he meant just as soon as the result of the election was definitely known.

'It seems that during the uncertain hours of Tuesday night, November 7, both the President and Mrs. Wilson were cheered, as I was, by the thought of the dramatic dénouement we had in mind in the event of defeat.'

At no time, however, was House really discouraged at the prospect, nor was he disturbed by the fact that betting odds in New York favored Hughes. 'We have had a hard fight,' he wrote Plunkett later, 'but I never lost confidence at any time. We were well organized and knew what to expect.' Wilson remained philosophical during the final trying moments of the contest.

'The President [wrote House] has left everything in our hands, and has not . . . written a suggestion or given a word of advice, although his fortunes are so wholly at stake. He seems to have been confident that every means was being taken to protect his interests, and he has allowed it to rest at that. Several times he has had the White House Offices telephone me, to ask how things were going and what I thought of the outcome.'

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, *November 4, 1916*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I have taken a final survey of the field, and I cannot reach any other conclusion but that the fight is won. The *Herald* poll to-morrow will indicate your election, but their distribution of votes does not agree with ours. In my opinion, our figures are infinitely more accurate. It is the first time we have ever known in advance, with any degree of certainty, the final result.

I cannot tell you how satisfactory the campaign has been from start to finish. From McCormick down to the most insignificant worker, there has been unity of purpose without bickering or fault-finding of any sort whatsoever.

Woolley, Roper, Wallace, and some of the others have done really brilliant work, and Gordon tells me that the early hours of the morning have often found them still at it.

I have perfect confidence in the result.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

V

No athletic contest ever provided such thrills of anxiety and excitement as the election returns of November 7. By evening it became apparent that Hughes had carried the Eastern States with large majorities, so large that the *Times*

searchlight early indicated Republican victory. Even the newspapers that had supported Wilson most strongly conceded the election of Hughes on the morning of November 8, to the confusion of editorial writers who a few hours later were compelled to swallow their early morning words. For, as reports from the West trickled in, doubts arose. By noon it was clear that Wilson was making inroads upon normally Republican States. A note from the editor of *Life* suggests the atmosphere of suspense.

Mr. E. S. Martin to Colonel House

November 8, 1916, Noon

Mr. Martin is holding up the funeral wreath he ordered for Colonel House, till he knows the result of the current proceedings to reanimate the corpse.

Meanwhile he begs Colonel House not to feel neglected.

One after the other, the Western States upon which the Democrats had centered their efforts fell into the Wilson column, and by the morning of November 9, it was clear that the extra thirty-six electoral votes House had hoped for would in all probability be secured. Minnesota and California were doubtful. In both States voting was close; if Wilson won either, the victory would be his. On the 11th, returns from California definitely showed a small Wilson plurality. He had received 277 electoral votes as against 254 for Hughes.

'Election day [recorded Colonel House on November 9] was fairly quiet until about four o'clock in the afternoon, when the first news began to come in. . . . The afternoon returns were fairly favorable to the President, since most of them came from Kansas, strangely enough, where they seem to count the votes as fast as they are registered. Then came the deluge. By seven o'clock it was certain New York had

gone heavily against us. Later Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana seemed lost. At one time Ohio was said to be threatened.

'The campaign managers had prepared an elaborate banquet at the Biltmore Hotel, to which I was invited, but to which I declined to go. While I did not expect defeat, I did not wish to be at such a gathering without knowing whether the President was successful. McAdoo, Lansing, Lane, McCormick, etc., etc., all attended, and they tell me there was never such a morgue-like entertainment in the annals of time. . . .

'The United Press, the Associated Press, and the different newspaper offices were in constant touch with me, as were distant cities throughout the country. When things were at their worst, Gregory, who was with me for the evening, thought it well to look into the question of the President's resignation. Gregory was not certain as to some points of law, and it seemed to him, as indeed it was beginning to seem to me, that the President's defeat was imminent; so we went to the Bar Association to look up the Federal statutes on the subject. We found it would be necessary for the President to call the Senate in session, so that Hughes might be confirmed as Secretary of State, before he would be eligible to the Presidency. Then we looked up the question as to how much notice must be given the Senate before the date of assembly was named.

'Gregory left me and went to his hotel under the firm impression we were defeated.

'I had not given up the ship, for the reason that the vote I had given the President was being confirmed State by State. When he was here Thursday, I told him that in my opinion he would carry the States, a list of which is appended,¹ which would leave him thirty-six votes short of an absolute majority. . . .

¹ See Appendix to chapter.

'I expected, indeed, that we would carry many States we lost, but I at no time considered them certain and we lost no State I had placed in the certainties. I regard this with some degree of pride. The President was skeptical regarding the value of organization. I wonder if he is now, for if it had not been for organization we could not have forecast the result, and we could not have carried the States we did, since we would probably have scattered our strength and lost everything.

'It seemed certain, if we were to win, that it must be by the votes in the Far West, and these returns would not be in before the early morning. I therefore went to bed by eleven o'clock and left Gordon and Janet in the study to receive returns, which they did until three o'clock in the morning. By five o'clock, while still in bed, but with the telephone at my bedside, I again got into the game. At daybreak the returns began to come in from the Far West favorable to us, and it became evident that the election was to be a close one. I immediately got in touch with Headquarters, where a force had been on duty all night, and advised them to send telegrams to the county chairmen of every doubtful State, urging them to be vigilant and to pay no attention to press reports that Hughes was elected. I called up the *World* and other newspapers, as well as the United Press, and urged them to undo, as far as possible, the harm done by the morning press in conceding everything to Hughes. I was afraid if this was not done, everything would go by default, and the States which we carried in the West by close margins would be neglected and we might be robbed of victory.

'I visited Headquarters, to find a motley mob. . . . The all-night vigil and the certainty of defeat, followed by hope, had been too much for them. There was not an old stager around excepting Hugh Wallace, who was more composed.

'I asked the Attorney-General to remain over until tonight, and I have been in constant consultation with him

regarding measures to protect the ballot boxes in States where the votes were still being counted and which were in doubt.

‘I believe I can truthfully say that I have not worried a moment. If I had, I could not have stood the strain. It was not that I was altogether certain of the result, but I never permit myself to worry about matters over which I have no control.

‘*November 12, 1916: Friday, Saturday, and to-day have been taken up largely by party leaders coming to tell me how they did it. . . . They are a good lot, the best I have ever known in a political campaign — clean, able, and intelligent, and they deserve much credit. The desire to talk, however, seems to be a passion which some people make a vice. . . .*’

Thus was Wilson granted four years more of power, the first Democratic President to succeed himself since Andrew Jackson. Thus was he assured a position of world influence that might be utilized to forward the principles of a new organization of nations which, since the beginning of 1916, had come to be his purpose. He had promised the country to keep out of war if it was consistent with American honor and safety; he had also warned the country that it might prove impossible to remain at peace. Most definitely he had stated that the time had come for America to play an active rôle in establishing and maintaining the peace of the world. What these declarations might portend, the events of the succeeding weeks soon made plain.

APPENDIX

LIST OF 'CERTAIN' WILSON STATES
GIVEN WILSON BY HOUSE, November 2, 1916:


Alabama.....	12
Arkansas.....	9
Arizona.....	3
Colorado.....	6
Florida.....	6
Georgia.....	14
Kentucky.....	13
Louisiana.....	10
Maryland.....	8
Mississippi.....	10
Missouri.....	18
Ohio.....	24
North Carolina.....	12
Oklahoma.....	10
South Carolina.....	9
Tennessee.....	12
Texas.....	20
Virginia.....	12
Washington.....	7
Montana.....	4
Nebraska.....	8
Nevada.....	3
	<u>230</u>

OTHER STATES FINALLY CARRIED
BY WILSON:

California.....	13
Idaho.....	4
Kansas.....	10
New Hampshire.....	4
New Mexico.....	3
North Dakota.....	5
Utah.....	4
West Virginia.....	1
(Electors split)	
Wyoming.....	3
	<u>47</u>

Extra votes needed for election 36
Necessary total 266

House's 'Certain' States..... 230
Wilson's total..... 277



PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1916

CHAPTER XIII

FUTILE PEACE PROPOSITIONS

We utterly distrust the German Government's good faith.
Lord Bryce to House, December 27, 1916

I

EVEN as the final election reports trickled in from California, bearing the news of the victory achieved by so narrow a margin, the thoughts of President Wilson turned once more to the European situation. Signs were multiplying that the lull in relations with Germany, inaugurated by the *Sussex* pledge, could not long continue. Despatches from the American Embassy in Berlin emphasized the pressure brought to bear upon the German Government to disregard this pledge and resume the ruthless submarine campaign. On October 17, Joseph Grew, American Chargé in the absence of Mr. Gerard, wrote to House: 'Our Government should therefore be fully prepared for an eventual resumption of the indiscriminate submarine warfare against commerce in violation of the rights of neutrals on the high seas.' As we have seen, House received from Bernstorff the direct intimation that, unless Wilson made some move for peace, Germany would take what measures seemed best calculated to break the Allied resistance.

On October 14, the Colonel wrote to Grey:

'There is a strong belief in Germany, in army and navy circles as well as among the people generally that, if they pursue an unbridled submarine warfare, England could be isolated. The German Government themselves, as now constituted, are against this policy, but it is doubtful whether they will be able much longer to stem the tide.'

The correspondence of Count Bernstorff with Berlin, published since the war, proves the correctness of House's information. The military chiefs insisted that Germany was beginning to feel the effects of the blockade and could not stand the conditions of deadlock indefinitely. The war must be stopped. If Wilson could stop it by negotiation, as the Chancellor and Bernstorff hoped, well and good. If the Entente, however, would not agree to negotiation upon the basis of German terms, then England must be isolated by the unrestricted use of the submarine and the Entente Powers compelled to yield. The German army and navy leaders were not greatly impressed by Bernstorff's warning that such a step would result in American intervention on the side of France and Great Britain. They promised that, long before America could render effective aid, the submarine would have starved the British out.

Thus, all through the election campaign, Wilson faced the danger of a new submarine crisis which might bring war at any moment. In view of the delicacy of the situation, there was no little irony in the Democratic posters: 'He has kept us out of war.' Some intimation of the danger is to be found in Wilson's public speeches, but both publicly and privately he insisted that he would not permit war to come until he had exhausted every pacific expedient consistent with national honor.

The President and Colonel House did not agree as to the method by which the United States should meet the danger. Wilson believed that the simplest and most effective step was a frank demand by the American Government that the war must stop, in deference to the necessities and welfare of mankind. He was confident that such a demand, backed by the moral influence of the United States, would lead to negotiations. He saw no other means by which the entrance of the United States into the struggle could be averted, and he seems to have been willing at this time to approve a stale-

mate. The refusal of his offer of help, made the preceding spring, apparently convinced him that the war aims of the Allies were as selfish as those of Germany.

House opposed any attempt at mediation made without Allied approval.¹ He feared lest it give Germany a chance to insist that she was ready for peace, but that the Allies were intent upon conquest, and thus perhaps furnish some justification for resuming the submarine warfare on the plea of self-defence. Since the Allies had refused the American offer of help, there was nothing to be done, for any offer of mediation would be offensive to them and would merely help Germany to manœuvre into a favorable diplomatic position. He remained always distrustful of German peace offers, for he was convinced that the German leaders had not renounced their hope of dominating the continent.²

'October 20, 1916: Ambassador Gerard called [recorded Colonel House], and I showed him the memorandum sent me by Count von Bernstorff. . . . I am of the opinion that Bernstorff and the German Government "played us" in order to get Gerard home. It will be remembered that Bernstorff told me at Sunapee his Government wanted to convey to us unofficially their belief that it would be of benefit to both countries if he were brought home for a while

¹ 'I was trying,' he wrote on April 6, 1925, to the author, 'as you have noted, to keep Wilson from the threat of intervention without first having the Allies' consent.' House's reason was that, in view of our military unpreparedness, mediation without the consent of one side or the other could not succeed; it would have been possible to secure German consent in the autumn of 1916, but only to terms that meant a German victory. Hence his conclusion that, to mediate in the direction of a just peace, the consent of the Allies would be essential. If we had been adequately prepared, intervention might have been possible. President Wilson, House continued, 'did not seem to see the difference between our having a great military establishment and no preparation at all. Therefore . . . I believe our big mistake was that we were not in a position to intervene in spite of Allied or German protests.'

² A suspicion justified by the peace terms formulated by Germany at the end of the year.

on vacation. As a matter of fact, they wished him here so as to press peace moves.'

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, November 6, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... At spare moments I have kept in close touch with the European situation, and I find indisputable evidence that Germany is not yet ready to agree to peace terms that this country could recommend to the Allies. They sneer at such proposals as a league to enforce peace and believe, as they have believed heretofore, that large military armaments are necessary to enforce peace. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Wilson, however, did not make the same distinction as House, between Germany and the Allies; and his fear of drifting into war with Germany was quickened by the sinking of the *Marina* on October 28 under doubtful conditions, which seemed to indicate that the *Sussex* pledge had already been disregarded. The moment his reflection was assured, he summoned House to Washington to discuss his plan of mediation.

'November 14, 1916: I left New York this morning [wrote Colonel House], arriving at the White House at six o'clock. The President immediately came to my room and we had a long conference. We went at once into the matter about which he called me to Washington.

'The President desires to write a note to the belligerents, demanding that the war cease, and he desired my opinion. His argument is that, unless we do this now, we must inevitably drift into war with Germany upon the submarine issue. He believes Germany has already violated her promise

of May 4, and that in order to maintain our position we must break off diplomatic relations. Before doing this he would like to make a move for peace, hoping there is sufficient peace sentiment in the Allied countries to make them consent.

‘My reply to this was that the Allies would consider it an unfriendly act, if done at a time when they are beginning to be successful after two years of war;¹ that they will also see that his object in making the move now is to avoid a crisis with Germany on the U-boat controversy, and it would appear as if he wanted to reward Germany for breaking her promises to us and acting in total disregard of international obligations.

‘He was much worried over my position and asked me to think it over at length.

‘The President wondered if the matter could be furthered by my going to Europe and visiting each of the belligerent countries. We dismissed this after some discussion, because of the time it would take to do it and because of the adverse criticism which would be created in each of the Allied countries before I could make the round of capitals — knowing, as they surely would, that I had come upon a peace mission. He then suggested that I go to England and France and, upon my arrival, he would give out the message, letting me brave the British and French Governments and public. I was entirely willing to do this if it were thought best, although my feeling was that I should prefer Hades for the moment rather than those countries when such a proposal was put up to them. . . .

‘We then argued over and over again the question of what was best to do, I holding that for the moment nothing was necessary and we should sit tight and await further developments, the President holding that the submarine situation

¹ A reference to the successful French counter-attacks at Verdun and the Allied advance on the Somme.

would not permit of delay and it was worth while to try mediation before breaking off with Germany. I argued again and again that we should not pull Germany's chestnuts out of the fire merely because she desired it, was unruly, and was gradually forcing us into war. . . .

'November 15, 1916: I breakfasted alone. The President was unusually late, which bespoke a bad night. I was sorry, but it could not be helped. I dislike coming to the White House as his guest and upsetting him to the extent I often do. . . .

'The President said we should never get anywhere in the discussion unless he wrote his views in concrete form, and he had made up his mind to write his message and then write a note to the belligerents; that after he had written it and made his points clear, we could go over it again and discuss it with more intelligence.

'I did not yield a point in my opinion that he would make a mistake if he finally sent it, nor did he yield in his argument that it might be effective.'

House returned to New York convinced that any attempt at mediation at this time would simply muddy the waters. His conviction was based upon his distrust of the Germans, who had come to desire negotiations either as a means of capitalizing their military success and demanding a peace of victory, or simply to find an excuse for the renewal of submarine warfare on the ground that Allied obstinacy offered full justification. With this in mind, Berlin was now anxious for Wilson's mediation and obviously intended to utilize the threat of a ruthless submarine campaign in order to hasten it. As House realized, Wilson was extremely sensitive to this threat.

'November 20, 1916: The Germans [he noted] intend to push us to the closest point in the submarine controversy, in

order to force us to intervene rather than go to war with them.

‘In my opinion, the President’s desire for peace is partially due to his Scotch Presbyterian conscience and not to personal fear, for I believe he has both moral and physical courage. . . .’

II

President Wilson’s mind was evidently made up. On November 21, he wrote to House that he was confirmed in his impression that the moment was near, if not already at hand, for his move for peace. He said he had just completed his message to Congress and was about to sketch the draft of the peace note. He hoped to make the best haste consistent with his desire to have the paper the strongest and most convincing he had ever written.

Four days later, Wilson summoned his friend once more to Washington. He said that he had finished a first draft; he hoped he had a clear enough head for it. Events were thickening, he felt, and a definite course of action should be determined immediately.

In response, House left at once for Washington to discuss the proposed note. ‘I am fearful of its effect,’ he wrote in his journal; nor was his anxiety alleviated when the President read him the draft.

‘November 27, 1916: After dinner we went to the study and began the discussion of the object of my visit. He read several letters and despatches from abroad which Polk had already shown me. He then read a draft of the proposed note to the belligerents urging them to state what terms they demanded as a basis of peace.

‘It was a wonderfully well-written document, yet, strangely enough, he had fallen again into the same error of saying something which would have made the Allies frantic with rage. I

have called his attention to this time after time, and yet in almost every instance where he speaks of the war he offends in the same way.

“The sentence to which I objected was: “The causes and objects of the war are obscure.” I told him the Allies thought if there was one thing clearer than another, it was this; that their quarrel with him was that he did not seem to understand their viewpoint. They hold that Germany started the war for conquest; that she broke all international obligations and laws of humanity in pursuit of it. They claim to be fighting to make such another war impossible, and so to break Prussian militarism that a permanent peace may be established.

‘I urged him to insert a clause, in lieu of the one to which I objected, which would make the Allies believe he sympathized with their viewpoint. I thought he could do it in a way to which Germany would not object and might even take as vindication of her own position.

‘I also suggested another clause, which he inserted, stating specifically he was not trying to mediate or demand peace.’

House returned to New York pleased that he had persuaded Wilson to alter the character of the note so that it no longer represented an insistent offer of mediation, but was merely a suggestion that both sides state clearly the terms upon which they were ready to discuss peace. He maintained his opinion, however, that Wilson would be merely playing into the hands of the Germans if he issued the note at a time when the Allies were determined to listen to no hint of peace.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, November 30, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I have been thinking a lot of your proposed note to the belligerents, and I cannot bring myself to believe that

it should be done immediately or without further preparation.

You have before you the biggest opportunity for service that was ever given to man, and I hope you will not risk failure. Since you first suggested your plan, I have talked with everybody within my reach whose opinion I value, many of them having an intimate knowledge of the situation in the Allied countries, and there is not one that believes it could be successful at this time. . . .

I believe you have the situation in your own hands, and, if you do not act too hastily, you can bring about the desired result. If you do it now, there does not seem to me one chance in ten of success and you will probably lose your potential position for doing it later.

The Germans are the only ones that believe it can be done now, and the wish with them is father to the thought. They do not care how you come out of it, so it is done, and they reap a certain measure of profit in any event.

Before the step is finally taken, a good many things, I think, should be done. A background should be laid in both France and England, so that public opinion would listen with favor to any proposal from you. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Colonel House was certain that neither France nor Great Britain would regard an attempt at mediation in any light but that of a willingness to play Germany's hand. This conviction was intensified by a conversation with Ambassador Jusserand on December 3, in which the French Envoy spoke very freely and critically of what he regarded as Wilson's pro-Germanism. 'If I had not determined to keep my temper,' recorded House, 'I could have found grounds for saying things he would have remembered a long while.'

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, December 4, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . I had a long and spirited conversation with Jusserand yesterday. He promised to send a cable to his Government, embodying the things we have done for France since the war began. Jusserand was inclined to be critical because we had not sent Bernstorff home and had not held Germany to strict accountability in the submarine controversy. He mentioned the *Sussex*, *Marina*, and several of the latest incidents.

I turned on him when he had finished and made him confess that, if Germany started an unrestricted submarine warfare, there was a possibility of practically isolating England. He admitted that the course you had followed was the one most favorable to the Allies. The substance of my reply was that the Allies did not seem to know what was best for them and that they had better take our guidance.

He admitted that it was probable that no material change in the western line could be made for at least a year or more, and I suggested the wisdom of accepting your offer of last spring to mediate. He seemed to concur in this, but at the last moment, upon leaving, he veered away into the high-flown foolish declaration that France would fight to the last man.

Bernstorff is the only Ambassador of the belligerent countries that seems to have any sense of proportion and who never criticizes this Government in the slightest for anything that occurs. He takes what comes philosophically and tries to make a favorable impression if possible. The others seem at times to say what they can to irritate. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

It was obvious that, as in the previous spring, France would resent any move on the part of Wilson which might

interfere with the complete defeat of Germany. Great Britain would be even less willing to consider negotiations, because of the Cabinet crisis in December which resulted in the retirement of Asquith and Grey and the assumption of control by Lloyd George. The overturn of Asquith was the result of popular protests against his supposedly lackadaisical attitude, protests which had been whipped up by the Northcliffe press.

House regretted the resignation of Grey, and he did not believe that the revamped Cabinet would prove more effective. But it was clear that the country had lost faith in Asquith, and that the new Prime Minister would be compelled to base his policy upon the 'knock-out blow' theory, which excluded all possibility of negotiations with Germany.

'I am watching with a good deal of concern [he wrote Wilson on December 3] the crisis in the British Cabinet. If the Lloyd George-Northcliffe-Carson combination succeed in overthrowing the Government and getting control, there will be no chance of peace until they run their course.

'I do not know [he recorded on December 7] that Great Britain can better herself in the way of a Cabinet, although I can understand why there is general resentment at so many failures. I believe if Asquith had driven his Cabinet with a firmer hand, matters might have been different.

'Sir Edward Grey's mistake has been that he allowed Sir Cecil Spring-Rice to remain here at the most critical time in the history of the two countries. . . . Grey failed to see that conditions demanded radical changes and that the ordinary diplomatic corps was unequal to the new situation brought about by the war.'

House continued his close relations with British leaders, despite the change in the Cabinet. Grey cabled him that

Sir Eric Drummond, his secretary, would hold the same position with Balfour, the new Foreign Secretary, and that Balfour would expect House to use the private code as necessity arose. 'If Grey had to leave,' wrote the Colonel to Wilson, 'the next best man in the Kingdom for us is Balfour. This will give Sir Horace great influence upon American affairs, since Balfour and Plunkett are the closest friends and Balfour will look largely to him for guidance. This again is fortunate.'

III

The closer Colonel House's relations with the British, the more keenly he felt that the President's note should be delayed. He realized the existence of a body of liberal opinion in Great Britain, which advocated a negotiated peace with Germany; but it was as yet without influence. Articulate public opinion demanded that the new Lloyd George Cabinet must discard all ideas except that of military victory. It would regard a demand for a peace conference by Wilson as definitely unfriendly.

The President hesitated and, as he did so, the Berlin Government exploded a diplomatic bombshell. On December 12, the Germans, wearied of waiting for Wilson's mediation, published a note which expressed their willingness to enter a peace conference. The proposal contained no suggestion of specific terms, but its tone permitted the interpretation that Germany would consider no peace which was not one of victory, and the more recent publication of German documents has verified this suspicion.

It is certain that the terms German leaders had in mind would have been unacceptable to the Allies, and it is likely that the Germans knew it. The purpose of the note was, at least in part, to make it appear that the responsibility for the continuation of the war must rest upon the Allies. Nevertheless, some of the British felt that it was a mistake to

return a categorical refusal even to consider the proposal. Amongst them was a young British officer who, after being gassed at the fighting front, had been attached to the British Embassy at Washington and who later was to play a rôle of unsuspected importance. This was Sir William Wiseman, a natural diplomat, of whom Lord Reading later said, 'Wiseman is well named.'

In him Colonel House found a kindred spirit, and, despite the disparity in years, there sprang up a friendship which had significant effects. Wiseman was liberal, open to suggestion, but shrewd and fully aware of the peril of negotiating with Germany. He was convinced that the future welfare of the world depended upon an intimate understanding between Great Britain and the United States. Wiseman further perceived that the war, if carried on to the crushing defeat of Germany, might bring dangers as well as blessings to his country and the world; he thus joined heartily with Colonel House in every effort to achieve the earliest possible settlement consistent with safety from German imperialism. Between House and Wiseman there were soon to be few political secrets, and from their mutual comprehension resulted in large measure our close coöperative association with the British.

The advent of Wiseman in December was especially timely, for there was a need of better means of communication between Washington and London. The retirement of Grey from the Foreign Office meant that there was no one with whom Ambassador Page would be on thoroughly intimate and sympathetic terms. The British had begun to realize that Page did not exactly represent the Washington point of view, and they knew that in Washington the relations between Spring-Rice and the State Department were not entirely satisfactory. They recognized the need of a regular channel of communication with House, whom the British Foreign Office knew and of whose sympathy they

were certain. Wiseman himself thus describes the first stages of a mission which came to be of great political significance:

‘The British Ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, wished to make a confidential communication to Colonel House, and asked me to convey his message personally. The message itself was of no particular importance, but the talk I had with Colonel House convinced him that I should be a sympathetic and discreet channel of communication. From that date until the time that the United States came into the war, I was confidential intermediary between Colonel House and the British Ambassador.

‘I also communicated to the Foreign Office, through my Chief in London, certain information and suggestions which Colonel House thought they ought to have. Before doing this, however, I obtained permission from Sir Cecil, as I felt that, in communicating with the Foreign Office direct, I was encroaching on the prerogatives of the Embassy. Sir Cecil replied without hesitation that anything should be done in any way that would help the Cause; and that his own position in the matter was not to be considered. From then on until the time he left Washington, he gave me every possible encouragement and help.’¹

Sir William, unlike most of the British in official position, believed that, if the replies of the Entente Powers to the German peace note could be delayed, some chance of profitable negotiation might be discovered. At least the Allies ought not to make the obvious mistake of returning such a brusque reply as to justify the German Government before its own people.

¹ Memorandum communicated to the author, November 16, 1925.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, December 17, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

The British Ambassador has sent Sir William Wiseman of the Embassy to see me.

He suggested that I find out unofficially Germany's terms. This, I told him, could not be done before Friday or Saturday, since I was sure that Bernstorff did not know them; that what Bernstorff had was what his Government had given him for public consumption and they were not entrusting him with what they really had in mind.

The British Embassy is cabling their Government to-day, asking whether or not it would be possible for the Prime Minister to delay his answer until Friday or Saturday, telling them of his [Wiseman's] conversation with me and what is planned. They expect an answer by to-morrow afternoon at five o'clock.

If it is favorable, I am to get in touch with Bernstorff and see what can be done there.

It looks as if you might soon be having the belligerents talking; at least there is hope.

I am writing in great haste, because of the lateness of the hour. Will you not advise me promptly, by telegraphic code or letter, if you have anything further to suggest?

Your affectionate

E. M. HOUSE

The procedure suggested by House and Wiseman had much to commend it. The German Government were perhaps merely putting out their peace feeler as a method of quieting opinion at home and justifying Germany before neutral opinion; on the other hand, they might be willing to make broad concessions to secure peace. In either case it was to the advantage of the Allies to know what was in the German mind.

But the British Foreign Office seemed to be so much in a hurry to announce to the world that they would not consider peace that they had no time to utilize this opportunity of securing invaluable information. It may have been that they feared that if they once began to talk, as House suggested, peace would come before the complete defeat of Germany.

'December 18, 1916: The British Embassy [recorded House] received a reply from their Government, stating it would be impossible to postpone a statement by the Prime Minister regarding peace terms. They asked that their thanks be given me for my proffered service.'

It is possible that the request of the British Embassy for delay on the part of the British Foreign Office was not understood in London, for Lord Robert Cecil spoke of the request as signifying that Washington desired information as to the nature of the reply, whereas all that was asked for was delay. It seems unfortunate that Mr. Page was so thoroughly out of sympathy with Wilson's policy, since he gave the British to understand that Washington did not expect the German note to be taken seriously and he knew of no reason for delay. Some light is thrown on this incident by a letter of Lord Robert Cecil to the British Ambassador in Washington, repeating a conversation with Mr. Page in London:

Lord Robert Cecil to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 19, 1916

SIR:

The American Ambassador came to see me this afternoon.

I asked him whether he could tell me why his Government were anxious to have confidential information as to the nature of our response to the German peace note.

He replied that he did not know, but he imagined it was to enable them to frame the representations of which he had spoken to me.

I then told him that we had asked the French to draft a reply and that it would then be considered by the Allies and in all probability an identic note would be presented in answer to the German note. I thought it probable that we should express our view that it was impossible to deal with the German offer, since it contained no specific proposals.

He said that he quite understood this, and that we should in fact reply that it was an offer 'to buy a pig in a poke,' which we were not prepared to accept. He added that he thought his Government would fully anticipate a reply in this sense, and he himself obviously approved it. . . .

I am, etc.

ROBERT CECIL

It is easy to appreciate the British criticism that the German note contained no specific conditions, but it is more difficult to understand why they and Mr. Page could not see the value of Wiseman's proposal, which might have led to something specific, if merely the definite proof that Germany had impossible terms in mind.

The German peace offer, which took even Bernstorff by surprise, was bound to rob Wilson's note of any effect it might have had. If he issued the note at once, he would be accused of acting in collusion with Germany, and the Allies would be still less inclined to take heed of it. The President, however, instead of giving up the plan and awaiting a more propitious occasion, decided to issue his note immediately. He seems to have feared lest Great Britain and France might definitely bang the door upon all negotiations by a brusque refusal of the German proposal. He concluded to take this step without consulting House, who did not see the final draft of the note. Events had moved so fast, he wrote to House on December 19, that he did not have time to get him down to Washington to go over it with him. It was written

and sent off within a very few hours, evidently in the fear that the Governments of the Entente might in the meantime so have committed themselves against peace as to make the situation even more hopeless than it had been. Wilson added that the note proceeded along a different line than the draft which House had seen.

The President, however, did follow House's suggestion not to make a categorical demand for peace. His note was merely an appeal to the belligerents, emphasizing the interest of the United States in the future peace of the world and its willingness to coöperate with Europe in maintaining it. He underlined the danger of irreparable injury to civilization if peace were long delayed, and intimated that there was a chance of securing immediate peace if the belligerents would make explicit disclosure of their war aims.

‘It may be that peace is nearer than we know [said Wilson]; that the terms which the belligerents on the one side and on the other would deem it necessary to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some have feared; that an interchange of views would clear the way at least for conference and make the permanent concord of the nations a hope of the immediate future, a concert of nations immediately practicable.’

Colonel House, as we have seen, disapproved the basic idea of issuing a peace note at this time, when the Allies were obviously in no mood to receive it favorably. He was further troubled by Wilson's phraseology, for the President, pursued by some verbal Nemesis, again gave voice to an expression which was bound to irritate the French and British. ‘The objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war,’ said Wilson, ‘are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own peoples and to the world.’ The sentence was accurate, if the words were understood in a strict sense, and they contained a cer-

tain ironic humor. But the Allies would not enjoy the implication that their war aims were on the same plane as Germany's.

'December 20, 1916: The President sent me to-day [House recorded] the original draft of the note which he has sent to the belligerents and neutrals. He asked me to return it, so I took a copy with the eliminations and changes just as he had made them. I thought it might sometime be interesting, since the President may destroy the original.

'I have seldom seen anything he has written with so many changes. . . . I deprecate one sentence, which will give further impetus to the belief that he does not yet understand what the Allies are fighting for. That one sentence will enrage them. I talked to him for ten minutes when I was there and got him to eliminate from the original draft a much more pronounced offence of the same character, but he has put it back in a modified form. He seems obsessed with that thought, and he cannot write or talk on the subject of the war without voicing it. It has done more to make him unpopular in the Allied countries than any one thing he has done, and it will probably keep him from taking the part which he ought to take in peace negotiations. . . . It is all so unnecessary. He could have done and said the same things if he had said and done them in a different way.'

As House had foreseen, the effort of President Wilson to begin peace negotiations received scant attention in Allied countries as well as in Germany. The latter Power desired a conference in order to negotiate upon the basis of the military situation, which was all in her favor. A public announcement of her war aims, proving the extent of her ambitions, would merely stiffen the Allies in their determination to fight until the military situation became more favorable to them. Thus the German reply to the President, while polite, was

quite indefinite. They stated that a direct exchange of views appeared to them the most suitable means of arriving at peace, and they merely repeated their suggestion of a conference without any exposal of specific terms. Ambassador Gerard felt that their purpose in initiating a conference was to split the Allies.

‘Germany wants a peace conference [he wrote to House on January 9] in order to make a separate peace, on good terms to them, with France and Russia. Then she hopes to finish England by submarines, then later take the scalps of Japan, Russia, and France separately. The Allies ought to remember what Ben Franklin said about hanging together or separately. I get the above scheme from *very good authority*.’

The Allies refused negotiations on the ground that a durable peace presupposed a satisfactory settlement of the conflict and that at the moment it was hopeless to expect from the Central Powers the reparation, restitution, and guaranties necessary to such a peace. They challenged Wilson’s analogy between the war aims of the two groups, insisting that the attitude of the Central Powers was a menace to humanity and civilization. They met Wilson’s request for a statement of peace terms by an uncompromising declaration which won the approval of American opinion on the Atlantic coast, but which seemed to end the possibility of negotiations.

IV

Thus Wilson’s attempt served neither to remove the danger of a resumption of German submarine warfare, nor to improve our relations with the belligerents.

‘The dominant tone [wrote Page to House] in public and private comment on the President’s suggestion is surprise



To E. M. House
from his friend
Homer Plunkett
1925-

and sorrowful consternation and all public comment so far is visibly restrained. . . . The President's suggestion itself would have provoked little or no criticism if it had been made at another time. But his remarks accompanying his suggestion are interpreted as placing the Allies and the Central Powers on the same level. . . . A luncheon guest at the Palace yesterday informs me that the King wept while he expressed his surprise and depression.'

Even so sincere an admirer of Wilson as Plunkett could not conceal his regret that Wilson had made his suggestion at such a time and in such a way.

'December 22, 1916: Sir Horace Plunkett was my first visitor this morning [recorded Colonel House]. He is terribly exercised over the President's note. He is sorry that he sent it and regrets the verbiage. He called attention to the fact that it contained the same old refrain. He had made memoranda of sentences taken from the President's speeches during the campaign, notably the one in Cincinnati, and started to read them. I begged him not to do so, saying I could repeat them backward. I asked him to write out his views and send them to me, so I might transmit them to the President if I thought advisable. . . .'

On December 27, Lord Bryce wrote to Colonel House, emphasizing the unfortunate effect of Wilson's phrase, which seemed to the British to place them and the French on a par with the Germans. No reasonable man, Bryce added, supposed that the President had been influenced by the Germans or had any object in view beyond what he stated; but his words had certainly been taken to suggest that both sides were equally innocent or equally culpable.

Bryce then proceeded to give five reasons why the general feeling was against opening negotiations with the German

and Austrian Governments, the feeling, he said, not of jingoism, but of peace-lovers like himself. There was every reason to believe that Germany, Austria, and Turkey would not offer any acceptable terms. If that was an error, then let them state their basis for negotiation. In the second place, there was every reason to believe that they would not accept any terms the Allies could possibly offer. In the third place, it was easy for Germany to state terms because she dominated Austria and Turkey, but very difficult for the Allies because so many independent Powers were concerned, with many different views. Bryce admitted that the terms which each Power would lay down must depend largely on how it viewed the prospects of success.

In the fourth place, the British utterly distrusted the German Government's good faith and believed that she was merely trying to gain time. Finally, he was certain that Americans failed to realize the indignation and horror that had been aroused by German war methods and their disregard of international right and common justice, as shown by the Belgian deportations and the Armenian massacres. Men asked, he said, 'How can we make peace with such a Government, until we have defeated it? It will be a standing danger to all its neighbours until it has been defeated and taught that lawlessness and savagery don't pay.'

House did not thoroughly agree with this attitude. He realized the existence of selfish motives in Allied war aims and the desire to destroy Germany politically, which actuated certain Allied politicians. But the sincerity of Allied peoples as a whole could not be doubted. They were convinced of Germany's complete responsibility for the war and of their own moderation of purpose. Doubts cast upon their sincerity could only irritate, without improving the situation.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, December 20, 1916

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... Wiseman says that all the belligerents resent the tone of our press, even those papers that are pro-Ally. He quoted the *World* as an example. He says his Government understand and appreciate our attitude, but they find it difficult to make their people understand it.

No matter who brought on the war or what each Government knows the cause to be for which they were fighting, the people, he said, of every belligerent nation had worked themselves up to an exalted enthusiasm of patriotic fervor and they resent any suggestion that they have selfish motives and are not fighting solely for a principle.

I think we ought to keep this constantly in our thoughts and not try to argue with them as if they were in an ordinary frame of mind.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

P.S. I have just seen Sir Horace Plunkett, and he confirmed Sir William Wiseman's statement.

Thus, at the moment when the magnitude of the war threatened to exhaust the material strength of both sides, each of the fighting groups was more set than ever in the will to carry the struggle through to a complete decision. The German General Staff warned the Government that it was approaching the end of its resources, but it promised a quick victory through the ruthless submarine campaign. The French were worn out by the battles of Verdun and the Somme, and more and more dependent upon British help; so far as the British were concerned, Grey had some weeks before written an official memorandum in which he spoke of the need of telling the Allies, 'as they ought to be told now, that

our support in shipping and finance, one or both, will have to be curtailed in a few months.’¹

Yet no matter how much the French and British felt the pinch of the struggle, they were determined to fight on and were certain of ultimate victory. ‘The people themselves,’ wrote House, ‘do not know the true state of affairs and the Governments are not so much to blame for not informing them, for it is essential that their courage and enthusiasm should be kept at white heat. The people in each country are sure that victory is within sight.’

But if the war was to continue, the participation of the United States could only be regarded as a matter of time. For it was obvious that those in control of Germany, the harder they were pressed, would be more inclined to renew the submarine campaign, and such action almost automatically would bring us in. So plain did this seem to most of those who appreciated the peril of the crisis, that on December 21, Mr. Lansing stated publicly that we were ‘on the verge of war.’ Surely it was high time to make preparation — military preparation which might render our participation effective, diplomatic preparation which might clarify our purpose in fighting.

¹ Grey, *Twenty-Five Years* (Frederick A. Stokes Company), II, 131.

CHAPTER XIV

LAST HOPES OF PEACE

In the light of after events, it is clear that Germany missed a great opportunity for peace..

Viscount Grey of Fallodon, 'Twenty-Five Years'

I

IT is interesting to note that President Wilson's determination to preserve the neutrality of the United States was apparently strongest during the weeks that immediately preceded our break with Germany. It was this determination that led to his note of December, and he was not shaken by the failure of his effort to begin negotiations nor by the imminent danger that Germany would resume the submarine campaign.

Wilson's pacifism had been intensified by the events of the year. Previous to 1916, his sympathies, although carefully concealed, were strongly with the Allies, and he agreed with House that the welfare of the world depended upon the defeat of Germany. But the refusal of the Allies to accept his proffered intervention aroused his suspicions of their motives and led him to fear that, if we brought them military assistance, it would be used merely to further European nationalist aspirations. He distrusted intensely the real purposes of all the belligerent Governments, whatever their avowed war aims. He was equally affected by the course of the electoral campaign, which convinced him that he owed his reëlection largely to the votes of those who counted upon him to keep them out of war. He regarded the mandate of peace as compelling.

On January 4, 1917, House recorded the gist of a conversation in which he and Wilson discussed the steps that would

be necessary if Germany declared an unrestricted submarine campaign.

‘I took the occasion [wrote the Colonel] to express the feeling that we should not be so totally unprepared in the event of war. . . .

‘The President replied, “There will be no war. This country does not intend to become involved in this war. We are the only one of the great white nations that is free from war to-day, and it would be a crime against civilization for us to go in.”

‘The President may change this view [added House], for, as I have said before, he changes his views often.’

The advisers of President Wilson regarded the situation in a rather more practical light. Granted that the majority of the citizens desired fervently to remain at peace, a crisis might arise without warning which would render the Government impotent to maintain peace. Everything depended, not on what we wished, but on what Germany decided. For a renewal of the submarine campaign inevitably would compel a break. Those close to the President were troubled that there was not a more definite and active preparation for the crisis, in both a military and a diplomatic sense.

‘We are on the verge of war [wrote House in November], and not a move is being taken in the direction of immediate preparation. . . .

‘*December 14, 1916:* I had an opportunity of talking to Secretary Daniels at the Cabinet dinner. I obtained enough from him to know that my worst fears as to our unpreparedness were confirmed. . . .

‘I am convinced that the President’s place in history is dependent to a large degree upon luck. If we should get into a serious war and it should turn out disastrously, he would be

one of the most discredited Presidents we have had. . . . We have no large guns. If we had them, we have no trained men who would understand how to handle them. We have no air service, nor men to exploit it; and so it is down the list.

'I believe the President will pull through without anything happening, but I could not sleep at night if I had this responsibility upon my shoulders. . . .

'*December 23, 1916*: I have been in constant communication [with Washington] regarding foreign affairs. The State Department is worried sick over the President's *laissez-faire* policy. . . . I have promised to go [to Washington] next week, but I have no stomach for it. It is practically impossible to get the President to have a general consultation. I see him and then I see Lansing; and the result is, we get nowhere. What is needed is consultation between the three of us, and a definite programme worked out and followed as consistently as circumstances will permit. . . .

'*January 2, 1917*: — is much disturbed over conditions in Washington, especially as to the President's frame of mind. He thinks he is for peace almost at any price. He is concerned, too, at the lack of a positive programme. . . .

'*January 4, 1917*: X came and spent three quarters of an hour. He was terribly depressed. He thought the President had lost all interest and all "punch"; that things were drifting in an aimless sort of way. . . .'

In the hope of working toward a definite programme, Colonel House made a suggestion to the President which had notable consequences. On December 27, he wrote proposing that Wilson set forth clearly the main lines upon which a stable peace might be drawn and which the United States would take part in ensuring. It would be a development of his declaration of May 27, 1916.

Such a presentation of a future international organization could be made in terms so general that it would not carry the

offensive appearance of an offer of mediation. Yet, if the United States remained neutral, it would provide a basis upon which the belligerents might rely if they desired American mediation at any time. On the other hand, if the United States entered the war against Germany, it would serve to warn the Allies that America was not fighting for their nationalist war aims, but for the security and tranquillity of the world.

The suggestion was received without comment by the President, but he took it under consideration and discussed it with House at the first opportunity.

'January 3, 1917: The President wished to know [wrote House] what I thought of his stating in some way what, in his opinion, the general terms of the settlement should be, making the keystone of the settlement arch the future security of the world against wars, and letting territorial adjustments be subordinate to the main purpose. I was enthusiastic, since it was the exact proposal I outlined to Bernstorff and wrote of to the President in my letter of December 27. . . . The war and its consequences have become too great for any ordinary settlement, and the terms upon which it should be closed should be the fairest and best that the human mind can devise.

'We went into a long discussion as to what terms he might properly lay down and how it could be done. I thought he could outline the terms in an address to Congress if he wished to make it impressive. If he desired not to attract marked attention at first, then it would be better to make it in an address before some society. He thought he might do it before the Senate, and that was the tentative arrangement when we finished our discussion.

'We thought that the main principle he should lay down was the right of nations to determine under what government they should continue to live. This, of course, involves

a wide range. We thought that, since Germany and Russia had agreed to free Poland, that should be put in. We naturally agreed upon Belgium and Serbia being restored. Alsace and Lorraine we were not quite certain of, but we agreed that Turkey [in Europe] should cease to exist. I urged in addition that something be put in regarding the right of Russia to have a warm seaport. If this were not done, it would leave a sore which in time would bring about another war.

'The question was raised as to what would happen to our Ambassador at Constantinople when this speech was made, whether he would be promptly executed or be permitted to flee the country. The question of the American colleges in Turkey was also thought of. It is my purpose when I return to New York to study this matter more closely and outline in some detail a plan which I think the President could follow, and bring it to him when I return next week.¹

'I encouraged him in the thought of doing this great and dramatic thing. I said, "You are now playing with what the poker players term the blue chips and there is no use sitting by and letting great events swamp you. It is better to take matters into your own hands and play the cards yourself."

'We thought if he made his speech before the Senate, the occasion could be arranged in answer to a request from the Senate for information as to what America would demand if she consents to join a league to enforce peace. Whatever the President said in this way would be largely our own concern and could not be construed as meddling with the affairs of the belligerents. While it actually would be a proposal of peace terms, yet apparently it would be a statement of

¹ To avoid blurring the main principle of the address, Wilson decided not to include any statement of a desirable territorial settlement; he mentioned merely the necessity of a united independent Poland. Exactly a year later, he elaborated the chief items of this conversation with House into the Fourteen Points.

the terms upon which we would be willing to join in a league to enforce peace.

'*January 11, 1917:* We left for Washington this morning, and, strangely enough, the train was on time. . . . Almost as soon as we arrived, the President and I went into executive session. The President closed his study door so as not to be interrupted and we were at it for about two hours, having more time than usual, since the Lansing dinner to the President was not until eight o'clock, while the White House dinner is always at seven. . . .

'He read the address which he had prepared in accordance with our understanding last week. It is a noble document and one which I think will live.

'As usual, he struck the wrong note in one instance, which he seems unable to avoid. He said, "This war was brought on by distrust of one another."¹ I asked him to strike out this sentence, which he did. In another instance he said, "Both sides say they have no desire to humiliate or destroy the other." I asked him to strike out "humiliate," which he did.

'I asked him if he had shown the address to Lansing. He replied that he had shown it to no one, but that he intended to read it to the Secretary and Senator Stone,² before cabling it. He thought Lansing was not in sympathy with his purpose to keep out of war. . . .

'We decided that his address should be delivered before the Senate, and we discussed how best to get the text of it to the peoples of the belligerent nations. The President is not so much concerned about reaching the Governments as he is

¹ Colonel House would doubtless have been willing to concede that mutual distrust was a major cause of the war; but he wished to keep out of the address all controversial questions touching its origin, since the speech was designed to look to the future stability of the world and to emphasize, so far as possible, the general principles which would receive unanimous approval.

² Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

about reaching the people. . . . I suggested that it be cabled to London, Paris, Berlin, and Petrograd, letting Gerard give it to the Central Powers and Sharp to the Entente other than Russia and England, where it would be sent direct. That was tentatively agreed upon, although he rather hesitated on account of the cost. It was also agreed that the Ambassadors should see that the address was published in full in the several belligerent countries. This is important, as one can see by reading the text of the address.'

On the 17th of January, Colonel House received from the President a letter informing him that the speech was finished. He had talked it over with the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who, he reported, had acquiesced cordially, although Mr. Stone seemed slightly stunned. The speech had been put into code for cabling to the various Embassies and the President planned, as soon as he heard that it had reached them, to go before the Senate. Senator Stone, who the year before had opposed the President's attitude on the armed merchantmen issue, gave up pressing business at home, Mr. Wilson reported, so that he could help now in every way possible.

II

On January 22, President Wilson read his message to the Senate as had been planned. So effectively did he develop the ideas which he had discussed with House that G. Lowes Dickinson, a leading British critic of liberal persuasion, later described the speech as 'perhaps the most important international document of all history.'¹ Wilson made it plain that no security for the future could be expected from a settlement that left one side or the other crushed and revengeful: 'It must be a peace without victory.' The basis of the peace, he insisted, should be the right of each individual

¹ *The Choice Before Us*, 270.

nation to decide its destiny for itself without interference from a stronger alien foe.

‘I am proposing, as it were [said the President], that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.’

The old system of European alliances, from which had sprung the World War, was clearly inadequate for the maintenance of such principles; instead of it President Wilson insisted that there must be a general concert of Powers:

‘There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.’

Such were, indeed, the principles which the nations of the world agreed to accept when they ended the war and when, two years after this speech, they drafted the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The effect of the President’s address upon liberal statesmen and writers, both in America and Europe, was immediate and gratifying. Hall Caine wrote: ‘Let President Wilson take heart from the first reception of his remarkable speech. The best opinion here is one of deep feeling and profound admiration.’ Others soon discovered that what Wilson expressed, many people had already been thinking and waiting for some one to say.

On January 24, Lord Bryce wrote to House, referring to the President’s speech as ‘most impressive.’ The British warmly appreciated its spirit, he said, and would like to see

the attainment of the conditions which he laid down as pre-conditions to a league of peace. But he failed to see how these were to be attained with the existing German Government, 'a Government which goes on showing its utter disregard of justice and humanity, by its slave-raiding and other cruelties in Belgium, and by its entire contempt for the faith of treaties and other international obligations and treaties.'

He again insisted that there was no peace movement in Great Britain, but that there would be, except for the conduct of the German Government. If there were a chance that Germany would yield up Lorraine, and Austria the Trentino, and the Turks Armenia, he would be glad to know of it. These, he felt, were the concessions essential to stability and security in Europe.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, *January 23, 1917*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

The echoes of the speech sound increasingly good. The *Manchester Guardian*, so far, has the best comment and warns the British Government in no uncertain terms.

Hoover was with me again to-day, and I extracted this suggestion from him which seems worth consideration. It is that the next move should be to ask each of the belligerent Governments whether they agree to the principles laid down in your speech. If not, to what do they object? If they agree, then it is well within your province to ask them to meet in conference.

Sir William Wiseman has not returned from Washington, as he thought it best to remain there to-day in order to get the full opinion of the Allied group.

Whitehouse¹ is tremendously pleased.

Your affectionate

E. M. HOUSE

¹ British Liberal Member of Parliament.

The President wrote to House the next day, expressing interest in Wiseman's report, but declaring that he was chiefly concerned to discover what was in the mind of the German Government. There was no trace of undue elation at the prominent rôle which he was assuming nor an indication of any desire but that of serving the cause of peace. He closed, with renewed thanks for the encouragement and support that House had given him and a confession that at times in spite of himself he felt very lonely and very low in his mind.

Wilson's despondency was largely justified. Although American and British liberals applauded the principles he advanced and hailed his speech as a new charter of international relations, official sentiment, restrained though it was, continued undeniably hostile. They did not quarrel with his principles, but with his application of them. The Allied press dragged from his speech the unfortunate phrase, 'peace without victory' — unfortunate because such a phrase as 'peace of reconciliation' would have been more effective in conveying the President's thought — and insisted that it proved his complete failure to appreciate the factors that underlay the European situation. Smarting with the wounds of actual combat, they felt they were dying for the ideals about which Wilson merely talked.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, January 25, 1917

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... Wiseman brought a depressing story from Washington. He said that on the surface and officially your address was accepted with cordiality, but that underneath there was a deep feeling of resentment. The underlying feeling was that you were making a proposal to enforce arbitration in the future while the Allies were giving up both blood and treasure now for the same purpose. If Germany had arbitrated as

Grey demanded, this war could not have happened. Germany refused, and the Allies are doing exactly what you suggest should be done in the future; that since they are doing now what you suggest for the future, we should have more sympathy in their present undertaking. They consider it inconsistent for us to want to let Germany go free from punishment for breaking the very rules we wish to lay down for the future.

He says this is the consensus of the Allied view at Washington.

Wiseman's individual view is that in pressing the Allies too hard for peace, at this time, you will be doing the cause of democracy harm. He asserts that every belligerent Government is now in the hands of the reactionaries and must necessarily be in their hands when the war ends. He believes if we are not careful we will find that these forces in the belligerent Governments will all come together when peace is made, and it is not at all unlikely that their concentrated hate for democracy will be centred upon this country.

Peace, he says, must come first, and then a plan to enforce arbitration afterwards. He thinks it is possible that after peace is signed, and before the arbitration agreement is made, the reactionary forces might refuse to go into any league for future peace and make some pretext to turn upon us in order to save autocracy.

This seems to me a remote contingency, but, nevertheless, if I were you I would speed up the army and navy plans as a matter of precaution.

We are in deep and troubled waters, but I have an abiding faith in the ultimate good that will come from your noble efforts.

Your affectionate

E. M. HOUSE

III

Wilson's speech of January 22 was not merely a programme for the organization of permanent peace. It also provided an opportunity for Germany to announce to her people and the world that, in view of the security which Wilsonian principles seemed to offer, she could afford to renounce the territorial guaranties which she had hitherto demanded, and which appeared to her enemies as merely a covering excuse for aggressive annexations. Her acceptance of the basis for peace suggested by the President would prove, as nothing else could, the sincerity of her insistence that the war she waged was one of defence.

To understand the opportunity thus offered Germany, we must go back to the situation resulting in December from Wilson's note inviting the belligerents to state their terms. No one knew better than Bernstorff how tenuous was the thread which still maintained ostensibly friendly relations between Germany and the United States. Although he was not fully informed by his own Government, he realized that the rulers in Berlin were considering the renewal of the submarine campaign and that such a decision would inevitably precipitate a break. Events were likely to move swiftly and the sole means of forestalling the rupture would be the actual inauguration of peace negotiations. He also realized that there was no chance of negotiating unless Germany stated specifically the peace terms she had in mind. If he could secure such a statement and the terms proved not unreasonable, Colonel House might take the matter up with the British. In the meantime President Wilson might issue his programme for the organization of a peace settlement which would secure Germany from the political and economic annihilation which she feared.

Colonel House was not optimistic, for, as he constantly wrote to Wilson, German diplomacy was unreliable and the Germans themselves 'slippery customers.' Nevertheless, he

knew that Bernstorff was pulling every wire available to avert the recommencement of ruthless submarine warfare, and he himself was on the outlook for every chance, however slight, that might lead to the ending of the war on a reasonable basis.

'December 27, 1916: The German Ambassador called this morning [wrote House]. He is not pleased with Germany's answer to the President's note. He wishes to advise his Government that the only thing to do now is to give terms. He does not believe, however, they would make them public. He thought they would not be willing to send them through the State Department, because there are so many leaks from there.

'It was arranged, therefore, if the President thought well of the plan, that he [Bernstorff] should cable his Government suggesting they give terms through him, to go no further than the President and myself. I suggested to Bernstorff the advisability of having his Government take a stand on the high ground of permanent peace. I thought they would be in an unassailable position if they could say to the world that, no matter how the war began or what the interests of the different belligerents were in the beginning, it had now gotten into such a frightful state that all should unite upon a satisfactory plan to prevent such another war in the future. That the question of territory was unimportant compared to this one central fact.

'Bernstorff agreed to do this.'

During the following weeks the German Ambassador wrestled with his Government, apparently in all sincerity, to secure the specific terms which might lead to the end of the war, and also German acceptance of the more general principles of international organization which Wilson was to outline in his speech to the Senate. Bernstorff kept in close

touch with House, who, whatever his suspicions, saw the value of committing Germany to a definite statement of terms.

Conditions in Austria and Hungary seemed more propitious for the beginning of peace negotiations. The death of the old Kaiser, Francis Joseph, had brought to the throne Carl, who was suspected of resenting German control of Austria-Hungary, and whose wife Zita, herself a Bourbon, was known to entertain friendly sentiments toward France. Ambassador Gerard reported war-weariness among the Hungarians, as well as bitter anti-American feelings among the Germans.

Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House

BERLIN, January 16, 1917

MY DEAR COLONEL:

. . . My wife, just returned from a week's visit to her sister in Hungary, reports a great desire for peace, and that persons who, a year ago, said that the President could have nothing to do with peace or negotiations, now say he is the only possible mediator. *This comes from high Government circles there.* Sigray, her brother-in-law, was cup-bearer at the coronation feast, a sort of glorified butler, and poured out the wine.

The historic crown of St. Stephen was much too large for the King, as you will see from the enclosed photograph — but the little Crown Prince made a great hit with the populace.

At Solf's the other night a Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin (not the reigning Grand Duke) came up and tackled me in a loud voice about the export of American arms and munitions which he said was 'stamped on the German heart' and 'would never be forgotten.' He wore the order of the Black Eagle, the order of the Seraphim, and the order of the Elephant, and bellowed like a milkman! His voice and the dis-

played menagerie made him quite impressive. It is great practice for keeping the temper here. . . .

Yours ever

J. W. G.

Bernstorff's plan of securing Germany's terms which might be secretly transmitted to the Allies through House, and Wilson's speech of January 22 demanding an organized peace of security, offered to Berlin a chance of salvation. It was not yet too late to preserve her political and economic position in Europe, although she must necessarily renounce her militarist masters and aggressive designs. 'How does it all look now?' writes Grey in his memoirs. 'In the light of after-events, it is clear that Germany missed a great opportunity of peace. If she had accepted the Wilson policy, and was ready to agree to the Conference, the Allies could not have refused. They were dependent on American supplies; they could not have risked the ill-will of the Government of the United States, still less a *rapprochement* between the United States and Germany. Germans have only to reflect upon the peace they might have had in 1916 as compared with the Peace of 1919.'¹

But Berlin was blind to the opportunity. The military rulers of Germany knew that to secure peace, their own downfall would be essential. They knew that the terms they had in mind were such that Wilson would never sponsor them, and they refused to sacrifice themselves by changing the terms, even if it meant the saving of their country. It was obvious, after the failure of the peace notes of December and the firmness of the Allied response to Wilson's appeal for a statement of terms, that there was no hope of gaining their ends through negotiations. Hence the decision to renew the submarine blockade. The Admiralty and the General Staff promised to isolate England thereby, crush France,

¹ Grey, *Twenty-Five Years* (Frederick A. Stokes Company), II, 135.

and end the war victoriously. The Kaiser and the Chancellor yielded.

Ambassador von Bernstorff suspected the trend of events in Berlin, but he was not informed of the actual decision until the middle of January. For three weeks he continued to press his Government for specific terms, daily promised them to House, and urged upon him Germany's willingness to accept Wilson's principles. The Colonel, even while encouraging Bernstorff's efforts, found his suspicions of German intentions developing, especially as the Ambassador proved unable to extract definite pledges from his Government.

'Captain Guy Gaunt was my most interesting visitor [House recorded in the last week of January]. . . . The way I diagnosed the situation to him was this: The Kaiser, the Chancellor, and Germany generally desire peace. Von Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who control Germany, believe that peace can be secured quicker by the sword than through negotiations. The Chancellor and the Kaiser will therefore not be able to offer such terms as the Allies can afford to accept. He [Gaunt] tells me the British Intelligence Service is marvellously good. They have reports of everything going on in Berlin, and oftentimes they get copies of letters and documents of great value. He says in one letter von Bernstorff gives his estimate of me and claims that he "has House in his pocket." Gaunt promised to show me a copy of this letter. I doubt whether Bernstorff said this.' ¹

¹ What Bernstorff wrote, on one occasion at least, was: 'Of course, so far as Mr. House is concerned, I could hold him off with considerable ease.' — *Official German Documents, relating to the World War*, 981.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, *January 20, 1917*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . I am enclosing you a copy of a letter from Bernstorff, which came this morning. They are slippery customers and it is difficult to pin them down to anything definite. With the English, one knows where one is. They may be stubborn and they may be stupid, but they are reliable.

The Germans are trying to manœuvre themselves into a certain position, and just what is in the back of their minds is a matter for speculation. . . .

It is possible that they are manœuvring for position in regard to the resumption of their unbridled submarine warfare. They would like to put the Allies wholly in the wrong and justify Germany in the eyes of the neutrals in resorting to extreme measures. . . .

If we can tie up Germany in a conference, so that she cannot resume her unbridled submarine warfare, it will be a great point gained; and if a conference is once started, it can never break up without peace.

Your affectionate

E. M. HOUSE

On January 19, Bernstorff was informed of Berlin's decision. He did his utmost to alter it. Again and again he telegraphed his Government, begging for a postponement of the submarine blockade, or for a specific statement of German peace terms that might lead to negotiations; but in vain. The surrender of the Kaiser and Bethmann to Holtzendorff and Hindenburg had ruined his mission, which was always to keep the United States out of the war and to secure peace through Wilson.

The day following that on which he received news of the German decision, Bernstorff wrote to House, obviously in a dejected mood and intimating strongly that there was little

use in further conversations. House warned him of the danger of a renewal of submarine activities, a warning which was quite unnecessary, for Bernstorff himself had frequently used almost identical expressions in his despatches to Berlin. Following his custom, Bernstorff shifted the entire blame upon England's 'campaign of starvation,' regardless of the fact that Germany had refused to forego the use of the submarine even if England gave up the food blockade.

Count von Bernstorff to Colonel House

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1917

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

Since telephoning to you yesterday I have changed my mind on second thought and do not think it necessary to trouble you Monday morning with a visit. All I have to say, I told you over the phone, and I repeat it now, viz. that I am afraid the situation in Berlin is getting out of our hands. The exorbitant demands of our enemies, and the insolent language of their note to the President seem to have infuriated public opinion in Germany to such an extent, that the result may be anything but favorable to our peace plans. For this reason I had hoped that some step, statement or note might be forthcoming right away, so that the whole world and especially our people would know that President Wilson's movement for peace is still going on. In Berlin they seem to believe that the answer of our enemies to the President has finished the whole peace movement for a long time to come, and I am, therefore, afraid that my Government may be forced to act accordingly in a very short time.

This morning I received your letter of the 19th instant with many thanks. I am afraid that it will be very difficult to get any more peace terms from Berlin at this time for the reasons I mentioned above. However, I am very ready to try and to do my best in the matter. . . .

As far as I can see, every question leads us to the same

problem, viz. which methods my Government will be obliged by public opinion to use against the English starvation policy — a policy, by which all neutral countries in Europe are now suffering nearly as much as Germany.

Yours very sincerely

J. BERNSTORFF

P.S. In signing this letter, I am reminded of the fact that all our troubles come from the same source, namely, that England has been permitted to terrorize the neutral nations. By *illegal* methods England destroyed the legal trade of the neutral countries among themselves.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, *January 26, 1917*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Bernstorff has just left. He said the military have complete control in Germany, with von Hindenburg and Ludendorff at the head. Ludendorff, as you know, is Hindenburg's Chief of Staff.

In reply to a direct question as to the Kaiser's influence and power, he said he was under the impression that the Kaiser designedly left things in the hands of Hindenburg. The inference was that, whatever mistakes were made and whatever settlement came about, it would be Hindenburg's mistakes and settlements and not the Kaiser's. . . .

I called his attention to the danger that lay in postponing peace and of the probability of their coming in conflict with us on account of their submarine activities. He admitted this as a real danger, for he said that the submarine warfare would begin with renewed vigor and determination as soon as the spring campaign opened and all signs of immediate peace had disappeared. He thought if the spring campaign began, there could be no peace until the fighting ended in the autumn. To this I replied that the Allies would not make

peace with Germany in the autumn if the war continued that long, for they would want to carry it over another winter, hoping their blockade would be effective.

I did this to discourage the idea that peace could come in the autumn if it did not come now.

I told him that Germany must give you something definite to work on, and immediately. I suggested that they state that they would be willing completely to evacuate both Belgium and France and that they would agree to *mutual* 'restoration, reparation, and indemnity.' He rather shied at this last, although in a former conversation he suggested it himself.

I told him you wished something to use with the people of the Allied countries, so that public sentiment might force the Governments to discuss peace. . . .

Your affectionate

E. M. HOUSE

IV

Five days later, the German Ambassador threw off the mask which he had been wearing for a fortnight, clearly with rather uneasy grace.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, *January 30, 1917*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Bernstorff has just called me up to say that he is sending over by messenger to-morrow a very important letter. I asked him if it was an answer [to the American demand for German peace terms]. He replied, 'a partial one.'

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

Bernstorff's letter deserves perusal, for it would be difficult to discover a document more thoroughly impregnated with

the ironical. It is written on the same day that the Ambassador announced to Mr. Lansing the withdrawal of Germany's submarine pledge, an announcement which Bernstorff knew must lead to an immediate break. At the moment that the Berlin Government took the step which meant war with the United States, it asserted its friendship for America and begged the President to continue his efforts for a peace which would, according to the terms stated, have been a German triumph. What a contrast between those terms set forth with such arrogance and the conditions finally laid down in the Treaty of Versailles! What madness for the rulers of Germany to drive Wilson into war, thus ensuring their own defeat, at the moment when he was most eager to work for a peace that meant stalemate!

The main text of Bernstorff's letter was, of course, telegraphed from Berlin and merely passed on to House by the Ambassador.

Ambassador von Bernstorff to Colonel House

WASHINGTON, January 31, 1917

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE:

I have received a telegram from Berlin, according to which I am to express to the President the thanks of the Imperial Government for his communication made through you. The Imperial Government has complete confidence in the President and hopes that he will reciprocate such confidence. As proof I am to inform you in confidence that the Imperial Government will be very glad to accept the services kindly offered by the President for the purpose of bringing about a peace conference between the belligerents. My Government, however, is not prepared to publish any peace terms at present, because our enemies have published such terms which aim at the dishonor and destruction of Germany and her allies. My Government considers that as long as our enemies openly proclaim such terms, it would show weak-

ness, which does not exist, on our part, if we publish our terms and we would in so doing only prolong the war. However, to show President Wilson our confidence, my Government through me desires to inform him *personally* of the terms under which we would have been prepared to enter into negotiations, if our enemies had accepted our offer of December 12th.

‘Restitution of the part of Upper Alsace occupied by the French.

‘Gaining of a frontier which would protect Germany and Poland economically and strategically against Russia.

‘Restitution of Colonies in form of an agreement which would give Germany Colonies adequate to her population and economic interest.

‘Restitution of those parts of France occupied by Germany under reservation of strategical and economic changes of the frontier and financial compensations.

‘Restoration of Belgium under special guaranty for the safety of Germany which would have to be decided on by negotiations with Belgium.

‘Economic and financial mutual compensation on the basis of the exchange of territories conquered and to be restituted at the conclusion of peace.

‘Compensation for the German business concerns and private persons who suffered by the war. Abandonment of all economic agreements and measures which would form an obstacle to normal commerce and intercourse after the conclusion of peace, and instead of such agreements reasonable treaties of commerce.

‘The freedom of the seas.’

The peace terms of our allies run on the same lines.

My Government further agrees, after the war has been terminated, to enter into the proposed second international conference on the basis of the President’s message to the Senate.

My Government would have been glad to postpone the submarine blockade, if they had been able to do so. This, however, was quite impossible on account of the preparations, which could not be cancelled. My Government believes that the submarine blockade will terminate the war very quickly. In the meantime my Government will do everything possible to safeguard American interests and begs the President to continue his efforts to bring about peace, and my Government will terminate the submarine blockade as soon as it is evident that the efforts of the President will lead to a peace acceptable to Germany. . . .

Yours very sincerely

J. BERNSTORFF

P.S. I could not get the translation of the official answer to the President's message ready in time to send it to you. I was in such a hurry to give you the above most important news, namely, that the blockade will be terminated if a conference can be brought about on reasonable terms.

The rulers of Germany were under no illusions. Bethmann later stated to the committee of the German General Assembly: 'The U-boat war meant rupture and ultimately war with America.' Bernstorff, in his memoirs, says: 'The simultaneous declaration of the unrestricted U-boat war gave the death-blow to all hopes of maintaining peace.'

It has been often asserted in various German circles that the declaration of the ruthless submarine campaign was not the dynamic but merely the pretext for the rupture between the United States and Germany; that the power of American financial interests would in any case have brought America into the war; that Wilson himself was thoroughly impregnated with pro-Ally feeling. The assertion betrays a wealth of ignorance. Wilson was never more pacifically minded than at the moment of the German declaration, never more clear

that the aspirations of the Allies were as selfish as those of Germany. The only thing that could convince him that he was wrong and could make him anti-German, was the action taken by Berlin.

Upon Colonel House, the German Ambassador's letter produced an effect that was immediate and definite.

'It is absurd to call the letter [he recorded] an answer to our request for terms. Germany has evidently long ago determined upon her U-boat warfare, and the peace proposals which she put out last month were probably gotten up for home consumption and to better Germany's position in the eyes of neutrals. She desires some justification for her submarine warfare and thought she could get it by declaring her willingness to make peace.'

The Colonel recognized without any mental effort that the German declaration meant war. He spent a busy afternoon and evening, for the word had sifted through to New York. People said: 'It has come at last.' Would there be riots, explosions of munitions plants, derailments? — the practical manifestation of all those German intrigues which every one had talked about for two years? What attempt would be made by the interned German ships?

'As the afternoon grew late [wrote House], the excitement became intense, for the different press agencies had begun to receive the news. Wiseman, Gaunt, newspapermen, etc., etc., called me up to discuss it. We had a dinner engagement at the Plaza with Frank Trumbull, and the confusion of dressing, of receiving visitors, and of answering telegrams and telephone calls was something beyond endurance.

'Trumbull had for his other guests Mrs. Henry Redmond, Stuyvesant Fish, and an Englishman, Mr. Askwith. I was constantly interrupted by telephone calls. Wiseman had told

me that there was unusual activity in German and Austrian circles; that the Consulate had been open and busy all the night before, and that they were planning to do something with the interned ships. I therefore telephoned Dudley Malone before we went to the Plaza and succeeded in getting him just as he was leaving for a dinner engagement. He broke his engagement and began at once to take such precautions as seemed necessary in regard to the interned ships.

‘It was necessary for me to leave the dinner before the entertainment which Trumbull had provided for our pleasure was finished, for I had an engagement with Malone before I left for Washington on the midnight train. . . .

‘Dudley Malone called for me at eleven o’clock and we went to the station together. I could see that there was a good deal of suppressed excitement among the Pennsylvania officials who knew of my departure for Washington. A tenseness was already beginning to be felt since the newspapers had gotten out extras foreshadowing the seriousness of the situation.’

House arrived in the capital in time for breakfast at the White House. He spent the morning with Wilson and by half-past eleven Mr. Lansing had finished drafting the formal documents which broke relations between Germany and the United States.

CHAPTER XV

THE END OF NEUTRALITY

But the right is more precious than peace.

Wilson's Address to Congress, April 2, 1917

I

ON January 31, 1917, the same day as that on which Bernstorff disclosed to House Germany's secret terms, he sent to Mr. Lansing a notification, sufficiently clear, although wrapped in a wealth of verbiage, that Germany planned on the following day to resume the 'ruthless' submarine warfare. 'From February 1, 1917, all sea traffic will be stopped with every available weapon and without further notice' in a barred zone surrounding the British Isles and in the Mediterranean; 'neutral ships navigating these blockade zones do so at their own risk'; sailings of regular American passenger steamers might continue on certain conditions; namely, that the steamers followed a lane designated by the Germans, bore certain distinguishing marks (red and white stripes on the hull and a red and white chequered flag), and carried no contraband according to the German contraband list. Under such conditions, one steamer a week might sail in each direction.

The unconscious humor of the stipulations, at least in American eyes, did not rob the notification of its grim significance, for this was the climax of the long controversy between Germany and the United States, the prelude to America's entrance into the World War. Since the spring of 1915, President Wilson had protested against Germany's use of submarines, involving, as it did, the abandonment of the practice of warning and the disregard of the lives of non-combatants. Grudgingly and with many attempted eva-

sions, Germany had agreed to limit the submarine warfare by observing the rules of warning and search. After the sinking of the *Sussex* in the spring of 1916, Berlin promised that merchant ships would not be sunk 'without warning and without saving human lives.' The warmth of anti-Wilson feeling among many sympathizers with the Entente cause was so intense that it obscured the value of the assistance actually rendered by Wilson to that cause through the restrictions he laid upon the use of submarines. To a large extent, he had been serving it at the same time that he protected neutral rights. Because of American protests, Germany held her hand in the submarine war, much to the disgust of extremists in that country.

In Germany this virtual, although technically neutral assistance given by America to the Entente, as well as the mass of munitions which America exported to France and Great Britain, was evidently placed at a high evaluation. At any rate, the German High Command had come to believe that the United States hindered German victory more effectively as a neutral, by blocking unrestricted submarine warfare, than it would as an active belligerent; better that the United States should enter the war than that Germany should longer deprive herself of the one weapon which might isolate England and achieve German victory. Hence the decision to resume freedom of submarine action and to withdraw the pledge that Berlin had given in the previous spring.

That decision was not altogether unexpected. Early in the autumn, definite letters from Berlin had brought the warning that, unless Wilson succeeded in initiating peace negotiations, irresistible pressure would be brought upon the Chancellor to utilize every war weapon of which Germany disposed. Wilson's note of December resulted from his feeling that some step was necessary to avert the danger of a break with Germany on the submarine issue. Even during the weeks that followed, while Bernstorff was profuse in his

promises of securing moderate peace terms from Berlin, Colonel House was skeptical. He knew that the liberal influences in the German Government had suffered defeat, and he began to suspect that the negotiations of December and January were designed to strengthen the morale of the German people and to make the continuance of the struggle on their part appear purely defensive.

Ambassador Bernstorff's letter, accordingly, in which he announced the resumption of the ruthless submarine campaign, while it came as a bitter disappointment, could not have furnished a complete surprise to Colonel House. When he took the night train for Washington, on January 31, answering the President's call, he recognized not only that all hope of American mediation had finally passed, destroyed by the German Government which had seemed to demand it so anxiously, but also that the end of the long period of American neutrality was approaching.

'I went directly to the White House [he recorded] and had breakfast alone. Soon after breakfast the President appeared, and we were together continuously until two o'clock. I handed him Bernstorff's letter and he read it aloud. He saw at once how perfectly shallow it was. Bernstorff's protestations were almost a mockery when the substance of the cable from his Government was considered.

'The President said Lansing was preparing a communication to Bernstorff, citing our notes and theirs in the *Sussex* case, and their promise of May 4. This was being prepared for the purpose of giving Bernstorff his passports if it was thought advisable.'

To a greater extent than House, it would appear, Wilson had placed confidence in the hopes which Bernstorff had held out of securing definite peace proposals from Germany that might lead to negotiations. He had realized, in the

abstract, the danger of the step they now announced; but it seemed to him inconceivable that it should come at this moment, when all their talk was of peace. The sudden *volte-face* aroused in him a resentment against the German Government such as had not resulted from any previous German action. He had exaggerated the proximity of success in the matter of bringing the belligerents together, and his disappointment was intensified.

‘The President was sad and depressed [continued the Colonel], and I did not succeed at any time during the day in lifting him into a better frame of mind. He was deeply disappointed in the sudden and unwarranted action of the German Government. . . . The President said he felt as if the world had suddenly reversed itself; that after going from east to west, it had begun to go from west to east, and that he could not get his balance.

‘The question we discussed longest was whether it was better to give Bernstorff his passports immediately or wait until the Germans committed some overt act. When Lansing came, this discussion was renewed, and we all agreed that it was best to give him his passports at once, because by taking that course there was a possibility of bringing the Germans to their senses. If we waited for the overt act, they would believe we had accepted their ultimatum. I had in mind, too, the effect it would have on the Allies. We would not be nearly so advantageously situated if we waited, as if we acted promptly.’

At the capital and all through the country, speculation was intense as to what action Wilson would take. In the private study in the White House there seems to have been no question. The President had warned Germany in definite terms, after the sinking of the *Sussex*, that continuance of the unrestricted use of the submarine meant a rupture of

diplomatic relations; and he was determined to give effect to his threat. Critics of Wilson later argued that the step he now planned ought to have been taken on any one of a dozen occasions in the preceding year and a half. Wilson, however, was determined that the rupture should not come on a confused issue. In each case of submarine sinking since the *Lusitania*, there had been conflicting evidence. But now Germany in cold blood threatened the rights of humanity, and his patience came to an end.

Even now, however, Wilson refused to be convinced that the diplomatic rupture meant war. Perhaps he had in mind the arguments of Mr. Walter Page, who had asserted that merely by sending Bernstorff home, the United States would so impress Germany that she would see the hopelessness of her cause and the war would end.

Colonel House did not agree. He had always believed that a diplomatic break would inevitably lead to war, and he was the more sure of this because the defeat of liberal elements in Berlin signified Germany's unalterable determination to push the submarine blockade to its most effective limits.

'The President was insistent [wrote House] that he would not allow it to lead to war if it could possibly be avoided. He reiterated his belief that it would be a crime for this Government to involve itself in the war to such an extent as to make it impossible to save Europe afterward. He spoke of Germany as "a madman that should be curbed." I asked if he thought it fair to the Allies to ask them to do the curbing without doing our share. He noticeably winced at this, but still held to his determination not to become involved if it were humanly possible to do otherwise.

'We sat listlessly during the morning until Lansing arrived, which was not until half-past eleven o'clock. The President nervously arranged his books and walked up and down the floor. Mrs. Wilson spoke of golf and asked whether

I thought it would look badly if the President went on the links. I thought the American people would feel that he should not do anything so trivial at such a time.

'In great governmental crises of this sort, the public have no conception what is happening on the stage behind the curtain. If the actors and the scenery could be viewed, as a tragedy like this is being prepared, it would be a revelation. When the decision has been made, nothing further can be done until it is time for the curtain to rise. This will be when the President goes before Congress to explain why he is sending the German Ambassador home. Meanwhile we are listlessly killing time. We had finished the discussion within a half-hour and there was nothing further to say. The President at last suggested that we play a game of pool.¹ Toward the end of the second game, Lansing was announced. The President, Lansing, and I then returned to the study.

'Lansing was so nearly of our mind that there was little discussion. He read what he had written and we accepted it. The President showed him the German communication which the German Ambassador had made through me. Lansing took it to have a copy made, and then left.

'The President asked if I thought he ought to call a Cabinet meeting to-day. I thought it was not necessary; that he could call it to-morrow at the usual time, since it had been decided that Bernstorff should not be given his passports until Saturday morning. The President had promised Senator Stone, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that he would not give Bernstorff his passports without first notifying him, Stone. Stone is in St. Louis, and the President has telegraphed him to come at once to Washington.'

On February 3, President Wilson addressed Congress,

¹ According to a later statement of House, neither he nor the President was an adept.

announcing the break in diplomatic relations with Germany. Disappointed and emotionally roused against the German Government, he nevertheless emphasized the pacific character of the policy he hoped to pursue.

‘I refuse to believe that it is the intention of the German authorities to do in fact what they have warned us they will feel at liberty to do. . . . Only actual overt acts on their part can make me believe it even now. . . . We wish to serve no selfish ends. We seek to stand true alike in thought and action to the immemorial principles of our people. . . . These are the bases of peace, not war. God grant we may not be challenged to defend them by acts of wilful injustice on the part of the Government of Germany!’

Convinced though he was that war was inevitable, Colonel House utilized his influence constantly to prevent the growth of belligerent hysteria, and to warn his British friends not to attempt to force Wilson’s hand or hurry him. He had returned to New York.

‘*February 3, 1917*: Suppressed excitement everywhere. The British contingent had the field. All of them either telephoned or called. Willert of the *London Times* was my most interesting visitor. I advised him, as indeed I did Dilnot of the *London Chronicle* and other correspondents, not to send too enthusiastic despatches to their papers; that while the President would break diplomatic relations with Germany, it did not necessarily mean war. I thought the Allies would be delighted with the news and the President would be popular for ten days or two weeks, but the usual reaction would follow and something would come up again to make them critical. I thought the President had been treated unfairly and that amends should be made.

‘I insisted that the United States were unafraid, although

the Allies could not appreciate this feeling on our part. It might be the valor of ignorance, but, nevertheless, it existed, and we could not bring ourselves to feel the gratitude which Great Britain and France thought we should feel for the battles they claimed to be fighting for us as well as themselves.'

During the days that followed, the activities of Colonel House were multiplied. He spent long hours with editors and journalists of all shades of opinion. He drafted plans with secret service agents, in view of possible disturbances or plots. He worked constantly to make the German-Americans feel that the cause of America was their cause, and to persuade them to put their knowledge of Germany at the service of the United States.

'February 5, 1917: Chief Flynn of the Secret Service was my first caller [the Colonel recorded]. I gave him some cablegrams from our Minister at Berne telling of a plot to assassinate the President and giving the name of a German in New York who was concerned in it. Flynn and I went over the situation carefully as to the possible disturbances here which might arise in the event of war with Germany.

'Von Weigand took lunch with me. I wanted to extract further information regarding conditions in Germany. I see these Germans and German-Americans and get what they know or are willing to tell, and try to piece things together, just as one would a picture puzzle. . . .

'February 6, 1917: Ralph Pulitzer called at ten o'clock. I am trying to get the editors and managers of newspapers to keep out all sensational matter, and I am counselling calmness. I am also trying to keep out any disagreeable references to German-Americans. Pulitzer is in sympathy with this movement. . . .

'February 7, 1917: Commissioner Woods called to go over

the general situation and to tell of the plans to meet it. . . . I suggested that the Mayor appoint a committee of safety My idea is to have many German-Americans on the committee.

'February 15, 1917: Chief Flynn came to discuss secret service matters. . . .

'February 16, 1917: Roy Howard of the United Press and Dudley Malone came to lunch. After lunch I told Howard of my activities toward keeping the German-Americans quiet and he agreed to coöperate. I put him in touch with the Commissioner of Police and the Mayor. When the movement is started here, he is to notify, through the United Press, mayors of all the cities in the United States to form similar organizations.

'Herman Ridder of the *Staats-Zeitung* came to tell me of the loyalty of the German-Americans. I approved the plan which he outlined of getting them together in committees to offer their services to the Mayor. I could give his plan my most cordial support, since it was my own which had come to Ridder indirectly through the Mayor and Woods. I congratulated him upon the patriotism of the German-Americans and did what I could to stimulate that feeling.

'March 9, 1917: Phillips saw something of my intense activities while here and wondered how I lived through the day. I told him it was because I slept well at night and did not worry about anything, no matter how serious it might be. If I did not have this faculty, I could not last a week during these fateful days. . . .

'March 10, 1917: I had a long and interesting telephone conversation with Frank Polk about current affairs. It will be remembered that about half my activities have but little record here in the way of documentary evidence, since they are largely done by telephone and by personal conference. For instance, the State Department communicates with me practically every day and sometimes oftener. . . .

'*March 16, 1917:* Paul Warburg was my first caller. He is very fair-minded, although pro-German in his sympathies. He knows that at the present moment it is to this country's advantage to coöperate with the Allies. . . .

'*March 25, 1917:* Although Sunday, this has been one of my busiest days. It began at ten o'clock with the pacifists, including Amos Pinchot, Paul Kellogg, and Miss Lillian Wald. I think I satisfied them that the President knew more about the situation than they did, and was quite as anxious to keep out of war. . . .

'*March 30, 1917:*—was my first caller. He came . . . , so he said, to have me "brush the cobwebs out of his brain." This process seems more satisfactory to him than to me.'

II

Even after definite assurances of the diplomatic rupture, Count von Bernstorff continued his active efforts to prevent war between the United States and Germany, and renewed his endeavors to stop the submarine blockade planned by his Government.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, *February 10, 1917*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

The Dutch Minister called this morning. He said one reason your call to the neutrals had no response was because the neutrals had been trying to get you for two years to coöperate with them and that you had refused until a crisis arose.

He thinks if you would call a neutral conference at Washington, with the suggestion that the Ministers act as representatives, you could get the neutrals to join the United States in formulating a plan of action directed against violation of sea rights.

I have a notion that this plan was suggested to him by

Bernstorff, than whom he has no closer friend among the diplomatic corps.

Knowing that van Rappard [the Dutch Minister] would take whatever I told him back to Bernstorff, I used the opportunity to advantage. I gave him some idea of the potential force of this country from a military, financial, and industrial viewpoint, and told him that if we were pushed into war, the efforts of even England would be insignificant in comparison to what we could and would do. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

On February 15, Bernstorff and his staff sailed from New York. His departure was marked by an absence of animosity which, in view of the stories circulated about the activities of the German Embassy in conspiracies and propaganda, might seem surprising. House was convinced that Bernstorff himself had taken good care to know nothing of the intrigues of von Papen and Boy-Ed, and he was certain of the Ambassador's good faith and zeal in attempting to prevent the resumption of the U-boat warfare, a certainty which was later justified by the publication of Bernstorff's despatches to his Government. Until Germany withdrew her *Sussex* pledge, House had advocated keeping Bernstorff at Washington, for he saw in him an instrument by which the extremists in Berlin might be kept in check. On his side, the German Ambassador left with the kindest feelings for the Colonel.

'Dudley Malone telephoned this morning [recorded House on February 15] telling of Bernstorff's departure. He said both Bernstorff and the Countess were inexpressibly sad. The Ambassador's message to me was, "Give him my love and tell him he is the best friend I have in America. He

has saved me many times, and but for him it would have been impossible for me to have remained as long as I have." There is something pathetic about this message, for, as a matter of fact, while I have done much for Bernstorff, it has been done merely in line with my duty, as I saw it. . . .'

Wilson's desire to avoid actual war did not lead him to waver in his resolve to permit no compromise with Germany so long as she maintained the submarine warfare. Word came to House on February 11 that the Swiss Minister, who had taken over the care of German interests in the United States, was proposing negotiations designed to reestablish diplomatic relations. Officials of the State Department were evidently afraid that Wilson might weaken. The President's jaw was set, however, and he assured House that he need fear no temporizing.

'Frank Polk telephoned from Washington [recorded the Colonel, on February 12] to tell of the President's reply to the German overtures made through the Swiss Government. Polk telephoned last night to ask me to write the President concerning this. I did so, in time for him to receive it this morning. . . .

'*February 13, 1917:* The President's letter, received this morning, assured me that there was no cause for uneasiness about the Swiss-German move; that it would not work. He insists they must renew and carry out the pledge of last April if they want to talk to him now, or else propose peace on terms they know we can act upon.'

Public opinion had greeted the dismissal of von Bernstorff with unmistakable approval, and, on the Atlantic seaboard certainly, the assumption was general that war with Germany was almost sure to follow. From various quarters, however, opposing currents trickled into House's study.

‘Durant, head of the General Motors Company, called to express the hope that the President would keep us out of war. He has just returned from the Far West and insists that he met only one man between New York and California who wanted war. He believes we are sitting on a volcano and that war might cause an eruption. I did not quite follow his argument, nor did I agree with it. He was surprised to learn of my peace activities, which began before the war and which have continued without cessation until our break with Germany.’

The chance of peace negotiations through Austria still left a loophole which both Wilson and House wished to explore. Count Tarnowski, the new Austrian Ambassador, arrived in Washington almost simultaneously with the announcement of the German submarine decision, and shortly afterwards came Ambassador Penfield’s secretary from Vienna with news of a popular desire for peace in Austria-Hungary.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, *February 8, 1917*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

... Cardeza, Penfield’s secretary, has just landed. He gives me an intelligent résumé of conditions in Austria.

There is a general demand for peace. The Austrians and Hungarians are at swords’ points, and the Government does not dare call Parliament together. Many of its members are in jail. There is great antagonism between the Germans and Austrians, but Germans largely officer the Austrian troops.

Food conditions are bad, but he thinks it is possible to go through another winter. There is a shortage of metals, which is perhaps their most serious problem. . . . There is little ill feeling against America.

Your affectionate

E. M. HOUSE

‘Much to my surprise [noted House, at the moment that Wilson decided to send Bernstorff home], Lansing agreed with the President and me that, if we could possibly retain the Austrian Ambassador, we should do so. I advised the President to begin at once with Tarnowski and see whether we could not make peace proposals through the Austrians. I believe we have made a mistake in confining ourselves so wholly to the English and the Germans, for they are the real belligerents and the most stubborn of them all. This conflict comes down so largely to a question of supremacy between these two nations, that neither one will likely listen to a reasonable peace unless their allies force them to it.’

On returning to New York, Colonel House gathered that the liberal element in British circles, as represented by Sir William Wiseman, was of the opinion that the attempt to work through Austria was worth while.¹

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, February 2, 1917

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . I talked with Wiseman this morning and found that his mind was the same as yours, Lansing's, and mine. He took it for granted that you would send Bernstorff home, but expressed the hope that some way would be found to keep Tarnowski. He believes it might be possible to continue peace negotiations through him, and in a much more favorable way than through the German Government, for whom the Allies have such an abiding distrust. . . .

¹ At this moment the brother-in-law of the Emperor Carl, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon, an officer in the Belgian army, was engaged in secret negotiations which the French and British hoped might lead to a separate peace with Austria. Sixtus was encouraged by Cambon of the French Foreign Office and by Lloyd George. See Manteyer, *The Austrian Peace Offer*, with corroborative documents.

The sending of Bernstorff home may, after all, prove to be to the general advantage. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

'February 4, 1917: Frank Polk telephoned early this morning to tell of conditions at Washington, particularly regarding Tarnowski. They are following our suggestion as best they can, and are endeavoring to segregate him from von Bernstorff and not break off relations with Austria.'

It was necessary, however, to make certain that Austria would disassociate herself from Germany's ruthless submarine campaign, and House evidently felt that this was doubtful in the extreme. 'If Austria holds to Germany's new submarine policy,' he wrote Wilson on February 7, 'if I were you, I would send the whole lot home with the Germans.'

No word came as to the Austrian attitude, and on February 18 a note was sent to Vienna, asking for a definite statement of the Austrian position regarding submarine warfare and whether the assurances that had been given at the time of the sinking of the *Persia* and *Ancona* were to be regarded as still in force. The reply, delivered on March 6, was evasive. The Hapsburg Government maintained the assurances given at the time of the *Ancona* incident, but also insisted that neutrals sailing on ships of belligerent States in the barred zone did so at their own risk. In these circumstances it was decided that Count Tarnowski should not be permitted to present his credentials, and that diplomatic relations with Austria must be broken. Not until the following December was war declared, but all hope of working through Austria toward a general peace was immediately given up.

III

Wilson was waiting for what he called the 'overt act' before he took further steps against Germany, but the possibility of avoiding hostilities daily diminished.

'The President's assertion to me some weeks ago [recorded House, on February 12] that this country would not go to war, seems likely to be unverified, for we are drifting into it as rapidly as I expected.'

Critics of the President complained then and later that he permitted the country to drift, instead of himself leading it. The answer to the complaint is that, during this period of eight weeks following the dismissal of Bernstorff, public opinion crystallized in the conviction that war was necessary. A hasty declaration, any attempt of Wilson to hurry the country into hostilities, would have weakened the impression that he had done everything in his power to keep the peace and accepted war only as a last resort to protect American honor and security. It was this impression which led the most pacifist regions to fill their military quotas with enthusiasm and saved the country from the conscientious objector.

Misguided German diplomacy did its utmost to strengthen the growing feeling in the United States that war with Germany could not be avoided. On February 26, Colonel House was called to the telephone by Frank Polk and informed that the British Naval Intelligence had received and deciphered a sensational telegram from the German Foreign Office to von Eckhardt, the German Minister in Mexico City. Signed by Zimmermann himself and dated January 16, the telegram announced the imminence of unrestricted submarine warfare, and instructed the German Minister, in case of war with the United States, to attempt to arrange a German-Mexican alliance, on the understanding that Mexico

would be assisted to reconquer New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. Zimmermann further suggested that Carranza should approach Japan.

Mr. Polk fully realized that the publication of this telegram would blow American resentment to a white heat; it would strengthen enormously popular support of the President in any action he might take against Germany in defence of American rights on the sea. The same thought may have led the British to pass the deciphered telegram on to Washington. Wilson himself was disturbed and in doubt as to whether the publication of the telegram would not bring on a crisis he could not control. House urged immediate publication.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, *February 27, 1917*

DEAR GOVERNOR:

I am not surprised to read the despatch concerning the German proposal to Mexico. I have been satisfied for a long time that they have laid plans to stir up all the trouble they could, in order to occupy our attention in case of hostilities.

I hope you will publish the despatch to-morrow. It will make a profound impression both on Congress and on the country. . . .

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

The effect of publication was exactly what had been anticipated. Many persons naturally raised doubts as to the authenticity of the telegram; but Lansing formally assured Congress, and Zimmermann himself confessed, that it was genuine. Speculation was uncontrolled as to how it had been intercepted: it was rumored that the messenger had been caught by American guardsmen on the Mexican border; that a copy had been taken from von Bernstorff at Halifax; that

it was in a mysterious box seized by the British on the ship which Bernstorff sailed on.

Apparently the Germans themselves did not know how the message was caught; and few persons suspected that it was not the American State Department, but the British Admiralty which secured the despatch and gave it to the American Embassy in London. The secret of the capture of the incriminating message was carefully kept, even between the Allies, and no indiscreet pride of accomplishment filtered forth to indicate how it had been intercepted.

‘Hoaller, of the British Embassy [Colonel House recorded on March 9], called by appointment to discuss the Mexican situation. . . . He asked me in the most naïve way how it was that we had obtained the Zimmermann note. I replied, “I think you know.” He assured me that he had not the remotest idea, that perhaps the Ambassador knew and had not told him. He expressed the intention of taking the Ambassador to task for his reticence. I happen to suspect that Hoaller helped unearth it all. . . . “Blinker” Hall, head of the British Naval Intelligence Bureau, was the man who secured, deciphered, and gave it to us.’

Admiral Hall, as Chief of the Naval Intelligence, had since the early days of the war displayed a genius for the interception and elucidation of German secrets. He threw his nets very wide and, what was more important, never allowed the Germans even to suspect that they were spread. In the present instance he picked up the telegram in Mexico City, despite von Eckhardt’s assertion that telegrams were never out of the steel safe or the hands of the one man who deciphered them, and were read to the Minister at night ‘in a low voice.’ It was not the last of the exploits of Hall, who until the end of the war knew more of the secrets of the German Foreign Office than the German spies themselves.

Certain it is that he played a part in convincing America that war with Germany was inevitable.

Colonel House to Sir William Reginald Hall

NEW YORK, September 22, 1917

DEAR ADMIRAL HALL:

I want to congratulate you and felicitate you over the great work you have been doing.

I believe you were largely responsible for the overthrow of the recent German Ministry — certainly Zimmermann's downfall was brought about by the *exposé* of his note to the German Ambassador in Mexico.

I cannot think at the moment of any man who has done more useful service in this war than you, and I salute you.

Sincerely yours

E. M. HOUSE

Less spectacular, but of great practical moment, was the blockade of American shipping that resulted from the new submarine warfare. In view of German threats, shippers and shipping companies decided to play safe and keep their vessels in port. The American Line was told by the State Department that the rights of American vessels to 'traverse all parts of the high seas are the same now as they were prior to the issuance of the German declaration, and that a neutral merchant vessel may, if its owners believe that it is liable to be unlawfully attacked, take any measures to prevent or resist such attacks.' But on February 7, it was announced that the Government would provide no convoys. The congestion of American shipping constantly increased; and while the evil was, as Wilson pointed out, one of apprehension rather than of fact, it involved a humiliation and a material sacrifice which soon became intolerable.

On February 26, the President appeared before Congress, asking for powers enabling him to arm merchant ships

and to take other necessary measures for the protection of American citizens and property on the high seas. His demand meant a state of 'armed neutrality' hardly distinguishable from war. Wilson emphasized the fact that, despite four weeks' experience of ruthless submarine warfare, the 'overt act' had not yet been committed. But 'it would be foolish to deny that the situation is fraught with the gravest possibilities and dangers. No thoughtful man can fail to see that the necessity for definite action may come at any time if we are in fact, and not in word merely, to defend our elementary rights as a neutral nation. It would be most imprudent to be unprepared.' The President closed with an insistence upon the rights of humanity, 'without which there is no civilization. . . . We are speaking of no selfish material rights, but of rights which our hearts support and whose foundation is that righteous passion for justice upon which all law, all structures alike of family, of state, and of mankind must rest, as upon the ultimate base of our existence and our liberty.'

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, February 26, 1917

DEAR GOVERNOR:

. . . I believe your speech before Congress to-day will meet the approval of practically every American. The last two paragraphs are as fine as anything in the English language.

Henry White told me last night that Bernstorff said to him before he left that in sending him home you have done the only thing that could be done in the circumstances. He said that Bernstorff deeply regretted the action of his Government, believing that peace would have soon come through your efforts if they had not been interrupted.

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

In answer to Wilson's appeal, the House of Representatives introduced a bill to carry out his request for power to arm merchant vessels, passing it on March 1 by a vote of 403 to 13. On February 27, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported the measure enthusiastically, despite the bitter opposition of its Chairman, Senator Stone of Missouri, who had for two years fought every measure that seemed to endanger peaceful relations with Germany. Under his leadership and that of Senator La Follette, a filibuster was organized which threatened to kill the bill, for the session would automatically close on March 4.

Colonel House came over from New York on March 3, for the inauguration and to watch the crisis in the Senate.

'We drove immediately to the White House [he wrote]. After having tea with the President and Mrs. Wilson, the President and I went to his study, where he read me his Inaugural Address. There was much to commend and nothing to criticize, since it was a replica of his Senate Address of January 22.

'We were much concerned about the action of the Senate regarding the bill to permit the arming of merchantmen, and little else was talked of. There were some other house guests, consisting almost wholly of relatives. . . .

'*March 4, 1917:* The day is dark and gloomy, with high winds and floods of rain. The President and Mrs. Wilson started for the Capitol at 10.30. This was necessary in order that the President might sign the bills as they came in from Congress, and be ready to take the oath of office at twelve o'clock. They asked me to go with them, but I thought it best not to do so. . . .'

Throughout the long session of March 3 and until noon of March 4, the debate in the Senate had continued to rage over the bill for the arming of merchantmen; whenever a fresh

attempt was made to reach a vote, the group of twelve filibusterers blocked it inexorably. All that the overwhelming majority could accomplish was to draft a manifesto, signed by seventy-five Senators, indicating their approval of Wilson's demand: 'We desire the statement entered in the record,' it ran, 'to establish the fact that the Senate favors the legislation and would pass it if a vote could be secured.'

'When the President returned [Colonel House noted], he showed much excitement and was bitter in his denunciation of the small band of Senators who undertook to use the arbitrary rules of the Senate to defeat the wishes of the majority regarding the arming of merchantmen. I suggested that he say to the public what he was saying to me, and to say it immediately. His answer was that he could not put it in his Inaugural Address, because it would spoil the texture of it, but he would put it out in a few days. I urged him to do it now, giving it to the newspapers to-morrow morning, in order to strike while the iron was hot. He wondered whether he could do it so quickly, but said he would try.

'He shut himself in practically all the afternoon, and later produced the statement to be given out for publication in to-morrow morning's papers. He called in McAdoo, Burleson, and Tumulty after dinner to discuss it. They were unanimously in favor of the plan.'

Wilson's statement was issued a few hours after the Congress adjourned, and proved to be of infinite value. It crystallized the opinion which had been insulted by the tactics of the filibusterers, and which demanded definite action after so many delays. More than that, it put the President in the light of a leader and helped to efface the memory of what so many people regarded as listlessness or cowardliness in the face of German affronts. Of more value still, perhaps, it revealed the strong underlying passion in

the nature of this man who had so frequently been pictured as without emotions. 'A little group of wilful men,' he declared, 'representing no opinion but their own, have rendered the great Government of the United States helpless and contemptible.' The wave of protest which swept the country endorsed the President's indictment and encouraged him to proceed with the arming of ships as might be necessary, of his own executive authority. On March 12, Secretary Lansing announced that the Government had determined 'to place upon all American merchant ships sailing through the barred areas an armed guard for the protection of the vessels and the lives of the persons on board.'

IV

The country was, in truth, waiting for the President to lead. On the very day following his address to Congress, in which he declared that the overt act had not yet occurred, a submarine sank the Cunard liner *Laconia* without warning. Twelve persons perished, of whom two, both women, were American citizens. A fortnight later, on March 12, the American steamer *Algonquin*, carrying foodstuffs from New York to London, was sunk without warning, although the crew made safe their escape, and, after twenty-seven hours in open boats, reached the Scilly Isles. A week later, on Monday, March 19, word came that within twenty-four hours three American ships had been sunk by submarines, and that in the case of one, the *Vigilancia*, fifteen members of the crew had been lost.

Wilson's delay in taking more decisive action than that implied by 'armed neutrality' aroused bitter comment abroad and uneasiness at home. As House had prophesied, the dismissal of Bernstorff sent American stock high for the moment in Allied countries, but it began to fall rapidly when the diplomatic rupture did not lead immediately to war.

Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House

[Telegram]

LONDON, March 9, 1917

I find that continued delay in sending out American ships, especially American liners, is producing an increasingly unfavorable impression. . . . Delay is taken to mean the sub-mission of our Government to the German blockade. . . . There is a tendency, even in high Government circles, to regard the reasons for delay which are published here as technicalities which a national crisis should sweep aside. British opinion couples the delay of our ships with the sinking of the *Laconia* and the Zimmermann telegram, and seems to be reaching the conclusion that our Government will not be able to take positive action under any provocation. The feeling which the newspaper despatches from the United States produce on the British mind, is that our Government is holding back our people until the blockade of our ships, the Zimmermann telegram, and the *Laconia* shall be forgotten and until the British navy shall overcome the German submarines. There is danger that this feeling harden into a conviction and interfere with any influence that we might otherwise have when peace comes.

So friendly a man as Viscount Grey of Fallodon writes me privately from his retirement: 'I do not see how the United States can sit still while neutral shipping is swept off the sea. If no action is taken, it will be like a great blot in history or a failure that must grievously depress the future history of America.'

PAGE

House was not seriously troubled by Mr. Page's implied argument, that what the British thought ought to be regarded as a decisive factor. He believed that the United States must decide the question of peace or war in accordance with American interests and conscience rather than to satisfy

foreign opinion, and he was certain that Wilson would not fail in the crisis. 'I have never thought we could please the Allies,' he replied, 'unless a change in their fortunes comes about.' Official Washington, however, both State Department and Cabinet, were disturbed by Wilson's apparent unwillingness to take decisive steps, and they looked to House as the only man who could be expected to hurry the President. So far as a declaration of war was concerned, the Colonel was willing to wait; but he believed with his whole heart that no time should be lost in beginning active preparation.

'Billy Phillips came from Washington [wrote House on March 9] to deliver some messages from the Secretary and Frank Polk. Fortunately, the main things the Secretary wanted, the President had already done a few hours ago; that is, he gave the order for the arming of merchantmen and called Congress in special session. . . .

'*March 19, 1917*: — called me twice from Washington. He is disturbed at the President's inertia, and he and Lansing wish me to come to Washington to see if I cannot stir him into action. Both . . . wish Congress called immediately. I doubt whether this is wise. The President has authority now to do what is necessary to prepare the country before a declaration of war, and it is to our advantage to make some preparation before hostilities begin. Our coastwise shipping might find itself in a bad way if war were declared suddenly.

'*March 20, 1917*: X was my first caller. He is disturbed because there is not more activity in Washington and because the President has no well-defined policy of action. He believes there will be an unfavorable reaction against the President unless he formulates a plan and announces it, at least to his closest advisers, and follows it vigorously. . . .'

Wilson was evidently persuaded of the need to call Congress

at once; but, although he wanted the opinion of the Cabinet, he showed no inclination to share his with them.

‘*March 22, 1917*: Gregory told of the last Cabinet meeting [March 20]. He thinks the President had no idea of calling Congress together earlier than the 16th, but was persuaded to call it on the 2d of April because of the unanimous opinion of the Cabinet that he should do so. He said Burleson remarked that the people wished this country to go into the war actively. The President replied that it did not make so much difference what the people wished as what was right. Burleson answered that, if he were President and a situation like this arose, he would want the opinion of the people back of him.

‘The President gave no intimation to the Cabinet as to what he intended to do, but early next morning he called Congress for April 2. When Gregory telephoned yesterday at ten o’clock, to tell me he would be in New York to-day, he did not then know that the President had made the call.

‘—— came in the afternoon to talk over departmental matters and to tell of the situation in Washington. He says there was something akin to panic there in the early part of the week and that there was a feeling in governmental circles that, if the President did not act promptly, a strike would come about in Cabinet and official circles. He states that Secretary Baker is now belligerent, but the condition of army affairs has not been bettered materially in the past few months. He believes if war is declared, there will be great weakness shown in the War Department as well as in the Navy, and the President will come in for an avalanche of criticism. . . .’

Mr. Wilson continued to keep his own counsel, and House, despite his conviction that he must soon take active steps, refused to hurry him, confident that before the crisis fully

developed the call to Washington would come. On March 24, Mr. Lansing sought out the President's adviser in desperation.

'Lansing has no idea [wrote House] what the President has in mind to say in his address to Congress when it convenes. He saw the President yesterday and tried in several ways to get some line upon his thought, but failed. He wishes me to write the President and tell him what I think should be done, believing my advice will be along the lines of his, Lansing's, views. He is as anxious as I am that the President should take the reins in his own hands and not allow Congress to run away with the situation.'

Wilson was evidently determined that our entrance into the war should be based upon reasoned judgment and not upon hasty emotion; 'we must put excited feeling away,' he said a few days later. Whereas House was willing to delay in order to give time for naval and military preparation, Wilson needed it to assure himself that there was in truth no escape from war. The step he was about to embark upon was a violation of all that had hitherto seemed most sacred to his political faith. The undercurrent of emotion by which he was often assailed urged him to fight; he resolutely strove to set it one side, and to listen only to his Calvinist conscience. The struggle must have been sharp. Washington and the world waited.

House was sure of the President's final decision. On March 21 he wrote to Page:

'As far as we are concerned, we are in the war now, even though a formal declaration may not occur until after Congress meets, April 2. All the departments are preparing as rapidly as possible, but, even so, it will take time to get in a position where the Germans cannot destroy our coastwise

shipping in the event they have submarines lurking near our coasts.'

Much of the influence which the Colonel exercised over President Wilson resulted from his invariable refusal to become excited or to press arguments upon him. When he finally decided that the time had come for him to discuss matters with Wilson, his announcement contained no reference to the riddle that was driving the capital mad, and it might be described as unostentatious.

Colonel House to the President

NEW YORK, March 25, 1917

DEAR GOVERNOR:

If it is convenient to you I will come down on Tuesday, for there are some things I would like to talk over with you. . . .

Will you not telegraph me upon receipt of this, whether it is convenient for me to come or whether you would prefer another time?

Affectionately yours

E. M. HOUSE

The Colonel did not wait for a reply. On the following day he had a long interview with Howard Coffin, of the Council of National Defence, which disturbed him greatly. The interview, he recorded,

'definitely determined me to go to Washington to-morrow, to talk things out with the President. I am also anxious to talk with him concerning his message to Congress, which in some ways will be the most important one he has yet delivered.' . . .

House found the President at last decided that there was no escape from war. He had fought with himself night after

night, in the hope of seeing some other way out. 'What else can I do?' said Wilson. 'Is there anything else I can do?'

'*March 27, 1917*: I took the 11.08 for Washington [recorded House]. I had a quiet and restful trip. Frank Polk met me at the station and took me to the White House. The President was waiting for me. He had just finished with the Cabinet meeting, which he now holds in the afternoon. He was not well and complained of a headache. We went to his study and discussed matters, particularly his forthcoming message.

'The President asked whether I thought he should ask Congress to declare war, or whether he should say that a state of war exists and ask them for the necessary means to carry it on. I advised the latter. I was afraid of an acrimonious debate if he puts it up to Congress to declare war.'

Evidently Colonel House felt that it was important that the President should meet the crisis in a frame of mind at once humble and determined. He set himself the delicate task, first, to make the President feel the necessity of special effort on his part, and then that by such effort the task might be accomplished successfully.

'I told him a crisis had come in his Administration different from anything he had yet encountered, and I was anxious that he should meet it in a creditable way so that his influence would not be lessened when he came to do the great work which would necessarily follow the war. I said it was not as difficult a situation as many he had already successfully met, but that it was one for which he was not well fitted. He admitted this and said he did not believe he was fitted for the Presidency under such conditions. I thought he was too refined, too civilized, too intellectual, too cultivated not to see the incongruity and absurdity of war.

It needs a man of coarser fibre and one less a philosopher than the President, to conduct a brutal, vigorous, and successful war.'

Having pictured Wilson's disabilities to his face, with a tact which saved the President's temper and a frankness that would have surprised those who insisted that he could listen to nothing but adulation, the Colonel proceeded to enhearten him by indicating the advantages of his position and by reviewing the previous domestic success of his Administration.

'I made him feel, as Mrs. Wilson told me later, that he was not up against so difficult a proposition as he had imagined. In my argument I said that everything that he had to meet in this emergency had been thought out time and time again in other countries, and all we had to do was to take experience as our guide and not worry over the manner of doing it. I thought it not so difficult as taking a more or less ignorant, disorganized party in Congress and forcing it to pass the Federal Reserve Act, the Tariff Act, the Panama Tolls Act, and such other legislation as he had gotten through.

'I felt that he had taken a gamble that there would be no war, and had lost; and the country would hold it to his discredit unless he prosecuted the war successfully. . . . He listened with a kindly and sympathetic attention, and, while he argued with me upon many of the points, he did it dispassionately.'

On the following day, Wilson took up with House the substance of the message to Congress on April 2, in which he was to ask them to declare the existence of a state of war. It is interesting to note that only five days before giving this, the greatest speech of his career, the President had done no more than jot down the topics he meant to treat. Actual phraseology he left to the last minute.

‘Since last night he had made a memorandum of the subjects he thought proper to incorporate and which I approved. . . . He will differentiate between the German people and those who have led them into this disaster. . . . I advised the British Government to do this, but they never acted upon it, and I hope it is to be done now. My purpose was, and is, to break down the German Government by building a fire back of it within Germany. . . .¹ This is the main note I have urged him to strike; that is, this is a war for democracy and it is a war for the German people as well as for other nations.’

House was beset by naturally curious members of the Cabinet, who were anxious to know how far their own desires would be satisfied by Wilson’s policy.

‘The President played golf this morning [Colonel House noted on March 28], and McAdoo was my first caller. He remained practically all morning and until I told him I had to leave in order to see the President, who had returned and was waiting in his study. McAdoo wants war — war to the hilt. He said his appetite for it was so strong that he would like to quit the Cabinet, raise a regiment, and go to the front. All three of his sons have enlisted. We talked of how to finance the war and the kind of revenue bill we should have in order to meet expenses. . . .’

V

The few days which elapsed before the delivery of Wilson’s historic war message House spent in New York, largely

¹ House suggested this as far back as the first *Lusitania* crisis. House to Wilson, June 3, 1915, from London: ‘In the event of war with Germany, I would suggest an address to Congress laying the blame of this fearful conflict upon the Kaiser and his military *entourage*, and I would exonerate the great body of German citizenship, stating that we were fighting for their deliverance as well as the deliverance of Europe. This should have a fine effect upon German-Americans.’

engaged in culling from his host of friends indications of public opinion from all parts of the country. These were not invariably of a belligerent nature.

‘*March 31, 1917: Edward G. Lowry came to tell the result of his observations in a two-weeks trip through Kansas and Missouri. He believes the people do not wish war, but that they will follow the President. He said in Missouri they do not seem to know what it is all about. This is the pathos of the thing, and what is true there is true largely all over the world. . . .*’

On April 1, House again took the night train for Washington.

‘I arrived in time for breakfast. The President and Mrs. Wilson were ready to play golf, and I saw him for a moment only. While he was on the links I motored with Frank Polk, and we discussed pending matters. He says neither Lansing nor any member of the Cabinet knows what the President will say in his address to Congress to-day. . . .

‘McAdoo telephoned and asked about the address and how I liked it. I evaded a direct answer by saying that from what the President had told me of it, I thought it would meet every expectation. . . .’

In the afternoon, Wilson and House went into what the latter called executive session.

‘The President read the address to me, and I suggested his eliminating a phrase which read something like this: “until the German people have a government we can trust.” He was doubtful about this part of the sentence and I had no difficulty in persuading him to eliminate it. It looked too much like inciting revolution. It is needless to say that no

address he has yet made pleases me more than this one. . . . I have tried to get the President, as my letters will show, to demand among nations the same code of honor and morals as between individuals.¹ He handles this part superbly. . . .

'I asked him why he had not shown the Cabinet his address. He replied that, if he had, every man in it would have had some suggestion to make and it would have been picked to pieces if he had heeded their criticism. He said he preferred to keep it to himself and take the responsibility. I feel that he does his Cabinet an injustice. . . . I have noticed recently that he holds a tighter rein over his Cabinet and that he is impatient of any initiative on their part.'

On the evening of April 2, Wilson appeared before Congress to ask that they declare the existence of a state of war between the United States and Germany. Whatever his hesitation had been, now that he gave the signal for action his leadership was hailed with delight. 'Congress,' said press reports, 'roared cheer after cheer in an outburst of patriotic enthusiasm.'

'The present German submarine warfare against commerce [said Wilson] is a warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations. . . . Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive

¹ House to Wilson, November 17, 1916: 'I wish you would lay down the doctrine sometime soon that nations cannot expect peace and satisfactory relations until they are willing to maintain the same sort of honor as individuals practice towards one another.' And March 9, 1917: 'We are back to the Stone Age, where might makes right. It has taken us thousands of years to reach some sort of social order, and until the same obligations are recognized internationally as they are between individuals, there can be no peace or order in the world. . . .' See also Appendix to Chapter X.

will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion. . . . There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission. . . . With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States. . . .’

Having made his decision, Wilson began to escape from the agony of uncertainty which had caught him; but not until he finished his speech and realized the strength of opinion that supported his policy, did he completely regain the confidence necessary to firm leadership. On the afternoon of April 1, he told Frank Cobb of the *World* that he had never been so uncertain about anything in his life as that decision.

‘The President was apparently calm during the day [recorded House on April 2], but, as a matter of fact, I could see signs of nervousness. Neither of us did anything except kill time until he was called to the Capitol. In the morning he told me he was determined not to speak after three o’clock, believing it would make a bad impression — an impression that he was unduly pressing matters. I thought differently and persuaded him that he should hold himself ready to address Congress whenever that body indicated their readiness to hear him. It turned out that he began to speak at twenty minutes to nine and finished in about thirty-two minutes. I timed him carefully.

‘We had early dinner, at half-past six, for word had come

that Congress had been organized and would be ready to receive him at eight o'clock. We talked of everything excepting the matter in hand. There was no one present at dinner other than members of the family who had come to Washington to hear the address, and no one touched upon the coming speech.

'When we returned from the Capitol, the President, Mrs. Wilson, Margaret, and I foregathered in the Oval Room and talked it over as families are prone to do after some eventful occasion. I had handed the President a clipping from *Current Opinion* giving the foreign estimate of him. He read this aloud, and we discussed the article. I thought the President had taken a position as to policies which no other statesman had yet assumed. He seemed surprised to hear me say this, and thought Webster, Lincoln, and Gladstone had announced the same principles. I differed from him. It seemed to me that he did not have a true conception of the path he was blazing. Of the modern statesmen, Mazzini is the one who had a similar outlook, but no other, as far as I know. . . . I could see the President was relieved that the tension was over and the die cast. I knew this would happen.'

In comparing Wilson to Mazzini, House had in mind chiefly the President's ability to voice prophetically the subconscious hopes of the common people, a faculty which formed the basis of Wilson's title to political greatness. There is less justification for the claim to originality. Much that was reminiscent of Webster and Lincoln is indeed apparent in his idea of the war as a crusade. War for the sake of national liberty, for the sake of democracy, for the welfare of mankind, was nothing new in history.

But if Wilson originated little in his address of April 2, he did recall emphatically ideals which in this World War no one yet had effectively expressed. This generation had not heard those ideals preached with the eloquence and above

all with the authority that marked this message, for, as President of the United States of America, Wilson was the most influential man in the world. The issues of the struggle had been confused. As House had bewailed, people did not understand what it was all about. Wilson clarified the issues and at once stood forth as leader.

And he emphasized in clear language the great but ill-defined longing of all peoples — that this was a war to end war. There must be a new international order, based upon liberty, a concert of purpose and action that would henceforth ensure the observance of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power. Wilson's entire policy had been devoted to this cause. It was for this that he had endured the evasions of the Central Powers and the contempt of the Entente. He had held to neutrality, not in any spirit of cowardice, since he personally and the country had nothing to fear, but in the firm conviction that the world needed at least one great Power which thought in terms of peace and justice. America's entrance, he told Cobb, 'would mean that we should lose our heads along with the rest and stop weighing right or wrong. It would mean that a majority of people in this hemisphere would go war-mad, quit thinking and devote their energies to destruction. . . . It means an attempt to reconstruct a peace-time civilization with war standards, and at the end of the war there will be no bystanders with sufficient power to influence the terms. There won't be any peace standards left to work with. There will be only war standards. . . . Once lead this people into war and they'll forget there ever was such a thing as tolerance. . . . If there is any alternative, for God's sake, let's take it.'

Germany left no alternative. But he departed from the path of neutrality determined that, so far as in him lay the power, he would make the war thus forced upon the country a war to ensure peace. Eighteen months before, Colonel

House had written him, November 10, 1915: 'We must throw the influence of this nation in behalf of a plan by which international obligations must be kept and in behalf of some plan by which the peace of the world can be maintained.'

Wilson accepted the rôle and undertook the task, a far heavier and more complex task than that of defeating Germany on the field of battle.

'It is a fearful thing [he said] to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts — for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.'

INDEX

INDEX

- A. B. C. Powers, mediation of, between United States and Mexico, I, 207; House's Pan-American Pact proposed to Ambassadors of, 212-14; answers of, to House's proposal, 214-18; proposed by House that Mexican troubles be solved by coöperation of, with United States, 219, 220, 222; and Monroe Doctrine, 221.
- Adams, Alva, in the *Herald's* advance list of Cabinet appointees, I, 113.
- Adamson, Commissioner, I, 147.
- Addams, Jane, accumulates misinformation in Europe, II, 22; presides over Women's Peace Conference, 94; has interview with House, 96; tries to engineer a movement for mediation, 111.
- 'Adventures in Arcadia of the Idle Rich, The,' I, 122.
- Agadir incident, I, 237.
- Albania, State of, created, I, 245, 245 n.
- Albert, Dr. Heinrich, carelessness of, II, 339.
- Albert, King. *See* Belgians.
- Aldrich currency scheme, I, 50, 52.
- Algeciras Conference, I, 236.
- Algonquin*, the, sinking of, II, 458.
- Allied Conference (March, 1916), II, 274, 275.
- Allies, the, the situation not encouraging for (June 16, 1915), I, 468-70; Wilson's patience produces unfortunate impression upon peoples of, II, 51; attitude of leaders of, toward Wilson's patience, 52; their position in autumn of 1915, 80, 81; better understanding with, needed, 99-102; critical of each other, 151; lack of organization among, 151; not ready to take up House's plan for Presidential intervention, 219-21, 233, 259, 262, 270, 281-83, 288, 289; determined to fight to the collapse of Germany, 256, 257; public opinion among, with reference to Wilson, 260-62; postpone advent of American aid, 273, 293; their reception of Wilson's May 27 speech, 300-04; send note in reply to American note of protest, 305-07; will not accept German peace proposal, 398, 402, 403; their answer to Wilson's peace note, 406; their state of mind (Dec., 1916), 409. *See* France, Great Britain.
- Alsace-Lorraine, statesmen of France thought before the War to have given up the idea of recovering, I, 260, 262, 272, 273; as regards restoration of, 355, 363, 392, 399.
- American Peace Society, II, 94.
- Americans, sympathies of, closely woven with the democracies of France and England, II, 62. *See* United States.
- Ancona*, the, torpedoed by Austrian submarine, II, 46.
- Anderson, Chandler, of American Embassy in London, I, 345.
- Angell, Norman, II, 296.
- Anglo-American friendship, importance of, understood by Allied statesmen, I, 304, 306, 309, 459; II, 52, 53, 69, 70, 75; the only thing that can endanger, 327, 328.
- Arabic*, the, sinking of, II, 29; efforts to secure formal disavowal of sinking of, 37-43; disavowal of sinking of, secured, 45, 46; alleged reason for sinking of, 45, 46, 143.
- Archbishop of Canterbury, II, 126.
- Archibald, James F. J., American correspondent, despatches for the Austrian Government entrusted to, by Dr. Dumba, II, 38.
- Argentina, House's Pan-American Pact proposed to Ambassador of, I, 212, 213; favorable to the Pact, 215; representative of, confers with other representatives for Mexican settlement, 223; American Ambassador in, II, 365.
- Arizona, reconquest of, by Mexico, planned, II, 452.
- Armaments, the curbing of, discussed by Tyrrell and House, I, 200, 242, 243; discussed in Tyrrell's interview with President, 201.
- Armed neutrality, II, 455.
- Armenian*, the, II, 24.
- Arnold, Matthew, I, 120.
- Asia Minor, as to giving Germany a zone of influence in, I, 246; Allied intentions with regard to, II, 291 n.
- Askwith, Mr., II, 434.
- Asquith, H. H., on the peace of Europe, I, 238; talks with House, 268, 269; casts slur on Bryan, 269; thinks House's proposed trip to Germany should be postponed, 375, 378, 379, 381; in his old castle near Dover, 444, 445; House lunches with, II, 126; conference of, with House, Grey, and Balfour

- (Feb. 11, 1916), 173-76; conference of, with House, Grey, Balfour, Lloyd George, and Reading (Feb. 14, 1916), 179-82; criticized by House, 183, 184; retirement of, 397.
- Asquith, Mrs., I, 268; comment of House on, II, 126; talks with House, 126, 193.
- Astor, Mrs. John, I, 389.
- Auchincloss, Gordon, letters of House to, I, 386, 387, 399; II, 160.
- Austria, sends ultimatum to Serbia, I, 276; bombards Belgrade, 276; offered mediation between Napoleon and Allied Governments in 1813, II, 85 *n.*; conditions in (Feb. 3, 1916), 149; encouragement in, 253, 254; conditions in (Feb. 8, 1917), 448; hopes of securing peace through, 448-50; her attitude on submarine warfare, 450.
- Austrian Embassy, intends to assist in crippling munitions plants in America, II, 39.
- Bagdad Railway, I, 238, 384; II, 14.
- Bagehot, Richard, of the *Economist*, I, 460.
- Bagehot, Walter, I, 121.
- Bailey, Senator Joseph W., opposed to Wilson, I, 57.
- Baker, Newton D., considered for Cabinet, I, 108; refuses Secretaryship of the Interior, 109; intends to put Roosevelt men to the front, 232; approves of McCormick as Chairman of Democratic National Committee in 1916, II, 351; becomes belligerent, 461.
- Bakhmetieff, George, Russian Ambassador to United States, I, 327; confers with House, I, 351, 352; a negative quantity, II, 57.
- Balch, Emily, has interview with House, II, 94; has interview with Lansing, 94.
- Balfour, A. J., House has interview with (March 4, 1915), I, 386, 387; has charming personality, 390; at Lord and Lady Paget's dinner, 421, 422; House advised to consult with, 428; Lord Loreburn on, 429; Grey and, 'two great gentlemen,' 433; praises *Lusitania* note, 440; explains details of Treaty of London to President, 443 *n.*; in the new Cabinet, 463; provides convoy for House, II, 3, 4; understands interests of United States, 68; correspondence of, with House over armed merchantmen, 74, 75; his mind runs parallel with House's and Wilson's, 116, 118; discusses situation with House (Jan., 1916), 118-21; on British and German submarines, 122; confers with House on end of War (Jan. 15, 1916), 130; conference of, with House, Grey, and Asquith (Feb. 11, 1916), 173-76; conference of, with House, Grey, Asquith, Lloyd George, and Reading (Feb. 14, 1916), 179-82; on disarming of merchantmen, 211-14; becomes Foreign Secretary, 398; mentioned, I, 389.
- Letters:* to House, Sept. 12, 1915, II, 211; March 2, 1916, 270.
- Balkan embroglio, the, I, 238, 245, 245 *n.*
- Ball, Colonel, of Texas delegation in Baltimore Convention, I, 65.
- Baltimore Convention, I, 62-67.
- Banat of Temesvar, the, I, 462 *n.*
- Bank, central, the Aldrich plan for, I, 50.
- Banking and Currency Bill, II, 342.
- Barère, Bertrand, the term 'Freedom of the Seas' used by, I, 408.
- Baruch, B. M., advises McCombs to go into practice of law, I, 97; has sympathy for McCombs, II, 348.
- Bass, John, helps organize Progressive movement in New Hampshire, II, 369.
- Belgian Treaty, I, 293; II, 140, 140 *n.*
- Belgians, King of the, visited by House, II, 166-68.
- Belgium, invasion of, I, 277, 279; question of indemnity for, 325, 327, 328, 342, 355, 370, 371, 374-76, 380, 382, 391; question of evacuation of, 403, 410, 411, 417, 420, 430, 455; II, 8, 13, 22, 23; writer in Germany prosecuted for writing against annexation of, 42, 43; importance to Grey of fair settlement of, 68.
- Belgrade, bombardment of, I, 276.
- Bennett, Sir Courtenay, British Consul-General, I, 326 *n.*
- Beresford, Lord Charles, II, 326.
- Beresford, Mr., I, 361.
- von Bernstorff, Count, relations of House with, I, 190; talks with House relative to an international understanding, 240; talks freely of American officials, 240; gives Kaiser report on House, 247; House tries to arrange meeting between Spring-Rice and, 324-33; conversation of N. C. Wallace with, 331, 332; sincerity of his continued efforts for peace, 338, 340, 341; House's attitude toward, 338; insists that Germany is willing to make terms of peace, 338, 340, 343, 367; urged by House to have Germans stop killing non-combatants in England, 353; his suggestion with regard to Belgium far afield, 417; II, 22; Wilson acts on hint of, I, 444; obtains information from House of conditions in Germany, II, 7; talks as a neutral rather than as a belligerent, 8; Wilson advises House to talk to, 17, 27; Bryan talks to,

- 26; complains that Wilson does not treat Germany and England alike, 27; asks for delay in the *Arabic* crisis, 33, 34; suggests that Germany is ready to yield as to submarine warfare on passenger lines, 36; his efforts to secure formal disavowal of sinking of *Arabic*, 38-42; secures disavowal for sinking of *Arabic*, 45; praised by House for his efforts to preserve peace, 45; German Government complains of his concessions, 48; appalled by dismissal of German attachés, 105, 106; thinks he can get apology and indemnity for *Lusitania*, 106; untrustworthy, 109, 110; memorandum of, Jan. 7, 1916, concerning submarines in Mediterranean, 116 *n.*; talks with House on American intervention (March 12, 1916), 223-25; desires to avert break with Germany, 233, 234, 236-40, 255; tributes of House to, 234, 240, 244, 334; Germany's note a triumph for, 243, 244; talks with House on conditions in Germany, 328, 329, 331-34; consults House on memorandum announcing conditionally unrestricted submarine warfare, 334-36; on German-Americans, 372; never criticizes United States, 397; tries to avert recommencement of ruthless submarine warfare, 423; tries to secure from German Government specific terms, 423; his estimate of House, 426, 426 *n.*; informed of Germany's intention to resume unrestricted submarine warfare (Jan. 19, 1917), 427; his mission always to keep United States out of war and secure peace through Wilson, 427; shifts blame for submarine campaign upon England, 428, 429; announces to Lansing (Jan. 31, 1917) withdrawal of Germany's submarine pledge, 431, 436-38; gives House German Government's terms, 431-33; realizes that unrestricted submarine warfare means war with America, 433; continues efforts to prevent war between United States and Germany, 445; leaves United States, 446; has kindest feelings for House, 446, 447; regrets action of German Government in renewing submarine warfare, 455.
- Letters:* to House, July 27, 1915, II, 27; April 14, 1916, 237; July 14, 329; Oct. 18, 335; Jan. 20, 1917, 428; Jan. 31, 431; — to Lansing, Sept. 1, 1915, II, 36.
- von Bernstorff, Countess, II, 332, 446.
- Berry, to be recommended as Collector of the Port of Philadelphia, I, 129.
- Berthelot, M., II, 162.
- Bertie, Sir Francis, British Ambassador at Paris, I, 368; his opinion as to advisability of United States entering the War, 441.
- Bertron, S. R., II, 74, 342.
- von Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald, Imperial Chancellor, meeting of, with Gerard, I, 186; of peaceable aims, 237; his struggle with von Tirpitz, II, 12-15, 23, 25, 37, 38, 138, 146, 147, 221, 328-34; says it was necessary to break international laws, 28; against frightfulness, 43; has conference with House, 139-43, 147; his explanation of 'a scrap of paper,' 139, 140; his speech of April 5, 1916, 282 *n.*; realizes that unrestricted submarine warfare means war with America, 433.
- Bishop of London, I, 260.
- Bismarck, Prince, II, 273 *n.*
- Blacklisting order, issued by British, II, 312-14.
- Bliss, Robert, I, 419.
- Bliss-Shotwell-Miller plan to guarantee peace, II, 279 *n.*
- Blockade, and submarine, proposed compromise on, I, 443-53. *See* Contraband, Freedom of the Seas, Neutral Shipping.
- Bolivia, representative of, confers with other representatives for Mexican settlement, I, 223.
- Boston Clearing House Association, I, 163.
- Boulogne, II, 136, 168.
- Boy-Ed, Captain Karl, German attaché, sent home, II, 47; on ship with House, 115.
- Brandeis, Louis D., eliminated for Attorney-Generalship, I, 90; information concerning, given to Wilson by House, 91; in the *Herald's* advance list of Cabinet appointees, 113.
- Brazil, House's Pan-American Pact proposed to Ambassador of, I, 213; favorable to the Pact, 214; representative of, confers with other representatives for Mexican settlement, 223; becomes less enthusiastic for the Pact, 230, 232.
- Brent, Bishop, I, 135.
- Brest-Litovsk, peace of, II, 129 *n.*
- Briand, Aristide, dinner to, II, 127; has interviews with House, 156, 158, 159, 163-65, 194.
- British, slowness of, I, 377, 379; II, 102, 164, 170; a stubborn race, 142; House's estimate of, 427. *See* Great Britain.
- Brooks, Sidney, of the *London Times*, on the success of Mrs. Page as Ambassador, I, 189; House breakfasts with, at Lloyd George's, 268; puts the *Times* at House's disposal for purpose of his mission, 383; on the Foreign Office,

- 388, 389; gives encouraging information to House, 390; on the *Lusitania* note, 440; on the British paper blockade, 459; sent to America to write for *Times* and *Daily Mail*, II, 95; has interviews with House on the President's policy, 95, 96; on feeling in Government circles, 100; dinner with, 122; impatient with President's slowness of decision, 235.
- Brown, William Garrott, I, 64.
- Browning, Robert, I, 120.
- Brusilov, II, 248.
- Bryan, Grace, daughter of W. J. Bryan, I, 39.
- Bryan, William Jennings, his financial heresies, I, 39; his impracticability as seen by House, 39, 46, 105; his defeats for Presidency, 40; House strives to secure aid of, for Wilson, 43, 48-56; at Washington banquet, 52, 53; personal generosity of, 52, 53; his friendliness toward Wilson, 53, 55; distrusts Harvey, 53; neutral as between Wilson and Clark, 59, 60; veers toward Wilson, 62; intervenes at Baltimore Convention and secures nomination of Wilson, 67; does not interfere with management of campaign, 69; regarded as hero, 70; considered as impractical by Wilson, 84; as regards position to be offered to, 88, 90, 97, 98; not wanted by Wilson for Cabinet, 88, 98; advocates single term for President, 93, 95; plans for disposing of, 99; made by Wilson an exception to most party leaders, 102; informed with regard to Cabinet intentions, 103-06; his suggestions as to Cabinet and other appointments, 104-06; his character praised by House, 105; appointed Secretary of State, 106, 113; relations with President cordial, 115; 'Primus' in the Wilson-House cypher, 115; makes request of House, 138; comments on the influence of Dru with the President, 157; does not attack Federal Reserve Act, 173; seeks places for 'deserving Democrats,' 177, 178 *n.*; a spoilsman, 178, 179; insists that none but orthodox Christian can be appointed as Minister to China, 179 *n.*; gracious to Page, 182; Page's opinion of his conduct of State Department, 189, 190; his views of Lord Cowdray and Sir Lionel Carden, 199, 200; and House's Pan-American policy, 210, 211; fails to push the Pan-American Pact, 221-23; II, 18, 19; lacks ability to translate ideas into facts, I, 221; resignation of, from Secretaryship of State, 222; II, 2; von Bernstorff speaks freely of, I, 240; European opinion of, 269, 279, 282; President advised by House that he be not allowed to make overtures to the Powers, 279, 282; his attitude toward increase of reserve force, 300; plans to go to Europe as peace emissary, 352; expresses confidence in House as peace agent, 352, 359; alleged to have said that America was not in earnest in the *Lusitania* matter, 451; II, 6, 7; admiration of Lane for, I, 459; circumstances of his resignation, 5-8; accuses members of Cabinet of being unneutral, 5, 6; his resignation causes relief in diplomatic circles, 8; his resignation simplifies situation, 12; plans European trip as Apostle of Peace, 18, 19, 21; tells things to Dumba and Bernstorff, 26; responsible for anticipated trouble with Germany, 26; his policy of 'peace at any price,' 86.
- Letter:* to House, Dec. 28, 1911, I, 52.
- Bryan, Mrs. W. J., amenable to advice and suggestion, I, 39; approves of Wilson for Presidency, 60, 62; her influence valuable, 88; has poise and common sense, 105.
- Letter:* to House, July 27, 1912, I, 69.
- 'Bryan treaty,' the, I, 256 *n.*
- Bryans, the, in the South, I, 39; entertain House, 137.
- Bryce, (Viscount) James, I, 137, 260; II, 196; has conversation with House (Feb. 25, 1915), I, 383, 384; his attitude on Freedom of the Seas, 364; on the confidence of the American people in Wilson, II, 64; on British opinion of the American attitude, 65; on the War as affecting neutral interests, 65, 66; suggested by Lansing as sort of man for Ambassador, 101; writes to House of conditions among the Allies (Nov. 26, 1915), 110, 111; talks with House (Jan. 11 and 13, 1916), 124, 125, 132; suggestion that he be sent to United States, 125; gives House advice, 133; approves House's mission to Germany, 136; calls on House, 192; on disarming of merchantmen, 211; believes in continuing the war to an end, 259; article of, in *The New Republic*, 296; on Wilson's May 27 speech, 300; on Wilson's peace note, 407; gives reasons why Allies are unwilling to negotiate with Central Powers, 407, 408; on Wilson's address to the Senate (Jan. 22, 1917), 418, 419.
- Bulgaria, and Serbia, rival claims of, I, 362, 363, 462, 463; possibility of her fighting against Serbia, 372; both sides try for, 415; receives loans from Germany preparatory to entering the War,

- II, 25, 26, 26 *n.*; expectation that she will enter War on side of Germany, 32, 42, 44; enters War on German side, 80.
- Bullard, Arthur, II, 266, 267.
- de Bunsen, Sir M., I, 229, 230.
- Burdett-Coutts, I, 260.
- Burke, Edmund, I, 119, 121.
- Burleson, Albert S., writes to House on drafting of party platform, I, 38; his opinion of House's advice to cancel Wilson's speaking engagements, 78; suggested as Postmaster-General by House, 90; has interview with House, 94, 95; invited to Trenton by Wilson, 99; appointed Postmaster-General, 106, 113; 'Demosthenes' in the Wilson-House cypher, 115; consultations of, with House, 137-39; offers to resign from Cabinet in favor of House, 140; helps toward repeal of Panama tolls exemption, 193 *n.*, 205; opposition of Wall Street to, II, 342; approves President's statement about 'a little group of wilful men,' 457; remarks of, to President, in Cabinet session, 461.
- Burns, John, House's opinion of, I, 389.
- Buxton, Noel, II, 265.
- Cabinet, the process of forming a, I, 83-113.
- Cabinet, President Wilson's, nonchalant manner in which it was chosen, I, 111; a *mélange* of administrators and political leaders, 111; House alone intimately consulted in formation of, 111; opinions concerning, 112, 113; as prognosticated by the New York *Herald* and as appointed, 112, 113; intimacy of House's relations with, 137-44; as regards the making of speeches by members of, 138; Friday meetings of, 138; advisability of including member without portfolio in, 183 *n.*; members of, help toward repeal of Panama tolls exemption, 193 *n.*; opposition of Wall Street to, II, 342; advises President to call Congress April 2, instead of April 16, 1917, 461.
- Cadorna, General Luigi, II, 150.
- Caine, Hall, on Wilson's address to the Senate (Jan. 22, 1917), II, 418.
- California, in the 1916 election, II, 370, 382.
- Cambon, Jules, has interviews with House, II, 156-58, 163-65, 174, 194; doubts seriousness of President, 195, 289; encourages Sixtus of Bourbon in secret peace negotiations, 449 *n.*
- Campbell, Governor of Texas, supports Wilson, I, 57 *n.*
- Canada, attitude of Government of, on Pan-American Pact, I, 227, 230.
- Carden, Sir Lionel, British Ambassador in Mexico, I, 194, 199, 200, 202.
- Cardeza, Penfield's secretary, II, 448.
- Carl, Emperor, II, 424.
- Carranza, does not accept invitation of diplomatic representatives, I, 223; his government considered by the representatives as the *de facto* government, 224; recognized by United States Government, 224; Villa in revolt against, 230; retaliates on United States for expedition under Pershing, 231; in plot to arrange German-Mexican alliance, II, 452.
- Carver, Clifford, II, 123, 169.
- de Cásenave, I, 397; tells House of French opinion, 398.
- Cecil, Lord Robert, Minister of Blockade, II, 132, 320, 402.
- Letter:* to Spring-Rice, Dec. 19, 1916, II, 402.
- Chadbourne, Tom, II, 373.
- Chamberlain, Austen, II, 124.
- Chicago Convention, I, 67.
- Child Labor Bill, II, 344.
- Childers, H. H., I, 67.
- Chile, House's Pan-American Pact proposed to Ambassador of, I, 213; his answer to House's proposal, 216-18; delay caused by, 221, 222; representative of, confers with other representatives for Mexican settlement, 223; attitude of, on revised Pact, 226, 227, 230-32; fears Japan, 227.
- China*, the, II, 305.
- Choate, J. H., his use of term 'immunity of private property at sea,' I, 408.
- Christian Science Monitor*, comments on House's mission to Europe, II, 113.
- Churchill, Winston, American author, helps organize Progressive movement in New Hampshire, II, 369.
- Churchill, Winston Spencer, English statesman, I, 332, 371; his stand on the contraband question, 461; the Admiralty under, 463; on war of exhaustion, 249; on the enormity of the War, 258.
- Clark, Champ, esteemed a radical, I, 48; and the 1912 nomination, 50, 52, 58-67, 84; has interview with House, 94; his hatred for Bryan, 94; unable to get information from Wilson, 101; made by Wilson an exception to most party leaders, 102; interviews President on warning Americans not to travel on armed ships, 216.
- Clark, Judge George, opponent of Governor Hogg, I, 28.

- Clemens, Samuel L. (Mark Twain), and Captain Bill McDonald, 21.
- Clifford, Governor, of the Gold Coast country, I, 268.
- Cobb, Frank, of the *World*, II, 353, 469.
- Coffin, Howard, of the Council of National Defence, II, 463.
- Collier's*, the appellation of 'Silent Partner' first used in, I, 115 *n.*, 149, 150.
- Columbus, New Mexico, murder of American citizens by Villa at, I, 231.
- Compulsory arbitration, II, 279 *n.*
- Congress, votes to President power to take retaliatory measures, II, 315, 316; votes large naval appropriation, 316; action of, on bill to arm merchantmen, 456, 457.
- de Constant, Baron d'Estournelles, I, 26; II, 153, 159.
- Constantinople, the question of, in peace proposals, I, 355, 363, 393; II, 181.
- Consuls, views of House and Bryan on, I, 178, 179.
- 'Continuous Voyage,' American doctrine of, I, 313.
- Contraband, British interpretation of, I, 303, 313, 405; attitude of Great Britain on, at Second Hague Conference, 369, 370, 407; House's proposal with regard to, 406-09. *See* Freedom of the Seas, Neutral Shipping.
- Coolidge, Thomas Jefferson, Jr., I, 18.
- Corey, Herbert, quoted in *Commercial Advertiser*, I, 118.
- Cowan, Sir John, I, 389.
- Cowdray, Lord, oil interests of, I, 194, 199, 200.
- Crane, Charles R., I, 91; in the *Herald's* advance list of Cabinet appointees, 113.
- Crane, Senator Murray, and the currency bill, I, 165.
- Crane, M. M., candidate for nomination to Governorship of Texas, I, 31-33.
- 'Credit trust,' I, 159.
- Creelman, James, arranges dinner for meeting of House and Gaynor, I, 41; story about his death, II, 127.
- Crewe, Lord, Secretary for India, I, 194, 195, 241, 263, 265, 273; to act for Grey, 463; has interview with House, 466.
- Cromer, Lord, on British opinion of Wilson, II, 264, 265.
- Crosby, Mrs., I, 419.
- Crown Prince of Germany. *See* Friedrich Wilhelm.
- Culberson, Charles A., his campaigns managed by House, I, 29-31; supports M. M. Crane, 31; elected United States Senator, 34; his intimacy with House, 35-37; in the Senate, 37; seconds House's invitation to Gaynor to address Texas legislature, 41; considered as Presidential possibility, 42; his aid secured for Wilson, 43; House works through, in interest of Wilson, 44; has interview with House at Washington, 94; invited to Trenton by Wilson, 99; unable to get information from Wilson, 101.
- Cummings, Homer, in charge of Speakers' Bureau, II, 360.
- Currency reform, in Wilson's administration, I, 95, 158-75.
- Curzon, Lord, I, 260, 386; II, 169; a jingo, I, 389; speaks with bitterness of United States, II, 126.
- Cust, Mr., I, 389, 390.
- Dacia* incident, II, 57.
- Daniels, Josephus, considered for Cabinet position, I, 90; appointed Secretary of the Navy, 106, 113; Page's opinion of, 113; takes first steps toward increase of the Navy, II, 35, 36; opposition of Wall Street to, 342; approves of McCormick as Chairman of Democratic National Committee, 351.
- Dardanelles, intention of Allies to force, I, 379, 380, 415; failure of the attempt to force, 468.
- Davies, Joseph, I, 350; confers with House, II, 344.
- Davis, Jefferson, I, 25, 26.
- Davis, John W., Solicitor-General, suggested by House as Counsellor of the State Department, II, 9, 10; estimation in which he is held, 9-11.
- Declaration of London, the, I, 305, 305 *n.*, 307, 376, 410; II, 329.
- Declaration of Paris, the, I, 376, 410.
- Delano, F. C., appointed to Federal Reserve Board, I, 172 *n.*
- Delbrück, Vice-Chancellor, II, 251.
- Delcassé, Théophile, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, thinks time has not come to begin negotiations, I, 368; to see House in France, 392; interview of House with, 395, 396; information conveyed to, from House by Straight, 397; approves House's movements, 415.
- Democratic National Committee, Chairmanship of, in 1916, II, 347-54.
- Democratic Party, dominated by Bryan, I, 39; defeated under Bryan, 40; in 1910, 40; lack of harmony in, 68-77; Campaign Committee of, opposes canceling of Wilson's speaking engagements after attempted assassination of Roosevelt, 77-79; disagreement in, over legislative programme, 93; triumph of, in success of first legislative session under Wilson, 173; traditionally little

- interested in foreign affairs, 176; House aims to make progressive party of, II, 344; plan of campaign of, in 1916, 347, 354-63; victory of, 361.
- Denny, Mr., of the Morgan firm, I, 161.
- Denton, Frances B., presentation of House's papers made possible by, I, 3; II, 114; trustworthiness of, I, 356; discretion of, II, 310; her physical endurance, 340; mentioned, 90.
- Dernburg, Bernhard, in charge of German propaganda in America, I, 411; II, 28, 41; announcement of, concerning Freedom of the seas and Belgium, I, 411, 420, 464.
- Desborough, Lord and Lady, I, 389.
- Devereaux, Mrs. II, 264.
- Dickinson, G. Lowes, on Wilson's address to Senate (Jan. 22, 1917), II, 417.
- Dillon, Dr. E. J., II, 185.
- Dilnot, of London *Chronicle*, II, 442.
- Diplomates de carrière*, I, 178.
- Diplomatic appointments, basis on which they were made in Wilson's Administration, I, 177-80.
- Dix, Governor of New York, I, 73-75.
- Dixon, Frederick, of the *Christian Science Monitor*, II, 320.
- Dodge, Cleveland H., at the White House, I, 127; and the currency bill, 165, 166.
- Donald, Robert, of *The Daily Chronicle*, I, 460; II, 132.
- Dow, Captain, of the *Lusitania*, I, 361.
- Drummond, Sir Eric, Grey's secretary, II, 122; to be Balfour's secretary, 398.
- Dueling, among frontiersmen, I, 22-25.
- Dumba, Dr. Constantin, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, relations of House with, I, 190; has conversation with House on Balkan situation, 240; at the Borden Harrimans', 247; gives information to House, 322, 323; eager for peace measures to begin, 330; his message on Bryan's alleged remark on *Lusitania* note, 451; Bryan talks to, II, 26; his recall requested, 38, 39; given titles, 48.
- Dupont Powder Company, II, 105.
- Durant, of General Motors Company, II, 448.
- East Prussia, devastated by Russians, I, 320; Russians driven out of, 320, 365, 366.
- von Eckhardt, German Minister in Mexico City, in German plot for German-Mexican alliance, II, 451, 453.
- Eduardes, Señor, Chilean Minister to Great Britain, discusses Pan-American Pact with House, I, 227, 228; conversation of Grey with, concerning the Pact, 230.
- Edwards, S. V., Captain of Rangers, I, 25 n.
- Eliot, Dr. Charles W., admired by House, I, 26; not liked by Bryan for Chinese mission, 105; representative of Wilson's first choices for foreign posts, 177; refuses Ambassadorship to Great Britain, 180; policy of positive action in regard to the War suggested to the President by, 286-91.
Letters: to Wilson, Aug. 6, 1914, I, 287; Aug. 8, 287; Aug. 20, 290; Aug. 22, 291.
- Ellison, General, II, 190.
- Empress of Germany, I, 187, 245, 254, 257.
- Eulalia, Infanta, of Spain, her views of the Kaiser, I, 418, 419.
- Europeans, value flattery and politeness, II, 108.
- Exhaustion, war of, II, 249, 281, 321.
- von Falkenhayn, General, at Kaiser's luncheon, I, 253, 254; career of, 254 n.; influence of, 392, 414; in struggle for supremacy at Berlin, II, 14, 138, 146; deposed as Chief of Staff, 330; avoids Gerard, 330.
- Federal Reserve banking system, creation of, I, 50 n., 158-75; II, 344.
- Federal Reserve Board, selection and appointment of, I, 167-72.
- Fine, Professor, considered for Cabinet, I, 105; representative of Wilson's first choices for foreign posts, 177.
- Fingall, Lady, I, 421.
- Fish, Stuyvesant, II, 434.
- Fisher, Admiral Lord, II, 190-92.
- Fletcher, Henry P., Ambassador to Chile, I, 178; enthusiastic over President's success in Mexican difficulties, 207; discusses South American affairs with House, 221, 222; fails to grasp the idea of the Pact, 221; in charge of negotiations for Pact, 231, 232.
- Flynn, Chief of the Secret Service, II, 223, 443, 444.
- Foch, Marshal Ferdinand, quoted, II, 83, 83 n.
- Fokker, performs for House, I, 251.
- Ford, Henry, his peace ship, II, 93, 97; has interview with House, 96, 97; crudity of his views regarding peace, 97.
- France, reconciliation of, with Great Britain, I, 236; military development the order of the day in, 238; Cabinet crisis in, 258; the statesmen of, thought before the War to have given up the idea of recovering Alsace-Lorraine, 260, 262, 272, 273; has no written agreement with England or Russia, 263, 278;

- as regards restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to, 355, 363, 392, 399; her aspirations for territorial annexations, 394, 399; opinion of America in, 398; wants Alsace-Lorraine, 399; thinks Wilson pro-German, 416, 417; does not understand England, 418; not inclined toward American offer of conditional peace, II, 272; will not listen to peace proposal, 289-91; secret treaty of, with Russia, 290; secret treaty of, with Great Britain, 290.
- Francis Joseph, Emperor, death of, II, 424.
- Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, assassinated, I, 269, 270.
- Frazier, A. H., letter of, to House, Feb. 15, 1916, II, 162.
- Freedom of land, II, 13.
- Freedom of the Seas, first suggested by British Foreign Office, I, 369, 370, 382, 407; at the Second Hague Conference, 370 *n.*, 407; the plan of, as worked out by House, 405-07; the phrase, 408; advantages and weakness of House's plan for, 408, 409; used by House to pave the way for peace, 409-11; House's plan for, spoiled by Germans, 411; English fail to see advantages of, 411, 431; discussed by House and Grey, 423-26; House talks with Loreburn on, 429; House presents to Zimmermann results of English conferences on, 430, 431; as interpreted by Germany, 432; approved by Haldane, 450; Bryce's attitude on, 464; combined with disarmament, discussed, II, 116-18; Lloyd George's idea of, 129; in Wilson's May 27 speech, 300, 304.
- French, General Sir John, reports military situation a stalemate (Jan. 15, 1915), I, 354, 355.
- Frick, Mr., and the United States Steel Corporation, I, 128, 129; confers with House on currency reform, 161.
- Friedrich Wilhelm, Crown Prince of Germany, I, 414.
- Gallipoli, II, 80, 148.
- da Gama, Ambassador of Brazil, at Washington, House's Pan-American Pact proposed to, I, 213; answer of, to House's proposal, 214; pleased with procedure in regard to American action on Pact, 217; approves the revised Pact, 226.
- Letter: to House, Dec. 24, 1914, I, 214.
- Gardiner, A. G., his sketches of prominent men, I, 350; II, 119; House dines with, I, 364; his sketch of Bryce, 384; has interview with House, II, 119.
- Gardiner, Obadiah, in the *Herald's* advance list of Cabinet appointees, I, 113.
- Garrison, Lindley M., suggested by Tully as Secretary of War, I, 111; appointed Secretary of War, 113; 'Mars' in the Wilson-House cypher, 115; consults House, 138, 139.
- Garvin, J. L., of the *Observer*, II, 125; cables *Tribune* on House, 199.
- Gaunt, Captain Guy, British Naval Attaché, II, 108, 109, 307, 309, 310, 321; commended by House, 244, 264; aroused by exploit of German submarine U-53, 323; on British feeling toward United States, 326, 327; on the British Intelligence Service, 426.
- Gaynor, W. J., Mayor of New York, as Presidential possibility, I, 40-42.
- George V, King, gives audiences to House, I, 385, 466, 467; II, 125, 190; bellicose, I, 385; reads *Life*, II, 190.
- Gerard, James W., Ambassador to Germany, asks concerning prospects of Ambassadorship, I, 183, 184; correspondence of, with House, 185; his relations with House, 185; commended for his work as Ambassador, 185; his impressions of Page, 186; getting settled in Berlin, 186, 187; on Carranza, 224; his diplomacy in securing for House private interview with the Kaiser, 252; at the Kaiser's luncheon, 253, 254, 257; warned against expression of unneutral feeling, 312, 344; on sale of munitions by Americans to French and British, 345; sees victory for the Germans (Feb. 15, 1915), 376; thinks the Germans would not hesitate to go to war with United States, 396; thinks the Kaiser would be deposed if defeated, 397; his point of view wholly American, 404; and Bryan's alleged remark about *Lusitania* note, 451; hated by Germans, II, 25, 26; thinks the Germans are winning in autumn of 1915, 81; his account of interview with the Kaiser, 102, 103, 138, 139; approves of disarming merchantmen, 210; strives to preserve peace, 246; the reason of German Government's wish that he return home, 389, 390; tells why Germany wants a peace conference, 406.
- Letters: to House, Nov. 4, 1913, I, 186; July 7, 1914, 270; Nov., 336; Dec. 29, 344; Jan. 20, 1915, 345; Feb. 15, 376; March 6, 391; June 1, 454; June 16, II, 13; June 22, 14; July 20, 23; July 27, 25; Aug. 3, 28; Aug. 24, 32; Sept. 7, 37; Sept. 20, 42; Sept. 27, 43; Oct. 1 (?), 44; Oct. 19, 48; Dec. 7, 104; Dec. 14, 104; Jan. 3, 1916, 105; Feb. 1,

- Feb. 8, 208; Feb. 29, 221; Mar. 7, Mar. 14, 222; Mar. 20, 223; May 10, 246; May 17, 251; May 24, 252; June 7, 253; Aug. 16, Aug. 30, 330; Jan. 16, 1917, 424; — to Wilson, Jan. 24, 1915, I, 355.
- Gerards, the, dinner at, I, 249–51.
- German-Americans, Wilson fears outbreak of, II, 34; their view of Wilson, 250; the vote of, 372; efforts of House to make them good Americans in the War, 443, 444.
- German-Mexican alliance, Germany's attempt to arrange, II, 451–54.
- Germans, no evidence of their having placed foundations for great guns in this country, I, 299, 299 n.; defeated at the Marne, 320; war plans of, based on assumption of short campaign, 320; regard the War as one of self-defence, 335; spoil House's plan for Freedom of the Seas, 411; their opinion of the *Lusitania* notes, II, 23, 25; send Russians of revolutionary tendencies to Russia, 26; wish to interfere in Mexico, 28; and the Monroe Doctrine, 28; apparently winning in Autumn of 1915, 80, 81; House's estimate of, 427.
- Germany, alarmed at supposed peril of the Triple Entente, I, 236–38, 249; her attempts to break the Entente, 236, 237; the aggressive spirit in, 237, 249; rapid development of her sea-power, 237; legitimate exploitation of Central and South America by, suggested by House, 239, 246; and Great Britain, the feeling between, 239–41, 243, 245, 249, 278; and Great Britain, fear each other, 258; Government gives sanction to Austria for retaliatory measures against Serbia, 269; assured by House of coöperation of United States and Great Britain for peace, 274; Grey's policy shown not to be the isolation of, 274; army leaders seize control in, 276; sends ultimatum that precipitates war, 279; in hands of group of militants and financiers, 282; disintegration of, opposed by House, 318, 319; distrust of, 330, 343, 352, 353, 368, 394; attitude in, toward War, in autumn of 1915, 333, 335–37, 339; disturbed at American sales of munitions of war to Allies, 336, 343–47, 355, 377, 404, 411, 413, 414, 468; II, 14, 23, 27, 33, 101; hate against England in, I, 337; determines to utilize submarine, 366; proclaims war zone around British Isles (manifesto in regard to merchantmen), 366, 378; warned by United States, 366; state of feeling in, in February, 1915, 376; her system of espionage, 397; determined upon wide annexations, 399; dependent upon overseas trade, 406; would gain by Freedom of the Seas, 408; Government narrowly selfish, 414; antiquated in some of its ideas, 414; refuses compromise on submarine and blockade issue, 450–53; makes it clear that starvation is not justification of submarine policy, 452, 453; II, 15, 16, 240; the situation encouraging for (June 1–16, 1915), I, 454, 455, 468–70; her answer (May 28, 1915), to first *Lusitania* note, II, 2; the struggle in, between the civil and naval powers, 12–15, 23, 25, 37, 38, 138, 146, 147, 221, 225, 228–34, 239, 240; her reply (July 8, 1915), to second *Lusitania* note, 15; demands that America yield sovereign rights, 15; great confidence felt in (August 24, 1915), 32, 33; promises not to make submarine warfare on passenger liners, 36–38; makes no formal disavowal of sinking of *Lusitania* and *Arabic*, 37; continue their submarine warfare, 37, 38; political confusion in, 42–44; makes disavowal of sinking of *Arabic*, 45, 46; peace talk in, 104, 251–55; dismissal of attachés of, 105, 106; wants House to come to Berlin, 107; Italian attitude toward, 152, 153; her point of view on sinking of *Lusitania*, 206–09; announces that armed merchantmen will be regarded as warships, 215, 219; considers unlimited submarine blockade of England, 222; food question in, 222, 223; reply of (May 4, 1916), to Wilson's note of April 8, 1916, 240–42; would not have accepted terms suggested by House, 273 n., 292; Bernstorff explains her foreign policy, 333; determines conditionally on unrestricted submarine warfare, 334–36, 388; tries to influence Wilson by threat of ruthless submarine campaign, 390–93; expresses willingness to enter peace conference (Dec. 12, 1916), 398; House and Wiseman wish to find what her peace proposal signifies, 401; British and French will not accept her peace proposal, 402, 403; her reply to Wilson's peace note, 405, 406; opportunity offered to, by Wilson's address to Senate (Jan. 22, 1917), 422, 425; decides to recommence unrestricted submarine warfare, 426, 427; moderate party surrenders to military party in, 427–29; announcement (Jan. 31, 1917) of withdrawal of submarine pledge of, 431, 436–38; states terms to House, 431, 432; documents breaking relations of, with United States, drafted, 435; United

- States breaks with, 442; attempts to arrange German-Mexican alliance, 451-54.
- Gevers, Dutch Minister at Berlin, II, 137.
- Gibboney, Stuart, I, 147.
- Gibson, Hugh, II, 269.
- Gilbert, Cass, I, 131.
- Gilman, 'A Conservative,' I, 121.
- Giolitti, Premier of Italy, I, 412.
- Glass, Carter, his part in promoting currency reform, I, 94, 161, 162, 166.
- Glass-Owen Bill, I, 163, 165.
- Globe*, London, interview with House in, II, 186-88.
- Glynn, Governor, I, 147; Temporary Chairman of the St. Louis Convention, II, 356; in New York rally, 1916, 375, 376.
- Gore, Senator, ex-Populist, I, 84; characterizes House, 93; has interview with House, 94, 95; invited to Trenton by Wilson, 99. *See* Gore-McLemore resolution.
- Gore-McLemore resolution, II, 16 *n.*, 216, 270.
- Gorizia, II, 291 *n.*
- Goschen, Sir Edward, I, 249; his interview with Bethmann-Hollweg, II, 139, 140.
- Governments, actuated by self-interest, II, 139, 165, 285.
- Graham, to receive appointment in Attorney-General's office, I, 129.
- Grasty, Charles H., of the *Baltimore Sun*, I, 130.
- Gray, Thomas, his 'Elegy in a Country Churchyard,' I, 122.
- Grayson, Dr. Cary T., physician to the President, I, 120.
- Great Britain, gives provisional recognition to Huerta, I, 194; withdraws support from Huerta, 202; approves of Pan-American Pact, 227-29; reconciliation of, with France, 236; reconciliation of, with Russia, 236; rapid development of German sea-power felt as a threat at her security, 237; faced with an unpleasant dilemma, 237; and Germany, the feeling between, 239-41, 243, 245, 249, 278; and Germany, fear each other, 258; has no written agreement with France or Russia, 263, 278; delay of Government in replying to House's suggestions, 267, 277, 278; Foreign Office replies to House's suggestions, 271; committed to Belgium and France, 277; her interference with neutral trade, Wilson's view of, 303-06; her interference with neutral trade, Page's view of, 304-06; her interpretation of the term 'contraband,' 303, 313; attitude in, toward War, in autumn of 1915, 333-35; feeling in, against United States, 347-49; Freedom of the Seas first suggested by, 370, 382, 407; dependent upon overseas trade, 406; would gain by Freedom of the Seas, 409; public opinion opposed to Freedom of the Seas, 411, 431; not understood by France, 418; House's encomium on, at Paget's dinner, 422; public opinion in, does not approve blockade-and-submarine compromise, 444, 445; British Cabinet refuses compromise (March 15, 1915), 445; her interference with neutral trade causes difficulty in Washington, 457-59; her course opposed by some Englishmen, 459-61; shipping trouble with, a source of anxiety, II, 57-60, 69-73; the only obstacle between Germany and complete success (Aug. 4, 1915), 61; Bryce's estimate of opinion in, 65; Plunkett's estimate of opinion in, 66; Grey's estimate of opinion in, 67; controversy with, as regards arming of merchantmen, 73-75; strong resentment against America in, at note of protest, 75; misunderstanding of American motives in, 99; better understanding with, needed, 99-102; Page epitomizes opinion in, 203, 204; opinion in, in 1916, against suggestions of peace, 259; not inclined toward American offer of conditional help, 272; lack of cohesion in Government of, 284; secret treaty of, with France, concerning Syria, 290; disturbed over American counter-protest to mail seizures, 307-10; issues blacklisting order, 312, 313; increased friction between United States and, 316-28; irritated by Senate resolution on treatment of Irish prisoners, 317, 318; feeling in, over the exploit of the German submarine U-53, 322-26; change in Government of, 396-98; will not accept Germany's peace proposal, 398, 403, 404; effect of Wilson's peace note in, 406, 407. *See* Neutral Shipping.
- Greece, question as to her course, I, 363, 372, 463; gauges time of entering into War, II, 25.
- Gregory, T. W., on House's part in election of Governor Hogg, I, 28; on House as a campaign manager, 29; on House as a progressive, 34; helps arrange for address of Wilson in Texas, 44; turns remark of Waterson to Wilson's advantage, 54, 55; on the organization of Texas for Wilson, 57; on offer of Tammany to Texas delegation, 61; his activities in Baltimore Convention, 63-65; offers to resign from Cabinet in

favor of House, 140; his intimacy with House, 142, 143; considered for Federal Reserve Board, 169; gives House Cabinet news concerning Bryan and the two notes to Germany, II, 5-7; his opinion of Solicitor-General Davis, 10; on efforts made to induce Wilson to institute retaliatory measures against Entente for interference with American trade, 49; approves House's plan for making Hughes President immediately in case of election, 379; looks up legal aspect of President's resignation, 383; tells of Cabinet meeting, 461.

Letter: to House, Nov. 25, 1914, I, 144.

Grew, Joseph, of American Embassy in Berlin, II, 137; sends word of probable resumption of illegal submarine warfare, 387.

Grey, Sir Edward, community of personal tastes and ideals between House and, I, 194, 195, 428; talks with House on Panama tolls and Mexico, 195-97; effect of his conversation with House, 197; sends Sir William Tyrrell to United States, 197, 198; bases foreign policy on inviolability of treaties, 200-03, 206, 293; his tribute to Wilson on passage of Panama repeal bill, 206, 263; his sympathy with Pan-American Pact, 227-29; and the Balkan crisis, 238; remarks of Page on, 241; on distrust between nations, 241; talks with House on international affairs, 260-67, 278; enthusiastic for House's suggestions, 267, 273; not his policy to isolate Germany, 274; conference suggested by, to avert the War, 276; on the effect of piling up armaments, 301; understands the importance of Anglo-American friendship, 304, 309; II, 53; his personal attitude toward peace proposal, I, 341; confers with House (Feb., 1915), 362-64, 367-73; tributes of House to, 364, 393; II, 53, 54, 131, 177; his part in creation of League of Nations, I, 365; thinks that Great Britain will agree that all shipping be immune, 369, 370, 407; his instructions to delegates to Second Hague Conference, 370 *n.*, 407; his dominance, 382; thinks it time for House to go to Berlin, 390, 392; goes with House to Kew Gardens, 423, 432; his eyesight, 423; II, 55, 56; discusses with House Freedom of the Seas, I, 423-28; suggests some form of League of Nations, 425; II, 87, 89; on Kitchener's conception of work, I, 437 *n.*; and Balfour, 'two great gentlemen,' 438; ready to consider any reasonable compromise, 442;

his attitude toward the blockade-and-submarine compromise, 443-49, 452, 453; does what he can to keep United States out of the War, 446, 453; on Lord Haldane's work, 450 *n.*; on diplomacy of avoiding break with America, II, 52; on the influence of the United States on larger aspects of peace, 54-56, 88, 89; on the conference proposed before the War began, 55 *n.*, 56, 87; the War on his nerves, 63; his estimate of British opinion, 67; his attitude on intervention of United States, 68, 69; his attitude toward the American note on interference of trade, 79, 80; his chief object of the War to prevent future wars, 87-89; House proposes his peace plan to, 90, 91; his answer to House's peace proposal, 97, 98; in favor of Freedom of the Seas including elimination of militarism, 116-18; discusses situation with House (Jan., 1916), 118-21; confers with House on end of War, 130; approves House's mission to Germany, 136; House and German Chancellor talk of, 141; conversation of House with (Feb. 10, 1916), regarding peace conference, 170-73; conference of, with House, Asquith, and Balfour (Feb. 11, 1916), 173-76; believes time has come for President to demand peace conference, 176, 177, 182, 183; conversation of, with House and others (Feb. 14, 1916), regarding peace conference, 179-82; criticized by Loreburn, 193; final conferences of, with House (Feb. 17-Feb. 23, 1916), 194-96; draws up memorandum with House, 194-96; his memorandum, 200-02; his attitude toward American offer of conditional help, with special reference to the French, 272-77, 280-83, 288, 289; Wilson largely indebted to, for basic idea of speech of May 27, 1916, 296; on Wilson's May 27 speech, 302, 303; his reply to American note, 305; disturbed by American counter-protest on mail seizures, 307-10; raised to the peerage, 317 *n.*; on American attitude toward German submarine U-53, 323; resignation of, 397; should have made changes in diplomatic corps, 397; foresees early curtailment of support in shipping and finance, 409, 410; says that Germany missed a great opportunity in 1916, 425; disappointed at delay of United States in declaring war, 459;

Letters: to House, April 24, 1915, I, 425; June 6, II, 54; July 14, 55; Aug. 10, 87; Aug. 26, 67, 88; Sept. 22, 89; Nov. 11, 79; March 23, 1916, I, 229; March 24,

- II, 273; April 7, 275; May 12, 282; May 26, 310; Aug. 28, 317; — to Spring-Rice, Jan. 22, 1915, I, 347; May 23, 1916, II, 308.
- Grey, Earl, II, 324.
- Grey, Lord, cousin of Sir Edward, inveighs against America, II, 262.
- Grotius, his term *mare liberum*, I, 408.
- Guam, II, 44.
- Guatemala, representative of, confers with other representatives for Mexican settlement, I, 223.
- Gulflight*, the, torpedoed by Germans, I, 432, 432 n.
- Guthrie, to be Ambassador to Japan, I, 129.
- von Gwinner, banker, I, 405; II, 13, 14, 138.
- Hadley, Dr. Arthur T., not enthusiastic at nomination of Wilson, I, 67.
- Hague Conference, the, First, I, 408; the Second, 370 n., 407.
- Haldane, Lord, Lord Chancellor, I, 263, 273; cordial toward international co-operation, 265; talks with House, 449, 450; shows House diary of Berlin visit, 449; approves Freedom of the Seas, 450; his work on Expeditionary Forces, 150 n; excluded from Cabinet, 150 n.
- Hall, Admiral, Chief of the British Naval Intelligence Bureau, his part in discovery of German plot for German-Mexican alliance, II, 453; his genius for interception and elucidation of German secrets, 453, 454.
- Hall, Captain, of the British Intelligence Department, II, 125, 126.
- Hamby, General W. R., in Governor Hogg's campaign, I, 28.
- Hamilton, Alexander, and George Washington, I, 126.
- Hamilton, General Ian, II, 190, 191.
- Hamlin, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, desired by McAdoo as member of Federal Reserve Board, I, 172; appointed to Board, 172.
- Hammond, John Hays, II, 31.
- Hankey, Colonel, of the British National Defence Board, II, 126.
- Hanna, Mark, I, 89.
- Hapgood, Norman, admirer of Brandeis, I, 91, 462; admirer of Lane, 107, 108; mentioned, II, 22.
- Harding, Warren G., in election of 1916, II, 368.
- Harding, W. P. G., offered post on Federal Reserve Board, I, 171, 172.
- Hare, Montgomery, I, 147, 148.
- Harmon, Judson, and the 1912 nomination, I, 48, 52, 57, 58, 59.
- Harper's Weekly*, controversy as regards support of Wilson by, I, 53-55.
- Harriman, Borden, Mr. and Mrs., I, 247.
- Harris, Director of the Census, I, 350.
- Harris, of State Committee, New York, II, 375.
- Harris, Levenson, II, 123.
- Harrison, Consul-General at Frankfurt, I, 400.
- Harvey, George, his meeting with House, I, 51; on Wilson's prospects, 51; distrusted by Bryan, 53; his controversy with Wilson, 53-55; works for single Presidential term, 95; praises House as adviser of Wilson, 98; comments on House's mission to Europe, II, 113.
- Harvey, Sir Paul, II, 100.
- Hawaii, I, 297.
- Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, I, 192, 203, 205.
- Hayes-Tilden campaign, the, I, 13-15.
- Healy, Timothy, President of International Brotherhood of Stationary Firemen, I, 130.
- Hearst, William Randolph, and the 1912 nomination, I, 50, 52, 60.
- Helfferrich, Karl, I, 405; II, 26, 330.
- Henderson, General Sir David, II, 190.
- Henry, Bob, works for one four-year term for President, I, 94, 95; invited to Trenton by Wilson, 99.
- Herald*, New York, its advance list of Cabinet appointees, I, 112, 113.
- Herrick, Myron T., American Ambassador to France, sees House in Paris, I, 259; retained against his wishes, II, 366.
- Hesperian*, the, sinking of, II, 37.
- Higgins, Governor of Rhode Island, I, 104.
- Higginson, Major Henry L., his attitude toward currency reform, I, 163.
- Letter*: to House, Jan 13, 1915, I, 133.
- Higginson, Hetty, II, 60.
- von Hindenburg, Paul, drives Russians out of East Prussia, I, 320, 365; his attack on Russian Poland, 320, 365; popular hero, 414; out with an interview, II, 104; real ruler of Germany, 105; his salary before and in the War, 147; named Chief of the General Staff, 330; opposed to reckless submarine warfare, 331, 332; surrender of moderate party to, 427, 429.
- Hirst, Francis W., of the *Economist*, of the peace party, I, 390, 460; II, 123.
- Historical documents, reasons for and against their early publication, I, 1.
- Historical perspective, I, 1.
- History and fable, I, 1.
- Hoaller, of British Embassy in Washington, discusses the German-Mexican affair, II, 453.
- Hogg, Governor of Texas, successful in

- efforts to stop dueling, I, 23; second campaign and election of, 27-29; his altercation with House on nomination of Senator Reagan for Governorship of Texas, 30; as Governor, 34, 35; provides House with title of 'Colonel,' 37; advises House to enter National politics, 38; assists House to secure home for the Bryans, 39.
- Holland, no effort made by Allies to bring her into the War, I, 373; and Germany, relations of, II, 137.
- Holtzendorff, Admiral; II, 43, 427.
- L'Homme Enchaîné*, censored, II, 162.
- Hoover, Herbert C., resourcefulness of, I, 383; has interview with House, II, 94, 95; on his troubles in Belgium, 123; suggests further move as result of Wilson's address to the Senate (Jan. 22, 1917), 419.
- House, Colonel Edward M., his reason for allowing intimate papers to be published, 1, 2; extent and variety of his intimate papers, 2, 3; presentation of his papers made possible by Miss Denton, 3; his diary, 3, 73; paucity of published information concerning his career and accomplishments, 4; sought no office for self or friends, 4, 5; aimed to affect events through personal influence, 5; his desire to escape publicity, 5; his unique place in history, 6; 'the President's adviser,' 7; basis of his fame, 7.
- Early life and State politics*: his family Dutch by origin, 8; his more immediate forbears, 8; his father, 8; birth of, 8; his earliest recollections, 8-10; reared in an atmosphere of strife and destruction, 10, 11; taken to England and goes to school at Bath, 12; goes to school in Virginia, 12; goes to school in Connecticut, 13; budding enthusiasm of, for politics and public affairs, 13; at time of Hayes-Tilden campaign, 13-15; his friendship with Oliver T. Morton, 13-15; makes personal friends of political opponents, 14; in Cornell, 15, 16; results of early Washington experience, 16; his health, 16, 17; his ambition, 16, 17; determines to make his career of politics, 17; death of father, 17; his debt to his father, 17, 18; marriage, 18; embarks in various industrial schemes, 18; undertakes building of railway, 18, 19; his admiration for the older generation of Texans, 20; his acquaintance with frontiersmen and frontier life, 20-25; his love for frontier life, 25; his social position in Texas, 25; his house at Austin a focus of social and political life, 26; an omnivorous reader, 26, 27; works for election of Governor Hogg, 27-29; as a campaign manager, 29; his ability to foretell effects of measure on public opinion, 29; in the Culberson campaign, 29-31; opposed to 'machine' politics, 29, 32; in the Sayers campaign, 29, 32-34; directs Culberson Senatorial campaign, 34; his interest in legislation under Hogg, 34, 35; believes in progressive legislation, 34, 35; his intimacy with Culberson, 35-37; his title of 'Colonel,' 37; in Lanham campaigns, 37, 38; as a drafter of party platforms, 38.
- National politics*: waits for opportunity to enter national politics, 38-40; finds Bryan impracticable, 39, 40; considers Gaynor as Presidential possibility, 40-42; sees availability of Wilson for Presidential candidacy, 42-44; his first meeting with Wilson, 43-46; tries to secure support of Bryan for Wilson, 43, 48-56; attracted by personal amiability of Wilson, 45; advises Wilson to emphasize tariff issue, 47; arranges dinner for meeting of Wilson and Houston, 47; his meeting with Harvey, 51; in the Harvey-Wilson controversy, 53, 54; organizes Texas for Wilson, 56-58; his foresight, 57; fears for Wilson's nomination, 59, 60; advises Wilson to move cautiously, 61; his plans for handling Convention, 62-66; receives notification of Wilson's nomination, 67; enters campaign for Wilson, 68, 69; interested in Democratic harmony, 69-77; his attitude toward Tammany, 74-76; willing to work with best material at hand, 74; finds solution of New York muddle, 75, 76; advises canceling of Wilson's speaking engagements after attempted assassination of Roosevelt, 77-79; summons Bill McDonald for protection of Wilson, 79, 80; importance of his influence in election of Wilson, 82; gratitude of Wilson to, 82; quietness and effectiveness of his influence, 82 *n.*, 93; considers Wilson not to be envied, 84; assistance of, sought by Wilson, 84; his personal disinterestedness, 85; interested in measures, not men, 86; urges Wilson to leave appointments to others, 86; assaulted by place-seekers, 87; seeks to be well-informed if consulted by Wilson, 87; tries to avoid lime-light, 87; assists Wilson in drawing up tentative list of Cabinet positions, 88-90; investigates and sifts claims and capacities of applicants for office, 90-92, 96; as regards the Secretaryship of the Interior, 92; on impossibility of build-

ing Cabinet that shall please everybody, 92; visits Washington, 93-96; characterized by Senator Gore, 93; forms of salutation in Wilson's letters to, 93, 117; sends Wilson information about men at Washington and proposed legislative measures, 94-96; unwilling to accept office, 98, 100; his opinion of McAdoo, 98; discusses Cabinet possibilities with McAdoo, 99; offered Cabinet position, 100; reasons for his objection to holding office, 100; tries to soothe feelings of party leaders, 101, 102; fears that Wilson will appoint too many independents to the Cabinet, 102, 103; has conversation with Mrs. Wilson on Cabinet appointments, 103; suggests that Bryan be given a voice in composition of Cabinet, 103; talks with Bryan on composition of Cabinet, 104-06; his opinion of Bryan's character, 105; urges appointment of McReynolds and Lane to Cabinet, 107, 108; urges Baker to accept position in Cabinet, 109; has interview with Page, 110; recommends Wallace as Secretary of War, 111; his opinion of the Cabinet and the method in which it was formed, 111-13; Wilson's 'second personality,' 114; dependence of Wilson upon, for advice, 114; on the occasion of the inauguration, 114; his cypher with President, 115; called the Silent Partner, 115, 150; personal basis of his relationship with Wilson, 116; the President's pleasure at letter of, on passage of Tariff Bill, 116; depth of Wilson's friendship for, 117, 118; admitted to Wilson's family circle, 118; entertains the President on his visits to New York, 122, 123; his admiration for Wilson's intellectual qualities, 123, 124; recognizes certain deficiencies in Wilson, 124-28; his ways of lightening the President's burdens, 128-30; receives complaints against the Administration, 130-36; intimacy of his relations with the Cabinet, 137-44; Burleson and Gregory offer to resign from Cabinet in favor of, 139, 140; discusses farming with Plunkett, 144, 145; smooths the way for Plunkett in America, 145, 146; regard of Lane for, 146; broadness of his activities, 147, 148; unpleasant results of his newspaper notoriety, 148-50; called 'Assistant President House,' 150; interested primarily in excellence of performance, 151; insists on need of courage and of radical reform, 151, 152; his progressive views as set forth in 'Philip Dru: Administrator,' 152-58; the extent of his influence upon the legislative

plans of the Administration, 152, 153, 157; his interest in legislative problems confronting Wilson, 158; his share in the formation and passing of the Federal Reserve Act, 158-67; his share in the selection of the Federal Reserve Board, 167-72; satisfied with consciousness of having taken part in things worth while, 175.

Foreign policy: gives more attention to international affairs, 175; always considered foreign problems of first interest and importance, 176, 177; urges adherence to Civil Service Regulations in foreign appointments, 178, 179; discusses diplomatic appointments with Wilson, 179, 180; the first to suggest Page for English post, 180, 181; advice and assistance of, sought by all desiring diplomatic posts, 183, 184; in close touch with Ambassadors, 184; his relations with Gerard, 185; his relations with Page, 187, 188; asked by Page for assistance in formulating constructive policy, 188; explains to Page difficulties confronting State Department, 190; his relations with foreign diplomats in Washington, 190; his views on South American relations and the Monroe Doctrine, 191; looks for cooperative understanding with European powers, 191, 192, 238, 239; his views concerning Panama tolls controversy, 192-94; community of personal tastes and ideals between Sir Edward Grey and, 194, 195, 428; talks with Grey on Panama tolls and Mexico, 195-97; effect of his conversation with Grey, 197; talks with Tyrrell, 199, 200; the basis of his diplomacy, 201, 202.

Pan-American Pact: aims at Pan-American policy based on coöperation, 207-11; his proposal for international agreement compared with Article X of League of Nations Covenant, 209, 210; confers with Bryan on Pact, 210, 211; proposes Pact to A. B. C. Powers, 212-14; receives replies to proposal, 214-18; unable to approve purely negative line of action, 219; insists on importance of settlement of Mexican affairs, 219-22; has conference with Lansing, 222, 223; has conference with Chilean Minister to Great Britain on Pact, 227; tries to get statement of British Government on Pact, 227-29.

The Great Adventure: realizes that isolation of United States from European politics cannot last indefinitely, 233; early planned policy of coöperation between United States, Germany, and

Great Britain, 238, 239; wishes to bring about a better understanding between Great Britain and Germany, 239; hopes to encourage Germany to exploit legitimately Central and South America, 239, 246; talks to Bernstorff relative to an international understanding, 240; has idea of coöperation to develop waste places of the world, 240, 242, 264, 275; discusses international understanding with Page, 240, 241; wishes to secure limitation of armaments by international agreement, 242-46, 250; has conversation with Dumba on Balkan situation, 242; discusses international coöperation with Tyrrell, 242, 243; advised by Tyrrell to secure audience of the Kaiser, 242, 243; 'the power behind the throne,' 243; his plan of seeing the Kaiser approved by President, 243; prepares for visit to Berlin, 243-47; talks with B. I. Wheeler about the Kaiser, 244, 245; viewpoint from which his appeal is to be made to the Kaiser, 246; talks with Irwin Laughlin on disarmament and the Kaiser, 246; 'personal friend of the President,' 247; talks with von Moltke and von Jagow, 248; talks with von Tirpitz, 248-51; finds militarism run mad in Germany, 248; reports to President on conditions in Europe, 248, 249; the Kaiser consents to private interview with, 252; lunches with the Kaiser, 253; his conversation with the Kaiser, 254-57; finds Germany and Great Britain fear each other, 258; sees Herrick in Paris, 259; has conversations with Grey, Tyrrell, Page, Haldane, Crewe, and Spring-Rice on international coöperation, 260-67; suggests international understanding as regards investments, 264, 265; his silence means dissent, 265; writes to the Kaiser, 272-74, 279, 280; his belief in the good to be accomplished by concerted action between the nations, 274, 275.

The War: Spring-Rice suggests that his efforts may have precipitated crisis, 280, 281; his views as to the cause of the War, 285, 293; his forecast of possible results of the War, 292, 293; sees need of a new standard of international morals, 294, 295, 359; II, 468, 468 *n.*; sees necessity of preparedness, I, 296; II, 17; tries to convince Wilson of need of reserve force, I, 298-300; II, 17; aware of evils which attend extravagant military preparation, I, 301; extent to which he considered himself a pacifist, 302; sees that international pacifism must include all the great Powers, 302;

urges upon the President the need of a positive organization of our potential strength, 302; II, 17; his views of British interference with neutral trade, I, 306; and Spring-Rice, straighten out undiplomatic despatch of State Department, 307, 308; II, 107; warns Page and Gerard against expression of unneutral feeling, I, 312, 344; to be sent on European mission, 316, 317; opposed to disintegration of Germany, 318, 319; opposed to German militarism, 318, 319, 343; fears domination of Europe by Russia, 318, 319; suggests stopping of the War, 318, 319; sees that rivalry in excessive armaments causes distrust, 319; sketches what later became American plan for lasting peace, 319; disarmament and guaranteeing of territorial integrity suggested by, 320, 365; suggests mediation to Germany, 321, 322; gets information from Dumba and reports to the President, 322, 323; considers the War lost to Germans after defeat at Marne, 320, 321; tries to arrange meeting between Spring-Rice and Bernstorff, 324-33; feels that autumn is time to begin negotiations for peace, 338, 379; originally prejudiced against Bernstorff, 338; confers with Bernstorff and with Spring-Rice regarding peace proposal, 340-43; confers with President and with Ambassadors at Washington before leaving for Europe, 350-53; urges Bernstorff to have Germans stop killing non-combatants in England, 353; his letter of credentials, 354; affecting meeting with President before departure for Europe, 356-58; his expenses, 356, 357; his feeling regarding President's going to Europe, 356, 357 *n.*; called by Wilson his 'most trusted friend,' 358; crosses on the *Lusitania*, 359-61; has conferences with Grey, 362-64, 367-73, 378; tributes of, to Grey, 364, 393; II, 131, 177; as regards neutralization of Alsace-Lorraine, I, 363; his part in creation of League of Nations, 365; confers with Tyrrell, 367-70; says we cannot be a party to the making of peace, 368, 369; receives invitation from Germany to visit Berlin, 370, 371; decides to postpone visit to Berlin, 373-75; formulates plan for general convention to be called by Wilson, 374; complains of British slowness, 377, 379; II, 102, 164; his summary of the situation (February 23, 1915), I, 380-83; has conversation with Bryce, 384; has audiences of George V, 385, 386, 466, 467; II, 125, 190; takes

liking to Balfour, I, 386, 387; thinks out the problem of limiting of armaments, 387, 388; leaves England for Paris and Berlin, 390-94; tributes of Grey to, 393; II, 53, 54; interview of, with Delcassé, I, 395, 396; commissions Straight to tell same things to Delcassé, 397; learns of French opinion from de Casenave, 398; sees that it is useless to propose immediate peace parleys, 399; wishes to establish cordial relations in different belligerent capitals, 399, 400; arrives in Berlin, 400; has interview with Zimmermann, 400-03; on state of mind in Germany (March 26, 1915), 403, 404; thinks out the problem of contraband and neutral commerce, 405-09; his use of the term 'Freedom of the Seas,' 408; his plan to use Freedom of the Seas as a means of starting peace negotiations, 409-11; reports to President on visit to Berlin, 413-15; in Paris, 415-21; talks with Northcliffe, 421; talks in praise of Great Britain at the Pagets' dinner, 421, 422; goes to Kew Gardens with Grey, 423, 432; discusses with Grey Freedom of the Seas, 423-26; begins to make plans for Peace Conference, 426-28; his methods of organization in political conventions, 427; ill at critical formative period of Paris Peace Conference, 427 *n.*; his mind runs nearly parallel with Grey's, 428; talks with Loreburn on Freedom of the Seas, 429; presents results of English conferences on Freedom of the Seas to Zimmermann, 430, 431; his cable and letter to the President on sinking of *Lusitania*, 433-35; believes that Germany should be called to account for sinking of *Lusitania*, 433-35; has conversation with Kitchener on possible entry of United States into the War, 435-38; his opinion of men in official life in Germany, 437; tribute of, to Grey and Balfour, 438; anxious over Wilson's 'too proud to fight' speech, 438; does not have confidence in effectiveness of protests, 441; concludes that war is inevitable (May, 1915), 442; does not believe war justified unless all peaceful settlements are first tried, 442; works for settlement on basis of blockade-and-submarine compromise, 443-53; talks with Haldane, 449, 450; intends to urge President to wage vigorous war, 453, 454; wishes President to understand difficulties of English and importance of Anglo-American friendship, 456; convinced that our welfare is bound up with German defeat, 456, 457; im-

presses upon Englishmen the seriousness of the contraband question, 461-67; has interview with Lloyd George, 464, 465; has interview with McKenna, 465; has interview with Lansdowne, 465, 466; has interview with Crewe, 466; summarizes for the President his impressions of European affairs (June 16, 1915), 468-70; what he accomplished by his European visit, 470, 471; given convoy, II, 3, 4; suggests Davis as Counsellor of the State Department, 9, 10; approves Polk as Counsellor, 11, 12; tells Wilson we cannot resign sovereign rights, 16; again takes up with Wilson question of preparedness, 17-21; not impressed by pacifist arguments, 21; believes firm reply should be made to Germany, 21; his replies to President's request for advice in *Arabic* crisis, 29-31, 34; his idea of what should be done as result of *Arabic* sinking, 31; disapproves of further note-sending, 29, 30, 47; surprised at Wilson's attitude, 32; suspicious of German diplomacy, 34, 107; advises Daniels concerning increase in navy, 35, 36; tries to secure formal disavowal of sinking of *Arabic*, 40-42; gives credit to Bernstorff for his efforts to preserve peace, 45; asks Wilson for vigorous action, 47; suggests severing of diplomatic relations with Austria, 47; realizes importance of Anglo-American friendship, 53; urges Wilson not to press protests to British over-hard, 53; tries to ease the shipping trouble, 57-60; supports the President's course, 60-64; suggests that the War has gotten on Page's nerves, 63; as regards armed merchantmen, 73-75; has quarrel with Spring-Rice, 75-78; sees only escape for United States in adoption of positive policy, 81; recognizes (Autumn, 1915) three plans open to President, 82; his idea of a peace conference, 82-84, 110, 111; believes lack of preparation to have been the big mistake, 83, 84, 289 *n.*, 389 *n.*; lays peace plan before President, 84, 85; emphasizes the necessity of abolishing militarism, 85, 86; tells Polk of peace plan, 86; tells Lansing of peace plan, 86; his opinion of Bryan's 'peace at any price' policy, 86; proposes peace plan to Grey, 90, 91; urges patience on extreme pacifist leaders, 93; keeps in touch with pacifist leaders and others, 93-97; urges Hoover to impress upon Germans futility of Zeppelin raids, 95; receives Grey's answer to peace proposal, 97, 98; sees need of better understanding with

Allies, 100-02; Wilson decides to send him abroad, 101, 102; believes that United States must ultimately enter the War, 103; complimented in conversation with Spring-Rice, 108; on trouble caused by conveying information or misinformation, 109; newspaper comment on, 112-14; welcomed by newspapermen at pier in England, 111; Plunkett's eulogy of, 115 *n.*; discusses with Grey and Balfour international covenant based upon disarmament and Freedom of the Seas, 116-21; sees danger of Russia making a separate peace, 121, 129, 157, 174, 175, 258, 259; renews personal intimacies, 121-28; invited to dinner in honor of Aristide Briand, II, 127, 128; only foreigner ever given use of British Foreign Office cipher code, 128 *n.*; confers with Lloyd George, Grey, and Balfour on the end of the War and the rôle of United States in coöperation, 128-31; sends advice to President (Jan. 13 and 16, 1916), 132-34; leaves England for Germany by way of Paris and Geneva, 135; on way from England to Berlin, 136, 137; various persons seen by, in Berlin, 137-39; has conference with Chancellor, 139-43; has conference with von Jagow, 143; has conference with Zimmermann, 144; makes report to President on German situation, 144-48; the good accomplished by his visit to Berlin, 154; received by reporters in Paris, 155; has interviews with Briand, 156, 158, 159, 163-65; has interviews with Cambon, 156-58, 163-65; good effects of his visit to Paris, 160-63; promises American intervention under certain circumstances, 164, 179; visits King of the Belgians, 166-68; has negotiations with Grey, Asquith, Balfour, Lloyd George, Reading, and Whitehouse, bearing on peace conference (Feb. 10-Feb. 22, 1916), 170-85; promises that President will come to Hague, if invited, 180; interviewed by newspaper reporters, 186-88; thinks the Allies lack initiative, 188; has picture painted by Laszlo, 189; urges milder tone in English press, 189, 192; at dinner of General Ellison, 190-92; advises Loreburn, 192, 193; at Mrs. Asquith's tea, 193; final conferences of, with Grey (Feb. 17-Feb. 23, 1916), 194-96; draws up memorandum with Grey, 194-96; newspaper articles on, 197, 198; his name becomes a general term, 198; reports to President in Washington, 199; with President draws up cable to Grey approving peace

memorandum, 200-02; his attitude on disarmament of merchantmen, 218, 219; talks with Bernstorff on American intervention (March 12, 1916), 223-25; his view of proper action of United States after torpedoing of *Sussex*, 225, 226, 229; advises President to take decisive action, 227-31; helps prepare despatch for Grey regarding offer of intervention, 231, 231 *n.*; discusses note to Germany with Wilson, 235, 236; wishes Wilson to deliver philippic against Germany, 236; his advice on Germany's reply to Wilson's note, 242, 243; fears that civilization will be exhausted by the War, 258; his opinion of the reason for Great Britain's entry into the War, 265, 266; urges that Page come home, 269; believes Allies will accept American offer, 270, 271; makes new appeals to Grey, 278-80, 285-88; suggests measures to be taken by proposed convention, 279; accepts Allied refusal to American proposal, 290-92; suggests May 27 (1916) as good date for President's speech, 294; works out with Wilson details of President's May 27 speech, 294-97; comparison of his draft with Wilson's speech, 297, 337, 338; admires Wilson's May 27 speech, 299, 300, 355; settles matter of counter-protest on mail seizures, 309, 310; advises Wilson to act with circumspection with the Allies, 314, 315; warns President not to give impression that we should dispute mastery of the seas with Great Britain, 316; his opinion as to real source of difference with Great Britain, 316; his prognostications as to Allied demands, 320; criticizes to Jusserand Allied conduct of War, 321, 322; considers situation between Great Britain and America serious, 327; sees one danger to Anglo-American relations, 327, 328; consulted by Bernstorff as to German memorandum announcing conditionally unrestricted submarine warfare, 334-36.

Election of 1916: mass of business transacted by, 339, 340; the interest and excitement of his life, 339; impatient of domestic politics, 340; aims to make Democratic Party a progressive party, 344, 347, 354; believes Supreme Court should be kept out of politics, 346; prophesies Hughes's defeat, 347; disapproves McCombs for Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee, 347, 348; looks for suitable Chairman of Committee, 349-54; asked to be Chairman of Committee, 354; his plan of organization of Democratic cam-

paign, 356-63; suggests topics for Wilson's speeches, 364-68, 372; and the New York rally, 374-77; has acrimonious debate with President, 376; his election list of States of Nov. 2, 377, 378, 383, 386; suggests that, in case of Hughes's election, Marshall and Lansing resign, Hughes be appointed Secretary of State, and then Wilson resign, 378-80; confident of victory in election, 380, 381; his account of election, 382-85; never worries over matters over which he has no control, 385.

The War: writes Grey of probable resumption by Germany of illegal submarine warfare, 387; opposes attempt at mediation made without Allied approval, 389, 389 *n.*; distrustful of German peace offers, 389, 390; summoned by Wilson to discuss plan of mediation, 390; advises President not to propose peace to the Allies, 390-95, 404; relieves President of imputation of fear, 393; objects to sentence in Wilson's peace note, 393, 394, 405; and Wiseman, mutual comprehension of, 399, 400; wishes to find what is in the German mind regarding peace, 401; believes Wilson's place in history dependent to a large degree on luck, 412; suggests that Wilson state main lines on which stable peace might be drawn, 413, 414; considers with President address to be delivered to Senate, 414-17; wishes to commit Germany to definite terms, 423, 424; Bernstorff's estimate of, 426, 426 *n.*; his estimate of Germans and British, 427; suggests that Germany proffer definite terms, 430; Germany states terms to, 431, 432; effect upon, of Bernstorff's letter stating German terms, 434; at Trumbull's dinner, 434, 435; consults with President and Lansing, 438-42; believes that Bernstorff should be given his passports, 439; convinced that war is inevitable, 440, 442; his activities with German-Americans and others, 442-45; never worries, 444; advocated retention of Bernstorff until withdrawal of *Sussex* pledge, 446; writes to President about Swiss-German move for reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Germany, 447; informed of plot to arrange German-Mexican alliance, 451; urges immediate publication of German telegram concerning German-Mexican affairs, 452; advises President to issue immediately his statement about 'a little group of wilful men,' 457; consulted by Lansing as to President's message, 462; sure of the President's

final decision, 462; source of his influence over the President, 463; advises President as to message, 464-68; tries to put the President in proper frame of mind for war, 464, 465; suggests making distinction between German people and German leaders, 466, 466 *n.*; will have nations have same code of honor as individuals, 468, 468 *n.*; compares Wilson to Mazzini, 470.

Letters: to Auchincloss, March 2, 1915, I, 386; March 5, 387; March 21, 399; Feb. 4, 1916, II, 160; — to Brown, April 10, 1913, I, 135; — to Bryan, Nov. 25, 1911, I, 49; Dec. 6, 50; Jan. 27, 1912, 55; April 15, 1915, I, 417; — to Bryce, Aug. 12, 1915, II, 63; — to Burleson, June 21, 1915, I, 140; — to Culberson, July 26, 1911, I, 159; May 1, 1912, 60; Nov. 5, 86; — to Gerard, Aug. 17, 1914, I, 319; March 1, 1915, 377; May 19, 448; May 25, 452; Dec. 1, II, 97; — to Gregory, Aug. 20, 1914, I, 143; — to Grey, April 12, 1915, I, 424; June 17, II, 12; July 8, 56; Oct. 17, 90; March 8, 1916, II, 202; March 10, 220; May 10, 278; May 11, 279; May 19, 286; May 23, 287; May 24, 310; May 27, 288; June 8, 290; — to Hall, Sept. 22, 1917, II, 454; — to Houston, March 12, 1912, I, 154; Oct. 22, 79; — to Kaiser, July 7, 1914, I, 272; — to Lansing, Aug. 14, 1915, II, 11; — to McAdoo, March 7, 1914, I, 136; — to McCombs, Feb. 10, 1912, I, 56; March 4, 57; — to McDonald, Oct. 15, 1912, I, 79; — to Martin, Jan. 18, 1912, I, 54; Sept. 2, 1913, 164; — to Mezes, Nov. 25, 1911, I, 46; Oct. 11, 1912, 87; Nov. 4, 85; April 24, 1913, 149; April 18, 1915, 418; — to Page, Oct. 29, 1914, I, 308; Dec. 4, 1914, 312; Aug. 4, 1915, II, 60; Aug. 19, 63; Oct. 6, 72; Oct. 29, 78; June 30, 1916, 311; — to Polk, July 25, 1916, II, 314; — to Wilson, Feb. 2, 1912, I, 55; March 6, 58; June 7, 61; June 20, 64; June 23, 65; Aug. 28, 68; Sept. 2, 72; Nov. 22, 91; Nov. 28, 94; Jan. 30, 1913, 104; Feb. 6, 106; Feb. 21, 1914, 169; April 3, 170; May 29, 248; June 17, 262; June 26, 263, 264; July 3, 271; July 4, 266; July 31, 277; Aug. 1, 278; Aug. 5, 282; Aug. 22, 284; Sept. 5, 321; Sept. 6, 323; Sept. 18, 324; Sept. 22, 329; Oct. 6, 330; Oct. 8, 179; Oct. 21, 305; Nov. 30, 208; Dec. 26, 215; Jan. 21, 1915, 218; Feb. 9, 362; Feb. 15, 373; Feb. 18, 378; Feb. 23, 380; March 1, 385; March 8, 390; March 14, 395; March 15, 220, 398; March 20, 400; March 21, 402; March 26, 403; March

- 27, 410; April 11, 413; April 12, 424; April 13, 415; April 17, 416; April 20, 419; April 30, 426; May 3, 429; May 5, 432; May 7, 461; May 9, 433; May 11, 434; May 14, 442; May 20, 446; May 24, 451; May 25, 452, 456; May 27, 462; June 16, 468; July 7, II, 9; July 10, 15; July 12, 17; July 14, 19; July 15, 21; July 17, 22; July 22, 58; Aug. 4, 62; Aug. 8, 19; Aug. 22, 30; Aug. 26, 34; Sept. 17, 39; Nov. 10, 92; Nov. 21, 47; Dec. 16, 106; Dec. 21, 109; Dec. 22, 107; Jan. 7, 1916, 116, 118; Jan. 11, 119; Jan. 13, 132; Jan. 16, 133; Jan. 30, 145; Feb. 3, 146, 149, 156; Feb. 9, 163; Feb. 10, 171; March 12, 224; April 3, 229; April 8, 233, 274; April 15, 238; April 19, 277; April 21, 348; April 25, 239; May 6, 243; May 17, 285; May 18, 269; May 19, 296, 351; May 21, 297; May 29, 356; May 30, 352; June 10, 346; June 14, 267; June 23, 268; July 5, 359; July 12, 266; July 25, 315, 360; Aug. 3, 364, 365; Sept. 30, 373; Oct. 5, 371; Oct. 20, 379; Oct. 23, Oct. 27, 374; Nov. 4, 381; Nov. 6, 390; Nov. 30, 394; Dec. 4, 396; Dec. 17, 401; Dec. 20, 409; Jan. 20, 1917, 427; Jan. 23, 419; Jan. 25, 420; Jan. 26, 429; Jan. 30, 430; Feb. 2, 449; Feb. 8, 448; Feb. 10, 445; Feb. 26, 455; Feb. 27, 452; March 25, 463;—to Zimmermann, Sept. 5, 1914, I, 321; Feb. 17, 1915, 375; May 1, 430.
- House, Mrs., II, 114.
- House of Representatives, vote of, on resolution warning Americans not to travel on armed ships, II, 216, 217; action of, on bill to arm merchantmen, 456.
- Houston, D. F., meets Wilson at dinner arranged by House, I, 47; gives support to Wilson, 47, 48; has interview with House, 96; appointed Secretary of Agriculture, 106, 113; on the President's failure to confide in others, 127; consults House, 138, 139; gives advice to House as to 'Philip Dru,' 154; approves of currency bill, 164; considered for Federal Reserve Board, 169, 171; manner of his appointment as Secretary of Agriculture, 181, 182; and Sir William Tyrrell, 198.
- Letter:* to Mezes, Dec. 11, 1911, I, 48.
- Howard, Roy, of the United Press, II, 444.
- Huerta, British support of, I, 194-96, 199; abdication and flight of, related to withdrawal of British support, 202, 207; defended by Hughes, II, 366. *See* Mexico.
- Hughes, Charles Evans, on running for political office after holding place on Supreme Court, II, 345; nominated for the Presidency, 346; his election speeches, 365, 366, 368; not attractive to Progressives, 368, 369; indecision and evasions of, 368-71; in California, 370; stubborn, 371.
- Hungarians, war-weariness among, II, 424.
- Income tax law, I, 158, 173.
- Indiana, in the 1916 election, II, 373.
- Industrial relations, regulation of, I, 158.
- Inheritance Tax, II, 344.
- International coöperation, efforts of House to bring about plan of, I, 207-29, 238-75. *See* Pan-American Pact.
- International Law, humane provisions of, II, 271; must have a sanction, 88; British violations of, 329.
- Irish prisoners, Senate resolution on treatment of, II, 317, 318.
- Istria, II, 291 *n*.
- Italy, result of her unpreparedness, I, 300; uncertainty regarding her action, 362, 363, 366; conditions in (April, 1915), 412, 419; ready to join the Allies, 415; signs agreement to enter the War, 443; declares war against Austria, 443 *n*.; declares war against Germany, 443 *n*.; II, 152 *n*.; progress of, slow and costly, 81; conditions in (Feb. 1, 1916), 150-53; efforts made to cause her to join the Allies, 152; her attitude toward Germany, 152, 153; tired of war (Feb., 1916), 157.
- Jacobs, Dr., has interview with House, II, 94; has interview with Lansing, 94.
- von Jagow, Gottlieb, Minister for Foreign Affairs, talks with House, I, 248; at Gerards' dinner, 249; on his honeymoon, 253; wishes House to come to Berlin, 390, 391; pleased with tone of *Lusitania* note, II, 13; as regards Mexico, 28; asks House to dinner, 138; has conference with House, 142, 143; complains of Wilson's rôle, 251; opposed by Junkers, 328, 329.
- James, Henry, I, 260.
- James, Senator, I, 204.
- Japan, Chile's fear of, I, 227; should be no offence to, in Pan-American Pact, 228; the possibility of trouble from, discussed 297; and Mexico, II, 452.
- Jester, Lieutenant-Governor, candidate for nomination for Governorship of Texas, I, 32, 33.
- Joffre, Joseph, II, 191, 192.
- Johnson, Hiram, II, 370.
- Johnson, Senator R. M., seconds House's

- invitation to Gaynor to address Texas legislature, I, 41.
- Joline, Adrian H., remark of Wilson concerning Bryan made to, I, 52-55.
- Jordan, David Starr, has interview with House, II, 94; his secretary, 96.
- Journal*, Providence, comments on House's mission to Europe, II, 113.
- Jusserand, M., French Ambassador, relations of House with, I, 190; has bad case of nerves, 327; House confers with, 351, 352; spreads reports of President's pro-Germanism, II, 7; most forceful of the Allied representatives in Washington, 57; tries to prevent discourtesy to Wilson, 268; unwilling to take up with French Government question of American mediation, 275; says French are unwilling to consider peace proposals, 289-91; regards British blacklisting order as a blunder, 313; less aggressive, 321, 322; talks to House of Wilson's pro-Germanism, 395, 396.
- Jutland, battle of, II, 248.
- Kahn, Otto, I, 161.
- Keats, John, I, 120.
- Kellogg, Paul, pacifist, II, 445.
- Keppel, Mrs. George, I, 389.
- Kew Gardens, I, 423, 432.
- Kitchener (Earl) H. H., I, 379, 380; Northcliffe's opinion of, 421; conversation of House with, on possible entry of United States into the War, 435-38; pays tribute to American valor, 436; his power of organization, 437, 437 n.; his conception of work, 437 n.; his stand on the contraband question, 461; his view of continuance of War, II, 291.
- Knox, Philander C., criticized by von Bernstorff, I, 240.
- Laconia*, the, sinking of, II, 458.
- La Follette, Senator Robert M., I, 350; opposes bill to arm merchantmen, II, 456.
- Lane, Franklin K., House's opinion of, I, 92; as Secretary of the Interior, 92 n.; approved by Bryan for Cabinet, 104; his appointment to Cabinet urged by House, 107, 108; considered for War Department, 109, 110; appointed Secretary of the Interior, 113; on the President's failure to confide in others, 127; certain facts given by, misleading, 130; consults House, 137, 139; unwilling to embarrass House, 146, 147; comments on influence of Dru with the President, 157; emphasizes difficulties of American Government in face of British interference with neutral trade, 458, 459; his admiration for Bryan, 459.
- Letters*: to House, Dec. 25, 1913, I, 174; May 5, 1915, 458; — to Mezes, July 4, 1916, I, 146.
- Lanham, House in campaigns of, I, 29, 37, 38.
- Lansdowne, Marquis of, his attitude toward Pan-American Pact, I, 228; praises *Lusitania* note, 440; has interview with House, 465, 466.
- Lansing, Robert, appointed Secretary of State, I, 222; II, 9; confers with House, I, 222, 223; invites South American diplomatic representatives to meeting to discuss Mexican affairs, 223; considers Pan-American Pact, 225; agrees that breach with Allies must be avoided (Autumn, 1915), II, 70; his ideas about armed merchantmen, 73, 74; agrees to House's peace plan, 86; his opinion of Bryan's 'peace at any price' policy, 86; interview of Dr. Jacobs and Emily Balch with, 94; suggests change of Ambassadors desirable, 100, 101; insistent for break with Germany (Jan., 1916), 118; demands confession of illegality of sinking of *Lusitania*, 206; his plan for disarming merchantmen, 209-19; his view of proper action of United States after torpedoing of *Sussex*, 226; prepares memorandum, 230; not satisfied with Germany's note, 244; writes second note, 245; criticized by Page, 318; his opinion of British Ambassador, 319; his health, 350, 351, 353; approves House's plan for bridging the interview from Nov. 7 to March 4 in case of Hughes's election, 379, 380; states publicly that we are 'on the verge of War,' 410; Wilson talks over address to Senate with, 416, 417; notified by Bernstorff that Germany plans ruthless submarine warfare, 431, 436-38; drafts documents breaking relations with Germany, 435, 438, 441; believes that Bernstorff should be given passports, 439; advises retention of Tarnowski, 449; announces arming of merchantmen by executive authority, 458; wishes House to stir Wilson to action, 460; anxious as to what President's message will contain, 462; ignorant as to contents of President's message, 467.
- Letters*: to House, Nov. 18, 1915, I, 225; Feb. 3, 1916, II, 215.
- Laszlo, P. A., paints House's picture, II, 189.
- Laughlin, Irwin, confers with House on proposed visit to the Kaiser, I, 246; advises stilted style of House's letter

- to the Kaiser, 272 *n.*; mentioned, II, 125.
- Laughlin, Mrs. Irwin, I, 246; II, 125.
- Law, Bonar, as regards the Pan-American Pact, I, 229; practical, 429; praises *Lusitania* note, 440; comment of House on, II, 123.
- Lawrence, of the Associated Press, I, 166.
- Lay, Pat, press despatch of, I, 76.
- League to Enforce Peace, Wilson's speech of May 27, 1916, before, II, 253 *n.*, 254, 293-98, 355.
- League of Nations, 'Article X of Covenant of, compared with House's Pan-American Pact, I, 209, 210; II, 298; the Pan-American Pact the prototype of the Covenant of, I, 232; the germ of the mandatory scheme of, 264; the principle of the Covenant of, in message of House to Gerard, 319; great influence of Grey and House in drafting Covenant of, 365; some form of, suggested by Grey, 425; II, 87, 89; one of Wilson's guaranties of future peace, 110; Protocol affirmed by Assembly of, 279 *n.*; President's proposal as regards a, 283; creation of, advocated by Wilson in speech of May 27, 1916, 293-98; Bryce on, 300.
- Libre Parole*, on House, II, 155.
- Lichnowski, Prince, II, 333.
- Life*, read by King George, II, 190.
- Lincoln, Abraham, his Gettysburg Address, I, 119.
- Lloyd George, David, House breakfasts with, I, 263, 268; meeting with, arranged, 454; criticizes the War Department, 464, 465; virile and aggressive, 465; and McKenna, II, 124; ignorant of American public men and affairs, 126; his views of the effects of the War, 126; confers with House, 128, 129; his view of Freedom of the Seas, 129; takes House's proposition seriously, 169, 170; his approval of peace conference necessary, 176; agrees that the President should call peace conference, 179-82; on newspaper reporters, 188; says English like one wing in the water, 189; becomes Prime Minister, 397; encourages Sixtus of Bourbon in secret peace negotiations, 449 *n.*
- Locarno Pacts, II, 279 *n.*
- Lodge, Henry Cabot, I, 183.
- Loreburn, Lord, agrees to push work for Pan-American Pact, I, 229; House's opinion of, 389; of the peace party, 390, 460; House wishes to consult him on Admiralty questions, 428; advised by House to strike a high note, II, 192, 193; criticizes Grey, 193; his photograph, 196; on Wilson's May 27 speech, 300.
- Louvain, destruction of, I, 293.
- Lowry, Edward G., II, 467.
- Ludendorff, II, 330, 429.
- Lusinge, Princess, II, 160.
- Lusitania*, the, House crosses on, I, 359-61; raises American flag, 361; torpedoed by Germans, 432; attitude of Page on sinking of, 433; attitude of House on sinking of, 433-35; Wilson's first note on, 439-41; Bryan's alleged remark concerning Wilson's note on, 451; the second note on, II, 2; Bryan's reaction to the two notes on sinking of, 3, 5-8; opinion of the German people on Wilson's two notes concerning, 23; the third note on, 24; no formal disavowal made of sinking of, 37; House would have no break over wording of disavowal of, 82, 83, 145, 147, 154, 157, 161, 164, 171; an unsettled issue, 103, 206; inaction over issue, 116, 122, 131; discussion of issue in English papers, 172; German point of view on sinking of, 206-09; the issue linked up by Lansing with the disarming of merchantmen, 214, 215, 219.
- McAdoo, W. G., and McCombs, trouble between, I, 71-73, 76, 77, 84; willing to fight the bosses, 73; thought by House to be good material for Governorship, 74; urges Wilson to come out openly against bosses, 75; his claim to office, 89; suggested as Secretary of the Treasury by House, 90, 97; thought by friends to be effacing himself too much, 98; improves in House's opinion, 98; discusses Cabinet possibilities with House, 99; appointed Secretary of the Treasury, 106, 113; 'Pythias' in the Wilson-House cypher, 115; on the President's failure to confide in others, 126, 127; consults House, 139, 141; his part in promoting currency bill, 161, 162, 164-66; his part in selection of Federal Reserve Board, 170-72; helps toward repeal of Panama tolls exemption, 193 *n.*, 205; Wall Street opposed to, II, 342; approves President's statement about 'a little group of wilful men,' 457; wants war, 466; asks House about President's message, 467.
- Letter*: to House, Feb. 15, 1914, I, 168.
- McAneny, of the *New York Times*, I, 148; II, 353.
- McCabe, of Albany, II, 374.
- McCombs, W. F., at dinner arranged by House for meeting of Wilson and Houston, I, 47; exchange of letters between Watterson and, 53, 54; coached by House on handling conventions, 63,

- 65, 66; and McAdoo, trouble between, 71-73, 76, 77, 84; willing to endorse bosses, 73-75; praised for results of election, 82; his claim to office, 89, 96-98; his capacity distrusted by Wilson, 89; beset by office-seekers, 96; his testimony to characteristic of Wilson, 101; 'Damon' in the Wilson-House cypher, 115; Receiver of Customs in San Domingo appointed through influence of, 178 *n.*; and the Ambassadorship to France, 184; declines to serve in 1916 as National Democratic Chairman, II, 347, 348; letter of Wilson to, accepting his withdrawal from Chairmanship, 349; and party machinery, 358.
- McCormick, Vance, declines Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee, II, 351, 352; accepts Chairmanship, 354; talks with House on election prospects, 373; in 1916 campaign, 376, 381.
- McDonald, Captain Bill, Ranger, I, 20-23; as guard for Wilson, 79, 80; returns to Texas, 80, 81; always goes straight toward the point of danger, 152.
- Letters:* to House, Oct. 16, 1912, I, 79; Feb. 6, 1915, 360.
- Macfarlane, Peter Clark, originator of the appellation 'Silent Partner,' I, 115 *n.*
- McGuire, Mrs., I, 421.
- Mack, Norman, I, 80.
- McKenna, Reginald, Chancellor of the Exchequer, his interviews with House, I, 465; II, 123, 124.
- McKenna, Mrs., II, 123.
- McKinley, William, President, his way of providing Senate vacancy for Mark Hanna, I, 89.
- McKinney, Captain, of the Rangers, I, 22.
- McLemore. *See* Gore-McLemore resolution.
- McReynolds, James C., considered for Cabinet position, I, 90, 97; information concerning, gathered by House, 91; his appointment to Cabinet urged by House, 107; determined upon for Attorney-General, 109; appointed Attorney-General, 113; 'Coke' in the Wilson-House cypher, 115; on the President's failure to confide in others, 127; an eccentricity of, 141; consultations of, with House, 141, 142; his opinion of Solicitor-General Davis, II, 10.
- Letter:* to House, May 11, 1914, I, 141.
- Madison, James, and the War of 1812, I, 303, 304.
- Mail seizures, irritation caused by American counter-protest to Allied explanation of, II, 307-10, 315.
- Malone, Dudley, I, 147; II, 354, 444; agrees to work for conversion of O'Gorman on Panama tolls question, I, 203, 204; meets House on return from Europe, II, 5; takes measures to protect interned ships, 435; tells of Bernstorff's departure, 446.
- Malone, William, manager of House's farms, I, 19.
- Manchester Guardian*, on Wilson's address to the Senate, Jan. 22, 1917, II, 419.
- Manila, well fortified, I, 297.
- Mantoux, Captain, II, 83 *n.*
- Marble, John H., for Interstate Commerce Commission, I, 115; certain facts given by, misleading, 130.
- de Margerie, Jaquin, I, 395, 397, 398.
- Marina*, the, sinking of, II, 390.
- Mark Twain. *See* Clemens, Samuel L.
- Marlborough, Duchess of, I, 389.
- Martin, Edward S., editor of *Life*, letter of House to, quoted, I, 43; present at dinner arranged by House for meeting of Wilson and Houston, 47; in the Harvey-Wilson controversy, 53, 54; at lunch with House, 98; his humor and good sense, 120; gives advice as to 'Philip Dru,' 155; House expounds his creed about international morals to, 294, 295; King George interested in hearing of, II, 190; mentioned, I, 388, 418.
- Letters:* to House, 1914, I, 131; Feb. 10, 1915, 134; May 11, 132; May 18, 131; Oct. 21, 136; Nov. 8, 1916, II, 382.
- Maxse, L. J., of the *National Review*, I, 421.
- Mazzini, Guisepppe, Wilson compared to, II, 470.
- Merchantmen, the disarming of, the issue of, II, 192, 209-19; President asks Congress for power to arm, 454, 455; action of Congress on bill to arm, 456-58; armed by executive authority, 458.
- Mercier, Cardinal, II, 166.
- Mersey, Lord, I, 428.
- Mexico, British and American policies in, I, 194; discussed by House and Grey, 195, 196; discussed by House and Tyrrell, 198-200; discussed by Wilson and Tyrrell, 200, 201; British coöperation in American policy in, 202; American policy in, connected with repeal of Panama tolls exemption clause, 204-06; Wilson refuses to intervene in, 207; continued attacks on American lives and property in, 219; House's suggestion for solving the question of, 219, 222; proposed commission form of government for, 220; Wilson's picture of

- conditions in, 220, 221; meeting of South American diplomatic representatives to discuss settlement of affairs of, 223; conference of leaders in, called, 223; Carranza régime recognized as *de facto* government in, 224; new crisis in affairs with, 230, 231; Wilson slow to act in problem of, II, 18 *n.*, 19; Germany suggests to England interference in, 28; Hughes speaks in regard to, 366; Germany attempts to arrange alliance with, 451-54.
- Mezes, Sidney, I, 388.
- Miller, A. C., considered for Federal Reserve Board, I, 169; offered post in Board, 171, 172.
- Minnesota, in 1916 election, II, 382.
- Minto, Lord, II, 185.
- Missouri, feeling about War in, II, 467.
- Mitchel, J. P., Mayor of New York, II, 11.
- Mitchell, John, President of Federation of Miners, I, 130.
- Mobile address, of President, II, 298.
- von Moltke, Count, talks with House, I, 248, 250; II, 137.
- von Moltke, Countess, Dorothy, I, 250.
- Letter:* to House, Oct. 7, 1914, I, 336.
- Monroe Doctrine, and South America, House's views of, I, 191, 211, 212; desire of Argentina to transform, 215; and A. B. C. Powers, 221; understanding in regard to, planned by House, for United States, Great Britain, and Germany, 239; cursed by Germans, II, 28. *See* Pan-American Pact.
- Montenegro, surrender of, II, 149-51.
- Morgan, J. P., opposed to Wilson, I, 51, 52.
- Morgan, J. P., Jr., his currency plan, I, 161.
- Morgenthau, Henry, suggested for Turkey, I, 96; in Turkey, II, 160; approves of McCormick as Chairman of Democratic National Committee, 351; discusses election prospects with House, 373.
- Morley, Lord, I, 460.
- Morris, Ambassador to Sweden, correspondence of, with House, I, 184, 185.
- Morton, Senator Oliver P., I, 13.
- Morton, Oliver T., I, 13.
- Mueller, Paul F., of the *Abendpost*, Chicago, II, 250, 251.
- Müller, Dr., Brazilian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I, 232.
- Munitions of war, proposal for government ownership of, I, 209, 210; American sale of, to the Allies, 336, 343-47, 355, 377, 404, 411, 413, 414, 468; II, 14, 23, 27, 33, 101.
- Münster, Prince, I, 247, 248.
- Murphy, Charles F., Tammany boss, I, 73-75.
- Naon, Ambassador of Argentina, House's Pan-American Pact proposed to, I, 212, 213; enthusiastic over House's proposition, 215; suggestion of, accepted by President, 216; approves revised Pact, 226; desires temporary delay in Pact, 231, 232.
- Napoleon, and Austria's offer of mediation, II, 85 *n.*
- Nation*, London, article on House in, II, 197.
- Nelson, Colonel, of the *Kansas City Star*, I, 136.
- Neutral shipping, British interference with, I, 303-16; II, 57-62, 70-80, 131-34, 284; increased restriction on, 304, 311. *See* Blockade, Contraband, Freedom of the Seas.
- New Hampshire, in the 1916 election, II, 369, 370.
- New Mexico, reconquest of, by Mexico, planned, II, 452.
- New York (City), Democratic rally in, in 1916 campaign, II, 374-77.
- New York (State), goes Republican in 1916 election, II, 377, 382, 383.
- Newton, Whitney, college friend of House, I, 24.
- Nixon, Lewis, in the *Herald's* advance list of Cabinet appointees, I, 113.
- Norris, Edward L., in the *Herald's* advance list of Cabinet appointees, I, 113.
- Northcliffe, Lord, demands seizure of neutral vessels carrying reservists or contraband cargoes, I, 305; talks with House on the War, 421; sends Brooks to America, II, 95; talks rather foolishly about War, 125.
- Northcliffe, Lady, II, 125.
- O. Henry. *See* Porter, Sidney.
- Obregon, I, 223, 224.
- Observer*, London, article on House in, II, 198.
- O'Gorman, Senator J. A., I, 74; opposed to repeal of Panama tolls exemption clause, 203, 204; regards himself as an Irishman contending against England, 203.
- O'Leary, Jeremiah, anti-British agitator, reply of Wilson to offensive letter of, II, 374, 375 *n.*
- Olney, Richard, considered for Federal Reserve Board, I, 170; offered post on Board, 171, 172; refuses post on Board, 172; representative of Wilson's first choices for foreign posts, 177; refuses Ambassadorship to Great Britain, 180; regrets not having accepted the Ambassadorship to Great Britain, 283.
- Orduna*, the, sinking of, II, 33.

- Owen, Senator R. L., and currency reform, I, 162, 165, 166.
- Pacifists, II, 93-97.
- Pact of London, II, 272.
- Paderewski, I. J., II, 339.
- Page, Arthur W., cablegram sent to House through, I, 305, 309.
- Page, Thomas Nelson, I, 99, 423; considered for Italian and French posts, 180, 183; writes in appreciation of House's kindness, 184; in London, 266; tells House of attitude of mind in Italy, 412; urges House to go to Rome, II, 148, 160; reports to House on conditions in Italy, 150-53; sends confidential letters to House, 157.
- Letter:* to House, Feb. 1, 1916, II, 150.
- Page, Walter H., at dinner arranged by House for meeting of Wilson and Houston, I, 47; talks with House on Cabinet appointments, 102; considered for the Cabinet, 109, 110; his opinion of the Cabinet, 113; thinks that the President is not paying enough attention to business men, 127; why sent to England, 135; given no special instructions when appointed to England, 176; first suggested by House for English post, 180; accepts English post, 180, 181; pleased at Bryan's attitude, 182; correspondence of, with House, 185; his relations with House, 187, 188; on difficulties of taking a duchess or royalty out to dinner, 188; asks House for assistance in formulating constructive policy, 188; wins respect and regard of British people and Government, 189; subject to moods, 189; galled by difficulties of position, 189; his opinion of Bryan's conduct of State Department, 189, 190; shows importance of repeal of Panama tolls exemption, 193; at luncheon with House and Grey, 194; discusses international understanding with House, 240, 241; remarks of, on the Kaiser and on Grey, 241; praises House's work in Germany, 259; on House's plan of international understanding, 267; issues announcement to the press concerning efforts of United States to avert war, 280; thankful we can keep out of the War, 286; places great value on Anglo-American friendship, 304, 305; presents American protests with too little emphasis to suit American Government, 304; his view of British interference with neutral trade, 304-06, 309, 310; State Department has difficulty in impressing its point of view on, 308-13, 316; irritated at the State Department, 310-12; his leaning toward expression of unneutral feeling, 312; warned against expression of unneutral feeling, 312, 344 *n.*; misreading of the future and prescience displayed in his letters, 333-35; in conference with House and Grey, 367-69; liked by House, 389; regards intervention as inevitable as result of sinking of *Lusitania*, unless Germany yields, 433, 442; distressed at Wilson's Philadelphia speech, 438; expresses satisfaction with *Lusitania* note, 439; does not approve proposal that England give up blockade, 444-47, 449; his influence lessened by pro-Ally emotion, 456; on Bryan's resignation, II, 8, 9; writes of increasing resentment in Allied countries against Wilson, 71, 122; shows lack of sympathy with Wilson's policies, 99, 268, 269; asks what the United States wishes Great Britain to do, 124; does not approve House's mission to Germany, 135, 136; does not wish to participate in peace negotiations, 177, 178; epitomizes gist of British opinion, 203, 204; disapproves of disarming merchantmen, 215; on the determination of the Allies to fight to the collapse of Germany, 256, 257; House critical of, 268; recalled, 313, 314; criticizes Lansing, 318, 319; on the British irritation with United States, 319; strained relations between British and Americans attributed to, 320; on Wilson's political strength, 343; talks with Lord Cecil on Germany's peace proposal, 402, 403; asserted that dismissal of Bernstorff would end the War, 440; writes on British disappointment of American delay in declaring war, 459.
- Letters:* to Bryan, Jan. 15, 1915, I, 354; — to House, July 8, 1913, I, 197; Aug. 28, 193; Dec. 20, 173; Sept. 15, 1914, 333; Sept. 22, 334; Nov. 9, 309, 334; Dec. 12, 310; Dec. 15, 312; June 10, 1915, II, 8; July 21, 57; May 23, 1916, 256, 343; May 30, 301; June 16, 257, 311; March 9, 1917, 459; — to Lansing, Oct. 18, 1916, II, 323.
- Page, Mrs. W. H., her success as Ambassador, I, 189.
- Paget, General Sir Arthur, I, 421; tells of visit to Russia, 422.
- Paget, Lady, I, 383, 389, 421; II, 126, 185; loyal to her country, 193, 194.
- Paine, Albert Bigelow, and Captain Bill McDonald, I, 20-22.
- Paish, Sir George, I, 260.
- Palmer, A. Mitchell, invited to Trenton by Wilson, I, 99; refuses Secretaryship

- of War, 108; in the *Herald's* advance list, of Cabinet appointees, 113; consults House, 129, 130.
- Panama Canal, near completion, I, 297.
- Panama tolls exemption, views of Wilson and House on, I, 192-94; in the Congress, 193 n.; repeal of, helped along by Cabinet members, 193 n.; discussed by House and Grey, 195-97; discussed by House and Tyrrell, 200; discussed by Wilson and Tyrrell, 201; Spring-Rice leaves its determination in American hands, 202, 203; repeal of, 203-06; President's position in War strengthened by repeal of, 206.
- Pan-American Pact, as proposed by House, I, 209, 210; Article X of Covenant of League of Nations compared with, 209, 210; II, 298; acquiesced in, by Bryan, I, 210, 211; proposed to Ambassadors of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 212-14; answers of Powers to, 214-18; not pushed by Wilson and Bryan, 221-23; II, 18, 19; pushed by Lansing, I, 225; as revised, 225, 226, 233, 234; attitude of Chile on revised form of, 226, 227, 230; gist of, publicly stated by President, 227; discussed by House and Señor Eduardes, Chilean Minister to Great Britain, 227; approved by Great Britain, 227-29; fails of completion, 232; the prototype of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 232.
- Pan-American policy, of House, I, 207-11. See Pan-American Pact.
- von Papen, Franz, German military attaché, II, 39; sent home, 47.
- Paris Peace Conference, I, 427, 427 n.
- Parker, Judge, I, 80.
- Passow, Captain F. M., of the *St. Paul*, II, 4.
- Peabody, George Foster, letter of, to House, Dec. 16, 1914, I, 301.
- Peace Conference, House begins to lay plans for, I, 426-28; House's idea of, II, 82-86; House proposes plan of, to Grey, 90, 91; Grey's answer to plan of, 97, 98; House leaves for Europe to further plan for, 112; conversations of House in England in furtherance of, 170-85; memorandum on, 194-96, 200-02; accepted by President, 200-04; could have been called by United States if we had been prepared, 231 n.; Allies not ready for, 219, 220, 233, 259, 262, 270, 281-83, 288, 289; again proposed by House, 278, 279, 285-88.
- Peace Conference of 1919, I, 462 n.
- Penfield, Frederic C., Ambassador to Austria, correspondence of, with House, I, 184, 185; confers with House, II, 148-50, 160; receives apology from Austrian Government for cartoon of Wilson, 268.
- Letter*: to House, June 5, 1916, II, 253.
- Pershing, John J., leads punitive expedition into Mexico, I, 231; II, 227 n.
- Persia, as to giving Germany zone of influence in, I, 246, 260.
- Persia*, the, sinking of, II, 116, 116 n.
- Phelan, approved by Bryan for Cabinet, I, 104.
- 'Philip Dru: Administrator,' novel by House, I, 152-58; II, 379.
- Philippines, the, conditions in, I, 135.
- Phillips, William, positions held by, I, 178, 307 n.; House meets British Ambassador at house of, 307, 307 n., 314, 341, 351, 357; II, 75, 78; has conversation with House, I, 315; on Davis for position of Counsellor of the State Department, II, 9, 10; criticizes Spring-Rice, 321; wonders at House's activities, 444; brings messages to House, 460.
- Pichon, Stephen, editor of *Petit Journal*, II, 161.
- Pinchot, Amos, pacifist, II, 445.
- Plunkett, Sir Horace, on the alliance of House and Wilson, I, 44; beginning of his friendship with House, 144, 145; in America, 145, 146; sees House in England, 260; at Lord and Lady Paget's dinner, 421; arranges for House to meet Lloyd George, 454; informs House by wireless of Bryan's resignation, II, 5; his estimate of British opinion, 66; on the probable result should America enter the War, 68; his eulogy of House, 115 n.; on the misunderstandings of Wilson's policy, 260; on the Irish situation, 317; friend of Balfour, 398; disturbed at Wilson's peace note, 407; on belligerents' state of mind, 409; mentioned, 266.
- Letters*: to House, Oct. 16, 1913, I, 145; Aug. 23, 1915, II, 66; Oct. 1, 68; March 7, 1916, 271; June 7, 301; — to Wilson, June 4, 1915, I, 470.
- Poincaré, President Raymond, interviews of House with, I, 415-17; II, 160.
- Poland, attacked by Germans, I, 320; failure of German attack on, 366; Russians driven out of, 415; question of nationalization of, II, 181.
- Polk, Frank L., Under-Secretary of State, I, 231; corporation Counsel of New York, II, 11; selected as Counsellor for the State Department, 11, 12; realizes difficulty of avoiding rupture with Germany, 40; approves House's peace plan, 86; on trade questions, 100; ad-

- vises that President obtain authority from Congress to take retaliatory measures on Allies, 315; conferences of House with, 321, 327; on irritation of British over exploit of German submarine U-53, 322; smoothes over incident of U-53, 324-26; considered as Chairman of Democratic National Committee in 1916, 349-51; approves of McCormick as Chairman, 351, 353; approves of plan for Wilson's resignation in case of Hughes's election, 379; talks with House about current affairs (March 10, 1917), 444; anxious about Swiss-German move for reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Germany, 447; tells of conditions at Washington, 450; informs House of German-Mexican alliance, 451; discusses with House pending matters (April 1, 1917), 467.
Letters: to House, July 22, 1916, II, 312; Oct. 19, 325.
- Pollen, A. H., on the British paper blockade, I, 459; mentioned, II, 122, 125.
- Pope, the, change of policy in Germany said to be due to, II, 38.
- Porter, Sidney (O. Henry), I, 20.
- Preparedness, attitude of Wilson and of House on, I, 296-302; II, 17-21; attitude of Bryan on, I, 299, 300; lack of, was the big mistake, II, 84, 289 *n.*, 389 *n.*; Wilson turns to, 84.
- Presidential term, question of a single, I, 95.
- Price, of the Washington *Siar*, I, 166.
- Progressive Party, Convention of, I, 67; as organization, destroyed by Roosevelt, II, 346.
- Progressives, the, in 1916, II, 344-46; capture of, for the Democratic Party, planned by House, 344, 347, 354; offer nomination to Roosevelt, 354; turn from Hughes, 368-70.
- Pulitzer, Ralph, II, 443.
- Quincy, Josiah, I, 162, 163.
- Railroad situation, the, in March, 1914, I, 133.
- van Rappard, Dutch Minister to United States, gives reason why Wilson's appeal to neutrals met with no response, II, 445, 446.
- Rathenau, Dr., I, 402, 403, 405.
- Rathom, John R., II, 345.
- Reading, Lord, II, 124; talks with House on armed merchantmen, 73-75; House dines with, 126; arranges for meeting of House and Lloyd George, 169, 170; conference of, with House, Grey, Asquith, Balfour, and Lloyd George (Feb. 14, 1916), 179-82; calls on House, 184; a special messenger, 196, 196 *n.*; on Wiseman's name, 399.
- Reagan, John H., withdraws from candidacy for nomination for Governorship of Texas, I, 30.
- 'Reasonable terms,' agreed upon by Grey and House for settlement of War, II, 170 *n.*
- Redfield, W. C., in Wilson's Cabinet, I, 113; consults House, 139.
- Redmond, Mrs. Henry, II, 434.
- Reed, Senator James A., delays currency bill, I, 164.
- Reinach, Joseph, House lunches with, I, 420; has conversation with House II, 161; impressed by House's remarks, 162.
- Repington, Colonel, II, 185.
- Republican Party, split in 1912, I, 67, 68; nominates Hughes in 1916, II, 346; campaign of, 368-73.
- Reventlow, II, 14, 25.
- Review*, Atlantic City, comments on House, II, 113, 114.
- Rhineland, secret treaty between Russia and France concerning, II, 290.
- Richardson, Second Secretary of T. N. Page, II, 157.
- Ridder, Herman, of the *Staats-Zeitung*, II, 444.
- von Rintelin, Franz, secret service agent, II, 105.
- Roberts, Chalmers, I, 389.
- Roberts, Elmer, II, 264.
- Robins, Elizabeth, II, 264.
- Roosevelt, Theodore, nominated for the Presidency by the Progressive Party in 1912, I, 67; attempted assassination of, 77-79; defeated in election, 81; insists that responsibility must accompany power, 235; takes part in Algierais Conference, 236; and the Kaiser, 243-45, 254; subject of conversation between House and Herrick, 259; lunches with House, 260; congratulates the country on being able to be neutral, 286; his visit to the New Forest with Grey, 371; insists on our breaking with Germany after sinking of *Lusitania*, 439; bitter against the President, II, 95, 203; General Staff opposed to, 232 *n.*; refuses Progressive nomination in 1916, 346; leaves no doubt of his attitude toward Germany and the Allies, 371.
- Root, Elihu, his instructions to delegates to Hague Conference, I, 407; candidate for nomination to the Presidency, II, 345, 346.
- Roper, Daniel C., in charge of organization of Democratic campaign in 1916, II, 358, 360, 373, 374, 381.

- Ruble, George, in the 1916 election, II, 369, 370.
- Rumania, her course undecided, I, 300, 362, 363; bargains to enter the War on the side of Allies, 462; in the Peace Conference of 1919, 462 *n.*; consents to allow grain to be exported to Germany and Austria, II, 25; negotiates with Central Powers, 81; enters War, 248; invaded, 248.
- Runciman, Mr., II, 123, 124.
- Rural Credits Bill, II, 344, 366.
- Russia, reconciliation of, with Great Britain, I, 236; had no written agreement with England or France, 263, 278; military development the order of the day in, 238; mobilization of, 276; domination of Europe by, feared by House, 318; and Constantinople, 355, 363, 393; her difficulty one of transportation, 363; General Paget tells of visit to, 422; danger of her making a separate peace, II, 121, 129, 157, 174, 175, 258, 259; secret treaty of, with France, 290.
- Russian Revolution, II, 292.
- Russians, devastate East Prussia, I, 320; driven back by Hindenburg, 320, 365; driven out of Poland, 415; of revolutionary tendency, sent back to Russia by Germans, II, 26; defeats of, 80, 248.
- Russo-Japanese War, II, 191.
- Salandra, Premier of Italy, I, 412; II, 150.
- Sale, George, letter of, to House, Feb. 2, 1916, II, 263.
- Saloniki, II, 248.
- Sammons, Edward, secretary of House, I, 18, 19; expert accountant, 31.
- San Domingo, Receiver of Customs in, appointed through influence of McCombs, I, 178.
- Sargent, John, I, 260.
- Sayers, Joseph D., supported by House in campaign for Governorship of Texas, I, 29, 32-34.
- Schiff, Jacob, I, 165, 166.
Letter: to House, Dec. 23, 1913, I, 174.
- Schrippenfest*, the, I, 252, 252 *n.*, 253.
- von Schwimmer, II, 96.
- 'Scrap of paper,' I, 293; von Bethmann-Hollweg's explanation of, II, 139, 140.
- Selenka, Frau, II, 96.
- Senate, resolution of, on treatment of Irish prisoners, II, 317, 318; action of, on bill to arm merchantmen, 456, 457.
- Serbia, and Bulgaria, differences between, I, 362, 363; her claim to part of the Banat of Temesvar, 462 *n.*, 463; German attack upon, II, 25, 25 *n.*; invaded by Germans and Austrians, 42; conquest of, 80.
- Shakespeare, William, I, 120.
- Sharp, William G., Ambassador to France, I, 418; II, 158, 161; on good feeling resulting from House's visit to Paris, 163; appointed and confirmed before the War began, 366.
Letter: to House, June 2, 1915, I, 440.
- Sharp, Mrs., I, 418; II, 158, 161.
- Shearn, Clarence, I, 147.
- Sherman, Senator John, his appointment as Secretary of State, I, 89, 89 *n.*
- Shipping Bill, I, 134.
- Sill, Edward, his 'A Fool's Prayer,' I, 120, 121.
- Simmons, considered for Federal Reserve Board, I, 169.
- Sixtus of Bourbon, Prince, engages in secret negotiations with French and Belgians for separate peace with Austria, II, 449 *n.*
- Skinner, Mr., American Consul, II, 123.
- Smith, Hoke, I, 101; has interview with House, 94; invited to Trenton by Wilson, 99; mouthpiece of Southern cotton-growers, 70.
- Solf, Minister for the Colonies, I, 405; II, 424; the fairest and broadest of all the German officials, I, 138; tells House of the controversy between the Chancellor and Tirpitz, 138.
- Somme, the, the Allies on, II, 248, 391 *n.*; and Verdun, French worn out by battles of, 409.
- Sonnino, Baron, II, 150.
- South African War, II, 142.
- South America, and the Monroe Doctrine, House's views concerning, I, 191, 211, 212; German exploitation of, suggested by House, 239, 246; Ambassadors in, under Wilson, 365. *See* Pan-American Pact.
- Spain, Willard tells House of conditions in, I, 413; king of, wishes to take part in peace negotiations, 413, 419; king of, wishes to meet House, 419.
- Spender, of the *Westminster Gazette*, II, 125.
- Speyer, James, I, 239, 240.
Letter: to House, March 12, 1914, I, 132.
- Spoils system, Wilson opposed to, I, 177.
- Sprague, Professor O. M. W., his review of Paul Warburg's criticism of the Glass-Owen bill, I, 163.
- Spring-Rice, Sir Cecil, relations of House with, I, 190; illness of, 198, 199; II, 78; leaves Panama tolls question in American hands, I, 202, 203; approves House's plan of international coöperation, 264; prepares memorandum for Grey on House's proposal, 265, 266; suggests that House's efforts may have

- precipitated crisis, 280, 281; hopes that United States will keep out of War, 286; and House, straighten out undiplomatic despatch of State Department, 307, 308; II, 107; and the State Department, I, 313-16; his nervousness, 314, 315, 462; II, 57, 76, 78, 99, 100, 102; House tries to arrange meeting between Bernstorff and, I, 324-33; his letters to House, 316 *n.*; confers with House on peace proposal, 341-43, 351; fosters sentiment that Wilson is pro-German, 462; II, 7; telegraphs Grey on shipping, 71; has quarrel with House, 75-78; tries to smooth over difficulties between Great Britain and United States, 78; difficult to negotiate with, 99; compliments House, 108; in an amiable mood, 109; felt to be incalculable, 109; House advised by Bryce with regard to, 133; out of sympathy with Wilson, 266; regards blacklisting order as a blunder, 313; Lansing's opinion of, 319; strained relations between British and Americans attributed to, 320; House smooths matters out with, 321; views exploit of German submarine U-53 calmly, 322; should have been recalled by Grey, 397; gives encouragement and help to Wiseman, 400.
- Letters:* to Grey, Oct., 1915, II, 71; — to House, Sept. 24, 1914, I, 331; Nov. 5, 313; undated, 316, 328.
- Spring-Rice, Lady, I, 199.
- Squier, Colonel George O., his diary, I, 339.
- Stamfordham, Lord, I, 385, 386; II, 126, 190.
- State Department. *See* United States.
- Steed, Henry Wickham, quoted, I, 427 *n.*
- Stetson, Francis Lynde, I, 148.
- Stone, Senator W. J., machine politician, I, 84; becomes friend of President, 204; sympathetic to Pan-American Pact, 216, 217; letter of Wilson to, on yielding American right to travel on high seas, II, 216, 217; his helpful attitude toward Wilson's address to Senate, 416, 417; called by President to Washington, 441; opposes bill to arm merchantmen, 456; fights all measures seeming to endanger peaceful relations with Germany, 456.
- Stovall, Minister, I, 399, 400.
- Strachey, St. Loe, II, 122, 126.
- Letter:* to House, June 1, 1915, I, 446.
- Straight, Willard, conveys information from House to Delcassé, I, 397.
- Straus, Oscar, engages in peace discussions with Bernstorff, I, 324.
- Suarez, Chilean Ambassador, House's Pan-American Pact proposed to, I, 213, 214; answer of, to proposal, 216, 218; delay caused by, 221; and the revised Pact, 226, 230.
- Letter:* to House, Jan. 19, 1915, I, 218.
- Submarine, Germany decides to utilize, I, 366, 376; meaning to Great Britain of introduction of, 406; and blockade, proposed compromise on, 443-53; and armed merchantmen, II, 192, 209-19; warnings of unrestricted campaign of, 328-34; Germany threatens conditionally unrestricted warfare of, 334-36; Germany decides definitely for recommencement of unrestricted warfare of, 427-29; announcement of withdrawal of Germany's pledge in regard to, 431. *See* U-53.
- Sullivan, Jerry, I, 130.
- Sulzer, William, nominated for Governor of New York, I, 75.
- Sumner, William Graham, quoted, I, 238.
- Sussex*, the, torpedoed, II, 225; as to the Commander of the submarine that torpedoed, 252.
- Swiss Minister, proposes negotiations to reestablish diplomatic relations with Germany, II, 447.
- Syria, secret treaty between Great Britain and France concerning, 290.
- Taft, William H., nominated for the Presidency, I, 67; defeated in election, 81; favors single Presidential term, 95; approves *Lusitania* note, 439; Secretary of League to Enforce Peace, II, 294.
- Tammany, offer of, to Texas delegation to Baltimore Convention, I, 61; supports Clark in Convention, 67; attitude of Wilson toward, 73; makes trouble, 73-75; House's attitude toward, 74-76; Wilson saved by House from quarrelling with, 75, 76; in the 1916 election, II, 373, 374.
- Tanks, II, 188 *n.*
- Tariff Bill, I, 116, 151, 158, 173.
- Tarnowski, Count, Austrian Ambassador in Washington, hopes of securing peace through, II, 448-50; not permitted to present credentials, 450.
- Tarver, George, brother of, I, 22.
- Temps*, the, on House, II, 155.
- Texas, Rangers, I, 20-25; progressive movement in, 35; organized for Wilson, 56-58; delegation of, in Baltimore Convention, 63, 66; reconquest of, by Mexico, planned, II, 452.
- Thayer, William Roscoe, on the appointment of Senator Sherman to the Secretaryship of State, I, 89 *n.*
- Thompson, Jim, I, 23.

- Thompson, Samuel Huston, of the Department of Justice, I, 350.
- Thomson, T. A., plans for handling Baltimore Convention, I, 63, 65.
- von Tirpitz, Admiral, a reactionary, I, 242, 244; talks with House, 248-51; dislikes the British, 250, 251; his views on international matters, 250, 251; grateful for the opportunity of meeting House, 270; influence of, 392, 414; and the Foreign Office, the feeling not good between, 469; his struggle with Chancellor, II, 12-15, 23; 25, 37, 38, 138, 146, 147, 221, 328-34; harm done to Germany by, 95; watched as a spy, 105; his responsibility for German frightfulness, 138; resigns, 221-23.
- Transylvanian forelands, the, I, 462.
- Treaties, inviolability of, Wilson and Grey in agreement upon, I, 200, 201; signed by Russians, British, and French, II, 87; secret, 290.
- Treaty of London, I, 412 n., 443 n.
- von Trentler, Prussian Minister to Bavaria, II, 331.
- Tribune*, New York, on Wilson's leadership in carrying through currency reforms, I, 166; article on House in, II, 198; cable of Garvin on House in, 199.
- Trieste, II, 291 n.
- Trinity and Brazos Valley Railway, I, 18, 19.
- Triple Entente, the, I, 236, 237.
- Tripp, Guy, II, 31.
- Troubetskoy, Prince Paul, and wife, I, 247.
- Trumbull, Frank, I, 130; tells of opposition of Wall Street to Wilson, II, 342; dinner with, 434, 435.
- Trusts, legislation controlling, I, 152.
- Tuck, Mr. and Mrs., I, 419.
- Tumulty, Joseph P., secretary of Wilson, I, 66; telephones about interview of Wilson and Bryan, 98; wishes to be Secretary to the President, 99; as Cabinet possibility, 104; suggests Garrison as Secretary of War, 111; has talk with House, 223; approves President's statement about 'a little group of wilful men,' II, 457.
- Turkey, the partitioning of, II, 181, 181 n.
- Tyrol, the, II, 291 n.
- Tyrell, Sir William, his mission to the United States, I, 197-201; discusses international cooperation with House, 242, 243; advises House to secure audience with the Kaiser, 242, 243; likens the Kaiser to Roosevelt, 243; talks with House in England, 260, 262-67; approves House's plan of international cooperation, 264, 273; confers with House, 367-70; believes that Great Britain will agree that all shipping be immune, 369, 370, 407; sent to help Spring-Rice, II, 78.
- U-53, German submarine, exploit of, II, 322; feeling in Great Britain over exploit of, 322-26; incident of, smoothed over by Polk, 324-26.
- Underwood, Oscar W., I, 101; and the 1912 nomination, 48, 50-52, 58-63, 66, 84; made by Wilson an exception to most party leaders, 102.
- United States, the Government of, a 'negative' government, I, 156; II, 379; in conjunction with South American states, tries to settle Mexican affairs, I, 223, 224; isolation of, from European politics, cannot be maintained indefinitely, 233; abstention from political affairs of Europe traditional with, 235; had become a world power by the beginning of the twentieth century, 235, 236; Page issues announcement to press concerning efforts of, to avert war, 280; vitally concerned in preserving open routes to neutral countries, 303; an undiplomatic letter of the State Department, 307, 308; II, 108; State Department has difficulties in impressing its point of view on Page, I, 308-13, 316; a misunderstanding in the State Department, 311; the State Department and Spring-Rice, 313-16; German antagonism to, 336, 343-47, 355, 360, 377; order of State Department forbidding visiting or inspection of prison camps, 344-46; feeling in England turns against, 347-49, 360, 364; Government warns Germany in 'strict accountability' note, 366, 396; opinion in, toward the War and the quarrel with Germany, II, 48, 49, 60; State Department sends note (Oct. 21, 1915) to Great Britain on interference with trade, 70; resentment against, caused in Great Britain by note, 75; resentment of Spring-Rice against, 75-78; her neutral rights threatened by both sides, 80, 81; better understanding between Allies and, needed, 99-102; assistance of, must be to serve cause of permanent peace, 205; its action in disarming of merchantmen, 209-19; Allied public opinion, with reference to, 260-62, 264; the idealism of, impugned, 263; and mail seizures, 307-12; increased friction between Great Britain and, 316-28; documents breaking relations between Germany and, drafted, 435; breaks with Germany, 442; opinion

- crystallizes in, that war is necessary, 451; blockade of ships of, as result of submarine warfare, 454. *See* Neutral shipping.
- United States Steel Corporation, I, 123, 129.
- Uruguay, representative of, confers with other representatives for Mexican settlement, I, 223.
- Vanderlip, confers with House concerning currency reform, I, 161.
- Verdun, House prophesies German attack at, II, 179, 180; Germans attack at, 184 *n.*; defence of French at, 219, 234, 243, 271, 273, 277, 284, 391 *n.*; and Somme, French worn out by battles of, 409.
- Vick, Walter F., I, 96.
- Vigilancia*, the, sinking of, II, 453.
- Villa, murders American citizens, I, 230, 231.
- Voltaire, F. M. A., remark of, on history, I, 1.
- Wagoner, Senator, II, 375.
- Wald, Lilian, pacifist, II, 96, 445.
- Wall Street, opposed to Wilson, II, 342.
- Wallace, H. C., recommended by House for Secretaryship of War, I, 110; refuses Secretaryship of War, 111; talks with Bernstorff, 247; his memorandum of conversation with Bernstorff, 331, 332; agrees with House in *Lusitania* controversy, 161; suggests that House have his picture painted by Laszlo, 189; mentioned, 350, 454; II, 381, 384.
- War of 1812, the cause of, I, 303, 304, 405; II, 328.
- War of Jenkins' Ear, I, 408 *n.*
- Warburg, Paul, and the currency bill, I, 161, 163-65; offered post on Federal Reserve Board, 171, 172; pro-German in his sympathies, II, 445.
- Warren, Whitney, on feeling in France about Wilson, I, 440.
- Warsaw, II, 28.
- Washington, George, and Alexander Hamilton, I, 126.
- Watson, Archibald, I, 147.
- Watson, William, his 'Wordsworth's Grave,' I, 122.
- Watterson, Colonel Henry, has exchange of letters with McCombs, I, 53, 54; remark of, turned to Wilson's advantage by Gregory, 54; unable to coöperate successfully with Wilson, 127.
- Weekly Times*, Albany, article on House in, II, 197, 198.
- von Weigand, II, 443.
- Wheeler, Benjamin Ide, talks with House about the Kaiser, I, 244, 245; compares Roosevelt and the Kaiser, 244, 245.
- Wheeler, H. A., considered for Federal Reserve Board, I, 169; offered post on Board, 171, 172; unable to serve on Board, 172 *n.*
- White, Edward D., Chief Justice, has interview with House, I, 94, 95.
- White, Henry, II, 455.
- White, William Allen, on Wilson and the Democratic Party, II, 343, 344; on Hughes and the Progressives, 368, 369; on New Hampshire's vote in the 1916 election, 370.
- Whitehouse, Howard, talks with House, II, 184, 185; pleased with Wilson's address to the Senate (Jan. 22, 1917), 419.
- Whitlock, Brand, a friendly letter of, to House, I, 184; his account of conversation with Wilson, II, 50; House's comment on, 115; on Wilson's May 27 speech, 299.
- Wickersham, George W., letter of, to Martin, Feb. 3, 1914, I, 132.
- Wilbur, Consul-General, at Zurich, I, 400.
- Wilhelm II, of Germany, meeting of, with Gerard, I, 187; Page's criticism of, 241; and Roosevelt, 243-45, 254; his cruise to Norway arranged before the murder of the Archduke, 244 *n.*; subject of conversation between House and B. I. Wheeler, 244, 245; consents to private interview with House, 252; receives House at Potsdam, 253; conversation of House with, 254-57; enthusiastic about House, 270; 'German Emperor,' not 'Emperor of Germany,' 272 *n.*; House writes letter to, 272-74, 279, 280; criticized in Germany, 414; the Infanta Eulalia's views of, 419; kept in the background, II, 26, 32; Gerard's account of interview with, 102, 103; gossip concerning, 105, 138, 139; leaves things in hands of Hindenburg, 429.
- Willard, Daniel, of the Baltimore and Ohio, I, 130.
- Willard, Joseph E., Ambassador to Spain, correspondence of House with, I, 184, 185; tells House of state of mind in Spain, 413; House has conference with, 160, 161; mentioned, 419, 425; II, 160.
- Willart, of London *Times*, II, 442.
- Williams, opposition of Wall Street to, II, 342.
- Wilson, Huntington, criticized by von Bernstorff, I, 240.
- Wilson, Woodrow, House sees his availability for Presidential candidacy, I, 43, 44; his first meeting with House, 43-46; House attracted by his per-

sonal amiability, 45; his amenability to advice when Governor of New Jersey, 46, 62; meets Houston at dinner arranged by House, 47; his tariff speeches, 47; efforts to enlist Bryan in his support, 48-56; his remark as regards knocking Mr. Bryan into a cocked hat, 53-55; his controversy with Harvey, 53-55; Texas organized for, by House, 56-58; cheered by news from House regarding Texas, 58; advised by House to move cautiously, 61; nominated at Baltimore Convention, 67; refuses to support Tammany, 73-75; saved by House from quarrelling with Tammany, 75, 76; cancels speaking engagements after attempted assassination of Roosevelt, 77-79; Bill McDonald as guard for, 79, 80; elected President, 81, 82; his gratitude to House, 82; difficulties of his position, 83, 84; turns to House for assistance, 84; goes to Bermuda, 88, 90; assisted by House in drawing up tentative list of Cabinet positions, 88-90; form of salutation in his letters to House, 93, 117; opposed to single term for President, 93; follows suggestion of House in sending invitations, 99; offers House Cabinet position, 100; temperamentally unable to develop confidential relations with party leaders, 101; bitter feeling among party leaders at neglect by, 101, 102; does not ask Bryan's advice about Cabinet, 104; his Cabinet as finally fixed upon, 106-13; House his second personality, 114; his dependence upon House for advice, 114; his cypher with House, 115; his Silent Partner, 115; personal basis of House's relationship with, 116; his pleasure at letter of House on passage of Tariff Bill, 116; his friendship with House progressive and not dependent on physical propinquity, 117; House one of the few admitted to his family circle, 118; enjoys reading aloud, 118, 120, 122; his feeling of loneliness, 118; not elated at the accomplishment of an object, 119; on the force of public sentiment, 119; in sympathy with easy amendment of the Constitution, 119; his Princeton enemies, 119, 120; his opinion of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, 119; his belief that deep emotion is expressed in simple language, 119; has unsettled feeling of homelessness, 120; believes humor and good sense go together, 120; on being an editor of a daily paper, 120; enjoys *Punch*, 120; his consideration for others, 121; his simplicity, 121; his belief in the im-

portance of personal leadership, 121; a disciple of Burke and Bagehot, 121; his belief in the flexibility of political constitutions, 121, 122; on the right of secession, 122; entertained by House on visits to New York, 122, 123; his intellectual qualities rated high by House, 123, 124; 'dodges trouble,' 124; his prejudices intense, 124; his one-track mind, 124, 125; his casualness, 125; his speeches, 125; not a good 'mixer,' 125; showed disrespect for Senators, 125, 126; criticized for being aloof and self-confident, 126-28; his rating of Alexander Hamilton, 126; his burdens lightened by House, 128-30; complaints against, received by House, 130-36; the legislative problems confronting, 158; asserts his moral supremacy and party leadership, 158, 173; slow to develop a definite foreign policy, 176, 295; left Ambassadors to work out their own problems, 176; fought against spoils system in diplomatic posts, 177; discusses diplomatic appointments with House, 179, 180; selects Page for English post, 180, 181; does not lack authentic information of the political underworld in Europe, 185, 470, 471; his views on Panama tolls controversy, 192-94; his policy in Mexico felt to be hampered by British, 194; his policy discussed by House and Grey, 195, 196; receives Sir William Tyrrell, 200, 201; his policy in Mexico connected with repeal of Panama tolls exemption clause, 204-06; from his speech to Congress on repeal of exemption clause, 205; refuses to intervene in Mexico, 207, 220, 221; receives House's Pan-American Pact, 208-10; his picture of conditions in Mexico, 220, 221; fails to push the Pan-American Pact, 221-23; II, 18, 19; on the moral of the Mexican conference, I, 224; approves House's proposed visit to the Kaiser, 243, 247; pleased with House's conversation with the Kaiser, 258; his silence means consent, 265.

Difficulty of his position at the beginning of the War, 282; offers his services to the belligerents in the cause of mediation, 282, 283; his appeal for neutrality, 283, 284; criticized for not having adopted a positive policy, 285; impressed by President Eliot's suggestion of positive action in regard to the War, 287; his personal feeling opposed to the German attitude, 292, 293; looks upon the War as one which does not concern us closely in political sense,

294; feels that he has accomplished his great work, 295; lacking in appreciation of importance of European crisis, 296; cold as regards preparedness, 296, 298, 299; II, 17, 21; believes the United States should give an example of pacific idealism, I, 298; sees no need of reserve force, 298-300; his attitude on preparedness question approved in some quarters, 301; the price paid for his slowness in perceiving the need of preparation, 302; II, 17, 18, 289 *n.*; his comparison of the cause of the War of 1812 with the controversy in 1914 over contraband, I, 303, 304; understands importance of Anglo-American friendship, 304; his attitude on British interpretation of 'contraband,' 303-06; determines to send House on European mission, 316, 317; offers mediation to Germany, 321, 322; his appreciation of House's efforts for peace, 356-58; House's feeling as regards his going to Europe, 356, 357 *n.*; calls House his 'most trusted friend,' 358; his 'strict accountability' note, 366, 367, 396; thought in Europe to be pro-German, 416, 417; reads House's cable on sinking of *Lusitania* to Cabinet, 433, 461, 462; II, 5, 7; his words 'too proud to fight,' I, 438; his first *Lusitania* note, 438-41; makes proposal toward settling the submarine-and-blockade issue, 444-46; difficulties of, in connection with British interference with neutral trade, 457, 458; his motives for not joining the War after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, II, 1; his second *Lusitania* note, 2; retorts on Bryan in the Cabinet, 6; his opinion of Solicitor-General Davis, 10, 11; his letter to Senator Stone, refusing to approve Gore-McLemore resolution, 16 *n.*; advises House to talk with Bernstorff, 17, 27; unpreparedness weakens his protests to Germany, 17-19; House again takes up question of preparedness with, 17-21; constitutionally slow to act on doubtful questions, 18, 19, 51; again replies to Germany, 24; his warnings produce maximum of irritation and minimum of effect in Germany, 26, 27; asks advice of House in *Arabic* crisis, 29, 33, 34; House surprised at his attitude, 32; fears outbreak of German-Americans, 33, 34; takes first steps toward increase of the Navy, 35, 36; requests recall of Austrian Ambassador, 38, 39; perplexed by Bernstorff's attitude, 40; does not approve suggestion of rupture with Austria, 47; sends note

to Austria, 47; his patience commended by the press, 48; reasons for his policy of neutrality, 49-51; his sense of responsibility to public opinion in America and to mankind, 50, 51; his message to Congress, Dec. 7, 1915, quoted, 50; effect of his patience on Allied peoples, 51; attitude of Allied statesmen toward his position, 52; Bryce on confidence of the American people in, 64; Plunkett's opinion of, 66; demands preparation, 84; as to his uncertainty whether to take part in War, 84; House lays peace plan before, 84, 85; approves House's letter to Grey proposing peace plan, 90; inserts word 'probably' in letter of House to Grey engaging us conditionally to join Allies, 91 *n.*; begins to take interest in world problems, 91; criticized by both sides, 92, 93; convinced better understanding with Allies impossible through Ambassadors, 99, 101, 102; sees no value in change of Ambassadors, 101, 102; decides to send House abroad, 101, 102; irritated with diplomats at Washington, 109; his guarantees for future peace of the world, 110; cables willingness to coöperate in policy seeking permanent peace, 117; House reports to, 199; gratitude of, 200; with House draws up cable to Grey approving peace memorandum, 200-02; inserts word 'probably' in memorandum, 200, 201, 201 *n.*, 202; significance of the offer made by, to Allied Governments, 203, 204; terms on which he offers American help, 205, 206; his attitude toward disarming of merchantmen, 215, 216; insists on right of Americans to travel on high seas, 216, 217; letter of, to Senator Stone, 216, 217; to blame for allowing controversy over disarming of merchantmen to come up, 218, 219; his attitude toward sinking of *Sussex*, 226, 227; cannot realize necessity of preparation to meet crisis, 227; advised by House to take decisive action, 227-31; helps prepared despatch for Grey as regards offer of intervention, 231, 231 *n.*; discusses note to Germany with House, 235, 236; sends note to Germany, 238; sends second note to Germany, 244, 245; succeeds in preserving peace out of *Sussex* crisis, 245-47; not so convinced as House of necessity of standing by Allies, 250; cartoons of, in Austria, 251, 268; his speech delivered before League to enforce Peace (May 27, 1916), 253, 253 *n.*, 254, 293-98, 355; Allied suspicion of, 260, 265, 266; what

his policy accomplished for the Allies, 260-62; his claim to represent idealists, 263; inadequate reports of his speeches abroad, 267, 268; thinks of having Page come home for a vacation, 269; approves House's new appeal to Grey, 278; advocates creation of League of Nations in speech of May 27, 1916, 293-98; letter of, May 16, having bearing on speech of May 27, 296, 296 *n.*; comparison of his May 27 speech with House's draft, 297, 337, 338; his Mobile address, 298; reception of his May 27 speech, 299-304; his use of unfortunate phrases, 299, 299 *n.*, 393, 394, 404, 416, 420; does not study European opinion, 303; distrusts Allied motives, 304, 389, 411, 434; disturbed by British blacklisting order, 313; considers asking Congress for authority to prohibit loans and restrict exportations, 313; given power by Congress to take retaliatory measures, 315, 316; indifferent to warning of House, 316; his tendency to offend the Allies, 327; warns Germany of danger of submarine warfare along American coast, 334.

His interest in local situations, 340; prospects of his reelection, 341; strength of his position politically, 342, 343; wants Polk as chairman of Democratic National Committee, 349-51; his opinion of sort of man necessary for Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee, 353, 354; proposal that his May 27 speech be endorsed by St. Louis Convention, 356; House suggests topics for his speeches, 364-68, 372; at New York rally, 374-77; has acrimonious debate with House, 376; skeptical in regard to value of political organization, 376, 384; plans to resign immediately in case of Hughes's election, 380; election of, 381-85.

Willing to approve a stalemate in the War, 388, 389; summons House to discuss plan of mediation, 390; advised by House not to propose peace to the Allies, 390-95; his Scotch Presbyterian conscience, 393; sends peace note, 403-05; Germany's reply to his peace note, 405, 406, 425; answer of the Allies to his peace note, 406; intensification of his pacifism, 411; regards mandate of peace compelling, 411; says there will be no war (Jan. 4, 1917), 412; makes no move for immediate preparation (Nov., 1916), 412, 413; considers with House address to be delivered to Senate, 414-17; his Fourteen Points, 415 *n.*; reads message to Senate (Jan. 22, 1917), 417;

reception of his message to the Senate, 417-21; consults with House and Lansing, 438-42; effect on, of Bernstorff's announcement of ruthless submarine warfare, 438, 439; believes that Bernstorff should be given passports, 439; determined to avoid war if possible, 440; addresses Congress, announcing break with Germany, 441, 442; his appeal to neutrals, 445; determined not to yield to Swiss-German move to re-establish diplomatic relations with Germany, 447; sends note to Vienna asking position of Austria on submarine warfare, 450; as to his 'drifting' policy, 451; asks Congress for powers enabling him to arm merchant ships, 454, 455; his statement on 'a little group of wilful men,' 457, 458; arms merchantmen by executive authority, 458; irritation at his delay to declare war, 458-62; wants opinion of Cabinet, but tells Cabinet nothing, 461, 462; advised by Cabinet to call Congress April 2 instead of April 16, 461; calls Congress for April 2, 461; struggles with his conscience, 462; source of House's influence over, 463; consults with House as to message, 464-68; put in the proper frame of mind for war by House, 464, 465; his address to Congress (April 2, 1917), 468, 469; his movements on the day of the address, 469, 470; compared by House to Mazzini, 470; wherein the greatness of his address to Congress lies, 470, 471; engages in war to ensure peace, 471, 472.

Letter: to McCombs, April 22, 1916, II, 349.

Wilson, Mrs. Woodrow (Ellen Louise Axson), anxiety of, after attempted assassination of Roosevelt, I, 80; has conversation with House on cabinet appointments, 103; her death, 117.

Wilson, Mrs. Woodrow (Mrs. Edith B. Galt), II, 199, 232, 380, 440, 456, 465, 467, 470.

Wilson, W. B., appointed Secretary of Labor, I, 106, 113.

Winslow, Lanier, attaché in Berlin, on Berlin opinion in regard to Mexico, I, 220; on effect of American note on German Foreign Office, 396; on the German system of espionage, 397.

Wiseman, Sir William, a natural diplomat, II, 399; convinced of need of intimate understanding between Great Britain and United States, 399; sees danger in crushing defeat of Germany, 399; and House, mutual comprehension of, 399, 400; thinks Allies should not give cate-

- gorical refusal to German peace note, 399, 400; confidential intermediary between House and Spring-Rice, 400; communicates to Foreign Office information from House, 400; wishes to find what is in German mind regarding peace, 401; on belligerents' state of mind, 409; gets opinion of Allied group on Wilson's address to the Senate (Jan. 22, 1917), 419-21; reports unusual activity in German and Austrian circles, 434, 435; advises retention of Tarnowski, 449.
- Women's Peace Conference, II, 94.
- Wood, Leonard, I, 247; apostle of 'preparedness,' 296; his views of country's condition, 297; desires to go to war zone, 298, 299; II, 20; receptive on matter of necessity of reserve force, I, 298; investigates report of German foundations for great guns, 299; criticized in some quarters for attitude on preparedness, 301; gives information on Plattsburgh, II, 20; recommends modified Swiss system, 20; should be used conspicuously, 232.
- Wood, Mrs. Leonard, I, 298.
- Woods, Arthur, Police Commissioner of New York, II, 34, 35, 443.
- Woolley, Robert, II, 344, 351, 360, 381.
- Wordsworth, William, Wilson reads poems of, aloud, I, 120; House and Grey talk about, 371.
- Workman's Compensation Act, II, 344.
- Wynne, Colonel, candidate for nomination for Governorship of Texas, I, 32, 33.
- Zeppelins, II, 95, 143.
- Zimmermann, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, meeting of, with Gerard, I, 186; at Kaiser's luncheon, 253, 254, 257; Gerard gets along well with, 347; thinks Germans and Irish in America will start a revolution, 355; hopes that House will come to Berlin, 391; House has conferences with, 400-03; II, 144, 147; shows Gerard Dumba's message with regard to Bryan's alleged remark on *Lusitania* note, I, 451; pleased with tone of *Lusitania* note, II, 13; his attitude on submarine murder, 23; insists sinking of *Lusitania* justified, 206; in German plot for German-Mexican alliance, 451-54; his downfall, 454.
- Letters:* to House, Aug. 1, 1914, I, 279; Dec. 3, 339; Feb. 4, 1915, I, 370; March 2, 391; Jan. 29, 1916, II, 207.
- Zita, wife of Emperor Carl, II, 424.

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